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splunk-security_content/detections/endpoint/windows_wmi_process_call_create.yml
2023-09-15 10:58:38 -07:00

85 lines
3.6 KiB
YAML

name: Windows WMI Process Call Create
id: 0661c2de-93de-11ec-9833-acde48001122
version: 1
date: '2022-02-22'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Hunting
description: This analytic is to look for wmi commandlines to execute or create process.
This technique was used by adversaries or threat actor to execute their malicious
payload in local or remote host. This hunting query is a good pivot to start to
look further which process trigger the wmi or what process it execute locally or
remotely.
data_source:
- Sysmon Event ID 1
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_wmic` Processes.process
= "* process *" Processes.process = "* call *" Processes.process = "* create *"
by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.dest Processes.user
Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_wmi_process_call_create_filter`'
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must
be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to
the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint`
data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Administrators may execute this command for testing or auditing.
references:
- https://github.com/NVISOsecurity/sigma-public/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_wmi_execution.yml
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/2b804d25418004a5f1ba50e9dc637946ab8733c7/atomics/T1047/T1047.md
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/05/24/volt-typhoon-targets-us-critical-infrastructure-with-living-off-the-land-techniques/
- https://thedfirreport.com/2023/05/22/icedid-macro-ends-in-nokoyawa-ransomware/
tags:
analytic_story:
- Suspicious WMI Use
- Qakbot
- Volt Typhoon
- IcedID
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 50
impact: 50
message: process with $process$ commandline executed in $dest$
mitre_attack_id:
- T1047
observable:
- name: user
type: User
role:
- Victim
- name: dest
type: Hostname
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- _time
- Processes.dest
- Processes.user
- Processes.parent_process_name
- Processes.parent_process
- Processes.original_file_name
- Processes.process_name
- Processes.process
- Processes.process_id
- Processes.parent_process_path
- Processes.process_path
- Processes.parent_process_id
- Processes.process_guid
risk_score: 25
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1047/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog