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CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation Command and Scripting Interpreter , Windows Command Shell , Windows Service , Create or Modify System Process
Endpoint
2021-05-20 true
Command and Scripting Interpreter
Windows Command Shell
Windows Service
Create or Modify System Process
Execution
Execution
Persistence
Privilege Escalation
Persistence
Privilege Escalation
Splunk Enterprise
Splunk Enterprise Security
Splunk Cloud
Endpoint

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Description

This analytic identifies a common behavior by Cobalt Strike and other frameworks where the adversary will escalate privileges, either via jump (Cobalt Strike PTH) or getsystem, using named-pipe impersonation. A suspicious event will look like cmd.exe /c echo 4sgryt3436 > \\.\Pipe\5erg53.

  • Type: TTP
  • Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
  • Datamodel: Endpoint- Datasource: Splunk Add-on for Sysmon
  • Last Updated: 2021-05-20
  • Author: Michael Haag, Splunk
  • ID: eb277ba0-b96b-11eb-b00e-acde48001122

Annotations

ATT&CK
ID Technique Tactic
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Execution

| T1059.003 | Windows Command Shell | Execution |

| T1543.003 | Windows Service | Persistence, Privilege Escalation |

| T1543 | Create or Modify System Process | Persistence, Privilege Escalation |

Kill Chain Phase
  • Exploitation
NIST
CIS20
CVE

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` OR Processes.process=*%comspec%* (Processes.process=*echo* AND Processes.process=*pipe*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id 
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
| `cmd_echo_pipe___escalation_filter`

Macros

The SPL above uses the following Macros:

cmd_echo_pipe_-_escalation_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Required field

  • _time
  • Processes.dest
  • Processes.user
  • Processes.parent_process_name
  • Processes.parent_process
  • Processes.original_file_name
  • Processes.process_name
  • Processes.process
  • Processes.process_id
  • Processes.parent_process_path
  • Processes.process_path
  • Processes.parent_process_id

How To Implement

To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the Endpoint datamodel in the Processes node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.

Known False Positives

Unknown. It is possible filtering may be required to ensure fidelity.

Associated Analytic story

RBA

Risk Score Impact Confidence Message
64.0 80 80 An instance of parent_process_name spawning process_name was identified on endpoint dest by user user potentially performing privilege escalation using named pipes related to Cobalt Strike and other frameworks.

The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

Reference

Test Dataset

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range

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