Files
splunk-security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_com_hijacking_inprocserver32_modification.yml
2023-09-15 10:58:38 -07:00

81 lines
3.5 KiB
YAML

name: Windows COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification
id: b7bd83c0-92b5-4fc7-b286-23eccfa2c561
version: 1
date: '2022-09-26'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic identifies the use of reg.exe performing an add
to the InProcServer32, which may be related to COM hijacking. Adversaries can use
the COM system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate
software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence.
Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Registry to replace a reference
to a legitimate system component which may cause that component to not work when
executed. When that system component is executed through normal system operation
the adversary's code will be executed instead.
data_source:
- Sysmon Event ID 1
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` Processes.process=*inprocserver32*
by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name
Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_com_hijacking_inprocserver32_modification_filter`'
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must
be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to
the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint`
data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: False positives may be present and some filtering may be required.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015/
- https://blog.cluster25.duskrise.com/2022/09/23/in-the-footsteps-of-the-fancy-bear-powerpoint-graphite/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1546.015/T1546.015.md
tags:
analytic_story:
- Living Off The Land
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 80
impact: 80
message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified
on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to modify InProcServer32 within the
registry.
mitre_attack_id:
- T1546.015
- T1546
observable:
- name: user
type: User
role:
- Victim
- name: dest
type: Hostname
role:
- Victim
- name: parent_process_name
type: Process
role:
- Parent Process
- name: process_name
type: Process
role:
- Child Process
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- UPDATE
risk_score: 64
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.015/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
update_timestamp: true