name: Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn id: cb909b3e-512b-11ec-aa31-3e22fbd008af version: 1 date: '2023-04-14' author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk status: production type: TTP description: 'The following analytic is designed to identify possible lateral movement attacks that involve the spawning of a PowerShell process as a child or grandchild process of commonly abused processes. These processes include services.exe, wmiprsve.exe, svchost.exe, wsmprovhost.exe, and mmc.exe.\ Such behavior is indicative of legitimate Windows features such as the Service Control Manager, Windows Management Instrumentation, Task Scheduler, Windows Remote Management, and the DCOM protocol being abused to start a process on a remote endpoint. This behavior is often seen during lateral movement techniques where adversaries or red teams abuse these services for lateral movement and remote code execution.' data_source: - Sysmon Event ID 1 search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=wmiprvse.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=svchost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=wsmprovhost.exe OR Processes.parent_process_name=mmc.exe) (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*powershell.exe*) OR Processes.process_name=pwsh.exe OR (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe AND Processes.process=*pwsh.exe*)) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn_filter`' how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process. known_false_positives: Legitimate applications may spawn PowerShell as a child process of the the identified processes. Filter as needed. references: - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003/ - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006/ - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/ - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/ - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/ tags: analytic_story: - Active Directory Lateral Movement - Malicious PowerShell - Hermetic Wiper - Data Destruction - Scheduled Tasks asset_type: Endpoint confidence: 50 impact: 90 message: A PowerShell process was spawned as a child process of typically abused processes on $dest$ mitre_attack_id: - T1021 - T1021.003 - T1021.006 - T1047 - T1053.005 - T1543.003 - T1059.001 - T1218.014 observable: - name: dest type: Endpoint role: - Victim product: - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud required_fields: - _time - Processes.dest - Processes.user - Processes.parent_process_name - Processes.parent_process - Processes.original_file_name - Processes.process_name - Processes.process - Processes.process_id - Processes.parent_process_path - Processes.process_path - Processes.parent_process_id risk_score: 45 security_domain: endpoint tests: - name: True Positive Test attack_data: - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_powershell/windows-sysmon.log source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational sourcetype: xmlwineventlog