Files
trailofbits-skills/plugins/fp-check
Jonathan Hefner debfb29c8e Fix allowed-tools to use spec-compliant space-delimited strings (#139)
* Fix `allowed-tools` to use spec-compliant space-delimited strings

Per the agentskills.io specification, `allowed-tools` must be a single
string of space-delimited patterns, not a YAML list. Converted all 23
SKILL.md files from the `- Item` list format to the correct
`"Item1 Item2"` string format. Also updated the frontmatter examples in
CLAUDE.md and the workflow-skill-design skill template to match.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Fix remaining allowed-tools format in firebase-apk-scanner and workflow-skill-design docs

- Convert firebase-apk-scanner from comma-separated to space-delimited
- Update anti-patterns.md and tool-assignment-guide.md examples from YAML lists to space-delimited strings
- Remove unnecessary quotes from SKILL.md template placeholder

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Cover commands, new SKILL.md files, and fix template placeholder

Extends the previous spec-compliance fixes:

* Convert command frontmatter (commands/*.md) — per Claude Code
  docs, command files use the same frontmatter as skills, so the
  same space-delimited rule applies.
* Convert three SKILL.md files added since the original PR:
  mutation-testing, trailmark-structural, trailmark-summary.
* Fix the placeholder in the workflow-skill-design template.
  The previous "[minimum tools needed, space-delimited]" was YAML
  flow-sequence syntax, which parses as a list — the opposite of
  what the placeholder claims. Replaced with a concrete-looking
  space-delimited example plus a comment.

Zeroize-audit agent files still use `allowed-tools:` in YAML list
form. They are intentionally excluded: per the project's own docs
(workflow-skill-design references), agents declare tools with
`tools:` (not `allowed-tools:`). Fixing those requires changing
the field name as well as the format and is out of scope for this
PR.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* zeroize-audit agents: switch allowed-tools to tools

Subagents declare their tool allowlist via `tools:` (comma-separated),
not `allowed-tools:` — see Claude Code's subagent docs and this
repo's own designing-workflow-skills/SKILL.md:47:

> Skills use `allowed-tools:` in frontmatter. Agents use `tools:`
> in frontmatter.

Before this change, the zeroize-audit agents declared their tool list
under `allowed-tools:`, which Claude Code does not read for subagents.
The field was effectively a no-op; the spawned agents had no tool
restriction enforced.

Renames the field on all 11 agents to `tools:` and reformats the YAML
list as comma-separated to match the documented format and existing
agents elsewhere in the repo (e.g. function-analyzer.md,
spec-compliance-checker.md). Tool sets are unchanged.

Behavior change: tools now actually constrain what each spawned agent
can call. The lists are the ones the original author intended.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* skill-improver: convert command allowed-tools to space-delimited

The two command files in plugins/skill-improver/commands/ still used
the JSON flow-array format (`allowed-tools: ["..."]`), which the rest
of this PR converted everywhere else. Convert them to the spec-compliant
space-delimited string form for consistency.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Dan Guido <dan@trailofbits.com>
2026-04-28 19:50:30 -04:00
..

fp-check

A Claude Code plugin that enforces systematic false positive verification when verifying suspected security bugs.

Overview

When Claude is asked to verify suspected security bugs, this plugin activates a rigorous per-bug verification process. Bugs are routed through one of two paths:

  • Standard verification — a linear single-pass checklist for straightforward bugs (clear claim, single component, well-understood bug class). No task creation overhead.
  • Deep verification — full task-based orchestration with parallel sub-phases for complex bugs (cross-component, race conditions, ambiguous claims, logic bugs without spec).

Both paths end with six mandatory gate reviews. Each bug receives a TRUE POSITIVE or FALSE POSITIVE verdict with documented evidence.

Installation

/plugin install fp-check

Components

Skills

Skill Description
fp-check Systematic false positive verification for security bug analysis

Agents

Agent Phases Description
data-flow-analyzer 1.11.4 Traces data flow from source to sink, maps trust boundaries, checks API contracts and environment protections
exploitability-verifier 2.12.4 Proves attacker control, creates mathematical bounds proofs, assesses race condition feasibility
poc-builder 4.14.5 Creates pseudocode, executable, unit test, and negative PoCs

Hooks

Hook Event Purpose
Verification completeness Stop Blocks the agent from stopping until all bugs have completed all 5 phases, gate reviews, and verdicts
Agent output completeness SubagentStop Blocks agents from stopping until they produce complete structured output for their assigned phases

Reference Files

File Purpose
standard-verification.md Linear single-pass checklist for straightforward bugs
deep-verification.md Full task-based orchestration with parallel sub-phases for complex bugs
gate-reviews.md Six mandatory gates and verdict format
false-positive-patterns.md 13-item checklist of common false positive patterns and red flags
evidence-templates.md Documentation templates for verification evidence
bug-class-verification.md Bug-class-specific verification requirements (memory corruption, logic bugs, race conditions, etc.)

Triggers

The skill activates when the user asks to verify a suspected bug:

  • "Is this bug real?" / "Is this a true positive?"
  • "Is this a false positive?" / "Verify this finding"
  • "Check if this vulnerability is exploitable"

The skill does not activate for bug hunting ("find bugs", "security analysis", "audit code").

Methodology

Each bug is routed based on complexity:

Standard Path

For bugs with a clear claim, single component, and well-understood bug class:

  1. Data flow — trace source to sink, check API contracts and protections
  2. Exploitability — prove attacker control, bounds proofs, race feasibility
  3. Impact — real security impact vs operational robustness
  4. PoC sketch — pseudocode PoC required
  5. Devil's advocate spot-check — 5+2 targeted questions
  6. Gate review — six mandatory gates

Standard verification escalates to deep at two checkpoints if complexity warrants it.

Deep Path

For bugs with ambiguous claims, cross-component paths, concurrency, or logic bugs:

  1. Claim analysis — restate the vulnerability claim precisely, classify the bug class
  2. Context extraction — execution context, caller analysis, architectural and historical context
  3. Phase 1: Data flow analysis — trust boundary mapping, API contracts, environment protections, cross-references
  4. Phase 2: Exploitability verification — attacker control, mathematical bounds proofs, race condition proof, adversarial analysis
  5. Phase 3: Impact assessment — real security impact vs operational robustness, primary controls vs defense-in-depth
  6. Phase 4: PoC creation — pseudocode with data flow diagrams, executable PoC, unit test PoC, negative PoC
  7. Phase 5: Devil's advocate review — 13-question challenge with LLM hallucination self-check
  8. Gate reviews — six mandatory gates before any verdict