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splunk-security_content/detections/endpoint/excel_spawning_windows_script_host.yml
2023-09-15 10:58:38 -07:00

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YAML

name: Excel Spawning Windows Script Host
id: 57fe880a-9be3-11eb-9bf3-acde48001122
version: 1
date: '2021-04-12'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following detection identifies Microsoft Excel spawning Windows Script
Host - `cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe`. Typically, this is not common behavior and
not default with Excel.exe. Excel.exe will generally be found in the following path
`C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16` (version will vary). `cscript.exe`
or `wscript.exe` default location is `c:\windows\system32\` or c:windows\syswow64`.
`cscript.exe` or `wscript.exe` spawning from Excel.exe is common for a spearphishing
attachment and is actively used. Albeit, the command-line executed will most likely
be obfuscated and captured via another detection. During triage, review parallel
processes and identify any files that may have been written. Review the reputation
of the remote destination and block accordingly.
data_source:
- Sysmon Event ID 1
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process)
min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
where Processes.parent_process_name="excel.exe" Processes.process_name IN ("cscript.exe",
"wscript.exe") by Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.user
Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `excel_spawning_windows_script_host_filter`'
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must
be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to
the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint`
data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: False positives should be limited, but if any are present,
filter as needed. In some instances, `cscript.exe` is used for legitimate business
practices.
references:
- https://app.any.run/tasks/8ecfbc29-03d0-421c-a5bf-3905d29192a2/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/
tags:
analytic_story:
- Spearphishing Attachments
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 100
impact: 80
message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified
on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$, indicating potential suspicious macro execution.
mitre_attack_id:
- T1003.002
- T1003
observable:
- name: user
type: User
role:
- Victim
- name: dest
type: Hostname
role:
- Victim
- name: parent_process_name
type: Process
role:
- Parent Process
- name: process_name
type: Process
role:
- Child Process
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- _time
- process_name
- process_id
- parent_process_name
- dest
- user
- parent_process_id
risk_score: 80
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1566.001/macro/windows-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog