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splunk-security_content/detections/endpoint/malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command.yml
2025-07-31 10:54:21 -06:00

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YAML

name: Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command
id: c4db14d9-7909-48b4-a054-aa14d89dbb19
version: 16
date: '2025-07-29'
author: David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Splunk, SirDuckly, GitHub Community
status: production
type: Hunting
description: The following analytic detects the use of the EncodedCommand parameter
in PowerShell processes. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data
to identify variations of the EncodedCommand parameter, including shortened forms
and different command switch types. This activity is significant because adversaries
often use encoded commands to obfuscate malicious scripts, making detection harder.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute hidden code,
potentially leading to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or persistent
threats within the environment. Review parallel events to determine legitimacy and
tune based on known administrative scripts.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
- Windows Event Log Security 4688
- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)\
\ as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_powershell` by Processes.action\
\ Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec\
\ Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name\
\ Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid\
\ Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level\
\ Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id\
\ Processes.vendor_product | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`\
\ | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | where match(process,\"(?i)[\\-|\\/|\u2013\
|\u2014|\u2015][Ee^]{1,2}[NnCcOoDdEeMmAa^]+\\s+[\\\"]?[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{5,}[\\\"]?\"\
) | `malicious_powershell_process___encoded_command_filter`"
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must
be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to
the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint`
data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: System administrators may use this option, but it's not common.
references:
- https://regexr.com/662ov
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/master/Windows/TestHarnesses/T1059.001_PowerShell/OutPowerShellCommandLineParameter.ps1
- https://ss64.com/ps/powershell.html
- https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1440758396534214658?s=20
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/05/24/volt-typhoon-targets-us-critical-infrastructure-with-living-off-the-land-techniques/
tags:
analytic_story:
- CISA AA22-320A
- Hermetic Wiper
- Sandworm Tools
- Qakbot
- Volt Typhoon
- NOBELIUM Group
- Data Destruction
- Lumma Stealer
- Malicious PowerShell
- DarkCrystal RAT
- WhisperGate
- Crypto Stealer
- Microsoft SharePoint Vulnerabilities
- Scattered Spider
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1027
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1027/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog