diff --git a/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml b/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml index d6f1b914d4..b954523f7b 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/attempted_credential_dump_from_registry_via_reg_exe.yml @@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ references: [] tags: analytic_story: - Credential Dumping - - DarkSide Ransomware asset_type: Endpoint automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/bitsadmin_download_file.yml b/detections/endpoint/bitsadmin_download_file.yml index e63975b329..b25ad8dd5a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/bitsadmin_download_file.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/bitsadmin_download_file.yml @@ -38,7 +38,6 @@ tags: analytic_story: - Ingress Tool Transfer - BITS Jobs - - DarkSide Ransomware automated_detection_testing: passed dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1197/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/detections/endpoint/certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments.yml b/detections/endpoint/certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments.yml index 2ec1788a60..87fbbfd62a 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/certutil_download_with_urlcache_and_split_arguments.yml @@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Ingress Tool Transfer - - DarkSide Ransomware automated_detection_testing: passed dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/detections/endpoint/certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments.yml b/detections/endpoint/certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments.yml index 90045fc832..7c58bc5d30 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/certutil_download_with_verifyctl_and_split_arguments.yml @@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ references: tags: analytic_story: - Ingress Tool Transfer - - DarkSide Ransomware automated_detection_testing: passed dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1105/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log diff --git a/detections/endpoint/cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.yml b/detections/endpoint/cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.yml index 53d47f3a4a..8843771b28 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass.yml @@ -6,6 +6,16 @@ author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk type: batch datamodel: - Endpoint +<<<<<<< HEAD +description: This search is to detect a potential process using COM Object like CMLUA or CMSTPLUA + to bypassed UAC. This technique used by ransomware to gain administrative privileges to its running process. +search: '`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded IN ("*\\CMLUA.dll", "*\\CMSTPLUA.dll", "*\\CMLUAUTIL.dll") NOT(process_name IN("CMSTP.exe", "CMMGR32.exe")) + NOT(Image IN("*\\windows\\*", "*\\program files\\*")) + | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId + | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` + | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` + | `cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass_filter`' +======= description: This search is to detect a potential process using COM Object like CMLUA or CMSTPLUA to bypassed UAC. This technique used by ransomware to gain administrative privileges to its running process. @@ -14,6 +24,7 @@ search: '`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded IN ("*\\CMLUA.dll", | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded process_name Computer EventCode Signed ProcessId | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass_filter`' +>>>>>>> 82f9a5f69d687907e6c5b04ca10fcf2458fdf578 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. diff --git a/detections/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml b/detections/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml index 567c7f6913..02658570ca 100644 --- a/detections/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml +++ b/detections/endpoint/detect_mimikatz_using_loaded_images.yml @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ tags: - Credential Dumping - Detect Zerologon Attack - Cloud Federated Credential Abuse - - DarkSide Ransomware asset_type: Windows automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: diff --git a/detections/endpoint/multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml b/detections/endpoint/multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 3ba03e214a..0000000000 --- a/detections/endpoint/multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,60 +0,0 @@ -name: Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos -id: 98f22d82-9d62-11eb-9fcf-acde48001122 -version: 1 -date: '2021-04-14' -author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk -type: batch -datamodel: -- Endpoint -description: 'The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate - with multiple disabled domain users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could - represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory - environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers - progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may - execute a password spraying attack against disabled users. Event 4768 is generated every time - the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code `0x12` stands for - `clients credentials have been revoked` (account disabled, expired or locked out).\ - - The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages - the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, - users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. - This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ - - This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ - - The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts.' -search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 Account_Name!="*$" Result_Code=0x12 - | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Account_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) - as tried_accounts by _time, Client_Address | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as - comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Client_Address | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) - | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) - | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter` ' -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting - Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting - `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. -known_false_positives: A host failing to authenticate with multiple disabled domain - users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios - include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, multi-user systems missconfigured systems. -references: -- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/ -tags: - analytic_story: - - Active Directory Password Spraying - kill_chain_phases: - - Exploitation - mitre_attack_id: - - T1110.003 - product: - - Splunk Enterprise - - Splunk Enterprise Security - - Splunk Cloud - required_fields: - - _time - - EventCode - - Result_Code - - Account_Name - - Client_Address - security_domain: endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_disabled_users_kerberos/windows-security.log diff --git a/detections/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml b/detections/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml deleted file mode 100644 index cb357e355b..0000000000 --- a/detections/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,60 +0,0 @@ -name: Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos -id: 001266a6-9d5b-11eb-829b-acde48001122 -version: 1 -date: '2021-04-14' -author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk -type: batch -datamodel: -- Endpoint -description: 'The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate - with multiple invalid domain users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could - represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory - environment using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers - progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may - execute a password spraying attack using an invalid list of users. Event 4768 is generated - every time the Key Distribution Center issues a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). - Failure code 0x6 stands for `client not found in Kerberos database` (the attempted user is not a valid domain user).\ - - The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages - the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, - users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. - This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ - - This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ - - The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts.' -search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 Result_Code=0x6 Account_Name!="*$" - | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Account_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) - as tried_accounts by _time, Client_Address | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as - comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Client_Address | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) - | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) - | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter` ' -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting - Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting - `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. -known_false_positives: A host failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain - users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios - include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, multi-user systems and missconfigured systems. -references: -- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/ -tags: - analytic_story: - - Active Directory Password Spraying - kill_chain_phases: - - Exploitation - mitre_attack_id: - - T1110.003 - product: - - Splunk Enterprise - - Splunk Enterprise Security - - Splunk Cloud - required_fields: - - _time - - EventCode - - Result_Code - - Account_Name - - Client_Address - security_domain: endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_invalid_users_kerberos/windows-security.log diff --git a/detections/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.yml b/detections/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 2ae0ec1b18..0000000000 --- a/detections/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,60 +0,0 @@ -name: Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM -id: 57ad5a64-9df7-11eb-a290-acde48001122 -version: 1 -date: '2021-04-15' -author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk -type: batch -datamodel: -- Endpoint -description: 'The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate with multiple invalid users using the NTLM protocol. - This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment using NTLM to obtain - initial access or elevate privileges. As attackers progress in a breach, mistakes will be made. In certain scenarios, adversaries may execute a password spraying attack using an invalid list of users. - Event 4776 is generated on the computer that is authoritative for the provided credentials. For domain accounts, the domain controller is authoritative. - For local accounts, the local computer is authoritative. Error code 0xC0000064 stands for `The username you typed does not exist` (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\ - - The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages - the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, - users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. - This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ - - This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ - - The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source workstation name and attempted user accounts.' -search: ' `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4776 Logon_Account!="*$" 0xC0000064 action=failure - | bucket span=2m _time - | stats dc(Logon_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Logon_Account) as tried_accounts by _time, Source_Workstation - | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Source_Workstation - | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) - | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) - | search isOutlier=1 - | `multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter`' -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Credential - Validation' within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. -known_false_positives: A host failing to authenticate with multiple invalid domain users is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios - include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. If this detection triggers on a host other than a Domain Controller, the behavior could - represent a password spraying attack against the host's local accounts. -references: -- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/ -- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-credential-validation -- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4776 -tags: - analytic_story: - - Active Directory Password Spraying - kill_chain_phases: - - Exploitation - mitre_attack_id: - - T1110.003 - product: - - Splunk Enterprise - - Splunk Enterprise Security - - Splunk Cloud - required_fields: - - _time - - EventCode - - action - - Logon_Account - - Source_Workstation - security_domain: endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_invalid_users_ntlm/windows-security.log diff --git a/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials.yml b/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 8999955b61..0000000000 --- a/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,61 +0,0 @@ -name: Multiple Users Attempting To Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials -id: e61918fa-9ca4-11eb-836c-acde48001122 -version: 1 -date: '2021-04-13' -author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk -type: batch -datamodel: -- Endpoint -description: 'The following analytic identifies a source user failing to authenticate with multiple users using explicit credentials on a host. - This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. - Event 4648 is generated when a process attempts an account logon by explicitly specifying that accounts credentials. This event generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations.\ - - The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages - the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, - users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. - This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ - - This detection will trigger on the potenfially malicious host, perhaps controlled via a trojan or operated by an insider threat, from where a password spraying attack is being executed.\ - - The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source account, attempted user accounts and the endpoint were the behavior was identified.' -search: ' `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4648 - | bucket span=2m _time - | eval Source_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 0) - | eval Destination_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 1) - | search Source_Account != "*$" Source_Account !="-" Destination_Account !="*$" - | stats dc(Destination_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Destination_Account) as tried_account by _time, ComputerName, Source_Account - | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by ComputerName - | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) - | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) - | search isOutlier=1 - | `multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials_filter` ' -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers as - well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled. -known_false_positives: A source user failing attempting to authenticate multiple users on a host is not a common behavior for regular systems. - Some applications, however, may exhibit this behavior in which case sets of users hosts can be added to an allow list. - Possible false positive scenarios include systems where several users connect to like Mail servers, identity providers, remote desktop services, Citrix, etc. -references: -- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/ -- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4648 -- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-logon-events -tags: - analytic_story: - - Active Directory Password Spraying - kill_chain_phases: - - Exploitation - mitre_attack_id: - - T1110.003 - product: - - Splunk Enterprise - - Splunk Enterprise Security - - Splunk Cloud - required_fields: - - _time - - EventCode - - Security_ID - - Account_Name - - ComputerName - security_domain: endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_explicit_credential_spray/windows-security.log diff --git a/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml b/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml deleted file mode 100644 index e5cf6b75a4..0000000000 --- a/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,61 +0,0 @@ -name: Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos -id: 3a91a212-98a9-11eb-b86a-acde48001122 -version: 1 -date: '2021-04-08' -author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk -type: batch -datamodel: -- Endpoint -description: 'The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate - with multiple valid users using the Kerberos protocol. This behavior could represent - an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment - using Kerberos to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4771 is generated when - the Key Distribution Center fails to issue a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Failure code - 0x18 stands for `wrong password provided` (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\ - - The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages - the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, - users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. - This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ - - This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ - - The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source ip and attempted user accounts.' -search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4771 Failure_Code=0x18 Account_Name!="*$" - | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Account_Name) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) - as tried_accounts by _time, Client_Address | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as - comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Client_Address | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) - | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) - | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos_filter`' -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting - Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting - `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. -known_false_positives: A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid domain users - is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios - include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, missconfigured systems and - multi-user systems like Citrix farms. -references: -- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/ -- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn319109(v=ws.11) -- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4771 -tags: - analytic_story: - - Active Directory Password Spraying - kill_chain_phases: - - Exploitation - mitre_attack_id: - - T1110.003 - product: - - Splunk Enterprise - - Splunk Enterprise Security - - Splunk Cloud - required_fields: - - _time - - EventCode - - Result_Code - - Account_Name - - Client_Address - security_domain: endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_valid_users_kerberos/windows-security.log diff --git a/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.yml b/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.yml deleted file mode 100644 index e58c223ac8..0000000000 --- a/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,64 +0,0 @@ -name: Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM -id: 7ed272a4-9c77-11eb-af22-acde48001122 -version: 1 -date: '2021-04-13' -author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk -type: batch -datamodel: -- Endpoint -description: 'The following analytic identifies one source endpoint failing to authenticate - with multiple valid users using the NTLM protocol. This behavior could represent - an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment - using NTLM to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4776 is generated on the - computer that is authoritative for - the provided credentials. For domain accounts, the domain controller is authoritative. - For local accounts, the local computer is authoritative. Error code 0xC000006A means: - misspelled or bad password (the attempted user is a legitimate domain user).\ - - The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages - the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, - users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. - This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ - - This detection will only trigger on domain controllers, not on member servers or workstations.\ - - The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source workstation name and attempted user accounts.' -search: ' `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4776 Logon_Account!="*$" 0xC000006A action=failure - | bucket span=2m _time | stats dc(Logon_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Logon_Account) - as tried_accounts by _time, Source_Workstation | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) - as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Source_Workstation | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) - | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) - | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm_filter`' -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting - Domain Controller events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Credential - Validation` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled. -known_false_positives: A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid domain users - is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. Possible false positive scenarios - include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. - If this detection triggers on a host other than a Domain Controller, the behavior - could represent a password spraying attack against the host's local accounts. -references: -- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/ -- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-credential-validation -- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4776 -tags: - analytic_story: - - Active Directory Password Spraying - kill_chain_phases: - - Exploitation - mitre_attack_id: - - T1110.003 - product: - - Splunk Enterprise - - Splunk Enterprise Security - - Splunk Cloud - required_fields: - - _time - - EventCode - - action - - Logon_Account - - Source_Workstation - security_domain: endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_valid_users_ntlm/windows-security.log diff --git a/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process.yml b/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process.yml deleted file mode 100644 index cd6474499d..0000000000 --- a/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,70 +0,0 @@ -name: Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process -id: 9015385a-9c84-11eb-bef2-acde48001122 -version: 1 -date: '2021-04-13' -author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk -type: batch -datamodel: -- Endpoint -description: 'The following analytic identifies a source process name failing to authenticate - with multiple users. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password - Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access - or elevate privileges. Event 4625 generates - on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations when an account fails to logon. Logon Type 2 describes - an iteractive logon attempt.\ - - The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages - the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, - users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. - This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ - - This detection will trigger on the potenfially malicious host, perhaps controlled - via a trojan or operated by an insider threat, from where a password spraying attack - is being executed. This could be a domain controller as well as a member server - or workstation.\ - - The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source process name, source account and attempted user - accounts.' -search: ' `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=2 Caller_Process_Name!="-" - | bucket span=2m _time | eval Source_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 0) | eval Destination_Account - = mvindex(Account_Name, 1) | stats dc(Destination_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) - as tried_accounts by _time, Caller_Process_Name, Source_Account, ComputerName | - eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std - by Caller_Process_Name, Source_Account, ComputerName | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) - | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) - | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process_filter` ' -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting - Windows Event Logs from domain controllers aas well as member servers and workstations. - The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs - to be enabled. -known_false_positives: A process failing to authenticate with multiple users is not - a common behavior for legitimate user sessions. Possible false positive scenarios - include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems. -references: -- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/ -- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4625 -- https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4625 -- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-logon-events -tags: - analytic_story: - - Active Directory Password Spraying - kill_chain_phases: - - Exploitation - mitre_attack_id: - - T1110.003 - product: - - Splunk Enterprise - - Splunk Enterprise Security - - Splunk Cloud - required_fields: - - _time - - EventCode - - Logon_Type - - Caller_Process_Name - - Security_ID - - Account_Name - - ComputerName - security_domain: endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_multiple_users_from_process/windows-security.log diff --git a/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host.yml b/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 0dcf433565..0000000000 --- a/detections/endpoint/multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,62 +0,0 @@ -name: Multiple Users Remotely Failing To Authenticate From Host -id: 80f9d53e-9ca1-11eb-b0d6-acde48001122 -version: 1 -date: '2021-04-13' -author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk -type: batch -datamodel: -- Endpoint -description: The following analytic identifies a source host failing to authenticate against a remote host with multiple users. This behavior could represent an adversary - performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. - Event 4625 documents each and every failed attempt to logon to the local computer. This event generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations. Logon Type 3 - describes an remote authentication attempt.\ - - The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages - the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, - users can try different combinations of the `bucket` span time and the calculation of the `upperBound` field. - This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.\ - - This detection will trigger on the host that is the target of the password spraying attack. This could be a domain controller as well as a member server or workstation.\ - - The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source process name, source account and attempted user accounts. -search: ' `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=3 Source_Network_Address!="-" - | bucket span=2m _time - | eval Destination_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 1) - | stats dc(Destination_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Destination_Account) as tried_accounts by _time, Source_Network_Address, ComputerName - | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Source_Network_Address, ComputerName - | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) - | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) - | search isOutlier=1 - | `multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_filter` ' -how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers as - as well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled. -known_false_positives: A host failing to authenticate with multiple valid users against a remote host is not a common behavior for legitimate systems. - Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners, remote administration tools, missconfigyred systems, etc. -references: -- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/ -- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4625 -- https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4625 -- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/basic-audit-logon-events -tags: - analytic_story: - - Active Directory Password Spraying - kill_chain_phases: - - Exploitation - mitre_attack_id: - - T1110.003 - product: - - Splunk Enterprise - - Splunk Enterprise Security - - Splunk Cloud - required_fields: - - _time - - EventCode - - Logon_Type - - Security_ID - - Account_Name - - ComputerName - - Source_Network_Address - security_domain: endpoint - automated_detection_testing: passed - dataset: - - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_remote_spray/windows-security.log diff --git a/dist/escu/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv b/dist/escu/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv index 5347a9e765..0717cbc6ba 100644 --- a/dist/escu/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv +++ b/dist/escu/lookups/mitre_enrichment.csv @@ -1,182 +1,59 @@ mitre_id,technique,tactics,groups -T1553.006,Code Signing Policy Modification,Defense Evasion,Turla|APT39 -T1614,System Location Discovery,Discovery,no -T1613,Container and Resource Discovery,Discovery,no -T1552.007,Container API,Credential Access,no -T1612,Build Image on Host,Defense Evasion,no -T1611,Escape to Host,Privilege Escalation,no -T1204.003,Malicious Image,Execution,no -T1053.007,Container Orchestration Job,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1610,Deploy Container,Defense Evasion|Execution,no -T1609,Container Administration Command,Execution,no -T1608.005,Link Target,Resource Development,Silent Librarian -T1608.004,Drive-by Target,Resource Development,APT32|Threat Group-3390 -T1608.003,Install Digital Certificate,Resource Development,no -T1608.002,Upload Tool,Resource Development,Threat Group-3390 -T1608.001,Upload Malware,Resource Development,APT32 -T1608,Stage Capabilities,Resource Development,no -T1016.001,Internet Connection Discovery,Discovery,APT29|UNC2452|Turla -T1553.005,Mark-of-the-Web Bypass,Defense Evasion,TA505 -T1555.005,Password Managers,Credential Access,Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao -T1484.002,Domain Trust Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT29|UNC2452 -T1484.001,Group Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Indrik Spider -T1547.014,Active Setup,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1606.002,SAML Tokens,Credential Access,APT29|UNC2452 -T1606.001,Web Cookies,Credential Access,APT29|UNC2452 -T1606,Forge Web Credentials,Credential Access,no -T1555.004,Windows Credential Manager,Credential Access,Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Turla -T1059.008,Network Device CLI,Execution,no -T1602.002,Network Device Configuration Dump,Collection,no -T1542.005,TFTP Boot,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no -T1542.004,ROMMONkit,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no -T1602.001,SNMP (MIB Dump),Collection,no -T1602,Data from Configuration Repository,Collection,no -T1601.002,Downgrade System Image,Defense Evasion,no -T1601.001,Patch System Image,Defense Evasion,no -T1601,Modify System Image,Defense Evasion,no -T1600.002,Disable Crypto Hardware,Defense Evasion,no -T1600.001,Reduce Key Space,Defense Evasion,no -T1600,Weaken Encryption,Defense Evasion,no -T1556.004,Network Device Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence,no -T1599.001,Network Address Translation Traversal,Defense Evasion,no -T1599,Network Boundary Bridging,Defense Evasion,no -T1020.001,Traffic Duplication,Exfiltration,no -T1557.002,ARP Cache Poisoning,Credential Access|Collection,Cleaver -T1588.006,Vulnerabilities,Resource Development,Sandworm Team -T1053.006,Systemd Timers,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1562.008,Disable Cloud Logs,Defense Evasion,no -T1547.012,Print Processors,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1598.003,Spearphishing Link,Reconnaissance,Silent Librarian|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|APT32|Kimsuky -T1598.002,Spearphishing Attachment,Reconnaissance,Sidewinder -T1598.001,Spearphishing Service,Reconnaissance,no -T1598,Phishing for Information,Reconnaissance,ZIRCONIUM|APT28 -T1597.002,Purchase Technical Data,Reconnaissance,no -T1597.001,Threat Intel Vendors,Reconnaissance,no -T1597,Search Closed Sources,Reconnaissance,no -T1596.005,Scan Databases,Reconnaissance,no -T1596.004,CDNs,Reconnaissance,no -T1596.003,Digital Certificates,Reconnaissance,no -T1596.001,DNS/Passive DNS,Reconnaissance,no -T1596.002,WHOIS,Reconnaissance,no -T1596,Search Open Technical Databases,Reconnaissance,no -T1595.002,Vulnerability Scanning,Reconnaissance,Volatile Cedar|APT28|Sandworm Team -T1595.001,Scanning IP Blocks,Reconnaissance,no -T1595,Active Scanning,Reconnaissance,no -T1594,Search Victim-Owned Websites,Reconnaissance,Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team -T1593.002,Search Engines,Reconnaissance,no -T1593.001,Social Media,Reconnaissance,no -T1593,Search Open Websites/Domains,Reconnaissance,Sandworm Team -T1592.004,Client Configurations,Reconnaissance,HAFNIUM -T1592.003,Firmware,Reconnaissance,no -T1592.002,Software,Reconnaissance,Sandworm Team -T1592.001,Hardware,Reconnaissance,no -T1592,Gather Victim Host Information,Reconnaissance,no -T1591.004,Identify Roles,Reconnaissance,no -T1591.003,Identify Business Tempo,Reconnaissance,no -T1591.001,Determine Physical Locations,Reconnaissance,no -T1591.002,Business Relationships,Reconnaissance,Sandworm Team -T1591,Gather Victim Org Information,Reconnaissance,no -T1590.006,Network Security Appliances,Reconnaissance,no -T1590.005,IP Addresses,Reconnaissance,HAFNIUM -T1590.004,Network Topology,Reconnaissance,no -T1590.003,Network Trust Dependencies,Reconnaissance,no -T1590.002,DNS,Reconnaissance,no -T1590.001,Domain Properties,Reconnaissance,Sandworm Team -T1590,Gather Victim Network Information,Reconnaissance,HAFNIUM -T1589.003,Employee Names,Reconnaissance,Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team -T1589.002,Email Addresses,Reconnaissance,TA551|MuddyWater|HAFNIUM|APT32|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team -T1589.001,Credentials,Reconnaissance,APT28|Magic Hound|Chimera -T1589,Gather Victim Identity Information,Reconnaissance,APT32 -T1588.005,Exploits,Resource Development,no -T1588.004,Digital Certificates,Resource Development,Lazarus Group|Silent Librarian -T1588.003,Code Signing Certificates,Resource Development,Wizard Spider -T1588.002,Tool,Resource Development,MuddyWater|Silent Librarian|GALLIUM|Sandworm Team -T1588.001,Malware,Resource Development,Turla|APT1 -T1588,Obtain Capabilities,Resource Development,no -T1587.004,Exploits,Resource Development,no -T1587.003,Digital Certificates,Resource Development,APT29|PROMETHIUM -T1587.002,Code Signing Certificates,Resource Development,PROMETHIUM|Patchwork -T1587.001,Malware,Resource Development,APT29|Lazarus Group|UNC2452|Sandworm Team|Turla|FIN7|Night Dragon|Cleaver -T1587,Develop Capabilities,Resource Development,Kimsuky -T1586.002,Email Accounts,Resource Development,Magic Hound|Kimsuky -T1586.001,Social Media Accounts,Resource Development,no -T1586,Compromise Accounts,Resource Development,no -T1585.002,Email Accounts,Resource Development,Magic Hound|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team|APT1 -T1585.001,Social Media Accounts,Resource Development,Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|APT32|Cleaver -T1585,Establish Accounts,Resource Development,Fox Kitten|APT17 -T1584.006,Web Services,Resource Development,Turla -T1584.005,Botnet,Resource Development,no -T1584.004,Server,Resource Development,Indrik Spider|Turla|APT16 -T1584.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,Turla -T1584.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,no -T1584.001,Domains,Resource Development,APT29|UNC2452|APT1 -T1583.006,Web Services,Resource Development,ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|HAFNIUM|Lazarus Group|Turla|APT32|APT17|APT29 -T1583.005,Botnet,Resource Development,no -T1583.004,Server,Resource Development,GALLIUM|Sandworm Team -T1583.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,HAFNIUM|TEMP.Veles -T1583.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,no -T1584,Compromise Infrastructure,Resource Development,no -T1583.001,Domains,Resource Development,APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|UNC2452|Lazarus Group|Silent Librarian|menuPass|Sandworm Team|APT32|Kimsuky|APT1|APT28 -T1583,Acquire Infrastructure,Resource Development,no -T1564.007,VBA Stomping,Defense Evasion,no -T1558.004,AS-REP Roasting,Credential Access,no -T1580,Cloud Infrastructure Discovery,Discovery,no -T1218.012,Verclsid,Defense Evasion,no -T1205.001,Port Knocking,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,PROMETHIUM +T1205.001,Port Knocking,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no T1564.006,Run Virtual Instance,Defense Evasion,no T1564.005,Hidden File System,Defense Evasion,Strider|Equation -T1556.003,Pluggable Authentication Modules,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence,no +T1556.003,Pluggable Authentication Modules,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no T1574.012,COR_PROFILER,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Blue Mockingbird T1562.007,Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall,Defense Evasion,no T1098.004,SSH Authorized Keys,Persistence,no T1480.001,Environmental Keying,Defense Evasion,APT41|Equation -T1059.007,JavaScript,Execution,MuddyWater|Turla|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Kimsuky|FIN6|APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer +T1059.007,JavaScript/JScript,Execution,APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer T1578.004,Revert Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no T1578.003,Delete Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no T1578.001,Create Snapshot,Defense Evasion,no T1578.002,Create Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no T1127.001,MSBuild,Defense Evasion,Frankenstein -T1027.005,Indicator Removal from Tools,Defense Evasion,Operation Wocao|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|APT3|Turla|OilRig|Deep Panda +T1027.005,Indicator Removal from Tools,Defense Evasion,Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|APT3|Turla|OilRig|Deep Panda T1562.006,Indicator Blocking,Defense Evasion,no -T1573.002,Asymmetric Cryptography,Command And Control,Operation Wocao|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|OilRig|FIN8|FIN6 -T1573.001,Symmetric Cryptography,Command And Control,Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|APT33|BRONZE BUTLER|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group +T1573.002,Asymmetric Cryptography,Command And Control,Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|OilRig|FIN8|FIN6 +T1573.001,Symmetric Cryptography,Command And Control,Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|APT33|BRONZE BUTLER|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group T1573,Encrypted Channel,Command And Control,Tropic Trooper T1027.004,Compile After Delivery,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|MuddyWater T1574.004,Dylib Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no T1546.015,Component Object Model Hijacking,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT28 -T1071.004,DNS,Command And Control,Chimera|APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7 -T1071.003,Mail Protocols,Command And Control,Turla|Kimsuky|APT32|SilverTerrier|APT28 -T1071.002,File Transfer Protocols,Command And Control,Kimsuky|APT41|SilverTerrier|Honeybee -T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|UNC2452|Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Ke3chang|Orangeworm|APT19|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|Rancor|APT37|Dark Caracal|Turla|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT32|OilRig|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon -T1572,Protocol Tunneling,Command And Control,Chimera|Fox Kitten|OilRig|Cobalt Group|FIN6 -T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,Wizard Spider|FIN6|APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group -T1048.002,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,APT29|UNC2452 +T1071.004,DNS,Command And Control,APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7 +T1071.003,Mail Protocols,Command And Control,APT32|SilverTerrier|APT28 +T1071.002,File Transfer Protocols,Command And Control,APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|Honeybee +T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Cobalt Group|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Rancor|Orangeworm|APT37|Ke3chang|Dark Caracal|Turla|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|OilRig|Magic Hound|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon +T1572,Protocol Tunneling,Command And Control,OilRig|Cobalt Group|FIN6 +T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group +T1048.002,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,no T1048.001,Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,no -T1001.003,Protocol Impersonation,Command And Control,Higaisa|Lazarus Group -T1001.002,Steganography,Command And Control,APT29|Axiom +T1001.003,Protocol Impersonation,Command And Control,Lazarus Group +T1001.002,Steganography,Command And Control,Axiom T1001.001,Junk Data,Command And Control,APT28 T1132.002,Non-Standard Encoding,Command And Control,no -T1132.001,Standard Encoding,Command And Control,HAFNIUM|TA551|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT33|APT19|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork +T1132.001,Standard Encoding,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT33|APT19|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork T1090.004,Domain Fronting,Command And Control,APT29 -T1090.003,Multi-hop Proxy,Command And Control,APT28|Operation Wocao|Inception|FIN4|APT29 -T1090.002,External Proxy,Command And Control,APT39|Silence|GALLIUM|MuddyWater|APT3|FIN5|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT28 -T1090.001,Internal Proxy,Command And Control,APT29|Higaisa|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|APT39|Strider +T1090.003,Multi-hop Proxy,Command And Control,Inception|FIN4|APT29 +T1090.002,External Proxy,Command And Control,APT39|Silence|Soft Cell|MuddyWater|APT3|FIN5|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT28 +T1090.001,Internal Proxy,Command And Control,APT39|Strider T1102.003,One-Way Communication,Command And Control,Leviathan -T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|APT28|APT29|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|FIN7|Turla|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak +T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak T1102.001,Dead Drop Resolver,Command And Control,Rocke|APT41|BRONZE BUTLER|RTM|Patchwork T1571,Non-Standard Port,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Rocke|DarkVishnya|Silence|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT33|APT32|TEMP.Veles|Lazarus Group|FIN7 -T1074.002,Remote Data Staging,Collection,APT29|Chimera|UNC2452|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8 -T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|Kimsuky|APT39|Operation Wocao|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28 +T1074.002,Remote Data Staging,Collection,Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8 +T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Machete|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28 T1078.004,Cloud Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,APT33 T1564.004,NTFS File Attributes,Defense Evasion,APT32 -T1564.003,Hidden Window,Defense Evasion,Higaisa|Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound -T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,HAFNIUM|Turla|Operation Wocao|PROMETHIUM|Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32 -T1078.002,Domain Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT29|TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314 +T1564.003,Hidden Window,Defense Evasion,Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound +T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32 +T1078.002,Domain Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314 T1078.001,Default Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,no T1564.002,Hidden Users,Defense Evasion,no -T1574.006,Dynamic Linker Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,APT41|Rocke -T1574.002,DLL Side-Loading,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|Higaisa|BlackTech|Sidewinder|Chimera|BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|APT19|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390 -T1574.001,DLL Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Evilnum|APT41|Whitefly|RTM|Threat Group-3390|menuPass +T1574.006,LD_PRELOAD,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Rocke +T1574.002,DLL Side-Loading,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|APT19|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390 +T1574.001,DLL Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Whitefly|RTM|Threat Group-3390|menuPass T1574.008,Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no T1574.007,Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no T1574.009,Path Interception by Unquoted Path,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no @@ -184,174 +61,174 @@ T1574.011,Services Registry Permissions Weakness,Persistence|Privilege Escalatio T1574.005,Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no T1574.010,Services File Permissions Weakness,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no T1574,Hijack Execution Flow,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no -T1069.001,Local Groups,Discovery,Chimera|Operation Wocao|Turla|OilRig|admin@338 -T1570,Lateral Tool Transfer,Lateral Movement,Chimera|GALLIUM|Operation Wocao|APT32|Wizard Spider|Turla|FIN10 +T1069.001,Local Groups,Discovery,Turla|OilRig|admin@338 +T1570,Lateral Tool Transfer,Lateral Movement,APT32|Wizard Spider|Turla|FIN10 T1568.003,DNS Calculation,Command And Control,APT12 -T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Kimsuky|FIN6|PROMETHIUM|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Dragonfly 2.0|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|OilRig|Rancor|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|APT19|Patchwork|APT32|Gorgon Group|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|APT37|TA459|Leviathan|APT29|APT28|FIN8|Elderwood|PLATINUM|menuPass -T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|Turla|APT33 +T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Gorgon Group|Patchwork|OilRig|Dark Caracal|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|FIN7|APT32|Rancor|APT37|FIN8|APT28|Elderwood|TA459|APT29|Leviathan|menuPass|PLATINUM +T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|APT33|Turla T1195.003,Compromise Hardware Supply Chain,Initial Access,no -T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,APT29|UNC2452|Cobalt Group|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT41 +T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,Sandworm Team|APT41 T1195.001,Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools,Initial Access,no -T1568.001,Fast Flux DNS,Command And Control,menuPass|TA505 -T1052.001,Exfiltration over USB,Exfiltration,Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper -T1569.002,Service Execution,Execution,Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT41|Silence|FIN6|APT32|Honeybee|Ke3chang +T1568.001,Fast Flux DNS,Command And Control,TA505 +T1052.001,Exfiltration over USB,Exfiltration,Tropic Trooper +T1569.002,Service Execution,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT41|Silence|FIN6|APT32|Honeybee|Ke3chang T1569.001,Launchctl,Execution,no T1569,System Services,Execution,no -T1568.002,Domain Generation Algorithms,Command And Control,TA551|APT41 -T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,APT29|UNC2452 +T1568.002,Domain Generation Algorithms,Command And Control,APT41 +T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,no T1011.001,Exfiltration Over Bluetooth,Exfiltration,no -T1567.002,Exfiltration to Cloud Storage,Exfiltration,ZIRCONIUM|HAFNIUM|Chimera|Leviathan|Turla +T1567.002,Exfiltration to Cloud Storage,Exfiltration,Leviathan|Turla T1567.001,Exfiltration to Code Repository,Exfiltration,no -T1059.006,Python,Execution,ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Turla|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT29|Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete -T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT39|Machete|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound +T1059.006,Python,Execution,Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete +T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound T1059.004,Unix Shell,Execution,Rocke|APT41 -T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Higaisa|Indrik Spider|Chimera|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Machete|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|FIN6|TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Silence|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|Gorgon Group|Ke3chang|Dark Caracal|Leviathan|APT37|APT28|FIN8|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Suckfly|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1 +T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Silence|APT32|APT39|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Dark Caracal|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|Ke3chang|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|APT28|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gamaredon Group|Suckfly|Patchwork|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1 T1059.002,AppleScript,Execution,no -T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Mustang Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Lazarus Group|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|APT28|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Turla|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|DarkHydrus|Leviathan|TA459|MuddyWater|FIN8|OilRig|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT32|FIN10|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|FIN7|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda -T1567,Exfiltration Over Web Service,Exfiltration,APT28 +T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|APT19|DarkHydrus|APT28|Thrip|Gorgon Group|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|TA459|FIN8|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT32|FIN7|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda +T1567,Exfiltration Over Web Service,Exfiltration,no T1497.003,Time Based Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no -T1497.002,User Activity Based Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Darkhotel|FIN7 -T1497.001,System Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Darkhotel|Evilnum|Frankenstein +T1497.002,User Activity Based Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,FIN7 +T1497.001,System Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Frankenstein T1498.002,Reflection Amplification,Impact,no T1498.001,Direct Network Flood,Impact,no -T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,Ajax Security Team|Lazarus Group|Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal -T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT1|Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|Cobalt Group|Turla|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|APT29|APT33|Leviathan|FIN8|Elderwood|Patchwork|Magic Hound -T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT1|FIN6|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT19|Gorgon Group|Rancor|APT32|DarkHydrus|Lazarus Group|Dragonfly 2.0|MuddyWater|APT28|FIN8|Elderwood|APT37|menuPass|TA459|PLATINUM|APT29|Leviathan|Patchwork -T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly +T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal +T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|Turla|APT28|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|APT33|Elderwood|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Patchwork|APT29|FIN8 +T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|Turla|Gorgon Group|Rancor|DarkHydrus|Cobalt Group|FIN7|OilRig|Lazarus Group|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|FIN8|MuddyWater|APT28|TA459|Leviathan|Patchwork|PLATINUM|Elderwood|APT29|APT37|menuPass +T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,no