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splunk-security_content/detections/endpoint/disable_uac_remote_restriction.yml

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YAML

name: Disable UAC Remote Restriction
id: 9928b732-210e-11ec-b65e-acde48001122
version: 2
date: '2022-01-27'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
type: TTP
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification of registry to disable
UAC remote restriction. This technique was well documented in Microsoft page where
attacker may modify this registry value to bypassed UAC feature of windows host.
This is a good indicator that some tries to bypassed UAC to suspicious process or
gain privilege escalation.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="*\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System*"
Registry.registry_value_name="LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy" Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000001"
by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name
Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
|rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name
Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process
Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as
proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name
process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data]
| table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path
process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `disable_uac_remote_restriction_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response
product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data
used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes
to the registry.
known_false_positives: admin may set this policy for non-critical machine.
references:
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/windows-security/user-account-control-and-remote-restriction
tags:
analytic_story:
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
- Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
- Windows Registry Abuse
confidence: 100
context:
- Source:Endpoint
- Stage:Privilege Escalation
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.002/LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy/sysmon.log
impact: 80
kill_chain_phases:
- Exploitation
message: modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$
mitre_attack_id:
- T1548.002
- T1548
observable:
- name: dest
type: Hostname
role:
- Victim
- name: user
type: User
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- _time
- Registry.dest
- Registry.user
- Registry.registry_path
- Registry.registry_key_name
- Registry.registry_value_name
- Registry.registry_value_data
risk_score: 80
security_domain: endpoint
asset_type: Endpoint