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splunk-security_content/detections/unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass.yml
2020-07-09 14:21:33 +02:00

36 lines
1.5 KiB
YAML

name: Unsigned Image Loaded by LSASS
id: 56ef054c-76ef-45f9-af4a-a634695dcd65
version: 1
date: '2019-12-06'
description: This search detects loading of unsigned images by LSASS.
how_to_implement: This search needs Sysmon Logs with a sysmon configuration, which
includes EventCode 7 with lsass.exe. This search uses an input macro named `sysmon`.
We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations
(index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Windows Sysmon logs. Replace the macro definition
with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter
macro designed to filter out known false positives.
type: ESCU
references:
- https://2017.zeronights.org/wp-content/uploads/materials/ZN17_Kheirkhabarov_Hunting_for_Credentials_Dumping_in_Windows_Environment.pdf
author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
search: '`sysmon` EventID=7 Image=*lsass.exe Signed=false | stats count min(_time)
as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer, Image, ImageLoaded, Signed, SHA1
| rename Computer as dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `unsigned_image_loaded_by_lsass_filter` '
known_false_positives: Other tools could load images into LSASS for legitimate reason.
But enterprise tools should always use signed DLLs.
tags:
analytics_story:
- Credential Dumping
mitre_attack_id:
- T1003.001
kill_chain_phases:
- Actions on Objectives
cis20:
- CIS 8
- CIS 16
nist:
- DE.CM
security_domain: endpoint
asset_type: Windows