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splunk-security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_rclone_command_line_usage.yml
2021-07-21 09:22:09 +02:00

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3.2 KiB
YAML

name: Detect RClone Command-Line Usage
id: 32e0baea-b3f1-11eb-a2ce-acde48001122
version: 1
date: '2021-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
type: TTP
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: This analytic identifies commonly used command-line arguments used by
`rclone.exe` to initiate a file transfer. Some arguments were negated as they are
specific to the configuration used by adversaries. In particular, an adversary may
list the files or directories of the remote file share using `ls` or `lsd`, which
is not indicative of malicious behavior. During triage, at this stage of a ransomware
event, exfiltration is about to occur or has already. Isolate the endpoint and continue
investigating by review file modifications and parallel processes.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process IN ("*copy*",
"*mega*", "*pcloud*", "*ftp*", "*--config*", "*--progress*", "*--no-check-certificate*",
"*--ignore-existing*", "*--auto-confirm*", "*--transfers*", "*--multi-thread-streams*") by
Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id
Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rclone_command_line_usage_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
known_false_positives: There is potential for false positives as these arguments may
be used by other applications. Filter or tune the analytic as needed.
references:
- https://redcanary.com/blog/rclone-mega-extortion/
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/
tags:
analytic_story:
- DarkSide Ransomware
- Ransomware
automated_detection_testing: passed
confidence: 70
context:
- Source:Endpoint
- Stage:Exfiltration
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-sysmon.log
impact: 50
kill_chain_phases:
- Exfiltration
message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified
on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to connect to a remote cloud service
to move files or folders.
mitre_attack_id:
- T1020
observable:
- name: user
type: User
role:
- Victim
- name: dest
type: Hostname
role:
- Victim
- name: parent_process_name
type: Parent Process
role:
- Parent Process
- name: process_name
type: Process
role:
- Child Process
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- _time
- Processes.dest
- Processes.user
- Processes.parent_process
- Processes.process_name
- Processes.process
- Processes.process_id
- Processes.parent_process_id
risk_score: 35
security_domain: endpoint