From 9b8ff687ae751f185f7df5bf2201d66b0afab30b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mhaag-spl <5632822+MHaggis@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 2021 12:31:33 -0600
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] HaagRoast

---
 ...incipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.yml | 92 +++++++++++++++++
 ...ceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.yml | 99 +++++++++++++++++++
 macros/process_setspn.yml                     |  3 +
 ...alnames_discovery_with_powershell.test.yml | 12 +++
 ...ncipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.test.yml | 12 +++
 5 files changed, 218 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 detections/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.yml
 create mode 100644 detections/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.yml
 create mode 100644 macros/process_setspn.yml
 create mode 100644 tests/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.test.yml
 create mode 100644 tests/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.test.yml

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0bb8fcebff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+name: ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell
+id: 13243068-2d38-11ec-8908-acde48001122
+version: 1
+date: '2021-10-14'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: TTP
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
+description: 'The following analytic identifies `powershell.exe` usage, using Script Block Logging EventCode 4104, related to querying the domain for Service Principle Names. typically, this is a precursor activity related to kerberoasting or the silver ticket attack. \
+  
+  What is a ServicePrincipleName? \
+
+  A service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. This allows a client application to request that the service authenticate an account even if the client does not have the account name.\
+
+  The following analytic identifies the use of KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class within the script block. Using .NET System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class in PowerShell is the equivelant of using setspn.exe. \
+  
+  During triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity.'
+search: '`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message="*KerberosRequestorSecurityToken*" 
+  | stats count min(_time)
+      as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode 
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+  | `serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.
+known_false_positives: False positives should be limited, however filter as needed.
+references:
+  - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ad/service-principal-names
+  - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.identitymodel.tokens.kerberosrequestorsecuritytoken?view=netframework-4.8
+  - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting
+  - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/setspn.exe-5C184D581524245DAD7A0A02B51FD2C2.html
+  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/
+  - https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spn-setspn-syntax.aspx
+  - https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/
+  - https://blog.zsec.uk/paving-2-da-wholeset/
+  - https://msitpros.com/?p=3113
+  - https://adsecurity.org/?p=3466
+  - https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.
+  - https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63
+  - https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf
+  - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Active Directory Discovery
+  - Lateral Movement
+  dataset: []
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Lateral Movement
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1558.003
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  required_fields:
+    - _time
+    - Processes.dest
+    - Processes.user
+    - Processes.parent_process_name #parent process name
+    - Processes.parent_process #parent cmdline
+    - Processes.original_file_name
+    - Processes.process_name #process name
+    - Processes.process #process cmdline
+    - Processes.process_id
+    - Processes.parent_process_path
+    - Processes.process_path
+    - Processes.parent_process_id
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  impact: 80
+  confidence: 100
+  # (impact * confidence)/100
+  risk_score: 80
+  context:
+  - Source:Endpoint
+  - Stage:Credential Access
+  message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to identify service principle names.
+  observable:
+  - name: user
+    type: User
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  - name: dest
+    type: Hostname
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  - name: parent_process_name
+    type: Parent Process
+    role:
+    - Parent Process
+  - name: process_name
+    type: Process
+    role:
+    - Child Process
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/detections/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.yml b/detections/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e9b159accb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/detections/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+name: ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN
+id: ae8b3efc-2d2e-11ec-8b57-acde48001122
+version: 1
+date: '2021-10-14'
+author: Michael Haag, Splunk
+type: TTP
+datamodel:
+- Endpoint
+description: 'The following analytic identifies `setspn.exe` usage related to querying the domain for Service Principle Names. typically, this is a precursor activity related to kerberoasting or the silver ticket attack. \
+  
+  What is a ServicePrincipleName? \
+
+  A service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. This allows a client application to request that the service authenticate an account even if the client does not have the account name.\
+
+  Example usage includes the following \
+
+  1. setspn -T offense -Q */*
+  1. setspn -T attackrange.local -F -Q MSSQLSvc/*
+  1. setspn -Q */* > allspns.txt
+  1. setspn -q \
+
+  Values \
+
+  1. -F = perform queries at the forest, rather than domain level
+  1. -T = perform query on the specified domain or forest (when -F is also used)
+  1. -Q = query for existence of SPN \
+
+  During triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity.'
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_setspn`
+  (Processes.process="*-t*" AND Processes.process="*-f*") OR (Processes.process="*-q*" AND Processes.process="**/**") OR (Processes.process="*-q*") OR (Processes.process="*-s*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name
+  Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
+known_false_positives: False positives may be caused by Administrators resetting SPNs or querying for SPNs. Filter as needed. 
+references:
+  - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ad/service-principal-names
+  - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting
+  - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/setspn.exe-5C184D581524245DAD7A0A02B51FD2C2.html
+  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/
+  - https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spn-setspn-syntax.aspx
+  - https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/
+  - https://blog.zsec.uk/paving-2-da-wholeset/
+  - https://msitpros.com/?p=3113
+  - https://adsecurity.org/?p=3466
+tags:
+  analytic_story:
+  - Active Directory Discovery
+  - Lateral Movement
+  dataset: []
+  kill_chain_phases:
+  - Lateral Movement
+  mitre_attack_id:
+  - T1558.003
+  product:
+  - Splunk Enterprise
+  - Splunk Enterprise Security
+  - Splunk Cloud
+  required_fields:
+    - _time
+    - Processes.dest
+    - Processes.user
+    - Processes.parent_process_name #parent process name
+    - Processes.parent_process #parent cmdline
+    - Processes.original_file_name
+    - Processes.process_name #process name
+    - Processes.process #process cmdline
+    - Processes.process_id
+    - Processes.parent_process_path
+    - Processes.process_path
+    - Processes.parent_process_id
+  security_domain: endpoint
+  impact: 80
+  confidence: 100
+  # (impact * confidence)/100
+  risk_score: 80
+  context:
+  - Source:Endpoint
+  - Stage:Credential Access
+  message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to identify service principle names.
+  observable:
+  - name: user
+    type: User
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  - name: dest
+    type: Hostname
+    role:
+    - Victim
+  - name: parent_process_name
+    type: Parent Process
+    role:
+    - Parent Process
+  - name: process_name
+    type: Process
+    role:
+    - Child Process
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/macros/process_setspn.yml b/macros/process_setspn.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9c840ca5a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/macros/process_setspn.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+definition: (Processes.process_name=setspn.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=setspn.exe)
+description: Matches the process with its original file name, data for this macro came from https://strontic.github.io/
+name: process_setspn
diff --git a/tests/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.test.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..305b968da4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.test.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+name: ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell
+  file: endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  latest_time: 'now'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: windows-powershell_kerberos.log
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/atomic_red_team/windows-powershell_kerberos.log
+    source: WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational
+    sourcetype: wineventlog
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/tests/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.test.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d094d7ebe1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.test.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+name: ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN Unit Test
+tests:
+- name: ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN
+  file: endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.yml
+  pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0'
+  earliest_time: '-24h'
+  latest_time: 'now'
+  attack_data:
+  - file_name: windows-sysmon_setspn.log
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_setspn.log
+    source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
+    sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
\ No newline at end of file

From 611e8b95958b28c3a491ae8d7b179f6a45e2b653 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: root <root@ip-10-0-146-177>
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 2021 19:25:19 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] Added detection testing service results
 inServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell

---
 ...incipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.yml | 92 ++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.yml b/detections/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.yml
index 0bb8fcebff..33bf966efe 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell.yml
@@ -6,43 +6,52 @@ author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: TTP
 datamodel:
 - Endpoint
-description: 'The following analytic identifies `powershell.exe` usage, using Script Block Logging EventCode 4104, related to querying the domain for Service Principle Names. typically, this is a precursor activity related to kerberoasting or the silver ticket attack. \
-  
+description: 'The following analytic identifies `powershell.exe` usage, using Script
+  Block Logging EventCode 4104, related to querying the domain for Service Principle
+  Names. typically, this is a precursor activity related to kerberoasting or the silver
+  ticket attack. \
+
   What is a ServicePrincipleName? \
 
-  A service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. This allows a client application to request that the service authenticate an account even if the client does not have the account name.\
+  A service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs
+  are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service
+  logon account. This allows a client application to request that the service authenticate
+  an account even if the client does not have the account name.\
+
+  The following analytic identifies the use of KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class
+  within the script block. Using .NET System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken
+  class in PowerShell is the equivelant of using setspn.exe. \
 
-  The following analytic identifies the use of KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class within the script block. Using .NET System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class in PowerShell is the equivelant of using setspn.exe. \
-  
   During triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity.'
-search: '`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message="*KerberosRequestorSecurityToken*" 
-  | stats count min(_time)
-      as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName User EventCode 
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
-  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+search: '`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message="*KerberosRequestorSecurityToken*" |
+  stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Message OpCode ComputerName
+  User EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
   | `serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell_filter`'
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable
+  PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here
+  https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.
 known_false_positives: False positives should be limited, however filter as needed.
 references:
-  - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ad/service-principal-names
-  - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.identitymodel.tokens.kerberosrequestorsecuritytoken?view=netframework-4.8
-  - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting
-  - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/setspn.exe-5C184D581524245DAD7A0A02B51FD2C2.html
-  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/
-  - https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spn-setspn-syntax.aspx
-  - https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/
-  - https://blog.zsec.uk/paving-2-da-wholeset/
-  - https://msitpros.com/?p=3113
-  - https://adsecurity.org/?p=3466
-  - https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.
-  - https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63
-  - https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf
-  - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/
+- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ad/service-principal-names
+- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.identitymodel.tokens.kerberosrequestorsecuritytoken?view=netframework-4.8
+- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting
+- https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/setspn.exe-5C184D581524245DAD7A0A02B51FD2C2.html
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/
+- https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spn-setspn-syntax.aspx
+- https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/
+- https://blog.zsec.uk/paving-2-da-wholeset/
+- https://msitpros.com/?p=3113
+- https://adsecurity.org/?p=3466
+- https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.
+- https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63
+- https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf
+- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Active Directory Discovery
   - Lateral Movement
-  dataset: []
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/atomic_red_team/windows-powershell_kerberos.log
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Lateral Movement
   mitre_attack_id:
@@ -52,27 +61,27 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   required_fields:
-    - _time
-    - Processes.dest
-    - Processes.user
-    - Processes.parent_process_name #parent process name
-    - Processes.parent_process #parent cmdline
-    - Processes.original_file_name
-    - Processes.process_name #process name
-    - Processes.process #process cmdline
-    - Processes.process_id
-    - Processes.parent_process_path
-    - Processes.process_path
-    - Processes.parent_process_id
+  - _time
+  - Processes.dest
+  - Processes.user
+  - Processes.parent_process_name
+  - Processes.parent_process
+  - Processes.original_file_name
+  - Processes.process_name
+  - Processes.process
+  - Processes.process_id
+  - Processes.parent_process_path
+  - Processes.process_path
+  - Processes.parent_process_id
   security_domain: endpoint
   impact: 80
   confidence: 100
-  # (impact * confidence)/100
   risk_score: 80
   context:
   - Source:Endpoint
   - Stage:Credential Access
-  message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to identify service principle names.
+  message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified
+    on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to identify service principle names.
   observable:
   - name: user
     type: User
@@ -89,4 +98,5 @@ tags:
   - name: process_name
     type: Process
     role:
-    - Child Process
\ No newline at end of file
+    - Child Process
+  automated_detection_testing: passed

From d16e2b2829b7ef2c9c63ba2b3031d438c2eb5269 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: root <root@ip-10-0-146-71>
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 2021 19:26:26 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Added detection testing service results
 inServicePrincipalNames Discovery with SetSPN

---
 ...ceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.yml | 96 ++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)

diff --git a/detections/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.yml b/detections/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.yml
index e9b159accb..fe414f47d2 100644
--- a/detections/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.yml
+++ b/detections/endpoint/serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn.yml
@@ -6,50 +6,59 @@ author: Michael Haag, Splunk
 type: TTP
 datamodel:
 - Endpoint
-description: 'The following analytic identifies `setspn.exe` usage related to querying the domain for Service Principle Names. typically, this is a precursor activity related to kerberoasting or the silver ticket attack. \
-  
+description: 'The following analytic identifies `setspn.exe` usage related to querying
+  the domain for Service Principle Names. typically, this is a precursor activity
+  related to kerberoasting or the silver ticket attack. \
+
   What is a ServicePrincipleName? \
 
-  A service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service logon account. This allows a client application to request that the service authenticate an account even if the client does not have the account name.\
+  A service principal name (SPN) is a unique identifier of a service instance. SPNs
+  are used by Kerberos authentication to associate a service instance with a service
+  logon account. This allows a client application to request that the service authenticate
+  an account even if the client does not have the account name.\
 
   Example usage includes the following \
 
-  1. setspn -T offense -Q */*
-  1. setspn -T attackrange.local -F -Q MSSQLSvc/*
-  1. setspn -Q */* > allspns.txt
-  1. setspn -q \
+  1. setspn -T offense -Q */* 1. setspn -T attackrange.local -F -Q MSSQLSvc/* 1. setspn
+  -Q */* > allspns.txt 1. setspn -q \
 
   Values \
 
-  1. -F = perform queries at the forest, rather than domain level
-  1. -T = perform query on the specified domain or forest (when -F is also used)
-  1. -Q = query for existence of SPN \
+  1. -F = perform queries at the forest, rather than domain level 1. -T = perform
+  query on the specified domain or forest (when -F is also used) 1. -Q = query for
+  existence of SPN \
 
   During triage, review parallel processes for further suspicious activity.'
 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_setspn`
-  (Processes.process="*-t*" AND Processes.process="*-f*") OR (Processes.process="*-q*" AND Processes.process="**/**") OR (Processes.process="*-q*") OR (Processes.process="*-s*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name
-  Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
-  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
-  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn_filter`'
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
-known_false_positives: False positives may be caused by Administrators resetting SPNs or querying for SPNs. Filter as needed. 
+  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_setspn` (Processes.process="*-t*"
+  AND Processes.process="*-f*") OR (Processes.process="*-q*" AND Processes.process="**/**")
+  OR (Processes.process="*-q*") OR (Processes.process="*-s*") by Processes.dest Processes.user
+  Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name
+  Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
+  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`| `serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_setspn_filter`'
+how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
+  on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
+  your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition,
+  confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the
+  endpoint product.
+known_false_positives: False positives may be caused by Administrators resetting SPNs
+  or querying for SPNs. Filter as needed.
 references:
-  - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ad/service-principal-names
-  - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting
-  - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/setspn.exe-5C184D581524245DAD7A0A02B51FD2C2.html
-  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/
-  - https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spn-setspn-syntax.aspx
-  - https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/
-  - https://blog.zsec.uk/paving-2-da-wholeset/
-  - https://msitpros.com/?p=3113
-  - https://adsecurity.org/?p=3466
+- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ad/service-principal-names
+- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting
+- https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/setspn.exe-5C184D581524245DAD7A0A02B51FD2C2.html
+- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/
+- https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spn-setspn-syntax.aspx
+- https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/
+- https://blog.zsec.uk/paving-2-da-wholeset/
+- https://msitpros.com/?p=3113
+- https://adsecurity.org/?p=3466
 tags:
   analytic_story:
   - Active Directory Discovery
   - Lateral Movement
-  dataset: []
+  dataset:
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558.003/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon_setspn.log
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Lateral Movement
   mitre_attack_id:
@@ -59,27 +68,27 @@ tags:
   - Splunk Enterprise Security
   - Splunk Cloud
   required_fields:
-    - _time
-    - Processes.dest
-    - Processes.user
-    - Processes.parent_process_name #parent process name
-    - Processes.parent_process #parent cmdline
-    - Processes.original_file_name
-    - Processes.process_name #process name
-    - Processes.process #process cmdline
-    - Processes.process_id
-    - Processes.parent_process_path
-    - Processes.process_path
-    - Processes.parent_process_id
+  - _time
+  - Processes.dest
+  - Processes.user
+  - Processes.parent_process_name
+  - Processes.parent_process
+  - Processes.original_file_name
+  - Processes.process_name
+  - Processes.process
+  - Processes.process_id
+  - Processes.parent_process_path
+  - Processes.process_path
+  - Processes.parent_process_id
   security_domain: endpoint
   impact: 80
   confidence: 100
-  # (impact * confidence)/100
   risk_score: 80
   context:
   - Source:Endpoint
   - Stage:Credential Access
-  message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to identify service principle names.
+  message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified
+    on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to identify service principle names.
   observable:
   - name: user
     type: User
@@ -96,4 +105,5 @@ tags:
   - name: process_name
     type: Process
     role:
-    - Child Process
\ No newline at end of file
+    - Child Process
+  automated_detection_testing: passed