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splunk-security_content/detections/endpoint/unknown_process_using_the_kerberos_protocol.yml
2024-06-26 14:41:53 +00:00

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YAML

name: Unknown Process Using The Kerberos Protocol
id: c91a0852-9fbb-11ec-af44-acde48001122
version: 3
date: '2024-05-19'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic identifies a non-lsass.exe process making an outbound
connection on port 88, which is typically used by the Kerberos authentication protocol.
This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents,
focusing on process and network traffic logs. This activity is significant because,
under normal circumstances, only the lsass.exe process should interact with the
Kerberos Distribution Center. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate
an adversary attempting to abuse the Kerberos protocol, potentially leading to unauthorized
access or lateral movement within the network.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
where Processes.process_name!=lsass.exe by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name
Processes.dest Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| join process_id dest [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic
where All_Traffic.dest_port = 88 by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.process_id All_Traffic.dest_port
| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename src as dest ] | table _time dest
parent_process_name process_name process_path process process_id dest_port | `unknown_process_using_the_kerberos_protocol_filter`'
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must
be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to
the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint`
data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Custom applications may leverage the Kerberos protocol. Filter
as needed.
references:
- https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/
- https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/kerberos/ptk
tags:
analytic_story:
- Active Directory Kerberos Attacks
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 60
impact: 60
message: Unknown process $process_name$ using the kerberos protocol detected on
host $dest$
mitre_attack_id:
- T1550
observable:
- name: dest
type: Hostname
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- _time
- All_Traffic.dest_ip
- All_Traffic.dest_port
- All_Traffic.src_ip
- Processes.process_id
- Processes.process_name
- Processes.dest
- Processes.process_path
- Processes.process
- Processes.parent_process_name
risk_score: 36
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data:
https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550/rubeus/windows-security.log
source: WinEventLog:Security
sourcetype: WinEventLog
- data:
https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1550/rubeus/windows-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog