mirror of
https://github.com/splunk/security_content
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57 lines
3.0 KiB
YAML
57 lines
3.0 KiB
YAML
name: Process Writing DynamicWrapperX
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id: b0a078e4-2601-11ec-9aec-acde48001122
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version: 7
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date: '2025-05-02'
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author: Michael Haag, Splunk
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status: production
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type: Hunting
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description: The following analytic detects a process writing the dynwrapx.dll file
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to disk and registering it in the registry. It leverages data from the Endpoint
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datamodel, specifically monitoring process and filesystem events. This activity
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is significant because DynamicWrapperX is an ActiveX component often used in scripts
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to call Windows API functions, and its presence in non-standard locations is highly
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suspicious. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary
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code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment. Immediate
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investigation of parallel processes and registry modifications is recommended.
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data_source:
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- Sysmon EventID 11
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search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
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where Filesystem.file_name="dynwrapx.dll" by Filesystem.action Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_access_time
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Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.file_modify_time Filesystem.file_name
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Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_acl Filesystem.file_size Filesystem.process_guid
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Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.user Filesystem.vendor_product | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
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| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `process_writing_dynamicwrapperx_filter`'
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how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
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on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
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your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` and `Filesystem`
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node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the
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latest TA for the endpoint product.
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known_false_positives: False positives should be limited, however it is possible to
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filter by Processes.process_name and specific processes (ex. wscript.exe). Filter
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as needed. This may need modification based on EDR telemetry and how it brings in
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registry data. For example, removal of (Default).
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references:
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- https://blog.f-secure.com/hunting-for-koadic-a-com-based-rootkit/
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- https://www.script-coding.com/dynwrapx_eng.html
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- https://bohops.com/2018/06/28/abusing-com-registry-structure-clsid-localserver32-inprocserver32/
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- https://tria.ge/210929-ap75vsddan
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- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cb77b93150cb0f7fe65ce8a7e2a5781e727419451355a7736db84109fa215a89
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tags:
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analytic_story:
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- Remcos
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asset_type: Endpoint
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mitre_attack_id:
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- T1059
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- T1559.001
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product:
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- Splunk Enterprise
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- Splunk Enterprise Security
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- Splunk Cloud
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security_domain: endpoint
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tests:
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- name: True Positive Test
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attack_data:
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- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/remcos/remcos/windows-sysmon.log
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source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
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sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
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