11 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Michał Trojnara 97a9ade6ec Release 2.13
Signed-off-by: Michał Trojnara <Michal.Trojnara@stunnel.org>
2026-02-10 22:51:25 +01:00
Michał Trojnara f2f33bb131 Move providers_cleanup() back 2026-02-10 19:10:00 +01:00
Michał Trojnara 202b2c2866 Separate OpenSSL and functional initialization 2026-02-10 18:37:48 +01:00
olszomal 2a5409b7c4 Fix header bounds validation in PE page hash calculation 2026-02-09 16:15:21 +01:00
olszomal 87bce8e372 Fix memory leaks on error paths in PE signing 2026-02-09 16:15:21 +01:00
olszomal f7ace57c81 Validate PE attribute certificate table bounds 2026-02-09 16:15:21 +01:00
olszomal 92f8761b47 Fix heap corruption in PE page hash calculation 2026-02-06 15:41:01 +01:00
Antoni Klajn 09d3312fd9 Fixed integer overflow, integer underflow and Out-of-Bounds Read 2026-02-06 11:39:49 +01:00
olszomal 9d02a20aec Fix unsafe ZIP size handling and allocation checks 2026-02-04 10:13:03 +01:00
olszomal f190ec5d87 Fix double free in ZIP local header 2026-02-04 10:13:03 +01:00
Michał Trojnara 4b30d6be28 Initial 2.12-dev commit 2026-02-03 17:20:29 +01:00
12 changed files with 344 additions and 109 deletions
+1 -1
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ on:
env:
# Customize the CMake build type here (Release, Debug, RelWithDebInfo, etc.)
BUILD_TYPE: Release
version: osslsigncode-2.12
version: osslsigncode-2.13
jobs:
build:
+1 -1
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ set(BUILTIN_SOCKET ON CACHE BOOL "") # for static Python
# configure basic project information
project(osslsigncode
VERSION 2.12
VERSION 2.13
DESCRIPTION "OpenSSL based Authenticode signing for PE, CAB, CAT, MSI, APPX and script files"
HOMEPAGE_URL "https://github.com/mtrojnar/osslsigncode"
LANGUAGES C)
+15
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,20 @@
# osslsigncode change log
### 2.13 (2026.02.10)
**MULTIPLE SECURITY VULNERABILITIES**
This release includes important security fixes. Users are strongly encouraged
to upgrade, as the issues below may be exploitable when processing untrusted
files.
- fixed integer overflows when processing APPX compressed data streams
(by Małgorzata Olszówka)
- fixed double-free vulnerabilities in APPX file processing
(by Małgorzata Olszówka)
- fixed multiple memory corruption issues in PE page hash computation
(by Antoni Klajn (Opera) and Małgorzata Olszówka)
### 2.12 (2026.02.02)
**CRITICAL SECURITY VULNERABILITY**
+49 -5
View File
@@ -1503,6 +1503,7 @@ static int zipAppendSignatureFile(BIO *bio, ZIP_FILE *zip, uint8_t *data, uint64
if (!get_current_position(bio, &offset)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to get offset\n");
OPENSSL_free(header.fileName);
header.fileName = NULL;
OPENSSL_free(dataToWrite);
return 0; /* FAILED */
}
@@ -1513,6 +1514,7 @@ static int zipAppendSignatureFile(BIO *bio, ZIP_FILE *zip, uint8_t *data, uint64
if (!BIO_write_ex(bio, dataToWrite + written, toWrite, &check)
|| check != toWrite) {
OPENSSL_free(header.fileName);
header.fileName = NULL;
OPENSSL_free(dataToWrite);
return 0; /* FAILED */
}
@@ -1685,6 +1687,8 @@ static int zipRewriteData(ZIP_FILE *zip, ZIP_CENTRAL_DIRECTORY_ENTRY *entry, BIO
out:
OPENSSL_free(header.fileName);
OPENSSL_free(header.extraField);
header.fileName = NULL;
header.extraField = NULL;
return ret;
}
@@ -1852,6 +1856,11 @@ static size_t zipReadFileData(ZIP_FILE *zip, uint8_t **pData, ZIP_CENTRAL_DIRECT
}
if (entry->overrideData) {
