name: AWS CreateAccessKey id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-11ad-212bf3d0d111 version: 3 date: '2022-03-03' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk status: production type: Hunting description: This detection rule monitors for the creation of AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) access keys. An IAM access key consists of an access key ID and secret access key, which are used to sign programmatic requests to AWS services. While IAM access keys can be legitimately used by developers and administrators for API access, their creation can also be indicative of malicious activity. Attackers who have gained unauthorized access to an AWS environment might create access keys as a means to establish persistence or to exfiltrate data through the APIs. Moreover, because access keys can be used to authenticate with AWS services without the need for further interaction, they can be particularly appealing for bad actors looking to operate under the radar. Consequently, it's important to vigilantly monitor and scrutinize access key creation events, especially if they are associated with unusual activity or are created by users who don't typically perform these actions. This hunting query identifies when a potentially compromised user creates a IAM access key for another user who may have higher privilleges, which can be a sign for privilege escalation. Hunting queries are designed to be executed manual during threat hunting. data_source: [] search: '`cloudtrail` eventName = CreateAccessKey userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success | eval match=if(match(userIdentity.userName,requestParameters.userName),1,0) | search match=0 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.userName src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_createaccesskey_filter`' how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created keys for another user. references: - https://bishopfox.com/blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws - https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation-part-2/ tags: analytic_story: - AWS IAM Privilege Escalation asset_type: AWS Account confidence: 90 impact: 70 message: User $user_arn$ is attempting to create access keys for $requestParameters.userName$ from this IP $src$ mitre_attack_id: - T1136.003 - T1136 observable: - name: src type: IP Address role: - Attacker - name: user_arn type: User role: - Attacker product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud required_fields: - _time - eventName - userAgent - errorCode - requestParameters.userName risk_score: 63 security_domain: network tests: - name: True Positive Test attack_data: - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_createaccesskey/aws_cloudtrail_events.json sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail source: aws_cloudtrail update_timestamp: true