T1565.003,Runtime Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38 T1565.002,Transmitted Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38 T1565.001,Stored Data Manipulation,Impact,FIN4|APT38 T1565,Data Manipulation,Impact,no -T1564.001,Hidden Files and Directories,Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|Rocke|APT32|Tropic Trooper|APT28|Lazarus Group +T1564.001,Hidden Files and Directories,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT32|Tropic Trooper|APT28|Lazarus Group T1564,Hide Artifacts,Defense Evasion,no T1563.002,RDP Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no T1563.001,SSH Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no T1563,Remote Service Session Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no -T1518.001,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,Windshift|Sidewinder|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon +T1518.001,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon T1069.003,Cloud Groups,Discovery,no -T1069.002,Domain Groups,Discovery,Turla|Inception|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang +T1069.002,Domain Groups,Discovery,Turla|Wizard Spider|Inception|OilRig|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang T1087.004,Cloud Account,Discovery,no T1087.003,Email Account,Discovery,Sandworm Team|TA505 -T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,MuddyWater|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang -T1087.001,Local Account,Discovery,Chimera|Fox Kitten|Turla|Poseidon Group|OilRig|Ke3chang|APT32|APT1|Threat Group-3390|APT3|admin@338 +T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang +T1087.001,Local Account,Discovery,Turla|Poseidon Group|OilRig|Ke3chang|APT32|APT1|Threat Group-3390|APT3|admin@338 T1553.004,Install Root Certificate,Defense Evasion,no -T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak -T1562.003,Impair Command History Logging,Defense Evasion,no -T1562.002,Disable Windows Event Logging,Defense Evasion,APT29|UNC2452|Threat Group-3390 -T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,APT29|MuddyWater|UNC2452|Wizard Spider|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda +T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak +T1562.003,HISTCONTROL,Defense Evasion,no +T1562.002,Disable Windows Event Logging,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390 +T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda T1562,Impair Defenses,Defense Evasion,no T1003.004,LSA Secrets,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|menuPass|Leafminer|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Threat Group-3390 T1003.005,Cached Domain Credentials,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33 T1561.002,Disk Structure Wipe,Impact,Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38|APT37 T1561.001,Disk Content Wipe,Impact,Lazarus Group T1561,Disk Wipe,Impact,no -T1560.003,Archive via Custom Method,Collection,Mustang Panda|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|CopyKittens|FIN6 +T1560.003,Archive via Custom Method,Collection,Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|CopyKittens|FIN6 T1560.002,Archive via Library,Collection,Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390 -T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,APT29|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|Sowbug|APT3|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang +T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT3|Sowbug|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang T1560,Archive Collected Data,Collection,menuPass|APT32|Honeybee|Patchwork|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang T1499.004,Application or System Exploitation,Impact,no T1499.003,Application Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no T1499.002,Service Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no T1499.001,OS Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no -T1491.002,External Defacement,Impact,Sandworm Team +T1491.002,External Defacement,Impact,no T1491.001,Internal Defacement,Impact,Lazarus Group -T1114.003,Email Forwarding Rule,Collection,Silent Librarian|Kimsuky -T1114.002,Remote Email Collection,Collection,APT29|HAFNIUM|Chimera|UNC2452|APT1|FIN4|Dragonfly 2.0|APT28|Leafminer|Ke3chang -T1114.001,Local Email Collection,Collection,Chimera|Magic Hound|APT1 +T1114.003,Email Forwarding Rule,Collection,no +T1114.002,Remote Email Collection,Collection,APT1|FIN4|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|Leafminer +T1114.001,Local Email Collection,Collection,Magic Hound|APT1 T1134.005,SID-History Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no T1134.004,Parent PID Spoofing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no T1134.003,Make and Impersonate Token,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no T1134.002,Create Process with Token,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Turla|Lazarus Group T1134.001,Token Impersonation/Theft,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT28 -T1213.002,Sharepoint,Collection,Chimera|Ke3chang|APT28 +T1213.002,Sharepoint,Collection,Ke3chang|APT28 T1213.001,Confluence,Collection,no -T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,Ajax Security Team|ZIRCONIUM|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats +T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,Magic Hound|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats T1555.002,Securityd Memory,Credential Access,no T1555.001,Keychain,Credential Access,no -T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Sidewinder|Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|APT37|APT28|FIN7 +T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|APT28|FIN7 T1559.001,Component Object Model,Execution,Gamaredon Group|MuddyWater T1559,Inter-Process Communication,Execution,no T1558.002,Silver Ticket,Credential Access,no T1558.001,Golden Ticket,Credential Access,Ke3chang T1558,Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets,Credential Access,no -T1557.001,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,Credential Access|Collection,Wizard Spider -T1557,Man-in-the-Middle,Credential Access|Collection,Kimsuky -T1556.002,Password Filter DLL,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence,Strider -T1556.001,Domain Controller Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence,Chimera -T1556,Modify Authentication Process,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence,no +T1557.001,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,Credential Access|Collection,no +T1557,Man-in-the-Middle,Credential Access|Collection,no +T1556.002,Password Filter DLL,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,Strider +T1556.001,Domain Controller Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no +T1556,Modify Authentication Process,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no T1056.004,Credential API Hooking,Collection|Credential Access,PLATINUM T1056.003,Web Portal Capture,Collection|Credential Access,no T1056.002,GUI Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,FIN4 -T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,Ajax Security Team|Operation Wocao|APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|OilRig|Ke3chang|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28 -T1555,Credentials from Password Stores,Credential Access,APT29|Evilnum|UNC2452|FIN6|APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Stealth Falcon +T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|Ke3chang|OilRig|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28 +T1555,Credentials from Password Stores,Credential Access,APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Turla|Stealth Falcon T1552.005,Cloud Instance Metadata API,Credential Access,no T1003.008,/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow,Credential Access,no T1003.007,Proc Filesystem,Credential Access,no -T1003.006,DCSync,Credential Access,APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao -T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider +T1003.006,DCSync,Credential Access,no +T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,no T1552.006,Group Policy Preferences,Credential Access,APT33 -T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Chimera|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0 -T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass -T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Leafminer|Magic Hound|Lazarus Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver -T1110.004,Credential Stuffing,Credential Access,Chimera -T1110.003,Password Spraying,Credential Access,Silent Librarian|Chimera|APT28|APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group -T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,FIN6|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3 -T1110.001,Password Guessing,Credential Access,APT28 -T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,APT29|UNC2452|Chimera|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390 -T1021.005,VNC,Lateral Movement,Fox Kitten|GCMAN -T1021.004,SSH,Lateral Movement,Fox Kitten|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN +T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0 +T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass +T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Lazarus Group|Leafminer|Magic Hound|MuddyWater|PLATINUM|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver +T1110.004,Credential Stuffing,Credential Access,no +T1110.003,Password Spraying,Credential Access,APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group +T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3 +T1110.001,Password Guessing,Credential Access,no +T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,Threat Group-3390 +T1021.005,VNC,Lateral Movement,GCMAN +T1021.004,SSH,Lateral Movement,Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN T1021.003,Distributed Component Object Model,Lateral Movement,no -T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,Fox Kitten|APT41|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang -T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,Fox Kitten|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|FIN10|menuPass|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom +T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang +T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|menuPass|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom T1554,Compromise Client Software Binary,Persistence,no T1036.006,Space after Filename,Defense Evasion,no -T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Darkhotel|Lazarus Group|Indrik Spider|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Machete|Chimera|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1 -T1036.004,Masquerade Task or Service,Defense Evasion,ZIRCONIUM|APT29|Higaisa|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|PROMETHIUM|Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7 -T1036.003,Rename System Utilities,Defense Evasion,menuPass|APT32|GALLIUM +T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1 +T1036.004,Masquerade Task or Service,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7 +T1036.003,Rename System Utilities,Defense Evasion,menuPass|APT32|Soft Cell|PLATINUM T1036.002,Right-to-Left Override,Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|BlackTech|Ke3chang|Scarlet Mimic -T1036.001,Invalid Code Signature,Defense Evasion,Windshift|APT37 +T1036.001,Invalid Code Signature,Defense Evasion,Windshift T1553.003,SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no -T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,APT29|GALLIUM|UNC2452|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel +T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|APT37|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel T1553.001,Gatekeeper Bypass,Defense Evasion,no T1553,Subvert Trust Controls,Defense Evasion,no -T1027.003,Steganography,Defense Evasion,TA551|BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT37 -T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,ZIRCONIUM|Lazarus Group|TA505|Rocke|GALLIUM|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon -T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Gamaredon Group|APT32|Patchwork|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee +T1027.003,Steganography,Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT37 +T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,TA505|Rocke|Soft Cell|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon +T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|APT32|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee T1222.002,Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT32 -T1222.001,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider -T1552.004,Private Keys,Credential Access,APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Rocke +T1222.001,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no +T1552.004,Private Keys,Credential Access,Rocke T1552.003,Bash History,Credential Access,no T1552.002,Credentials in Registry,Credential Access,APT32 -T1552.001,Credentials In Files,Credential Access,Fox Kitten|Leafminer|APT33|OilRig|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT3 +T1552.001,Credentials In Files,Credential Access,Leafminer|APT33|OilRig|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT3 T1552,Unsecured Credentials,Credential Access,no T1216.001,PubPrn,Defense Evasion,APT32 -T1070.006,Timestomp,Defense Evasion,APT29|UNC2452|Chimera|Kimsuky|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28 +T1070.006,Timestomp,Defense Evasion,Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28 T1070.005,Network Share Connection Removal,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390 -T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,APT39|Mustang Panda|Chimera|Evilnum|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Honeybee|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass|FIN8|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29 +T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|APT28|Threat Group-3390|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29 T1070.003,Clear Command History,Defense Evasion,APT41 -T1550.004,Web Session Cookie,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT29|UNC2452 +T1550.004,Web Session Cookie,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,no T1550.001,Application Access Token,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT28 T1550.003,Pass the Ticket,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|APT29 -T1550.002,Pass the Hash,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,Chimera|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|APT1 -T1550,Use Alternate Authentication Material,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT29|UNC2452 +T1550.002,Pass the Hash,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,Soft Cell|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|APT1 +T1550,Use Alternate Authentication Material,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,no T1548.004,Elevated Execution with Prompt,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no T1548.003,Sudo and Sudo Caching,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no -T1548.002,Bypass User Account Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Evilnum|APT37|MuddyWater|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29 +T1548.002,Bypass User Access Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,APT37|MuddyWater|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29 T1548.001,Setuid and Setgid,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no T1548,Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no T1136.003,Cloud Account,Persistence,no T1070.002,Clear Linux or Mac System Logs,Defense Evasion,Rocke -T1070.001,Clear Windows Event Logs,Defense Evasion,Chimera|Operation Wocao|APT41|APT38|APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|FIN5|APT28 -T1136.002,Domain Account,Persistence,HAFNIUM|GALLIUM -T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,Fox Kitten|APT39|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|APT3 +T1070.001,Clear Windows Event Logs,Defense Evasion,APT41|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28 +T1136.002,Domain Account,Persistence,Soft Cell +T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,APT39|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|APT3 T1547.011,Plist Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no T1547.010,Port Monitors,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no T1547.009,Shortcut Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|Lazarus Group T1547.008,LSASS Driver,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no T1547.007,Re-opened Applications,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no T1547.006,Kernel Modules and Extensions,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1547.005,Security Support Provider,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Lazarus Group -T1547.004,Winlogon Helper DLL,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Wizard Spider|Tropic Trooper|Turla +T1547.005,Security Support Provider,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no +T1547.004,Winlogon Helper DLL,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Tropic Trooper|Turla T1547.003,Time Providers,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no T1546.014,Emond,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no T1546.013,PowerShell Profile,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Turla @@ -359,38 +236,38 @@ T1546.012,Image File Execution Options Injection,Privilege Escalation|Persistenc T1218.008,Odbcconf,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group T1546.011,Application Shimming,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,FIN7 T1547.002,Authentication Package,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1546.010,AppInit DLLs,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT39 +T1546.010,AppInit DLLs,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no T1546.009,AppCert DLLs,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Honeybee -T1218.007,Msiexec,Defense Evasion,ZIRCONIUM|Molerats|Machete|TA505|Rancor -T1546.008,Accessibility Features,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Fox Kitten|APT41|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda|Axiom +T1218.007,Msiexec,Defense Evasion,TA505|Rancor +T1546.008,Accessibility Features,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT41|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda|Axiom T1546.007,Netsh Helper DLL,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no T1546.006,LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no T1546.005,Trap,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no -T1546.004,Unix Shell Configuration Modification,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no -T1546.003,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Mustang Panda|UNC2452|APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29 +T1546.004,.bash_profile and .bashrc,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no +T1546.003,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29 T1546.002,Screensaver,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no T1546.001,Change Default File Association,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Kimsuky -T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Windshift|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT28|Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Dark Caracal|Threat Group-3390|Turla|Honeybee|APT19|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|APT37|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Magic Hound|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel +T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Machete|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Turla|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|Ke3chang|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel T1218.002,Control Panel,Defense Evasion,no -T1218.010,Regsvr32,Defense Evasion,TA551|Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|Cobalt Group|APT19|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda +T1218.010,Regsvr32,Defense Evasion,Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|Cobalt Group|APT19|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda T1218.009,Regsvcs/Regasm,Defense Evasion,no -T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|TA551|Sidewinder|Lazarus Group|Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7 -T1218.004,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|menuPass -T1218.001,Compiled HTML File,Defense Evasion,APT41|Silence|Lazarus Group|OilRig|Dark Caracal +T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7 +T1218.004,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion,no +T1218.001,Compiled HTML File,Defense Evasion,APT41|Silence|Lazarus Group|Dark Caracal|OilRig T1218.003,CMSTP,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group|MuddyWater -T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,HAFNIUM|TA551|UNC2452|APT41|Gamaredon Group|APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28 +T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28 T1547,Boot or Logon Autostart Execution,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no T1546,Event Triggered Execution,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no T1098.003,Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role,Persistence,no -T1098.002,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,Persistence,APT29|UNC2452|Magic Hound -T1098.001,Additional Cloud Credentials,Persistence,APT29|UNC2452 +T1098.002,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,Persistence,Magic Hound +T1098.001,Additional Azure Service Principal Credentials,Persistence,no T1543.004,Launch Daemon,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,PROMETHIUM|Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|FIN7|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak +T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Honeybee|FIN7|Threat Group-3390|APT19|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak T1543.002,Systemd Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke T1543.001,Launch Agent,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no T1037.005,Startup Items,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1037.004,RC Scripts,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1055.012,Process Hollowing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Gorgon Group|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Patchwork +T1037.004,Rc.common,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no +T1055.012,Process Hollowing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gorgon Group|Patchwork T1055.013,Process Doppelgänging,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Leafminer T1055.011,Extra Window Memory Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no T1055.014,VDSO Hijacking,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no @@ -400,7 +277,7 @@ T1055.005,Thread Local Storage,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no T1055.004,Asynchronous Procedure Call,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no T1055.003,Thread Execution Hijacking,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no T1055.002,Portable Executable Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Rocke|Gorgon Group -T1055.001,Dynamic-link Library Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Wizard Spider|TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda +T1055.001,Dynamic-link Library Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda T1037.003,Network Logon Script,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no T1543,Create or Modify System Process,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no T1037.002,Logon Script (Mac),Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no @@ -408,13 +285,13 @@ T1037.001,Logon Script (Windows),Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Cobalt Group|A T1542.003,Bootkit,Persistence|Defense Evasion,APT41|Lazarus Group|APT28 T1542.002,Component Firmware,Persistence|Defense Evasion,Equation T1542.001,System Firmware,Persistence|Defense Evasion,no -T1505.003,Web Shell,Persistence,Sandworm Team|HAFNIUM|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|GALLIUM|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|OilRig|Deep Panda +T1505.003,Web Shell,Persistence,Tropic Trooper|Soft Cell|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|OilRig|Deep Panda T1505.002,Transport Agent,Persistence,no T1505.001,SQL Stored Procedures,Persistence,no T1053.003,Cron,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke T1053.004,Launchd,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no T1053.001,At (Linux),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Mustang Panda|Higaisa|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Molerats|Machete|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|GALLIUM|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|Cobalt Group|OilRig|Patchwork|FIN8|FIN7|menuPass|FIN10|APT32|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29 +T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Patchwork|OilRig|Rancor|Cobalt Group|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|APT32|FIN7|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29 T1053.002,At (Windows),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,BRONZE BUTLER|Threat Group-3390|APT18 T1542,Pre-OS Boot,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no T1137.001,Office Template Macros,Persistence,MuddyWater @@ -424,141 +301,140 @@ T1137.005,Outlook Rules,Persistence,no T1137.006,Add-ins,Persistence,Naikon T1137.002,Office Test,Persistence,APT28 T1531,Account Access Removal,Impact,no -T1539,Steal Web Session Cookie,Credential Access,Evilnum +T1539,Steal Web Session Cookie,Credential Access,no T1529,System Shutdown/Reboot,Impact,Lazarus Group|APT38|APT37 -T1518,Software Discovery,Discovery,Mustang Panda|Windshift|MuddyWater|Windigo|Sidewinder|Operation Wocao|BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|Inception -T1547.013,XDG Autostart Entries,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no +T1518,Software Discovery,Discovery,BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|Inception T1534,Internal Spearphishing,Lateral Movement,Gamaredon Group T1528,Steal Application Access Token,Credential Access,APT28 T1535,Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions,Defense Evasion,no -T1525,Implant Internal Image,Persistence,no +T1525,Implant Container Image,Persistence,no T1538,Cloud Service Dashboard,Discovery,no -T1530,Data from Cloud Storage Object,Collection,Fox Kitten +T1530,Data from Cloud Storage Object,Collection,no T1578,Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure,Defense Evasion,no T1537,Transfer Data to Cloud Account,Exfiltration,no T1526,Cloud Service Discovery,Discovery,no T1505,Server Software Component,Persistence,no -T1499,Endpoint Denial of Service,Impact,Sandworm Team -T1497,Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Darkhotel -T1498,Network Denial of Service,Impact,APT28 +T1499,Endpoint Denial of Service,Impact,no +T1497,Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no +T1498,Network Denial of Service,Impact,no T1496,Resource Hijacking,Impact,Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT41|Lazarus Group T1495,Firmware Corruption,Impact,no T1491,Defacement,Impact,no T1490,Inhibit System Recovery,Impact,no -T1489,Service Stop,Impact,Wizard Spider|Lazarus Group -T1486,Data Encrypted for Impact,Impact,Indrik Spider|APT41|TA505|APT38 +T1489,Service Stop,Impact,Lazarus Group +T1486,Data Encrypted for Impact,Impact,APT41|TA505|APT38 T1485,Data Destruction,Impact,Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38 -T1484,Domain Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no -T1482,Domain Trust Discovery,Discovery,APT29|Chimera|UNC2452 +T1484,Group Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no +T1482,Domain Trust Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider T1480,Execution Guardrails,Defense Evasion,no -T1221,Template Injection,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Dragonfly 2.0|DarkHydrus -T1220,XSL Script Processing,Defense Evasion,Higaisa|Cobalt Group T1222,File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no -T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Machete|Windigo|Dragonfly|PROMETHIUM|Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|Leafminer|APT19|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|Patchwork|PLATINUM|APT37 -T1207,Rogue Domain Controller,Defense Evasion,no -T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,Sandworm Team|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|APT28|menuPass -T1197,BITS Jobs,Defense Evasion|Persistence,APT39|Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan -T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,Chimera|Fox Kitten -T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,Fox Kitten|FIN6|Turla +T1221,Template Injection,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Dragonfly 2.0|DarkHydrus +T1220,XSL Script Processing,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group +T1197,BITS Jobs,Defense Evasion|Persistence,Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan +T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,no +T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,Turla +T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Leafminer|Dark Caracal|APT19|APT32|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|Elderwood|APT37|Patchwork|PLATINUM +T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|APT37|Patchwork|Leviathan|Elderwood|TA459|APT29 T1212,Exploitation for Credential Access,Credential Access,no T1211,Exploitation for Defense Evasion,Defense Evasion,APT28 -T1200,Hardware Additions,Initial Access,DarkVishnya +T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Axiom +T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Threat Group-3390|APT28 T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,no -T1201,Password Policy Discovery,Discovery,Chimera|Turla|OilRig -T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,Volatile Cedar|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|APT28|APT29|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Axiom -T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|APT28 -T1219,Remote Access Software,Command And Control,Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Evilnum|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Carbanak -T1195,Supply Chain Compromise,Initial Access,no -T1204,User Execution,Execution,no -T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|Lazarus Group|APT29|TA459|APT37|Leviathan|Patchwork|Elderwood +T1200,Hardware Additions,Initial Access,DarkVishnya +T1201,Password Policy Discovery,Discovery,Turla|OilRig +T1219,Remote Access Software,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Carbanak +T1207,Rogue Domain Controller,Defense Evasion,no +T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,APT28|menuPass T1218,Signed Binary Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no -T1205,Traffic Signaling,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no +T1204,User Execution,Execution,no T1216,Signed Script Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no +T1195,Supply Chain Compromise,Initial Access,Elderwood +T1205,Traffic Signaling,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no T1176,Browser Extensions,Persistence,Kimsuky|Stolen Pencil T1175,Component Object Model and Distributed COM,Lateral Movement|Execution,no -T1187,Forced Authentication,Credential Access,Dragonfly 2.0|DarkHydrus +T1187,Forced Authentication,Credential Access,DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0 T1185,Man in the Browser,Collection,no -T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,FIN6|Blue Mockingbird +T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Blue Mockingbird T1136,Create Account,Persistence,no +T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|APT19|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER T1149,LC_MAIN Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no +T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug T1137,Office Application Startup,Persistence,Gamaredon Group|APT32 -T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,APT39|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|UNC2452|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gorgon Group|Honeybee|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER -T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug T1153,Source,Execution,no -T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Chimera|Sandworm Team|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18 +T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,Sandworm Team|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18 T1132,Data Encoding,Command And Control,no T1129,Shared Modules,Execution,no T1127,Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no T1125,Video Capture,Collection,Silence|FIN7 -T1124,System Time Discovery,Discovery,Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|The White Company|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Turla +T1124,System Time Discovery,Discovery,The White Company|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Turla T1123,Audio Capture,Collection,APT37 -T1120,Peripheral Device Discovery,Discovery,Operation Wocao|Turla|APT37|Gamaredon Group|Equation|APT28 -T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6 -T1115,Clipboard Data,Collection,Operation Wocao|APT39|APT38 -T1114,Email Collection,Collection,Silent Librarian -T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28 -T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|FIN8 -T1111,Two-Factor Authentication Interception,Credential Access,Chimera|Operation Wocao -T1110,Brute Force,Credential Access,APT28|Fox Kitten|DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla +T1120,Peripheral Device Discovery,Discovery,Turla|APT37|Gamaredon Group|Equation|APT28 +T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6 +T1115,Clipboard Data,Collection,APT39|APT38 +T1114,Email Collection,Collection,no +T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28 +T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|FIN8 +T1111,Two-Factor Authentication Interception,Credential Access,no +T1110,Brute Force,Credential Access,DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla T1108,Redundant Access,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no -T1106,Native API,Execution,Higaisa|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|APT37|Gorgon Group -T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,HAFNIUM|APT29|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Volatile Cedar|Indrik Spider|Evilnum|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Turla|OilRig|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|Elderwood|Leviathan|FIN8|PLATINUM|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|APT32|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28 +T1106,Native API,Execution,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|Gorgon Group|APT37 +T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Turla|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|FIN8|PLATINUM|Leviathan|Elderwood|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28 T1104,Multi-Stage Channels,Command And Control,APT41|MuddyWater|APT3 -T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,Fox Kitten|Turla|APT32|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6 +T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6 T1098,Account Manipulation,Persistence,APT3|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group -T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,HAFNIUM|Operation Wocao|FIN6|APT29|PLATINUM|APT3 +T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,APT29|PLATINUM|APT3 T1092,Communication Through Removable Media,Command And Control,APT28 -T1091,Replication Through Removable Media,Lateral Movement|Initial Access,Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28 -T1090,Proxy,Command And Control,Windigo|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|APT41|Turla -T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,APT29|UNC2452 -T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,APT29|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|menuPass|APT39|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dragonfly 2.0|Dark Caracal|Sowbug|APT3|Magic Hound|BRONZE BUTLER|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang -T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Windigo|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT32|APT37|Honeybee|APT19|Magic Hound|Sowbug|OilRig|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang -T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel -T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,APT29|Silent Librarian|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Leviathan|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|menuPass|APT28|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak +T1091,Replication Through Removable Media,Lateral Movement|Initial Access,Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28 +T1090,Proxy,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|APT41|Turla +T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,no +T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang +T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|Honeybee|APT19|APT37|APT32|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|Sowbug|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang +T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel +T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|Leviathan|APT33|OilRig|FIN5|menuPass|APT28|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak T1074,Data Staged,Collection,Wizard Spider T1072,Software Deployment Tools,Execution|Lateral Movement,Silence|APT32|Threat Group-1314 T1071,Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,Rocke|Magic Hound|Dragonfly 2.0 -T1070,Indicator Removal on Host,Defense Evasion,APT29|UNC2452 -T1069,Permission Groups Discovery,Discovery,APT29|UNC2452|TA505|APT3 -T1068,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,Privilege Escalation,ZIRCONIUM|Turla|Whitefly|APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Threat Group-3390|FIN6|APT28 +T1070,Indicator Removal on Host,Defense Evasion,no +T1069,Permission Groups Discovery,Discovery,TA505|APT3 +T1068,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,Privilege Escalation,Whitefly|APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Threat Group-3390|FIN6|APT28 T1064,Scripting,Defense Evasion|Execution,no T1062,Hypervisor,Persistence,no T1061,Graphical User Interface,Execution,no -T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,Windigo|Fox Kitten|APT32|Whitefly|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|FIN7|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang -T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang -T1056,Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,APT39 -T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Operation Wocao|APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|APT37|Cobalt Group|Turla|Honeybee|PLATINUM +T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,APT32|Molerats|Whitefly|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|FIN7|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang +T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang +T1056,Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,no +T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Turla|Cobalt Group|APT37|Honeybee|PLATINUM T1053,Scheduled Task/Job,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no T1052,Exfiltration Over Physical Medium,Exfiltration,no T1051,Shared Webroot,Lateral Movement,no -T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|GALLIUM|APT32|APT1|APT3|OilRig|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang +T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|Soft Cell|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang T1048,Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol,Exfiltration,no -T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Mustang Panda|Windshift|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|GALLIUM|APT32|MuddyWater|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda -T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Cobalt