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Nasreddine Bencherchali
11c909f725
* Add YAML formatting and validation infrastructure - Add yamlfmt configuration (.yamlfmt) with 4-space indent, LF line endings - Add yamllint configuration (.yamllint) for syntax validation (detections/ only) - Add pre-commit hook for automatic YAML formatting - Add CI validation script with unified error output - Add GitHub Actions workflow for PR validation - Add documentation for setup and usage - Support custom yamlfmt binary path via --yamlfmt-path flag * comment yaml check from pre-commit * apply yamlfmt * Update yaml-validation.yml * Update yaml-validation.yml * application folder search formatting * cloud folder search formatting * web folder search formatting * network folder search formatting * endpoint folder search formatting * resolve first conflict * apply formatting * remove additional pipe * Update README.md * update versions * restore and update formatting (#3920) --------- Co-authored-by: Bhavin Patel <bhavin.j.patel91@gmail.com>
55 lines
3.8 KiB
YAML
55 lines
3.8 KiB
YAML
name: Logon Script Event Trigger Execution
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id: 4c38c264-1f74-11ec-b5fa-acde48001122
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version: 8
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date: '2026-01-14'
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author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
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status: production
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type: TTP
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description: The following analytic detects the modification of the UserInitMprLogonScript registry entry, which is often used by attackers to establish persistence and gain privilege escalation upon system boot. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to the specified registry path. This activity is significant because it is a common technique used by APT groups and malware to ensure their payloads execute automatically when the system starts. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistent access and potentially escalate their privileges on the compromised host.
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data_source:
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- Sysmon EventID 13
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search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path IN ("*\\Environment\\UserInitMprLogonScript") by Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.process_id Registry.registry_hive Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_type Registry.status Registry.user Registry.vendor_product | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `logon_script_event_trigger_execution_filter`'
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how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.
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known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
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references:
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- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/001/
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drilldown_searches:
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- name: View the detection results for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
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search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$" user = "$user$"'
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earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
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latest_offset: $info_max_time$
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- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
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search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$", "$user$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
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earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
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latest_offset: $info_max_time$
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rba:
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message: Registry path $registry_path$ was modified, added, or deleted on $dest$.
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risk_objects:
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- field: dest
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type: system
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score: 80
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- field: user
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type: user
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score: 80
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threat_objects: []
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tags:
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analytic_story:
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- Data Destruction
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- Windows Privilege Escalation
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- Hermetic Wiper
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- Windows Persistence Techniques
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asset_type: Endpoint
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mitre_attack_id:
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- T1037.001
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product:
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- Splunk Enterprise
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- Splunk Enterprise Security
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- Splunk Cloud
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security_domain: endpoint
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tests:
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- name: True Positive Test
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attack_data:
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- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1037.001/logonscript_reg/sysmon.log
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source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
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sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
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