compressedSize = entry->overrideData->compressedSize;
/* Validate sizes for safe allocation */
if (compressedSize > (uint64_t)(SIZE_MAX - 1)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Corrupted compressedSize : %" PRIu64"\n", compressedSize);
return 0; /* FAILED */
}
uncompressedSize = entry->overrideData->uncompressedSize;
compressedData = OPENSSL_zalloc(compressedSize + 1);
memcpy(compressedData, entry->overrideData->data, compressedSize);
@@ -1863,6 +1872,8 @@ static size_t zipReadFileData(ZIP_FILE *zip, uint8_t **pData, ZIP_CENTRAL_DIRECT
if (!zipReadLocalHeader(&header, zip, compressedSize)) {
OPENSSL_free(header.fileName);
OPENSSL_free(header.extraField);
header.fileName = NULL;
header.extraField = NULL;
return 0; /* FAILED */
}
if (header.fileNameLen != entry->fileNameLen
@@ -1873,14 +1884,20 @@ static size_t zipReadFileData(ZIP_FILE *zip, uint8_t **pData, ZIP_CENTRAL_DIRECT
fprintf(stderr, "Local header does not match central directory entry\n");
OPENSSL_free(header.fileName);
OPENSSL_free(header.extraField);
header.fileName = NULL;
header.extraField = NULL;
return 0; /* FAILED */
}
/* we don't really need those */
OPENSSL_free(header.fileName);
OPENSSL_free(header.extraField);
header.fileName = NULL;
header.extraField = NULL;
if (compressedSize > (uint64_t)zip->fileSize - entry->offsetOfLocalHeader) {
fprintf(stderr, "Corrupted compressedSize : 0x%08" PRIX64 "\n", entry->compressedSize);
/* Validate sizes for safe allocation */
if (compressedSize > (uint64_t)(SIZE_MAX - 1)
|| compressedSize > (uint64_t)zip->fileSize - entry->offsetOfLocalHeader) {
fprintf(stderr, "Corrupted compressedSize : %" PRIu64"\n", compressedSize);
return 0; /* FAILED */
}
compressedData = OPENSSL_zalloc(compressedSize + 1);
@@ -1899,11 +1916,24 @@ static size_t zipReadFileData(ZIP_FILE *zip, uint8_t **pData, ZIP_CENTRAL_DIRECT
*pData = compressedData;
dataSize = compressedSize;
} else if (entry->compression == COMPRESSION_DEFLATE) {
uint8_t *uncompressedData = OPENSSL_zalloc(uncompressedSize + 1);
uint64_t destLen = uncompressedSize;
uint64_t sourceLen = compressedSize;
uint8_t *uncompressedData;
uint64_t destLen, sourceLen;
int ret;
/* Validate sizes for safe allocation */
if (uncompressedSize > (uint64_t)(SIZE_MAX - 1)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Corrupted uncompressedSize : %" PRIu64"\n", uncompressedSize);
return 0; /* FAILED */
}
/* Detect suspicious compression ratio (zip bomb protection) */
if (uncompressedSize > 1024 * 1024 && uncompressedSize / 100 >= compressedSize) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: suspicious compression ratio\n");
return 0; /* FAILED */
}
uncompressedData = OPENSSL_zalloc(uncompressedSize + 1);
destLen = uncompressedSize;
sourceLen = compressedSize;
ret = zipInflate(uncompressedData, &destLen, compressedData, (uLong *)&sourceLen);
OPENSSL_free(compressedData);
@@ -1970,6 +2000,8 @@ static int zipReadLocalHeader(ZIP_LOCAL_HEADER *header, ZIP_FILE *zip, uint64_t
header->extraFieldLen = fileGetU16(file);
/* file name (variable size) */
if (header->fileNameLen > 0) {
/* fileNameLen is uint16_t (ZIP spec, 2-byte field),
* so fileNameLen + 1 cannot overflow size_t */
header->fileName = OPENSSL_zalloc(header->fileNameLen + 1);
size = fread(header->fileName, 1, header->fileNameLen, file);
if (size != header->fileNameLen) {
@@ -1981,6 +2013,8 @@ static int zipReadLocalHeader(ZIP_LOCAL_HEADER *header, ZIP_FILE *zip, uint64_t
}
/* extra field (variable size) */
if (header->extraFieldLen > 0) {
