Files
splunk-security_content/dev/endpoint/etw_registry_disabled.yml
2023-01-20 13:24:15 +01:00

63 lines
1.9 KiB
YAML

name: ETW Registry Disabled
id: 8ed523ac-276b-11ec-ac39-acde48001122
version: 2
date: '2022-01-28'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: This analytic is to detect a registry modification to disable ETW feature
of windows. This technique is to evade EDR appliance to evade detections and hide
its execution from audit logs.
data_source:
- Sysmon Event ID 13
search:
selection1:
Registry.registry_value_name: ETWEnabled
TargetObject: '*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\.NETFramework*'
Details: '0x00000000'
condition: selection1
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response
product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data
used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes
to the registry.
known_false_positives: unknown
references:
- https://gist.github.com/Cyb3rWard0g/a4a115fd3ab518a0e593525a379adee3
tags:
analytic_story:
- Windows Persistence Techniques
- Windows Privilege Escalation
- Windows Registry Abuse
- Hermetic Wiper
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 100
impact: 90
message: modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$
mitre_attack_id:
- T1562.006
- T1127
- T1562
observable:
- name: dest
type: Hostname
role:
- Victim
- name: user
type: User
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
risk_score: 90
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127/etw_disable/sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog