mirror of
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64ed5bb1e8
* APT 37 and The No Good Rustonotto ## Updated analytics ``` detections/application/detect_html_help_spawn_child_process.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/bitsadmin_download_file.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/cisco_nvm___suspicious_download_from_file_sharing_website.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/cobalt_strike_named_pipes.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_renamed.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_url_in_command_line.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/detect_html_help_using_infotech_storage_handlers.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_inline_hta_execution.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_renamed.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/detect_mshta_url_in_command_line.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/detect_outlook_exe_writing_a_zip_file.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/executables_or_script_creation_in_temp_path.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/icedid_exfiltrated_archived_file_creation.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/lolbas_with_network_traffic.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___execution_policy_bypass.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/mshta_spawning_rundll32_or_regsvr32_process.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/powershell_4104_hunting.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/process_creating_lnk_file_in_suspicious_location.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/processes_tapping_keyboard_events.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/registry_keys_used_for_persistence.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/scheduled_task_deleted_or_created_via_cmd.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/suspicious_curl_network_connection.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/suspicious_image_creation_in_appdata_folder.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/suspicious_mshta_spawn.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/suspicious_process_executed_from_container_file.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/suspicious_scheduled_task_from_public_directory.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/windows_alternate_datastream___base64_content.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/windows_archive_collected_data_via_powershell.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/windows_archive_collected_data_via_rar.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/windows_archived_collected_data_in_temp_folder.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/windows_boot_or_logon_autostart_execution_in_startup_folder.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/windows_cab_file_on_disk.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/windows_curl_download_to_suspicious_path.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/windows_exfiltration_over_c2_via_invoke_restmethod.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/windows_exfiltration_over_c2_via_powershell_uploadstring.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/windows_file_download_via_powershell.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/windows_high_file_deletion_frequency.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/windows_http_network_communication_from_msiexec.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/windows_indicator_removal_via_rmdir.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/windows_input_capture_using_credential_ui_dll.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/windows_iso_lnk_file_creation.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/windows_obfuscated_files_or_information_via_rar_sfx.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/windows_office_product_dropped_cab_or_inf_file.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/windows_office_product_spawned_child_process_for_download.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/windows_office_product_spawned_uncommon_process.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/windows_process_executed_from_removable_media.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/windows_process_execution_from_programdata.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/windows_process_injection_into_commonly_abused_processes.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/windows_process_injection_into_notepad.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/windows_replication_through_removable_media.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/windows_scheduled_task_with_suspicious_command.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/windows_scheduled_task_with_suspicious_name.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/windows_screen_capture_in_temp_folder.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/windows_screen_capture_via_powershell.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/windows_service_created_with_suspicious_service_path.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/windows_spearphishing_attachment_onenote_spawn_mshta.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/windows_suspicious_driver_loaded_path.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/windows_system_binary_proxy_execution_compiled_html_file_decompile.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/windows_usbstor_registry_key_modification.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/windows_user_execution_malicious_url_shortcut_file.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/windows_wpdbusenum_registry_key_modification.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/winevent_scheduled_task_created_within_public_path.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/web/multiple_archive_files_http_post_traffic.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/web/plain_http_post_exfiltrated_data.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer detections/endpoint/windows_expand_cabinet_file_extraction.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer ``` ## New Story ``` stories/apt37_rustonotto_and_fadestealer.yml — APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer ``` * Create windows_expand_cabinet_file_extraction.yml * Apply suggestion from @nasbench Co-authored-by: Nasreddine Bencherchali <nasreddineb@splunk.com> * Update detections/endpoint/windows_expand_cabinet_file_extraction.yml Co-authored-by: Nasreddine Bencherchali <nasreddineb@splunk.com> * Update detections/endpoint/windows_expand_cabinet_file_extraction.yml Co-authored-by: Nasreddine Bencherchali <nasreddineb@splunk.com> * Update detections/endpoint/windows_expand_cabinet_file_extraction.yml Co-authored-by: Nasreddine Bencherchali <nasreddineb@splunk.com> * updating conflicts --------- Co-authored-by: Nasreddine Bencherchali <nasreddineb@splunk.com> Co-authored-by: Bhavin Patel <bhavin.j.patel91@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Bhavin Patel <bpatel@splunk.com>
90 lines
4.7 KiB
YAML
90 lines
4.7 KiB
YAML
name: Windows Process Execution From ProgramData
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id: 237016fa-d8e6-47b4-80f9-70c4d42c72c0
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version: '5'
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date: '2025-09-18'
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author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
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status: production
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type: Anomaly
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description: The following analytic identifies processes running from file paths within
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the ProgramData directory, a common location abused by adversaries for executing
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malicious code while evading detection. Threat actors often drop and execute payloads
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from this directory to bypass security controls, as it typically has write permissions
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for standard users. While this behavior can indicate malware execution or persistence
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techniques, it is important to note that some legitimate software, installers, and
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update mechanisms also run from ProgramData, leading to potential false positives.
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Security teams should validate detections by correlating with other indicators,
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such as unusual parent processes, unsigned binaries, or anomalous network activity.
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data_source:
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- Sysmon EventID 1
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- Windows Event Log Security 4688
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- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
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search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process_name)
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as process_name values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
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as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_path = "*:\\ProgramData\\*"
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by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
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Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
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Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec
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Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
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Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
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| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
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| `windows_process_execution_from_programdata_filter`'
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how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
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and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
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telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
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you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
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Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must
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be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to
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the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint`
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data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
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names and speed up the data modeling process.
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known_false_positives: Administrators may allow execution of specific binaries in
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non-standard paths. Filter as needed.
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references:
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- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/05/24/volt-typhoon-targets-us-critical-infrastructure-with-living-off-the-land-techniques/
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drilldown_searches:
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- name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
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search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$"'
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earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
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latest_offset: $info_max_time$
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- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
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search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$")
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starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
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values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories)
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as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic)
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as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
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| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
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earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
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latest_offset: $info_max_time$
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rba:
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message: Suspicious process $process_name$ running from a process path- $process_path$
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on host- $dest$
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risk_objects:
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- field: dest
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type: system
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score: 25
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threat_objects:
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- field: parent_process_name
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type: parent_process_name
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tags:
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analytic_story:
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- SnappyBee
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- XWorm
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- Salt Typhoon
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- China-Nexus Threat Activity
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- APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer
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- GhostRedirector IIS Module and Rungan Backdoor
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asset_type: Endpoint
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mitre_attack_id:
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- T1036.005
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product:
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- Splunk Enterprise
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- Splunk Enterprise Security
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- Splunk Cloud
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security_domain: endpoint
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tests:
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- name: True Positive Test
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attack_data:
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- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1036.005/process_in_programdata/exec_programdata.log
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source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
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sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
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