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splunk-security_content/detections/application/windows_ad_suspicious_attribute_modification.yml
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name: Windows AD Suspicious Attribute Modification
id: 5682052e-ce55-4f9f-8d28-59191420b7e0
version: 1
date: '2023-11-13'
author: Dean Luxton
status: production
type: TTP
data_source:
- Windows Security 5136
description: 'This detection monitors changes to the following Active Directory attributes:
"msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo", "msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity", "msDS-KeyCredentialLink",
"scriptPath", and "msTSInitialProgram". Modifications to these attributes can indicate
potential malicious activity or privilege escalation attempts. Immediate investigation
is recommended upon alert.'
search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5136 AttributeLDAPDisplayName IN ("msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo","msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity","scriptPath","msTSInitialProgram")
OperationType=%%14674 ```Changes to the attribute "msDS-KeyCredentialLink" are
also worth moniroting, however tuning will need to be applied``` | table _time ObjectClass
ObjectDN OpCorrelationID src_user SubjectLogonId DSName AttributeValue AttributeLDAPDisplayName |
rename SubjectLogonId as TargetLogonId, src_user as initiator, _time as eventTime |
appendpipe [| map search="search `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 TargetLogonId=$TargetLogonId$"] |
stats min(eventTime) as _time values(initiator) as src_user, values(DSName) as targetDomain,
values(ObjectDN) as ObjectDN, values(ObjectClass) as ObjectClass, values(src_category)
as src_category, values(src_ip) as src_ip values(LogonType) as LogonType values(AttributeValue)
as AttributeValue values(AttributeLDAPDisplayName) as AttributeLDAPDisplayName by
TargetLogonId | rex field=ObjectDN "^CN=(?P<cn>.*?),[A-Z]{2}\=" | eval dest=if(ObjectClass="computer",cn,null),
user=if(ObjectClass="user",cn,null) | fields - cn | `windows_ad_suspicious_attribute_modification_filter`'
how_to_implement: Ensure you are ingesting Active Directory audit logs - specifically
event 5136. See lantern article in references for further on how to onboard AD audit
data. Ensure the wineventlog_security macro is configured with the correct indexes.
known_false_positives: If key credentials are regularly assigned to users, these events
will need to be tuned out.
references:
- https://trustedsec.com/blog/a-hitchhackers-guide-to-dacl-based-detections-part-1-a
- https://lantern.splunk.com/Security/Product_Tips/Enterprise_Security/Enabling_an_audit_trail_from_Active_Directory
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for $src_user$ and $dest$
search: '%original_detection_search% | search src_user = $src_user$ dest = $dest$'
tags:
analytic_story:
- Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 100
impact: 100
message: $src_user$ has added $AttributeLDAPDisplayName$ ACL rights to $ObjectClass$
$ObjectDN$
mitre_attack_id:
- T1550
- T1222
- T1222.001
observable:
- name: src_user
type: User
role:
- Victim
- name: dest
type: Hostname
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
risk_score: 100
required_fields:
- _time
- OperationType
- ObjectDN
- OpCorrelationID
- src_user
- AttributeLDAPDisplayName
- AttributeValue
- ObjectClass
- SubjectLogonId
- DSName
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/dacl_abuse/suspicious_acl_modification-windows-security-xml.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog