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https://github.com/trailofbits/skills
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Jonathan Hefner
debfb29c8e
* Fix `allowed-tools` to use spec-compliant space-delimited strings Per the agentskills.io specification, `allowed-tools` must be a single string of space-delimited patterns, not a YAML list. Converted all 23 SKILL.md files from the `- Item` list format to the correct `"Item1 Item2"` string format. Also updated the frontmatter examples in CLAUDE.md and the workflow-skill-design skill template to match. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Fix remaining allowed-tools format in firebase-apk-scanner and workflow-skill-design docs - Convert firebase-apk-scanner from comma-separated to space-delimited - Update anti-patterns.md and tool-assignment-guide.md examples from YAML lists to space-delimited strings - Remove unnecessary quotes from SKILL.md template placeholder Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Cover commands, new SKILL.md files, and fix template placeholder Extends the previous spec-compliance fixes: * Convert command frontmatter (commands/*.md) — per Claude Code docs, command files use the same frontmatter as skills, so the same space-delimited rule applies. * Convert three SKILL.md files added since the original PR: mutation-testing, trailmark-structural, trailmark-summary. * Fix the placeholder in the workflow-skill-design template. The previous "[minimum tools needed, space-delimited]" was YAML flow-sequence syntax, which parses as a list — the opposite of what the placeholder claims. Replaced with a concrete-looking space-delimited example plus a comment. Zeroize-audit agent files still use `allowed-tools:` in YAML list form. They are intentionally excluded: per the project's own docs (workflow-skill-design references), agents declare tools with `tools:` (not `allowed-tools:`). Fixing those requires changing the field name as well as the format and is out of scope for this PR. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * zeroize-audit agents: switch allowed-tools to tools Subagents declare their tool allowlist via `tools:` (comma-separated), not `allowed-tools:` — see Claude Code's subagent docs and this repo's own designing-workflow-skills/SKILL.md:47: > Skills use `allowed-tools:` in frontmatter. Agents use `tools:` > in frontmatter. Before this change, the zeroize-audit agents declared their tool list under `allowed-tools:`, which Claude Code does not read for subagents. The field was effectively a no-op; the spawned agents had no tool restriction enforced. Renames the field on all 11 agents to `tools:` and reformats the YAML list as comma-separated to match the documented format and existing agents elsewhere in the repo (e.g. function-analyzer.md, spec-compliance-checker.md). Tool sets are unchanged. Behavior change: tools now actually constrain what each spawned agent can call. The lists are the ones the original author intended. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * skill-improver: convert command allowed-tools to space-delimited The two command files in plugins/skill-improver/commands/ still used the JSON flow-array format (`allowed-tools: ["..."]`), which the rest of this PR converted everywhere else. Convert them to the spec-compliant space-delimited string form for consistency. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Dan Guido <dan@trailofbits.com>
Firebase APK Security Scanner
Scan Android APKs for Firebase security misconfigurations including open databases, exposed storage buckets, and authentication bypasses.
When to Use
Use this skill when you need to:
- Audit Android applications for Firebase misconfigurations
- Test Firebase endpoints extracted from APKs (Realtime Database, Firestore, Storage)
- Check authentication security (open signup, anonymous auth, email enumeration)
- Enumerate Cloud Functions and test for unauthenticated access
- Perform mobile app security assessments involving Firebase backends
When NOT to Use
- Scanning apps you do not have explicit authorization to test
- Testing production Firebase projects without written permission
- When you only need to extract Firebase config without testing (use manual grep/strings instead)
- For non-Android targets (iOS, web apps) - this skill is APK-specific
- When the target app does not use Firebase
What It Does
This skill automates Firebase security testing for Android applications. When invoked, Claude will:
- Decompile the APK using apktool
- Extract Firebase configuration from all sources (google-services.json, XML resources, assets, smali code, DEX strings)
- Test authentication endpoints for misconfigurations
- Probe Realtime Database and Firestore for open read/write access
- Check Storage buckets for public listing and upload vulnerabilities
- Enumerate Cloud Functions and test accessibility
- Generate detailed reports with findings and remediation guidance
Key Features
- Supports native Android, React Native, Flutter, and Cordova apps
- Extracts config from 7+ sources including raw DEX binary strings
- Tests 14 distinct vulnerability categories
- Automatic cleanup of test data created during scans
- Detailed vulnerability reference documentation included
Installation
/plugin install trailofbits/skills/plugins/firebase-apk-scanner
Prerequisites
Install required dependencies before use:
macOS:
brew install apktool curl jq binutils
Ubuntu/Debian:
sudo apt install apktool curl jq unzip binutils
Usage
/firebase-scan ./app.apk
/firebase-scan ./apks/
Or run the standalone script directly:
./scanner.sh app.apk
./scanner.sh ./apks/ --no-cleanup
Vulnerability Categories
| Category | Tests | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| Authentication | Open signup, anonymous auth, email enumeration | Critical/High/Medium |
| Realtime Database | Unauthenticated read/write, auth token bypass | Critical/High |
| Firestore | Document access, collection enumeration | Critical/High |
| Storage | Bucket listing, unauthenticated upload | Critical/High |
| Cloud Functions | Unauthenticated access, function enumeration | Medium/Low |
| Remote Config | Public parameter exposure | Medium |