/* extraFieldLen is uint16_t (ZIP spec, 2-byte field),
* so extraFieldLen + 1 cannot overflow size_t */
header->extraField = OPENSSL_zalloc(header->extraFieldLen + 1);
size = fread(header->extraField, 1, header->extraFieldLen, file);
if (size != header->extraFieldLen) {
@@ -2011,6 +2045,8 @@ static int zipReadLocalHeader(ZIP_LOCAL_HEADER *header, ZIP_FILE *zip, uint64_t
fprintf(stderr, "The input file is not a valid zip file - flags indicate data descriptor, but data descriptor signature does not match\n");
OPENSSL_free(header->fileName);
OPENSSL_free(header->extraField);
header->fileName = NULL;
header->extraField = NULL;
return 0; /* FAILED */
}
header->crc32 = fileGetU32(file);
@@ -2477,6 +2513,8 @@ static ZIP_CENTRAL_DIRECTORY_ENTRY *zipReadNextCentralDirectoryEntry(FILE *file)
entry->offsetOfLocalHeader = fileGetU32(file);
/* file name (variable size) */
if (entry->fileNameLen > 0) {
/* fileNameLen is uint16_t (ZIP spec, 2-byte field),
* so fileNameLen + 1 cannot overflow size_t */
entry->fileName = OPENSSL_zalloc(entry->fileNameLen + 1);
size = fread(entry->fileName, 1, entry->fileNameLen, file);
if (size != entry->fileNameLen) {
@@ -2487,6 +2525,8 @@ static ZIP_CENTRAL_DIRECTORY_ENTRY *zipReadNextCentralDirectoryEntry(FILE *file)
}
/* extra field (variable size) */
if (entry->extraFieldLen > 0) {
/* extraFieldLen is uint16_t (ZIP spec, 2-byte field),
* so extraFieldLen + 1 cannot overflow size_t */
entry->extraField = OPENSSL_zalloc(entry->extraFieldLen + 1);
size = fread(entry->extraField, 1, entry->extraFieldLen, file);
if (size != entry->extraFieldLen) {
@@ -2497,6 +2537,8 @@ static ZIP_CENTRAL_DIRECTORY_ENTRY *zipReadNextCentralDirectoryEntry(FILE *file)
}
/* file comment (variable size) */
if (entry->fileCommentLen > 0) {
/* fileCommentLen is uint16_t (ZIP spec, 2-byte field),
* so fileCommentLen + 1 cannot overflow size_t */
entry->fileComment = OPENSSL_zalloc(entry->fileCommentLen + 1);
size = fread(entry->fileComment, 1, entry->fileCommentLen, file);
if (size != entry->fileCommentLen) {
@@ -2635,6 +2677,8 @@ static int readZipEOCDR(ZIP_EOCDR *eocdr, FILE *file)
}
#endif
if (eocdr->commentLen > 0) {
/* ZIP_EOCDR commentLen is uint16_t (ZIP spec, 2-byte field),
* so fileCommentLen + 1 cannot overflow size_t */
eocdr->comment = OPENSSL_zalloc(eocdr->commentLen + 1);
size = fread(eocdr->comment, 1, eocdr->commentLen, file);
if (size != eocdr->commentLen) {
+2 -1
View File
@@ -342,7 +342,8 @@ static int cab_verify_digests(FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx, PKCS7 *p7)
const u_char *p = content_val->data;
SpcIndirectDataContent *idc = d2i_SpcIndirectDataContent(NULL, &p, content_val->length);
if (idc) {
if (spc_extract_digest_safe(idc, mdbuf, &mdtype) < 0) {
if (spc_indirect_data_content_get_digest(idc, mdbuf, &mdtype) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to extract message digest from signature\n\n");
SpcIndirectDataContent_free(idc);
return 0; /* FAILED */
}
+2 -5
View File
@@ -390,15 +390,12 @@ static int cat_print_content_member_digest(ASN1_TYPE *content)
idc = d2i_SpcIndirectDataContent(NULL, &data, ASN1_STRING_length(value));
if (!idc)
return 0; /* FAILED */
if (spc_extract_digest_safe(idc, mdbuf, &mdtype) < 0) {
if (spc_indirect_data_content_get_digest(idc, mdbuf, &mdtype) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to extract message digest from signature\n\n");
SpcIndirectDataContent_free(idc);
return 0; /* FAILED */
}
SpcIndirectDataContent_free(idc);
