admin/elastic-detection-rules
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules synced 2026-06-08 14:00:08 +00:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

[New] Potential Account Takeover - Logon from New Source IP (#5770)

Browse Source 
* [New] Potential Account Takeover - Logon from New Source IP

* Update credential_access_account_takeover_new_source_ip.toml

* Update credential_access_account_takeover_new_source_ip.toml

* Update privilege_escalation_takeover_new_source_ip.toml

* ++

* Update privilege_escalation_account_takeover_mixed_logon_types.toml

* Update privilege_escalation_account_takeover_mixed_logon_types.toml

* Update rules/windows/privilege_escalation_takeover_new_source_ip.toml

Co-authored-by: Eric Forte <119343520+eric-forte-elastic@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/privilege_escalation_account_takeover_mixed_logon_types.toml

Co-authored-by: Eric Forte <119343520+eric-forte-elastic@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Eric Forte <119343520+eric-forte-elastic@users.noreply.github.com>

(cherry picked from commit a7c34ebf3b)
This commit is contained in:
Samirbous
2026-03-09 15:33:57 +00:00
committed by tradebot-elastic
parent 55523469d4
commit 331cc74577
2 changed files with 174 additions and 0 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
rules/windows/privilege_escalation_account_takeover_mixed_logon_types.toml
+87
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
[metadata]
creation_date = "2026/02/25"
integration = ["system", "windows"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2026/02/25"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies a user account (often a service account) that normally logs in with high volume using one logon type
suddenly showing successful logons using a different logon type with low count. This pattern may indicate account
takeover or use of stolen credentials from a new context (e.g. interactive or network logon where only batch/service
was expected).
"""
from = "now-30m"
interval = "15m"
language = "esql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Potential Account Takeover - Mixed Logon Types"
note = """## Triage and analysis
### Investigating Potential Account Takeover - Mixed Logon Types
A high-volume account (e.g. service account tied to a specific logon type such as Batch or Network) that also shows successful logons with a different logon type and low count may indicate credential compromise and use from a new context (account takeover or misuse).
### Possible investigation steps
- Confirm with the account owner or service owner whether the additional logon type is expected (e.g. new automation, RDP for maintenance).
- Review which logon types appear in Esql.logon_type_values and which has the low count (likely the anomalous one).
- Correlate with other alerts for the same user (e.g. logon from new source IP, password changes, MFA changes).
- Check whether the account is a known service account; if so, verify if any new scripts or systems were authorized to use it.
### False positive analysis
- Legitimate expansion of use (e.g. service account also used for occasional interactive logon for troubleshooting) can trigger this. Tune thresholds (e.g. max_logon >= 1000, min_logon <= 10) or add exclusions for known service accounts with documented multi-context use.
- New scheduled tasks or automation that use a different logon type may cause a short-lived spike in the "other" logon type; review over a longer window if needed.
### Response and remediation
- If takeover or misuse is confirmed: force password reset, revoke sessions, rotate service account credentials, and restrict logon type or source where possible.
- Investigate how credentials may have been compromised and address the vector.
"""
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/"]
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "b2c3d4e5-f6a7-5b6c-9d0e-1f2a3b4c5d6e"
severity = "medium"
tags = [
"Domain: Endpoint",
"OS: Windows",
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
"Tactic: Privilege Escalation",
"Data Source: Windows Security Event Logs",
"Resources: Investigation Guide",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "esql"
query = '''
from logs-system.security*, logs-windows.forwarded*, winlogbeat-* metadata _id, _version, _index
| WHERE event.category == "authentication" and event.action == "logged-in" and winlog.event_id == "4624" and
event.outcome == "success" and not user.id in ("S-1-5-18", "S-1-5-19", "S-1-5-20") and
to_lower(user.name) != "administrator"
| STATS logon_count = COUNT(*) by user.name, winlog.logon.type
| STATS
Esql.max_logon = MAX(logon_count),
Esql.min_logon = MIN(logon_count),
