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splunk-security_content/detections/endpoint/detect_remote_access_software_usage_process.yml
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Michael Haag ec5cf468e3 The Haag Identity: Operation Seashell Blizzard 🌊❄️
This PR introduces comprehensive updates to our detection analytics, focusing on tagging relevant detections with the new "Seashell Blizzard" analytic story. The changes include:
Version and date updates across 20 detection files, with dates standardized to '2025-03-24' or '2025-03-25', and version numbers incremented appropriately.
Analytics tagged with "Seashell Blizzard" include:
ConnectWise ScreenConnect vulnerability detections (authentication bypass, path traversal)
Exchange Server exploitation detections (ProxyShell, ProxyNotShell, web shell)
Credential access monitoring (LSASS dumps via TaskMgr and ProcDump)
Remote access software usage detections (file, process, registry)
Scheduled task abuse detections
SQL Server xp_cmdshell configuration changes
Registry hive dumping detection
Key updates:
- Added "Seashell Blizzard" tag to 20 existing detections

These changes enhance our ability to track and detect activities associated with the Seashell Blizzard threat actor.
2025-03-24 14:18:40 -06:00

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5.2 KiB
YAML

name: Detect Remote Access Software Usage Process
id: ffd5e001-2e34-48f4-97a2-26dc4bb08178
version: 7
date: '2025-03-24'
author: Steven Dick
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic detects the execution of known remote access software
within the environment. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR)
agents, focusing on process names and parent processes mapped to the Endpoint data
model. This activity is significant as adversaries often use remote access tools
like AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer to maintain unauthorized access.
If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to control systems remotely,
exfiltrate data, or deploy additional malware, posing a severe threat to the organization's
security.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
- Windows Event Log Security 4688
- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
where Processes.dest!=unknown Processes.process!=unknown by Processes.dest Processes.user
Processes.process_name Processes.process | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` |
`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | lookup remote_access_software
remote_utility AS process_name OUTPUT isutility, description as signature, comment_reference
as desc, category | search isutility = True | `remote_access_software_usage_exceptions`
| `detect_remote_access_software_usage_process_filter`'
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must
be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to
the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint`
data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
names and speed up the data modeling process. The "exceptions" macro leverages both
an Assets and Identities lookup, as well as a KVStore collection called "remote_software_exceptions"
that lets you track and maintain device- based exceptions for this set of detections.
known_false_positives: It is possible that legitimate remote access software is used
within the environment. Ensure that the lookup is reviewed and updated with any
additional remote access software that is used within the environment. Known false
positives can be added to the remote_access_software_usage_exception.csv lookup
to globally suppress these situations across all remote access content
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/
- https://thedfirreport.com/2022/08/08/bumblebee-roasts-its-way-to-domain-admin/
- https://thedfirreport.com/2022/11/28/emotet-strikes-again-lnk-file-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$" user = "$user$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$",
"$user$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk
Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all)
as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics"
by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: Investigate processes on $dest$
search: '| from datamodel:Endpoint.Processes| search dest=$dest$ process_name=$process_name$'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
message: A process for a known remote access software $process_name$ was identified
on $dest$.
risk_objects:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 25
- field: user
type: user
score: 25
threat_objects:
- field: process_name
type: process_name
- field: signature
type: signature
tags:
analytic_story:
- Insider Threat
- Command And Control
- Ransomware
- Gozi Malware
- CISA AA24-241A
- Remote Monitoring and Management Software
- Seashell Blizzard
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1219
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
manual_test: This detection uses A&I lookups from Enterprise Security.
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data:
https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1219/screenconnect/screenconnect_sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog