splunk-security_content/detections/endpoint/logon_script_event_trigger_execution.yml

name: Logon Script Event Trigger Execution
id: 4c38c264-1f74-11ec-b5fa-acde48001122
version: 1
date: '2021-09-27'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
type: TTP
datamodel:
- Endpoint
description: This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry entry
  to persist and gain privilege escalation upon booting up of compromised host. This
  technique was seen in several APT and malware where it modify UserInitMprLogonScript
  registry entry to its malicious payload to be executed upon boot up of the machine.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count  min(_time) as firstTime
  max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path
  IN ("*\\Environment\\UserInitMprLogonScript") by Registry.dest  Registry.user Registry.registry_path
  Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `logon_script_event_trigger_execution_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
  that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
  in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response
  product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data
  used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes
  to the registry.
known_false_positives: unknown
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/001
tags:
  analytic_story:
  - Windows Persistence Techniques
  - Windows Privilege Escalation
  dataset:
  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1037.001/logonscript_reg/sysmon.log
  kill_chain_phases:
  - Exploitation
  mitre_attack_id:
  - T1037
  - T1037.001
  product:
  - Splunk Enterprise
  - Splunk Enterprise Security
  - Splunk Cloud
  required_fields:
  - _time
  - Registry.dest
  - Registry.user
  - Registry.registry_path
  - Registry.registry_key_name
  - Registry.registry_value_name
  security_domain: endpoint
  impact: 80
  confidence: 100
  risk_score: 80
  context:
  - source:endpoint
  - stage:Privilege Escalation Persistence
  message: modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$
  observable:
  - name: dest
    type: Hostname
    role:
    - Victim
  - name: user
    type: user
    role:
    - Victim
  automated_detection_testing: passed