4.6 KiB
title, excerpt, categories, last_modified_at, toc, toc_label, tags
| title | excerpt | categories | last_modified_at | toc | toc_label | tags | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anomalous usage of 7zip | Archive via Utility, Archive Collected Data |
|
2021-04-22 | true |
|
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Description
The following detection identifies a 7z.exe spawned from Rundll32.exe or Dllhost.exe. It is assumed that the adversary has brought in 7z.exe and 7z.dll. It has been observed where an adversary will rename 7z.exe. Additional coverage may be required to identify the behavior of renamed instances of 7z.exe. During triage, identify the source of injection into Rundll32.exe or Dllhost.exe. Capture any files written to disk and analyze as needed. Review parallel processes for additional behaviors. Typically, archiving files will result in exfiltration.
- Type: Anomaly
- Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
- Datamodel: Endpoint
- Last Updated: 2021-04-22
- Author: Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
- ID: 9364ee8e-a39a-11eb-8f1d-acde48001122
ATT&CK
| ID | Technique | Tactic |
|---|---|---|
| T1560.001 | Archive via Utility | Collection |
| T1560 | Archive Collected Data | Collection |
Search
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("rundll32.exe", "dllhost.exe") Processes.process_name=*7z* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `anomalous_usage_of_7zip_filter`
Associated Analytic Story
How To Implement
To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the Endpoint datamodel in the Processes node.
Required field
- _time
- Processes.process_name
- Processes.process
- Processes.dest
- Processes.user
- Processes.parent_process_name
- Processes.process_name
- Processes.parent_process
- Processes.process_id
- Processes.parent_process_id
Kill Chain Phase
- Actions on Objective
Known False Positives
False positives should be limited as this behavior is not normal for rundll32.exe or dllhost.exe to spawn and run 7zip.
RBA
| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message |
|---|---|---|---|
| 64.0 | 80 | 80 | An instance of parent_process_name spawning process_name was identified on endpoint dest by user user. This behavior is indicative of suspicious loading of 7zip. |
Reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001/
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/31/bazar-no-ryuk/
Test Dataset
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
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