name: AWS CreateAccessKey id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-11ad-212bf3d0d111 version: 1 date: '2021-03-02' author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk type: batch datamodel: [] description: This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A who has already permission to create access keys, makes an API call to create access keys for another user B. Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case new victim(user B) has more permissions than old victim(user B) search: '`cloudtrail` eventName = CreateAccessKey userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success| search userName!=requestParameters.userName | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.userName src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`|`aws_createaccesskey_filter`' how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs. known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created keys for another user. references: - https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws - https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation-part-2/ tags: analytic_story: - AWS IAM Privilege Escalation asset_type: AWS Account automated_detection_testing: passed cis20: - CIS 13 dataset: - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_createaccesskey/aws_cloudtrail_events.json kill_chain_phases: - Actions on Objectives mitre_attack_id: - T1136.003 nist: - PR.DS - PR.AC - DE.CM product: - Splunk Security Analytics for AWS - Splunk Enterprise - Splunk Enterprise Security - Splunk Cloud required_fields: - _time - eventName - userAgent - errorCode - requestParameters.userName risk_object: src risk_object_type: system risk_score: 20 security_domain: network