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splunk-security_content/detections/endpoint/malicious_inprocserver32_modification.yml
2024-06-26 14:41:53 +00:00

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YAML

name: Malicious InProcServer32 Modification
id: 127c8d08-25ff-11ec-9223-acde48001122
version: 2
date: '2024-05-30'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects a process modifying the registry with
a known malicious CLSID under InProcServer32. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection
and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on registry modifications within the HKLM or
HKCU Software Classes CLSID paths. This activity is significant as it may indicate
an attempt to load a malicious DLL, potentially leading to code execution. If confirmed
malicious, this could allow an attacker to persist in the environment, execute arbitrary
code, or escalate privileges, posing a severe threat to system integrity and security.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
- Sysmon EventID 12
- Sysmon EventID 13
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid
Processes.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid [| tstats
`security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=
"*\\CLSID\\{89565275-A714-4a43-912E-978B935EDCCC}\\InProcServer32\\(Default)" by
Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest
Registry.process_guid Registry.user | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | fields _time
dest registry_path registry_key_name registry_value_name process_name process_path
process process_guid user] | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
by dest, process_name registry_path registry_key_name registry_value_name user |
`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `malicious_inprocserver32_modification_filter`'
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must
be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to
the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint`
data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: False positives should be limited, filter as needed. In our
test case, Remcos used regsvr32.exe to modify the registry. It may be required,
dependent upon the EDR tool producing registry events, to remove (Default) from
the command-line.
references:
- https://bohops.com/2018/06/28/abusing-com-registry-structure-clsid-localserver32-inprocserver32/
- https://tria.ge/210929-ap75vsddan
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cb77b93150cb0f7fe65ce8a7e2a5781e727419451355a7736db84109fa215a89
tags:
analytic_story:
- Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity
- Remcos
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 100
impact: 80
message: The $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ modifying the registry
with a known malicious clsid under InProcServer32.
mitre_attack_id:
- T1218.010
- T1112
observable:
- name: dest
type: Hostname
role:
- Victim
- name: process_name
type: Process
role:
- Child Process
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- _time
- dest
- process_name
- registry_path
- registry_key_name
- registry_value_name
- user
risk_score: 80
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data:
https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos/windows-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog