mirror of
https://github.com/trailofbits/skills
synced 2026-06-21 14:12:00 +00:00
Jonathan Hefner
debfb29c8e
* Fix `allowed-tools` to use spec-compliant space-delimited strings Per the agentskills.io specification, `allowed-tools` must be a single string of space-delimited patterns, not a YAML list. Converted all 23 SKILL.md files from the `- Item` list format to the correct `"Item1 Item2"` string format. Also updated the frontmatter examples in CLAUDE.md and the workflow-skill-design skill template to match. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Fix remaining allowed-tools format in firebase-apk-scanner and workflow-skill-design docs - Convert firebase-apk-scanner from comma-separated to space-delimited - Update anti-patterns.md and tool-assignment-guide.md examples from YAML lists to space-delimited strings - Remove unnecessary quotes from SKILL.md template placeholder Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Cover commands, new SKILL.md files, and fix template placeholder Extends the previous spec-compliance fixes: * Convert command frontmatter (commands/*.md) — per Claude Code docs, command files use the same frontmatter as skills, so the same space-delimited rule applies. * Convert three SKILL.md files added since the original PR: mutation-testing, trailmark-structural, trailmark-summary. * Fix the placeholder in the workflow-skill-design template. The previous "[minimum tools needed, space-delimited]" was YAML flow-sequence syntax, which parses as a list — the opposite of what the placeholder claims. Replaced with a concrete-looking space-delimited example plus a comment. Zeroize-audit agent files still use `allowed-tools:` in YAML list form. They are intentionally excluded: per the project's own docs (workflow-skill-design references), agents declare tools with `tools:` (not `allowed-tools:`). Fixing those requires changing the field name as well as the format and is out of scope for this PR. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * zeroize-audit agents: switch allowed-tools to tools Subagents declare their tool allowlist via `tools:` (comma-separated), not `allowed-tools:` — see Claude Code's subagent docs and this repo's own designing-workflow-skills/SKILL.md:47: > Skills use `allowed-tools:` in frontmatter. Agents use `tools:` > in frontmatter. Before this change, the zeroize-audit agents declared their tool list under `allowed-tools:`, which Claude Code does not read for subagents. The field was effectively a no-op; the spawned agents had no tool restriction enforced. Renames the field on all 11 agents to `tools:` and reformats the YAML list as comma-separated to match the documented format and existing agents elsewhere in the repo (e.g. function-analyzer.md, spec-compliance-checker.md). Tool sets are unchanged. Behavior change: tools now actually constrain what each spawned agent can call. The lists are the ones the original author intended. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * skill-improver: convert command allowed-tools to space-delimited The two command files in plugins/skill-improver/commands/ still used the JSON flow-array format (`allowed-tools: ["..."]`), which the rest of this PR converted everywhere else. Convert them to the spec-compliant space-delimited string form for consistency. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Dan Guido <dan@trailofbits.com>
Sharp Edges
Identifies error-prone APIs, dangerous configurations, and footgun designs that enable security mistakes through developer confusion, laziness, or malice.
When to Use
- Reviewing API designs for security-relevant interfaces
- Auditing configuration schemas that expose security choices
- Evaluating cryptographic library ergonomics
- Assessing authentication/authorization APIs
- Any code review where developers make security-critical decisions
What It Does
Analyzes code and designs through the lens of three adversaries:
- The Scoundrel: Can a malicious developer or attacker disable security via configuration?
- The Lazy Developer: Will copy-pasting the first example lead to insecure code?
- The Confused Developer: Can parameters be swapped without type errors?
Core Principle
The pit of success: Secure usage should be the path of least resistance. If developers must read documentation carefully or remember special rules to avoid vulnerabilities, the API has failed.
Installation
/plugin install trailofbits/skills/plugins/sharp-edges
Sharp Edge Categories
The skill identifies six categories of misuse-prone designs:
| Category | Example |
|---|---|
| Algorithm Selection | JWT alg: none attack; PHP hash("crc32", $password) |
| Dangerous Defaults | session_timeout: 0 meaning infinite; empty password accepted |
| Primitive vs. Semantic APIs | encrypt(msg, bytes, bytes) where key/nonce can be swapped |
| Configuration Cliffs | verify_ssl: false disables all certificate validation |
| Silent Failures | Verification returns False instead of throwing; ignored return values |
| Stringly-Typed Security | Permissions as comma-separated strings; SQL from concatenation |
Related Skills
- constant-time-analysis - Detect timing side-channels in cryptographic code
- differential-review - Security-focused code change review
- audit-context-building - Deep architectural analysis before auditing