updated logo, minor grammatical fixes in ui, and updated documentation to match

Hub/ui/src/views/Store.vue

@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ const sensors = [
             </div>
 
             <h3>Security Architecture</h3>
-            <p>This sensor is architected for extreme resilience against exploits. By utilizing a minimal attack surface and enforcing strict container sandboxing, it ensures the host filesystem remains protected.</p>
+            <p>This sensor is architected for extreme resilience against exploits by utilizing a minimal attack surface and enforcing strict container sandboxing, ensuring the host filesystem remains protected.</p>
             <ul class="list-disc pl-5 mb-6 space-y-1">
                 <li><strong>Unprivileged Execution:</strong> Runs entirely as a non-root user (<code>UID 65532</code>), preventing system-level modifications even in the event of a container breach.</li>
                 <li><strong>Read-Only Mounts:</strong> The target directory is mounted with strict <code>read_only: true</code> flags, ensuring the container cannot write to or modify the host files.</li>
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ const sensors = [
             </div>
 
             <h3>Security Architecture</h3>
-            <p>This sensor is architected for extreme resilience against exploits. By utilizing a minimal attack surface and enforcing strict container sandboxing, it safely intercepts raw ICMP traffic.</p>
+            <p>This sensor is architected for extreme resilience against exploits by utilizing a minimal attack surface and enforcing strict container sandboxing to safely intercept raw ICMP traffic.</p>
             <ul class="list-disc pl-5 mb-6 space-y-1">
                 <li><strong>Raw Socket Isolation:</strong> Bypasses heavy NIDS frameworks by interacting directly with network packets in pure Go, eliminating external C-library vulnerabilities.</li>
                 <li><strong>Least Privilege Execution:</strong> Runs as container root strictly to bind the raw socket, relying on container boundaries to limit system access.</li>
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ const sensors = [
             </div>
             
             <h3>Security Architecture</h3>
-            <p>This sensor is architected for extreme resilience against exploits. By utilizing a minimal attack surface and enforcing strict container sandboxing, it safely handles raw network traffic.</p>
+            <p>This sensor is architected for extreme resilience against exploits by utilizing a minimal attack surface and enforcing strict container sandboxing to safely handle raw network traffic.</p>
             <ul class="list-disc pl-5 mb-6 space-y-1">
                 <li><strong>Raw Socket Isolation:</strong> Bypasses heavy NIDS frameworks by interacting directly with network packets in pure Go, eliminating external C-library vulnerabilities.</li>
                 <li><strong>Least Privilege Execution:</strong> Runs as container root strictly to bind the raw socket, but relies on capability dropping to prevent privilege escalation.</li>
@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ const sensors = [
             </ul>
 
             <h3>Security Architecture</h3>
-            <p>This sensor is architected for extreme resilience against exploitation. By adhering to the principle of least privilege and enforcing strict resource limits.</p>
+            <p>This sensor is architected for extreme resilience against exploitation by adhering to the principle of least privilege and enforcing strict resource limits.</p>
             <ul class="list-disc pl-5 mb-6 space-y-1">
                 <li><strong>Kernel Capability Stripping:</strong> Drops all Linux kernel capabilities (<code>cap_drop: ALL</code>) via the Docker Compose configuration, neutralizing advanced kernel exploitation techniques.</li>
                 <li><strong>Distroless Isolation:</strong> Built on a statically-linked Distroless image. It completely lacks a shell (<code>/bin/sh</code>), package managers, or common Linux utilities (like <code>curl</code> or <code>wget</code>), leaving attackers with zero tools to pivot if they achieve Remote Code Execution.</li>
@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ const sensors = [
             </div>
 
             <h3>Security Architecture</h3>
-            <p>This sensor is architected for extreme resilience against web-based exploits. By utilizing a minimal attack surface and enforcing strict container sandboxing.</p>
+            <p>This sensor is architected for extreme resilience against web-based exploits by utilizing a minimal attack surface and enforcing strict container sandboxing.</p>
             <ul class="list-disc pl-5 mb-6 space-y-1">
                 <li><strong>Framework-Free Execution:</strong> Built purely on Go's native <code>net/http</code> library, eliminating the massive attack surface and supply-chain risks associated with heavy third-party web frameworks (like FastAPI, Flask, or Express).</li>
                 <li><strong>Unprivileged Execution:</strong> Runs entirely as a non-root user (<code>UID 65532</code>), preventing system-level modifications even in the event of a container breach.</li>

README.md

@@ -1,7 +1,12 @@
 [![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-GPLv3-blue.svg)](LICENSE)
+<p align="center">
+  <img  src="Hub/ui/public/favicon.svg" alt="HoneyWire Logo" width="150" />
+</p>
+<h1 align="center">HoneyWire</h1>
 
+---
 ## 📋 Table of Contents
-- [Overview](#honeywire)
+- [Overview](#overview)
 - [Screenshots](#screenshots)
 - [The Universal Event Standard](#-the-universal-event-standard-bring-your-own-sensor)
 - [Features](#features)
@@ -13,8 +18,8 @@
 - [Operational Checklist](#operational-checklist)
 
 ---
-# HoneyWire
 
+## Overview
 **HoneyWire Sentinel** is a lightweight, Distributed High-Signal Security Early-Warning System, designed for internal networks. It replaces the "magnifying glass" approach of traditional SIEMs, which often drown analysts in false positives by surveilling legitimate traffic, with a High-Fidelity Tripwire model. 
 
 Place a sensor exactly where you want it. If it trips, you have an intruder.
@@ -121,7 +126,7 @@ services:
     security_opt: ["no-new-privileges:true"]
     
     environment:
-      - HW_ENV=development # Required if not using HTTPS, or the cookie will have the secure flag set, in production it is highly raccomended to remove this and run this behind a reverse proxy using https
+      - HW_ENV=development # Required if not using HTTPS, or the cookie will have the secure flag set, in production it is highly recommended to remove this and run this behind a reverse proxy using https
       - HW_PORT=8080
       # Optional: Hardcode the dashboard password (disables the UI password reset feature)
       # - HW_DASHBOARD_PASSWORD=admin
@@ -165,11 +170,11 @@ nc localhost 2222
 ---
 
 ## Security Notes
-* **API Secret:** Ensure your `HW_HUB_KEY` is strong and identical on both the Hub and the Sensors. The Hub will reject any payloads with mismatched keys.
+* **API Secret:** Ensure your `Hub Secret Key` is strong and identical on both the Hub and the Sensors. The Hub will reject any payloads with mismatched keys.
 * **System Arming:** You can toggle the "System Armed" button in the Hub UI to temporarily disable push notifications while doing internal network maintenance or vulnerability scanning.
 * **Container Hardening:** HoneyWire utilizes `gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12:nonroot`. We follow the principle of least privilege to make sure that if a container is compromised, the blast is contained.
 * **Distributed Deployment:** It is highly recommended to run the Hub and its Sensors on separate physical or virtual machines. If an attacker compromises a sensor node, they should not have immediate local access to the centralized Hub.
-* ⚠️ **Encryption (HTTPS):** Always serve the Hub Web GUI and API over HTTPS using a reverse proxy (like Nginx, Caddy, or Traefik) in production. Failure to do so exposes your `HW_HUB_KEY` and Dashboard password to network sniffing.
+* ⚠️ **Encryption (HTTPS):** Always serve the Hub Web GUI and API over HTTPS using a reverse proxy (like Nginx, Caddy, or Traefik) in production. Failure to do so exposes your `Hub Secret Key` and Dashboard password to network sniffing.
 ---
 
 ## Tech Stack
@@ -190,6 +195,6 @@ nc localhost 2222
 
 ## Operational Checklist
 - [x] Complete the Web UI Initial Setup to set the Master Password.
-- [x] Retrieve the generated `HW_HUB_KEY` from Settings and apply it to your sensors.
+- [x] Retrieve the generated `Hub Secret Key` from Settings and apply it to your sensors.
 - [x] Configure your push notification webhooks via the Settings UI.
 - [x] Rebuild/redeploy containers after any version bump in `VERSION` or environment variable changes.

Sensors/official/TcpTarpit/README.md

@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ docker compose up -d
 
 ## Security Architecture
 
-This sensor is architected for extreme resilience against exploitation. By adhering to the principle of least privilege and enforcing strict resource limits.
+This sensor is architected for extreme resilience against exploitation by adhering to the principle of least privilege and enforcing strict resource limits.
 
 **Core Defense-in-Depth Measures:**
 * **Kernel Capability Stripping:** Drops all Linux kernel capabilities (`cap_drop: ALL`) via the Docker Compose configuration, neutralizing advanced kernel exploitation techniques.

Sensors/official/WebRouterDecoy/README.md

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ docker compose up -d
 
 ## Security Architecture
 
-This sensor is architected for extreme resilience against web-based exploits. By utilizing a minimal attack surface and enforcing strict container sandboxing.
+This sensor is architected for extreme resilience against web-based exploits by utilizing a minimal attack surface and enforcing strict container sandboxing.
 
 **Core Defense-in-Depth Measures:**
 * **Framework-Free Execution:** Built purely on Go's native `net/http` library, eliminating the massive attack surface and supply-chain risks associated with heavy third-party web frameworks (like FastAPI, Flask, or Express).