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76 lines
2.9 KiB
YAML
76 lines
2.9 KiB
YAML
name: Detect Rundll32 Inline HTA Execution
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id: 91c79f14-5b41-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
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version: 1
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date: '2021-01-20'
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author: Michael Haag, Splunk
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type: batch
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datamodel:
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- Endpoint
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description: The following analytic identifies "rundll32.exe" execution with inline
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protocol handlers. "JavaScript", "VBScript", and "About" are the only supported
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options when invoking HTA content directly on the command-line. This type of behavior
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is commonly observed with fileless malware or application whitelisting bypass techniques.
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The search will return the first time and last time these command-line arguments
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were used for these executions, as well as the target system, the user, process
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"rundll32.exe" and its parent process.
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search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
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as process values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process min(_time) as firstTime
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max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=rundll32.exe
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(Processes.process=*vbscript* OR Processes.process=*javascript* OR Processes.process=*about*)
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by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.dest |
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`drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
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| `detect_rundll32_inline_hta_execution_filter`'
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how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
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on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
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your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
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known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may exhibit
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this behavior, triggering a false positive.
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references:
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- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses
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- https://redcanary.com/blog/introducing-atomictestharnesses/
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- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/search/-search-3x-wds-extidx-prot-implementing
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tags:
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analytic_story:
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- Suspicious MSHTA Activity
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- NOBELIUM Group
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asset_type: Endpoint
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automated_detection_testing: passed
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cis20:
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- CIS 8
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confidence: 80
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context:
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- Source:Endpoint
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- Stage:Initial Access
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- Stage:Execution
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- Stage:Defense Evasion
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dataset:
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- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.005/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
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impact: 70
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kill_chain_phases:
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- Exploitation
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message: Suspicious rundll32.exe inline HTA execution on $dest$
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mitre_attack_id:
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- T1218.005
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nist:
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- PR.PT
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- DE.CM
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observable:
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- name: dest
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type: Endpoint
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role:
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- Victim
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product:
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- Splunk Enterprise
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- Splunk Enterprise Security
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- Splunk Cloud
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required_fields:
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- _time
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- Processes.process
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- Processes.process_name
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- Processes.user
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- Processes.dest
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- Processes.parent_process_name
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- Processes.parent_process
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risk_score: 56
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security_domain: endpoint
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