if (mdtype == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to extract current message digest\n\n");
return 0; /* FAILED */
}
printf("\tHash algorithm: %s\n", OBJ_nid2sn(mdtype));
print_hash("\tMessage digest", "", mdbuf, EVP_MD_size(EVP_get_digestbynid(mdtype)));
return 1; /* OK */
+35 -27
View File
@@ -548,33 +548,6 @@ SpcLink *spc_link_obsolete_get(void)
return link;
}
/*
* Safely extract digest from SpcIndirectDataContent
* [in] idc: parsed SpcIndirectDataContent
* [out] mdbuf: output buffer (must be EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE bytes)
* [out] mdtype: digest algorithm's NID
* [returns] -1 on error or digest length on success
*/
int spc_extract_digest_safe(SpcIndirectDataContent *idc,
u_char *mdbuf, int *mdtype)
{
int digest_len;
if (!idc || !idc->messageDigest || !idc->messageDigest->digest ||
!idc->messageDigest->digestAlgorithm) {
fprintf(stderr, "Missing digest data\n");
return -1;
}
digest_len = idc->messageDigest->digest->length;
if (digest_len <= 0 || digest_len > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid digest length: %d\n", digest_len);
return -1;
}
memcpy(mdbuf, idc->messageDigest->digest->data, (size_t)digest_len);
*mdtype = OBJ_obj2nid(idc->messageDigest->digestAlgorithm->algorithm);
return digest_len;
}
/*
* [in] mdbuf, cmdbuf: message digests
* [in] mdtype: message digest algorithm type
@@ -590,6 +563,37 @@ int compare_digests(u_char *mdbuf, u_char *cmdbuf, int mdtype)
return mdok;
}
/*
* Safely extract digest from SpcIndirectDataContent with bounds checking.
* This function validates that the digest length from the ASN.1 structure
* does not exceed the destination buffer size, preventing buffer overflows
* from maliciously crafted signatures.
* [in] idc: parsed SpcIndirectDataContent structure
* [out] mdbuf: output buffer (must be at least EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE bytes)
* [out] mdtype: digest algorithm NID
* [returns] digest length on success, -1 on error
*/
int spc_indirect_data_content_get_digest(SpcIndirectDataContent *idc, u_char *mdbuf, int *mdtype)
{
int digest_len;
if (!idc || !idc->messageDigest || !idc->messageDigest->digest ||
!idc->messageDigest->digestAlgorithm) {
return -1; /* FAILED */
}
digest_len = idc->messageDigest->digest->length;
/* Validate digest length to prevent buffer overflow */
if (digest_len <= 0 || digest_len > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid digest length in signature: %d (expected 1-%d)\n",
digest_len, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
return -1; /* FAILED */
}
*mdtype = OBJ_obj2nid(idc->messageDigest->digestAlgorithm->algorithm);
memcpy(mdbuf, idc->messageDigest->digest->data, (size_t)digest_len);
return digest_len; /* OK */
}
/*
* Helper functions
*/
@@ -645,6 +649,10 @@ static int spc_indirect_data_content_create(u_char **blob, int *len, FILE_FORMAT
idc->data->value->type = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
idc->data->value->value.sequence = ASN1_STRING_new();
idc->data->type = ctx->format->data_blob_get(&p, &l, ctx);
if (!idc->data->type) {
SpcIndirectDataContent_free(idc);
return 0; /* FAILED */
}
idc->data->value->value.sequence->data = p;
idc->data->value->value.sequence->length = l;
idc->messageDigest->digestAlgorithm->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(mdtype);
+1 -2
View File
@@ -24,9 +24,8 @@ int is_content_type(PKCS7 *p7, const char *objid);
MsCtlContent *ms_ctl_content_get(PKCS7 *p7);
ASN1_TYPE *catalog_content_get(CatalogAuthAttr *attribute);
SpcLink *spc_link_obsolete_get(void);
int spc_extract_digest_safe(SpcIndirectDataContent *idc,
u_char *mdbuf, int *mdtype);
int compare_digests(u_char *mdbuf, u_char *cmdbuf, int mdtype);
int spc_indirect_data_content_get_digest(SpcIndirectDataContent *idc, u_char *mdbuf, int *mdtype);
/*
Local Variables:
+2 -1
View File
@@ -419,7 +419,8 @@ static int msi_verify_digests(FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx, PKCS7 *p7)
const u_char *p = content_val->data;
SpcIndirectDataContent *idc = d2i_SpcIndirectDataContent(NULL, &p, content_val->length);
if (idc) {
if (spc_extract_digest_safe(idc, mdbuf, &mdtype) < 0) {
if (spc_indirect_data_content_get_digest(idc, mdbuf, &mdtype) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to extract message digest from signature\n\n");
SpcIndirectDataContent_free(idc);
return 0; /* FAILED */
}
+32 -25
View File
@@ -3082,12 +3082,8 @@ static int verify_content_member_digest(FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx, ASN1_TYPE *content
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to extract SpcIndirectDataContent data\n");
return 1; /* FAILED */
}
if (spc_extract_digest_safe(idc, mdbuf, &mdtype) < 0) {
SpcIndirectDataContent_free(idc);
return 1; /* FAILED */
}
if (mdtype == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to extract current message digest\n\n");
if (spc_indirect_data_content_get_digest(idc, mdbuf, &mdtype) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to extract message digest from signature\n\n");
SpcIndirectDataContent_free(idc);
return 1; /* FAILED */
}
@@ -5082,7 +5078,7 @@ static void engine_control_set(GLOBAL_OPTIONS *options, const char *arg)
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE */
int main(int argc, char **argv)
static int main_execute(int argc, char **argv)
{
FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx = NULL;
GLOBAL_OPTIONS options;
@@ -5094,24 +5090,6 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
/* reset options */
memset(&options, 0, sizeof(GLOBAL_OPTIONS));
/* Set up OpenSSL */
if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CRYPTO_STRINGS
| OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS
| OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS
| OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG, NULL))
DO_EXIT_0("Failed to init crypto\n");
/* create some MS Authenticode OIDS we need later on */
if (!OBJ_create(SPC_STATEMENT_TYPE_OBJID, NULL, NULL)
/* PKCS9_COUNTER_SIGNATURE exists as OpenSSL OBJ_pkcs9_countersignature */
|| !OBJ_create(MS_JAVA_SOMETHING, NULL, NULL)
|| !OBJ_create(SPC_SP_OPUS_INFO_OBJID, NULL, NULL)
|| !OBJ_create(SPC_NESTED_SIGNATURE_OBJID, NULL, NULL)
|| !OBJ_create(SPC_UNAUTHENTICATED_DATA_BLOB_OBJID, NULL, NULL)
|| !OBJ_create(SPC_RFC3161_OBJID, NULL, NULL)
|| !OBJ_create(PKCS9_SEQUENCE_NUMBER, NULL, NULL))
DO_EXIT_0("Failed to create objects\n");
/* commands and options initialization */
if (!main_configure(argc, argv, &options))
goto err_cleanup;
@@ -5359,6 +5337,35 @@ err_cleanup:
return ret;
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int ret = -1;
/* one-time OpenSSL initialization */
if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CRYPTO_STRINGS
| OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS
| OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS
| OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG, NULL))
DO_EXIT_0("Failed to init crypto\n");
/* create some MS Authenticode OIDS we need later on */
if (!OBJ_create(SPC_STATEMENT_TYPE_OBJID, NULL, NULL)
/* PKCS9_COUNTER_SIGNATURE exists as OpenSSL OBJ_pkcs9_countersignature */
|| !OBJ_create(MS_JAVA_SOMETHING, NULL, NULL)
|| !OBJ_create(SPC_SP_OPUS_INFO_OBJID, NULL, NULL)
|| !OBJ_create(SPC_NESTED_SIGNATURE_OBJID, NULL, NULL)
|| !OBJ_create(SPC_UNAUTHENTICATED_DATA_BLOB_OBJID, NULL, NULL)
|| !OBJ_create(SPC_RFC3161_OBJID, NULL, NULL)
|| !OBJ_create(PKCS9_SEQUENCE_NUMBER, NULL, NULL))
DO_EXIT_0("Failed to create objects\n");
/* perform the requested operation */
ret = main_execute(argc, argv);
err_cleanup:
return ret;
}
/*
Local Variables:
c-basic-offset: 4
+202 -40
View File
@@ -163,8 +163,10 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *pe_spc_image_data_get(u_char **p, int *plen, FILE_FORMAT_CTX
if (EVP_MD_size(ctx->options->md) > EVP_MD_size(EVP_sha1()))
phtype = NID_sha256;
link = pe_page_hash_link_get(ctx, phtype);
if (!link)
if (!link) {
SpcPeImageData_free(pid);
return NULL; /* FAILED */
}
pid->file = link;
} else {
pid->file = spc_link_obsolete_get();
@@ -255,7 +257,9 @@ static int pe_verify_digests(FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx, PKCS7 *p7)
SpcIndirectDataContent_free(idc);
return 0; /* FAILED */
}
if (spc_extract_digest_safe(idc, mdbuf, &mdtype) < 0) {
if (spc_indirect_data_content_get_digest(idc, mdbuf, &mdtype) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to extract message digest from signature\n\n");
OPENSSL_free(ph);
SpcIndirectDataContent_free(idc);
return 0; /* FAILED */
}
@@ -402,6 +406,7 @@ static PKCS7 *pe_pkcs7_signature_new(FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx, BIO *hash)
content = spc_indirect_data_content_get(hash, ctx);
if (!content) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to get spcIndirectDataContent\n");
PKCS7_free(p7);
return NULL; /* FAILED */
}
if (!sign_spc_indirect_data_content(p7, content)) {
@@ -914,12 +919,25 @@ static u_char *pe_page_hash_calc(int *rphlen, FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx, int phtype)
uint16_t nsections, opthdr_size;
uint32_t alignment, pagesize, hdrsize;
uint32_t rs, ro, l, lastpos = 0;
int pphlen, phlen, i, pi = 1;
size_t written;
u_char *res, *zeroes;
int mdlen, pphlen, phlen, i, pi = 1;
size_t written, off, sect_off, sect_tbl, need;
u_char *res = NULL, *zeroes = NULL;
char *sections;
const EVP_MD *md = EVP_get_digestbynid(phtype);
BIO *bhash;
BIO *bhash = NULL;
uint32_t filebound;
size_t pphlen_sz, sections_factor;
if (rphlen == NULL || ctx == NULL || ctx->options == NULL || ctx->pe_ctx == NULL
|| ctx->options->indata == NULL)
return NULL;
if (md == NULL)
return NULL;
mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
if (mdlen <= 0)
return NULL;
/* NumberOfSections indicates the size of the section table,
* which immediately follows the headers, can be up to 65535 under Vista and later */
@@ -961,10 +979,46 @@ static u_char *pe_page_hash_calc(int *rphlen, FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx, int phtype)
fprintf(stderr, "Corrupted optional header size: 0x%08X\n", opthdr_size);
return NULL; /* FAILED */
}
pphlen = 4 + EVP_MD_size(md);
phlen = pphlen * (3 + (int)nsections + (int)(ctx->pe_ctx->fileend / pagesize));
/* Validate that pagesize >= hdrsize to prevent integer underflow */
if (pagesize < hdrsize) {
fprintf(stderr, "Page size (0x%08X) is smaller than header size (0x%08X)\n",
pagesize, hdrsize);
