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bc1b413923
* Fix #3961 * Fix #3909 * Fix output fields * Remove duplicate process_name entry * Update outbound_network_connection_from_java_using_default_ports.yml * Update detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml * Update detect_computer_changed_with_anonymous_account.yml * Fix #3969 * update palo alto TA and beautify analytics * Update vmware_aria_operations_exploit_attempt.yml * fix source * enhance metadata and fp info * beautify spl for ease of reading * add some missing attack techniques * remove unnecessary usage of regex * Update windows_uac_bypass_suspicious_escalation_behavior.yml * small fix * Refine description and improve regex * Update windows_uac_bypass_suspicious_escalation_behavior.yml * Update possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn.yml * Update possible_lateral_movement_powershell_spawn.yml * Update windows_event_log_security_4756.yml * description update --------- Co-authored-by: Bhavin Patel <bhavin.j.patel91@gmail.com>
83 lines
4.6 KiB
YAML
83 lines
4.6 KiB
YAML
name: Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command
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id: c4db14d9-7909-48b4-a054-aa14d89dbb19
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version: 20
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date: '2026-03-25'
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author: David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Splunk, SirDuckly, GitHub Community
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status: production
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type: Hunting
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description: |
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The following analytic detects the use of the EncodedCommand parameter in PowerShell processes.
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It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data to identify variations of the EncodedCommand parameter, including shortened forms and different command switch types.
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This activity can be significant because adversaries often use encoded commands to obfuscate malicious scripts, making detection harder.
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If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute hidden code, potentially leading to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or persistent threats within the environment.
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Review parallel events to determine legitimacy and tune based on known administrative scripts.
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data_source:
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- Sysmon EventID 1
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- Windows Event Log Security 4688
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- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
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search: |-
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| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
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count min(_time) as firstTime
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max(_time) as lastTime
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from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
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`process_powershell`
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by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
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Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
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Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
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Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
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Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
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Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id
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Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name
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Processes.process_path Processes.user
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Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
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| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
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| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
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| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
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| where match(process,"(?i)(?:^|\\s)(?:/(?!/)|--?|–{1,2}|—{1,2}|―{1,2})(?:ec|encodedcommand|encodedcomman|encodedcomma|encodedcomm|encodedcom|encodedco|encodedc|encoded|encode|encod|enco|enc|en|e(?=\\s))\\s+['\\\"]?[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{5,}['\\\"]?")
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| `malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command_filter`
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how_to_implement: |
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The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
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known_false_positives: |
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False positives are expected from legitimate PowerShell scripts,
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system administrators, and applications. Filter as needed.
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references:
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- https://regexr.com/662ov
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- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/master/Windows/TestHarnesses/T1059.001_PowerShell/OutPowerShellCommandLineParameter.ps1
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- https://ss64.com/ps/powershell.html
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- https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1440758396534214658?s=20
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- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/
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- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/05/24/volt-typhoon-targets-us-critical-infrastructure-with-living-off-the-land-techniques/
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tags:
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analytic_story:
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- SolarWinds WHD RCE Post Exploitation
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- CISA AA22-320A
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- Hermetic Wiper
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- Sandworm Tools
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- Qakbot
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- Volt Typhoon
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- NOBELIUM Group
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- Data Destruction
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- Lumma Stealer
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- Malicious PowerShell
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- DarkCrystal RAT
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- WhisperGate
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- Crypto Stealer
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- Microsoft SharePoint Vulnerabilities
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- Scattered Spider
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- GhostRedirector IIS Module and Rungan Backdoor
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- Microsoft WSUS CVE-2025-59287
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asset_type: Endpoint
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mitre_attack_id:
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- T1027
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product:
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- Splunk Enterprise
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- Splunk Enterprise Security
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- Splunk Cloud
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security_domain: endpoint
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tests:
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- name: True Positive Test
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attack_data:
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- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1027/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
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source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
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sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
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