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https://github.com/splunk/security_content
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Eric
97 lines
4.8 KiB
YAML
97 lines
4.8 KiB
YAML
name: Windows Mimikatz Binary Execution
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id: a9e0d6d3-9676-4e26-994d-4e0406bb4467
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version: 9
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date: '2025-05-02'
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author: Michael Haag, Splunk
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status: production
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type: TTP
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description: The following analytic identifies the execution of the native mimikatz.exe
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binary on Windows systems, including instances where the binary is renamed. It leverages
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data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names
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and original file names. This activity is significant because Mimikatz is a widely
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used tool for extracting authentication credentials, posing a severe security risk.
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If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to obtain sensitive
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credentials, escalate privileges, and move laterally within the network, leading
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to potential data breaches and system compromise.
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data_source:
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- Sysmon EventID 1
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- Windows Event Log Security 4688
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- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
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search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
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as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=mimikatz.exe
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OR Processes.original_file_name=mimikatz.exe) by Processes.action Processes.dest
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Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
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Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name
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Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
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Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name
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Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
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| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
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| `windows_mimikatz_binary_execution_filter`'
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how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
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and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
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telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
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you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
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Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must
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be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to
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the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint`
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data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
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names and speed up the data modeling process.
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known_false_positives: False positives should be limited as this is directly looking
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for Mimikatz, the credential dumping utility.
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references:
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- https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/sites/default/files/publications/aa22-320a_joint_csa_iranian_government-sponsored_apt_actors_compromise_federal%20network_deploy_crypto%20miner_credential_harvester.pdf
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- https://www.varonis.com/blog/what-is-mimikatz
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- https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/24/2003229517/-1/-1/0/CSA_Living_off_the_Land.PDF
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drilldown_searches:
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- name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
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search: '%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
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earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
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latest_offset: $info_max_time$
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- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
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search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$",
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"$dest$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
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as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk
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Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all)
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as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics"
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by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
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earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
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latest_offset: $info_max_time$
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rba:
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message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified
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on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting dump credentials.
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risk_objects:
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- field: user
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type: user
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score: 100
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- field: dest
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type: system
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score: 100
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threat_objects:
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- field: parent_process_name
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type: parent_process_name
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- field: process_name
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type: process_name
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tags:
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analytic_story:
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- Sandworm Tools
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- Volt Typhoon
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- Flax Typhoon
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- CISA AA22-320A
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- CISA AA23-347A
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- Compromised Windows Host
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- Credential Dumping
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asset_type: Endpoint
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mitre_attack_id:
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- T1003
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product:
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- Splunk Enterprise
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- Splunk Enterprise Security
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- Splunk Cloud
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security_domain: endpoint
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tests:
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- name: True Positive Test
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attack_data:
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- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003/credential_extraction/mimikatzwindows-sysmon.log
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source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
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sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
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