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splunk-security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_debugger_tool_execution.yml
Nasreddine Bencherchali 9fc8942993 New Rules & Updates - Oct 25 (#3726)
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* new analytic and updates / incl. fix #3730

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2025-10-24 14:19:48 -07:00

59 lines
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YAML

name: Windows Debugger Tool Execution
id: e14d94a3-07fb-4b47-8406-f5e37180d422
version: 6
date: '2025-10-21'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
- Windows Event Log Security 4688
- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
type: Hunting
status: production
description: This analysis detects the use of debugger tools within a production environment.
While these tools are legitimate for file analysis and debugging, they are abused
by malware like PlugX and DarkGate for malicious DLL side-loading. The hunting query
aids Security Operations Centers (SOCs) in identifying potentially suspicious tool
executions, particularly for non-technical users in the production network.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "x32dbg.exe"
OR Processes.process_name = "x64dbg.exe" OR Processes.process_name = "windbg.exe"
by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec
Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_debugger_tool_execution_filter`'
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must
be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to
the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint`
data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: administrator or IT professional may execute this application
for verifying files or debugging application.
references:
- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/enter-the-gates-an-analysis-of-the-darkgate-autoit-loader.html
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/b/investigating-the-plugx-trojan-disguised-as-a-legitimate-windows.html
tags:
analytic_story:
- DarkGate Malware
- PlugX
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1036
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036/debugger_execution/debugger.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog