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Mr. The Plague
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100 lines
3.6 KiB
Markdown
100 lines
3.6 KiB
Markdown
# SquidC5 threat model (authorized lab / red team)
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**Organization:** [SquidSec](https://squidoffense.com/)
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**Scope:** Teamserver, operator clients, implants/beacons on **authorized** targets only.
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## Assets
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| Asset | Sensitivity |
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|-------|-------------|
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| Operator and admin API tokens | Critical |
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| Bootstrap `admin_token.txt` | Critical |
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| Session/shell channels and task results | High |
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| LLM API keys (server-side) | High |
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| Plugin signing secret / secrets master key | High |
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| C2 profile configuration | Medium |
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| Audit log integrity | High |
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| OAST interaction data | Medium |
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## Trust boundaries
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```text
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[ Internet scanners ]
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v
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[ Redirector / TLS edge ] ---- optional
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v
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[ SquidC5 teamserver ] <--- operators (sc5 /ops) with scoped tokens
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+---> SQLite data/ (local disk)
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+---> BYO LLM API (egress)
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+---> Implants/beacons (authorized targets only)
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+---> MCP clients (external AI; off by default)
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```
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## Adversaries
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1. Internet scanners and credential stuffing against the API
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2. Stolen operator tokens (scope abuse)
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3. Malicious external MCP clients
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4. Prompt injection via implant/session output into Admin AI
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5. Network observer on implant channel (if unauthenticated)
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6. Local host compromise of teamserver disk
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7. Insider operator exceeding engagement scope
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## Controls
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| Threat | Control |
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|--------|---------|
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| API map disclosure | Public OpenAPI/docs hard-off |
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| Cross-origin abuse | Empty CORS default; no wildcard |
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| Token theft at rest | Hashed tokens; admin_token 0600 |
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| Credential stuffing | Rate limit + stricter auth-fail bucket |
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| Oversized bodies | `max_body_bytes` middleware |
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| Admin UI leak | `/ops/admin.js` requires admin scope |
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| MCP abuse | Off by default; per-token tool allow-list |
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| Prompt injection | `sanitize_untrusted` + capability allow-list |
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| HITL spoofing | Server-side queue; client flags ignored; command binding hash |
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| LLM key theft from DB | Fernet at-rest (`secrets.key`) |
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| Plugin forgery | Non-default HMAC secret required outside debug |
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| Listener loss on restart | Restore `running` listeners on boot |
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| False reverse shells | Classify + exec probe + stage-2 stabilize |
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| Fingerprinting | Minimal public health; security headers |
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| Supply chain | CI pip-audit gate; SquidGate on PRs |
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| Prod drift | Binary-only deploy from main CI |
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## STRIDE (summary)
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| Category | Examples | Mitigations |
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|----------|----------|-------------|
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| Spoofing | Fake beacon registration | Implant channel crypto (roadmap A11); TLS for API |
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| Tampering | Audit row edits | SQLite file perms; integrity chain (roadmap C08) |
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| Repudiation | Operator denies action | Audit + policy checks |
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| Info disclosure | OpenAPI, CORS *, admin JS | Locked defaults |
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| DoS | Request floods | Rate limit, body limit |
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| Elevation | Non-admin feature toggle | Scope checks server-side |
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## Out of scope
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- Unauthorized access to third-party systems
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- Guaranteeing implant evasion against all EDRs
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- Multi-region HA teamserver clustering (single-node SQLite)
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## Residual risks
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- Script implants without AEAD remain forgeable until implant crypto lands
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- Single SQLite node is a availability and backup dependency (`sc5 backup`)
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- Redirector tier is operator-provided
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## Related
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| Doc | Link |
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|-----|------|
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| Disclosure | [SECURITY.md](../SECURITY.md) |
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| Deployment | [deployment.md](deployment.md) |
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| Prod readiness | [prod-readiness-plan.md](prod-readiness-plan.md) |
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| Vision | [squidc5-vision.md](squidc5-vision.md) |
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| User guide - Security model | [user-guide.md#security-model](user-guide.md#security-model) |
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| Docs index | [README.md](README.md) |
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