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splunk-security_content/detections/endpoint/logon_script_event_trigger_execution.yml

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YAML

name: Logon Script Event Trigger Execution
id: 4c38c264-1f74-11ec-b5fa-acde48001122
version: 1
date: '2021-09-27'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
type: TTP
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry entry
to persist and gain privilege escalation upon booting up of compromised host. This
technique was seen in several APT and malware where it modify UserInitMprLogonScript
registry entry to its malicious payload to be executed upon boot up of the machine.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path
IN ("*\\Environment\\UserInitMprLogonScript") by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path
Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `logon_script_event_trigger_execution_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response
product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data
used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes
to the registry.
known_false_positives: unknown
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/001/
tags:
analytic_story:
- Windows Persistence Techniques
- Windows Privilege Escalation
- Hermetic Wiper
confidence: 100
context:
- Source:Endpoint
- Stage:Privilege Escalation
dataset:
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1037.001/logonscript_reg/sysmon.log
impact: 80
kill_chain_phases:
- Exploitation
message: modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$
mitre_attack_id:
- T1037
- T1037.001
observable:
- name: dest
type: Hostname
role:
- Victim
- name: user
type: User
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- _time
- Registry.dest
- Registry.user
- Registry.registry_path
- Registry.registry_key_name
- Registry.registry_value_name
risk_score: 80
security_domain: endpoint
asset_type: Endpoint