Esql.logon_type_values = VALUES(winlog.logon.type),
Esql.count_distinct_logon_types = COUNT_DISTINCT(winlog.logon.type) by user.name
// high count of logons is often associated with service account tied to a specific service, if observed in use with a different logon type it's suspicious
| WHERE Esql.count_distinct_logon_types >= 2 and Esql.max_logon >= 1000 and (Esql.min_logon >= 1 and Esql.min_logon <= 10)
| EVAL winlog.logon.type = MV_FIRST(Esql.logon_type_values)
| KEEP user.name, winlog.logon.type, Esql.*
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1078"
name = "Valid Accounts"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0004"
name = "Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
rules/windows/privilege_escalation_takeover_new_source_ip.toml
+87
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
[metadata]
creation_date = "2026/02/25"
integration = ["system", "windows"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2026/02/25"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies a user account that normally logs in with high volume from one source IP suddenly logging in from a different
source IP. This pattern (one IP with many successful logons, another IP with very few) may indicate account takeover
or use of stolen credentials from a new location.
"""
from = "now-30m"
interval = "15m"
language = "esql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Potential Account Takeover - Logon from New Source IP"
note = """## Triage and analysis
### Investigating Potential Account Takeover - Logon from New Source IP
An account that historically logs in many times from a single source IP (e.g. usual workstation or VPN) and then shows successful logons from exactly one other IP with a low count may indicate credential compromise and use from a new location (account takeover).
### Possible investigation steps
- Confirm with the account owner whether they recently logged in from the new source IP or from a new device/location.
- Check the new source IP for reputation, geography, and whether it is expected (e.g. corporate VPN range vs unknown).
- Correlate with other alerts for the same user or source IP (e.g. logon failures, password changes, MFA changes).
- Review timeline: if the "new" IP logon is very recent compared to the high-count IP, treat as higher priority.
### False positive analysis
- Legitimate use from a second device (e.g. new laptop, second office, VPN from travel) can produce exactly two IPs with one IP having few logons. Tune threshold (e.g. max_logon >= 100) or add exclusions for known VPN/remote ranges if needed.
- Service or shared accounts that are used from multiple jump hosts or scripts may show two IPs; consider excluding known service accounts.
### Response and remediation
- If takeover is confirmed: force password reset, revoke sessions, and enable or enforce MFA. Disable or lock the account until the user verifies identity.
- Investigate how credentials may have been compromised (phishing, breach, endpoint) and address the vector.
"""
references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/"]
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "a1b2c3d4-e5f6-4a5b-8c9d-0e1f2a3b4c5d"
severity = "medium"
tags = [
"Domain: Endpoint",
"OS: Windows",
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
"Tactic: Privilege Escalation",
"Data Source: Windows Security Event Logs",
"Resources: Investigation Guide",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "esql"
query = '''
from logs-system.security*, logs-windows.forwarded*, winlogbeat-* metadata _id, _version, _index
| where event.category == "authentication" and event.action == "logged-in" and winlog.event_id == "4624" and
event.outcome == "success" and winlog.logon.type in ("Network", "RemoteInteractive") and
source.ip is not null and source.ip != "127.0.0.1" and not to_string(source.ip) like "*::*" and not user.name like "*$"
| stats logon_count = COUNT(*) by user.name, source.ip
| stats
Esql.max_logon = MAX(logon_count),
Esql.min_logon = MIN(logon_count),
Esql.source_ip_values = VALUES(source.ip),
Esql.count_distinct = COUNT_DISTINCT(source.ip) by user.name
// high count of logons is often associated with service account tied to a specific source.ip, if observed in use from a new source.ip it's suspicious
| where Esql.max_logon >= 1000 and (Esql.min_logon >= 1 and Esql.min_logon <= 5) and Esql.count_distinct == 2
| eval source.ip = mv_first(Esql.source_ip_values)
| KEEP user.name, source.ip, Esql.*
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1078"
name = "Valid Accounts"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0004"
name = "Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"