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63 lines
2.6 KiB
YAML
63 lines
2.6 KiB
YAML
name: Windows Registry Certificate Added
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id: 5ee98b2f-8b9e-457a-8bdc-dd41aaba9e87
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version: 1
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date: '2022-03-31'
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author: Michael Haag, Splunk
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status: production
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type: TTP
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description: The following analytic identifies installation of a root CA certificate
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by monitoring the registry. The base paths may be found [here](https://gist.github.com/mattifestation/75d6117707bcf8c26845b3cbb6ad2b6b/raw/ae65ef15c706140ffc2e165615204e20f2903028/RootCAInstallationDetection.xml).
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In short, there are specific certificate registry paths that will be written to
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(SetValue) when a new certificate is added. The high-fidelity events to pay attention
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to are SetValue events where the TargetObject property ends with "<THUMBPRINT_VALUE>\Blob"
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as this indicates the direct installation or modification of a root certificate
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binary blob. The other high fidelity reference will be which process is making the
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registry modifications. There are very few processes that modify these day to day,
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therefore monitoring for all to start (hunting) provides a great beginning.
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data_source:
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- Sysmon Event ID 13
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search:
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selection1:
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Registry.registry_value_name: Blob
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TargetObject: '*\\certificates\\*'
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condition: selection1
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how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
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on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
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your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Registry` node.
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In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest
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TA for the endpoint product.
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known_false_positives: False positives will be limited to a legitimate business applicating
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consistently adding new root certificates to the endpoint. Filter by user, process,
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or thumbprint.
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references:
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- https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec
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- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/tree/master/atomics/T1553.004
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tags:
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analytic_story:
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- Windows Drivers
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- Windows Registry Abuse
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asset_type: Endpoint
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confidence: 70
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impact: 60
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message: A root certificate was added on $dest$.
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mitre_attack_id:
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- T1553.004
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- T1553
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observable:
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- name: dest
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type: Endpoint
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role:
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- Victim
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product:
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- Splunk Enterprise
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- Splunk Enterprise Security
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- Splunk Cloud
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risk_score: 42
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security_domain: endpoint
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tests:
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- name: True Positive Test
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attack_data:
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- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1587.002/atomic_red_team/certblob_windows-sysmon.log
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source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
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sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
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