4.0 KiB
title, excerpt, categories, last_modified_at, toc, toc_label, tags
| title | excerpt | categories | last_modified_at | toc | toc_label | tags | |||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Logon Script Event Trigger Execution | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts, Logon Script (Windows) |
|
2021-09-27 | true |
|
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Description
This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry entry to persist and gain privilege escalation upon booting up of compromised host. This technique was seen in several APT and malware where it modify UserInitMprLogonScript registry entry to its malicious payload to be executed upon boot up of the machine.
- Type: TTP
- Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
- Datamodel: Endpoint
- Last Updated: 2021-09-27
- Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
- ID: 4c38c264-1f74-11ec-b5fa-acde48001122
ATT&CK
| ID | Technique | Tactic |
|---|---|---|
| T1037 | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts | Persistence, Privilege Escalation |
| T1037.001 | Logon Script (Windows) | Persistence, Privilege Escalation |
Search
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path IN ("*\\Environment\\UserInitMprLogonScript") by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
| `logon_script_event_trigger_execution_filter`
Associated Analytic Story
How To Implement
To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.
Required field
- _time
- Registry.dest
- Registry.user
- Registry.registry_path
- Registry.registry_key_name
- Registry.registry_value_name
Kill Chain Phase
- Exploitation
Known False Positives
unknown
RBA
| Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message |
|---|---|---|---|
| 80.0 | 80 | 100 | modified/added/deleted registry entry Registry.registry_path in dest |
Reference
Test Dataset
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
source | version: 1