Group|OilRig|Leafminer|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390 -T1043,Commonly Used Port,Command And Control,OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|APT19|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT37|APT3|Magic Hound|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390 -T1041,Exfiltration Over C2 Channel,Exfiltration,ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Chimera|APT39|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang -T1040,Network Sniffing,Credential Access|Discovery,Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|Stolen Pencil|APT28 -T1039,Data from Network Shared Drive,Collection,Chimera|Fox Kitten|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|menuPass +T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|Soft Cell|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda +T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|OilRig|Cobalt Group|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390 +T1043,Commonly Used Port,Command And Control,Machete|OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|FIN8|APT37|Magic Hound|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390 +T1041,Exfiltration Over C2 Channel,Exfiltration,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang +T1040,Network Sniffing,Credential Access|Discovery,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|Stolen Pencil|APT28 +T1039,Data from Network Shared Drive,Collection,Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass T1037,Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke -T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|UNC2452|Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|PLATINUM|Dragonfly 2.0 +T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|Dragonfly 2.0 T1034,Path Interception,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no -T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|APT19|APT32|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3 +T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3 T1030,Data Transfer Size Limits,Exfiltration,Threat Group-3390 -T1029,Scheduled Transfer,Exfiltration,Higaisa -T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,APT39|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|FIN6|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|APT37|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Leafminer|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|APT19|BlackOasis|FIN8|FIN7|Elderwood|MuddyWater|Leviathan|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|APT32|Group5|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Putter Panda|APT28 +T1029,Scheduled Transfer,Exfiltration,no +T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|Leafminer|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|menuPass|APT19|BlackOasis|FIN8|Leviathan|Elderwood|MuddyWater|FIN7|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28 T1026,Multiband Communication,Command And Control,Lazarus Group -T1025,Data from Removable Media,Collection,Turla|Gamaredon Group|APT28 +T1025,Data from Removable Media,Collection,Machete|Turla|Gamaredon Group|APT28 T1021,Remote Services,Lateral Movement,no -T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Sidewinder|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee -T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,APT29|UNC2452|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|GALLIUM|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|Leafminer|Ke3chang|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN5|APT3|menuPass|FIN6|Turla -T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,ZIRCONIUM|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang +T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee +T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|Soft Cell|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Ke3chang|FIN8|APT3|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla +T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|OilRig|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang T1014,Rootkit,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT41|APT28|Winnti Group -T1012,Query Registry,Discovery,ZIRCONIUM|Chimera|Fox Kitten|APT39|Operation Wocao|APT32|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla +T1012,Query Registry,Discovery,APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla T1011,Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium,Exfiltration,no T1010,Application Window Discovery,Discovery,Lazarus Group -T1008,Fallback Channels,Command And Control,Carbanak|APT41|OilRig|Lazarus Group -T1007,System Service Discovery,Discovery,Chimera|Operation Wocao|BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang +T1008,Fallback Channels,Command And Control,APT41|OilRig|Lazarus Group +T1007,System Service Discovery,Discovery,BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang T1006,Direct Volume Access,Defense Evasion,no -T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,APT29|Windigo|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|Turla|menuPass|Dragonfly 2.0|Dark Caracal|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang +T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang T1003,OS Credential Dumping,Credential Access,APT39|Frankenstein|APT32|APT28|Leviathan|Sowbug|Suckfly|Poseidon Group|Axiom -T1001,Data Obfuscation,Command And Control,Operation Wocao|Axiom +T1001,Data Obfuscation,Command And Control,Axiom diff --git a/stories/active_directory_password_spraying.yml b/stories/active_directory_password_spraying.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 0b96099ec6..0000000000 --- a/stories/active_directory_password_spraying.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,35 +0,0 @@ -name: Active Directory Password Spraying -id: 3de109da-97d2-11eb-8b6a-acde48001122 -version: 1 -date: '2021-04-07' -author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk -type: batch -description: Monitor for activities and techniques associated with Password Spraying attacks within Active Directory environments. -narrative: In a password spraying attack, adversaries leverage one or a small list of commonly used / popular passwords against a large volume of usernames to acquire valid account credentials. - Unlike a Brute Force attack that targets a specific user or small group of users with a large number of passwords, password spraying follows the opposite aproach and increases the chances of obtaining valid credentials while avoiding account lockouts. - This allows adversaries to remain undetected if the target organization does not have the proper monitoring and detection controls in place.\ - - Password Spraying can be leveraged by adversaries across different stages in an attack. It can be used to obtain an iniial access to an environment but can also be used - to escalate privileges when access has been already achieved. In some scenarios, this technique capitalizes on a security policy most organizations implement, password rotation. - As enterprise users change their passwords, it is possible some pick predictable, seasonal passwords such as `$CompanyNameWinter`, `Summer2021`, etc.\ - - Specifically, this Analytic Story is focused on detecting possible Password Spraying attacks against Active Directory environments leveraging Windows Event Logs in the - `Account Logon` and `Logon/Logoff` Advanced Audit Policy categories. It presents 9 detection analytics which can aid defenders in identifyng instances where one source - user, source host or source process attempts to authenticate against a target or targets using a high, unsual, number of unique users. A user, host or process attempting to authenticate with multiple - users is not common behavior for legitimate systems and should be monitored by security teams. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to - vulnerability scanners, remote administration tools, multi-user systems and missconfigured systems. These should be easily spotted when first implementing the detection and addded to an allow list or lookup table. - The presented detections can also be used in Threat Hunting exercises. -references: -- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/ -- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/23/protecting-organization-password-spray-attacks/ -- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn452415(v=ws.11) -tags: - analytic_story: - - Active Directory Password Spraying - category: - - Adversary Tactics - product: - - Splunk Enterprise - - Splunk Enterprise Security - - Splunk Cloud - usecase: Advanced Threat Detection \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index d0f1540cc5..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,12 +0,0 @@ -name: Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos Unit Test -tests: -- name: Multiple Disabled Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - file: endpoint/multiple_disabled_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml - pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' - attack_data: - - file_name: windows-security.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_disabled_users_kerberos/windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 21ab5d03d6..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15 +0,0 @@ -name: Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos Unit Test -tests: -- name: Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - file: endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml - pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' - attack_data: - - file_name: windows-security.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_invalid_users_kerberos/windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - sourcetype: WinEventLog - - - \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 06f44387f7..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,12 +0,0 @@ -name: Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM Unit Test -tests: -- name: Multiple Invalid Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - file: endpoint/multiple_invalid_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.yml - pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' - attack_data: - - file_name: windows-security.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_invalid_users_ntlm/windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 1f438d0a3a..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,12 +0,0 @@ -name: Multiple Users Attempting To Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials Unit Test -tests: -- name: Multiple Users Attempting To Authenticate Using Explicit Credentials - file: endpoint/multiple_users_attempting_to_authenticate_using_explicit_credentials.yml - pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' - attack_data: - - file_name: windows-security.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_explicit_credential_spray/windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 4d91d51ec5..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,12 +0,0 @@ -name: Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos Unit Test -tests: -- name: Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using Kerberos - file: endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_kerberos.yml - pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' - attack_data: - - file_name: windows-security.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_valid_users_kerberos/windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 628a04e034..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,12 +0,0 @@ -name: Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM Unit Test -tests: -- name: Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Host Using NTLM - file: endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_host_using_ntlm.yml - pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' - attack_data: - - file_name: windows-security.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_valid_users_ntlm/windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index e3b73b81d6..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,12 +0,0 @@ -name: Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process Unit Test -tests: -- name: Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Process - file: endpoint/multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process.yml - pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' - attack_data: - - file_name: windows-security.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_multiple_users_from_process/windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/endpoint/multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host.test.yml b/tests/endpoint/multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host.test.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 7dc381b88b..0000000000 --- a/tests/endpoint/multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host.test.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,12 +0,0 @@ -name: Multiple Users Remotely Failing To Authenticate From Host Unit Test -tests: -- name: Multiple Users Remotely Failing To Authenticate From Host - file: endpoint/multiple_users_remotely_failing_to_authenticate_from_host.yml - pass_condition: '| stats count | where count > 0' - earliest_time: '-24h' - latest_time: 'now' - attack_data: - - file_name: windows-security.log - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.003/purplesharp_remote_spray/windows-security.log - source: WinEventLog:Security - sourcetype: WinEventLog \ No newline at end of file