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splunk-security_content/detections/endpoint/office_application_drop_executable.yml
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2024-07-16 14:06:31 +02:00

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YAML

name: Office Application Drop Executable
id: 73ce70c4-146d-11ec-9184-acde48001122
version: 5
date: '2024-05-14'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Michael Haag, Splunk, TheLawsOfChaos, Github
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects Microsoft Office applications dropping
or creating executables or scripts on a Windows OS. It leverages process creation
and file system events from the Endpoint data model to identify Office applications
like Word or Excel generating files with extensions such as .exe, .dll, or .ps1.
This behavior is significant as it is often associated with spear-phishing attacks
where malicious files are dropped to compromise the host. If confirmed malicious,
this activity could lead to code execution, privilege escalation, or persistent
access, posing a severe threat to the environment.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1 AND Sysmon EventID 11
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
where Processes.process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe","wordpad.exe","wordview.exe","onenote.exe","onenotem.exe","onenoteviewer.exe","onenoteim.exe","msaccess.exe")
by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest
Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |join process_guid, _time
[| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN ("*.exe","*.dll","*.pif","*.scr","*.js","*.vbs","*.vbe","*.ps1")
by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_name
Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
| fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path
process process_guid] | dedup file_create_time | table dest, process_name, process,
file_create_time, file_name, file_path, process_guid | `office_application_drop_executable_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed rundll32.exe may be used.
known_false_positives: office macro for automation may do this behavior
references:
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation
- https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046/
- https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/702680/0/html
- https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/trojanized-onenote-document-leads-to-formbook-malware/
tags:
analytic_story:
- FIN7
- AgentTesla
- CVE-2023-21716 Word RTF Heap Corruption
- Warzone RAT
- PlugX
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 80
impact: 80
message: process $process_name$ drops a file $file_name$ in host $dest$
mitre_attack_id:
- T1566
- T1566.001
observable:
- name: dest
type: Hostname
role:
- Victim
- name: process_name
type: Process
role:
- Attacker
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- _time
- process_name
- file_name
- process_guid
- dest
- user_id
risk_score: 64
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data:
https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/fin7/fin7_macro_js_1/sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog