splunk-security_content/docs/_posts/2021-12-07-fsutil_zeroing_file.md

title, excerpt, categories, last_modified_at, toc, toc_label, tags

title	excerpt	categories	last_modified_at	toc	toc_label	tags
Fsutil Zeroing File	Indicator Removal on Host	Endpoint	2021-12-07	true		Indicator Removal on Host Defense Evasion Splunk Behavioral Analytics Endpoint_Processes

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Description

This search is to detect a suspicious fsutil process to zeroing a target file. This technique was seen in lockbit ransomware where it tries to zero out its malware path as part of its defense evasion after encrypting the compromised host.

• Type: TTP
• Product: Splunk Behavioral Analytics
• Datamodel: Endpoint_Processes
• Last Updated: 2021-12-07
• Author: Michael Haag, Splunk
• ID: f792cdc9-43ee-4429-a3c0-ffce4fed1a85

ATT&CK

ID	Technique	Tactic
T1070	Indicator Removal on Host	Defense Evasion

Search

| from read_ssa_enriched_events() 
| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_path"), "string", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), "string", null), event_id=ucast(map_get(input_event, "event_id"), "string", null) 
| where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND process_name IS NOT NULL AND process_name="fsutil.exe" AND (like (cmd_line, "%setzerodata%")) 
| eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body=create_map(["event_id", event_id, "cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) 
| into write_ssa_detected_events();

Macros

The SPL above uses the following Macros:

Note that fsutil_zeroing_file_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Required field

• _time
• dest_device_id
• process_name
• parent_process_name
• process_path
• dest_user_id
• process
• cmd_line

How To Implement

To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed net.exe may be used.

Known False Positives

System administrators or scripts may delete user accounts via this technique. Filter as needed.

Associated Analytic story

• Ransomware

Kill Chain Phase

• Exploitation

RBA

Risk Score	Impact	Confidence	Message
54.0	60	90	An instance of parent_process_name spawning process_name was identified on endpoint dest_device_id by user dest_user_id atempting to perform file deletion.

Note that risk score is calculated base on the following formula: (Impact * Confidence)/100

Reference

• https://app.any.run/tasks/e0ac072d-58c9-4f53-8a3b-3e491c7ac5db/
• https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/fsutil-file

Test Dataset

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range

• https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070/fsutil_file_zero/windows-security.log

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