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pyth0n1c
89 lines
3.4 KiB
YAML
89 lines
3.4 KiB
YAML
name: Detect RClone Command-Line Usage
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id: 32e0baea-b3f1-11eb-a2ce-acde48001122
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version: 2
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date: '2021-11-29'
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author: Michael Haag, Splunk
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type: TTP
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datamodel:
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- Endpoint
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description: This analytic identifies commonly used command-line arguments used by
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`rclone.exe` to initiate a file transfer. Some arguments were negated as they are
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specific to the configuration used by adversaries. In particular, an adversary may
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list the files or directories of the remote file share using `ls` or `lsd`, which
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is not indicative of malicious behavior. During triage, at this stage of a ransomware
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event, exfiltration is about to occur or has already. Isolate the endpoint and continue
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investigating by review file modifications and parallel processes.
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search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
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as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rclone` Processes.process
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IN ("*copy*", "*mega*", "*pcloud*", "*ftp*", "*--config*", "*--progress*", "*--no-check-certificate*",
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"*--ignore-existing*", "*--auto-confirm*", "*--transfers*", "*--multi-thread-streams*") by
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Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process
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Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
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| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_rclone_command_line_usage_filter`'
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how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
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on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
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your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition,
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confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the
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endpoint product.
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known_false_positives: False positives should be limited as this is restricted to
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the Rclone process name. Filter or tune the analytic as needed.
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references:
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- https://redcanary.com/blog/rclone-mega-extortion/
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- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations
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- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/
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- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/29/continuing-the-bazar-ransomware-story/
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tags:
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analytic_story:
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- DarkSide Ransomware
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- Ransomware
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confidence: 70
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context:
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- Source:Endpoint
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- Stage:Exfiltration
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dataset:
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- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1020/windows-sysmon.log
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impact: 50
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kill_chain_phases:
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- Exploitation
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message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified
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on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to connect to a remote cloud service
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to move files or folders.
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mitre_attack_id:
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- T1020
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observable:
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- name: user
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type: User
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role:
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- Victim
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- name: dest
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type: Hostname
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role:
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- Victim
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- name: parent_process_name
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type: Process
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role:
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- Parent Process
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- name: process_name
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type: Process
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role:
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- Child Process
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product:
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- Splunk Enterprise
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- Splunk Enterprise Security
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- Splunk Cloud
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required_fields:
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- _time
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- Processes.dest
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- Processes.user
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- Processes.parent_process
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- Processes.process_name
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- Processes.process
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- Processes.process_id
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- Processes.parent_process_id
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- Processes.original_file_name
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risk_score: 35
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security_domain: endpoint
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supported_tas:
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- Splunk_TA_microsoft_sysmon
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asset_type: Endpoint
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