Files
splunk-security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_rclone_command_line_usage.yml
2024-08-15 15:36:03 -05:00

96 lines
4.0 KiB
YAML

name: Detect RClone Command-Line Usage
id: 32e0baea-b3f1-11eb-a2ce-acde48001122
version: 4
date: '2024-08-15'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the usage of `rclone.exe` with specific
command-line arguments indicative of file transfer activities. It leverages data
from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions
and process details. This activity is significant as `rclone.exe` is often used
by adversaries for data exfiltration, especially during ransomware attacks. If confirmed
malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized data transfer, resulting in
data breaches and potential loss of sensitive information. Immediate isolation of
the affected endpoint and further investigation are recommended.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
- Windows Event Log Security 4688
- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rclone` Processes.process
IN ("*copy*", "*mega*", "*pcloud*", "*ftp*", "*--config*", "*--progress*", "*--no-check-certificate*",
"*--ignore-existing*", "*--auto-confirm*", "*--transfers*", "*--multi-thread-streams*") by
Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name
Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `detect_rclone_command_line_usage_filter`'
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must
be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to
the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint`
data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: False positives should be limited as this is restricted to
the Rclone process name. Filter or tune the analytic as needed.
references:
- https://redcanary.com/blog/rclone-mega-extortion/
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/29/continuing-the-bazar-ransomware-story/
tags:
analytic_story:
- DarkSide Ransomware
- Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 70
impact: 50
message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified
on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to connect to a remote cloud service
to move files or folders.
mitre_attack_id:
- T1020
observable:
- name: user
type: User
role:
- Victim
- name: dest
type: Hostname
role:
- Victim
- name: parent_process_name
type: Process
role:
- Attacker
- name: process_name
type: Process
role:
- Attacker
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- _time
- Processes.dest
- Processes.user
- Processes.parent_process
- Processes.process_name
- Processes.process
- Processes.process_id
- Processes.parent_process_id
- Processes.original_file_name
risk_score: 35
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data:
https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog