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splunk-security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_mimikatz_binary_execution.yml
2024-08-15 15:36:03 -05:00

100 lines
4.0 KiB
YAML

name: Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution
id: a9e0d6d3-9676-4e26-994d-4e0406bb4467
version: 3
date: '2024-08-15'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic identifies the execution of the native mimikatz.exe
binary on Windows systems, including instances where the binary is renamed. It leverages
data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names
and original file names. This activity is significant because Mimikatz is a widely
used tool for extracting authentication credentials, posing a severe security risk.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to obtain sensitive
credentials, escalate privileges, and move laterally within the network, leading
to potential data breaches and system compromise.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
- Windows Event Log Security 4688
- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=mimikatz.exe
OR Processes.original_file_name=mimikatz.exe) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name
Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id
Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_mimikatz_binary_execution_filter`'
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must
be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to
the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint`
data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: False positives should be limited as this is directly looking
for Mimikatz, the credential dumping utility.
references:
- https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/sites/default/files/publications/aa22-320a_joint_csa_iranian_government-sponsored_apt_actors_compromise_federal%20network_deploy_crypto%20miner_credential_harvester.pdf
- https://www.varonis.com/blog/what-is-mimikatz
- https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/24/2003229517/-1/-1/0/CSA_Living_off_the_Land.PDF
tags:
analytic_story:
- Volt Typhoon
- Sandworm Tools
- Credential Dumping
- Flax Typhoon
- CISA AA22-320A
- CISA AA23-347A
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 100
impact: 100
message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified
on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting dump credentials.
mitre_attack_id:
- T1003
observable:
- name: user
type: User
role:
- Victim
- name: dest
type: Hostname
role:
- Victim
- name: parent_process_name
type: Process
role:
- Attacker
- name: process_name
type: Process
role:
- Attacker
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- _time
- Processes.dest
- Processes.user
- Processes.parent_process_name
- Processes.parent_process
- Processes.original_file_name
- Processes.process_name
- Processes.process
- Processes.process_id
- Processes.parent_process_path
- Processes.process_path
- Processes.parent_process_id
risk_score: 100
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data:
https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/mimikatzwindows-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
update_timestamp: true