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Nasreddine Bencherchali
11c909f725
* Add YAML formatting and validation infrastructure - Add yamlfmt configuration (.yamlfmt) with 4-space indent, LF line endings - Add yamllint configuration (.yamllint) for syntax validation (detections/ only) - Add pre-commit hook for automatic YAML formatting - Add CI validation script with unified error output - Add GitHub Actions workflow for PR validation - Add documentation for setup and usage - Support custom yamlfmt binary path via --yamlfmt-path flag * comment yaml check from pre-commit * apply yamlfmt * Update yaml-validation.yml * Update yaml-validation.yml * application folder search formatting * cloud folder search formatting * web folder search formatting * network folder search formatting * endpoint folder search formatting * resolve first conflict * apply formatting * remove additional pipe * Update README.md * update versions * restore and update formatting (#3920) --------- Co-authored-by: Bhavin Patel <bhavin.j.patel91@gmail.com>
45 lines
2.3 KiB
YAML
45 lines
2.3 KiB
YAML
name: AWS CreateAccessKey
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id: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-11ad-212bf3d0d111
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version: 10
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date: '2026-02-25'
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author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
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status: production
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type: Hunting
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description: The following analytic identifies the creation of AWS IAM access keys by a user for another user, which can indicate privilege escalation. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to detect instances where the user creating the access key is different from the user for whom the key is created. This activity is significant because unauthorized access key creation can allow attackers to establish persistence or exfiltrate data via AWS APIs. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to AWS services, data exfiltration, and long-term persistence in the environment.
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data_source:
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- AWS CloudTrail CreateAccessKey
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search: |-
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`cloudtrail` eventName = CreateAccessKey userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success
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| eval match=if(match(userIdentity.userName,requestParameters.userName),1,0)
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| search match=0
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| rename user_name as user
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| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
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BY signature dest user
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user_agent src vendor_account
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vendor_region vendor_product
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| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
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| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
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| `aws_createaccesskey_filter`
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how_to_implement: You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.
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known_false_positives: While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created keys for another user.
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references:
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- https://bishopfox.com/blog/privilege-escalation-in-aws
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- https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation-part-2/
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tags:
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analytic_story:
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- AWS IAM Privilege Escalation
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asset_type: AWS Account
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mitre_attack_id:
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- T1136.003
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product:
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- Splunk Enterprise
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- Splunk Enterprise Security
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- Splunk Cloud
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security_domain: network
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tests:
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- name: True Positive Test
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attack_data:
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- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1078/aws_createaccesskey/aws_cloudtrail_events.json
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sourcetype: aws:cloudtrail
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source: aws_cloudtrail
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