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splunk-security_content/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml
2023-05-25 12:16:00 +02:00

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3.6 KiB
YAML

name: Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command
id: c4db14d9-7909-48b4-a054-aa14d89dbb19
version: 7
date: '2022-01-18'
author: David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: Hunting
description: 'The following analytic identifies the use of the EncodedCommand PowerShell
parameter. This is typically used by Administrators to run complex scripts, but
commonly used by adversaries to hide their code. \
The analytic identifies all variations of EncodedCommand, as PowerShell allows the
ability to shorten the parameter. For example enc, enco, encod and so forth. In
addition, through our research it was identified that PowerShell will interpret
different command switch types beyond the hyphen. We have added endash, emdash,
horizontal bar, and forward slash. \
During triage, review parallel events to determine legitimacy. Tune as needed based
on admin scripts in use. \
Alternatively, may use regex per matching here https://regexr.com/662ov.'
data_source:
- Sysmon Event ID 1
search: "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)\
\ as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.user\
\ Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name\
\ Processes.dest Processes.process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`\
\ | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/|\u2013\
|\u2014|\u2015]e(nc*o*d*e*d*c*o*m*m*a*n*d*)*\\s+[^-]\") | `malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command_filter`"
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition,
confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the
endpoint product.
known_false_positives: System administrators may use this option, but it's not common.
references:
- https://regexr.com/662ov
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/master/TestHarnesses/T1059.001_PowerShell/OutPowerShellCommandLineParameter.ps1
- https://ss64.com/ps/powershell.html
- https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1440758396534214658?s=20
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/05/24/volt-typhoon-targets-us-critical-infrastructure-with-living-off-the-land-techniques/
tags:
analytic_story:
- Hermetic Wiper
- Malicious PowerShell
- NOBELIUM Group
- WhisperGate
- DarkCrystal RAT
- Qakbot
- CISA AA22-320A
- Sandworm Tools
- Data Destruction
- Volt Typhoon
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 50
impact: 70
message: Powershell.exe running potentially malicious encodede commands on $dest$
mitre_attack_id:
- T1027
observable:
- name: dest
type: Endpoint
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- _time
- Processes.process_name
- Processes.process
- Processes.user
- Processes.parent_process_name
- Processes.dest
- Processes.process_id
risk_score: 35
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1027/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog