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splunk-security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_regasm_spawning_a_process.yml
2023-09-15 10:58:38 -07:00

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YAML

name: Detect Regasm Spawning a Process
id: 72170ec5-f7d2-42f5-aefb-2b8be6aad15f
version: 1
date: '2021-02-12'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic identifies regasm.exe spawning a process. This
particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products.
Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. Spawning of a child process
is rare from either process and should be investigated further. During investigation,
identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional
suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly.
regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe
and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm|regsvcs.exe.
data_source:
- Sysmon Event ID 1
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=regasm.exe
by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regasm_spawning_a_process_filter`'
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must
be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to
the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint`
data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Although unlikely, limited instances of regasm.exe or regsvcs.exe
may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments,
or process lineage.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/
tags:
analytic_story:
- Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity
- Living Off The Land
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 80
impact: 80
message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified
on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ spawning a child process, typically not normal
behavior for $parent_process_name$.
mitre_attack_id:
- T1218
- T1218.009
observable:
- name: user
type: User
role:
- Victim
- name: dest
type: Hostname
role:
- Victim
- name: parent_process_name
type: Process
role:
- Parent Process
- name: process_name
type: Process
role:
- Child Process
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- _time
- Processes.parent_process_name
- Processes.dest
- Processes.user
- Processes.parent_process
- Processes.process
- Processes.process_id
- Processes.parent_process_id
risk_score: 64
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog