name: CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation
id: eb277ba0-b96b-11eb-b00e-acde48001122
version: 4
date: '2024-08-15'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic identifies the use of named-pipe impersonation
  for privilege escalation, commonly associated with Cobalt Strike and similar frameworks.
  It detects command-line executions where `cmd.exe` uses `echo` to write to a named
  pipe, such as `cmd.exe /c echo 4sgryt3436 > \\.\Pipe\5erg53`. This detection leverages
  data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and
  command-line telemetry. This activity is significant as it indicates potential privilege
  escalation attempts. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain elevated privileges,
  enabling further compromise and persistence within the environment.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
- Windows Event Log Security 4688
- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` OR Processes.process=*%comspec%*
  (Processes.process=*echo* AND Processes.process=*pipe*) by Processes.dest Processes.user
  Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name
  Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `cmd_echo_pipe___escalation_filter`'
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
  and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
  telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
  you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
  Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must
  be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to
  the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint`
  data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
  names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Unknown. It is possible filtering may be required to ensure
  fidelity.
references:
- https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/cobalt-strike/
- https://github.com/rapid7/meterpreter/blob/master/source/extensions/priv/server/elevate/namedpipe.c
tags:
  analytic_story:
  - BlackByte Ransomware
  - Cobalt Strike
  - Graceful Wipe Out Attack
  asset_type: Endpoint
  confidence: 80
  impact: 80
  message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified
    on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ potentially performing privilege escalation
    using named pipes related to Cobalt Strike and other frameworks.
  mitre_attack_id:
  - T1059
  - T1059.003
  - T1543.003
  - T1543
  observable:
  - name: user
    type: User
    role:
    - Victim
  - name: dest
    type: Hostname
    role:
    - Victim
  - name: parent_process_name
    type: Process
    role:
    - Attacker
  - name: process_name
    type: Process
    role:
    - Attacker
  product:
  - Splunk Enterprise
  - Splunk Enterprise Security
  - Splunk Cloud
  required_fields:
  - _time
  - Processes.dest
  - Processes.user
  - Processes.parent_process_name
  - Processes.parent_process
  - Processes.original_file_name
  - Processes.process_name
  - Processes.process
  - Processes.process_id
  - Processes.parent_process_path
  - Processes.process_path
  - Processes.parent_process_id
  risk_score: 64
  security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
  attack_data:
  - data: 
      https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1055/cobalt_strike/windows-sysmon.log
    source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
    sourcetype: xmlwineventlog