return NULL; /* FAILED */
}
pphlen = 4 + mdlen;
/* Compute an upper bound for result size and guard overflow */
pphlen_sz = (size_t)pphlen;
sections_factor = 3 + (size_t)nsections + ((size_t)ctx->pe_ctx->fileend / pagesize);
if (sections_factor > SIZE_MAX / pphlen_sz) {
fprintf(stderr, "Page hash allocation size would overflow\n");
return NULL; /* FAILED */
}
phlen = (int)(pphlen_sz * sections_factor);
/* Sanity limit - page hash shouldn't exceed reasonable size (16 MB) */
if (phlen < 0 || (size_t)phlen > SIZE_16M) {
fprintf(stderr, "Page hash size exceeds limit: %d\n", phlen);
return NULL; /* FAILED */
}
/* Determine the file boundary for section data validation */
filebound = ctx->pe_ctx->sigpos ? ctx->pe_ctx->sigpos : ctx->pe_ctx->fileend;
/* Validate section table bounds before reading section headers */
sect_off = (size_t)ctx->pe_ctx->header_size + 24u + (size_t)opthdr_size;
sect_tbl = (size_t)nsections * 40u;
if (sect_off > (size_t)filebound || sect_tbl > (size_t)filebound - sect_off) {
fprintf(stderr, "Section table out of bounds: off=%zu size=%zu filebound=%u\n",
sect_off, sect_tbl, filebound);
return NULL; /* FAILED */
}
sections = (char *)ctx->options->indata + sect_off;
bhash = BIO_new(BIO_f_md());
if (bhash == NULL)
return NULL;
#if defined(__GNUC__)
#pragma GCC diagnostic push
#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wcast-qual"
@@ -977,7 +1031,10 @@ static u_char *pe_page_hash_calc(int *rphlen, FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx, int phtype)
#if defined(__GNUC__)
#pragma GCC diagnostic pop
#endif
BIO_push(bhash, BIO_new(BIO_s_null()));
if (BIO_push(bhash, BIO_new(BIO_s_null())) == NULL) {
BIO_free_all(bhash);
return NULL;
}
if (!BIO_write_ex(bhash, ctx->options->indata, ctx->pe_ctx->header_size + 88, &written)
|| written != ctx->pe_ctx->header_size + 88) {
BIO_free_all(bhash);
@@ -989,36 +1046,84 @@ static u_char *pe_page_hash_calc(int *rphlen, FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx, int phtype)
BIO_free_all(bhash);
return NULL; /* FAILED */
}
if (!BIO_write_ex(bhash,
ctx->options->indata + ctx->pe_ctx->header_size + 160 + ctx->pe_ctx->pe32plus*16,
hdrsize - (ctx->pe_ctx->header_size + 160 + ctx->pe_ctx->pe32plus*16), &written)
|| written != hdrsize - (ctx->pe_ctx->header_size + 160 + ctx->pe_ctx->pe32plus*16)) {
off = ctx->pe_ctx->header_size + 160 + (size_t)ctx->pe_ctx->pe32plus * 16;
if (hdrsize < off || hdrsize > filebound) {
BIO_free_all(bhash);
return NULL; /* FAILED: header too small */
}
if (!BIO_write_ex(bhash, ctx->options->indata + off, (size_t)hdrsize - off, &written)
|| written != hdrsize - off) {
BIO_free_all(bhash);
return NULL; /* FAILED */
}
if (pagesize < hdrsize) {
BIO_free_all(bhash);
return NULL; /* FAILED: header larger than page */
}
zeroes = OPENSSL_zalloc((size_t)pagesize);
if (!BIO_write_ex(bhash, zeroes, pagesize - hdrsize, &written)
|| written != pagesize - hdrsize) {
if (zeroes == NULL) {
BIO_free_all(bhash);
return NULL; /* FAILED */
}
if (!BIO_write_ex(bhash, zeroes, (size_t)pagesize - (size_t)hdrsize, &written)
|| written != (size_t)pagesize - (size_t)hdrsize) {
BIO_free_all(bhash);
OPENSSL_free(zeroes);
return NULL; /* FAILED */
}
res = OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)phlen);
if (res == NULL) {
BIO_free_all(bhash);
OPENSSL_free(zeroes);
return NULL; /* FAILED */
}
memset(res, 0, 4);
BIO_gets(bhash, (char*)res + 4, EVP_MD_size(md));
if (BIO_gets(bhash, (char *)res + 4, mdlen) != mdlen) {
BIO_free_all(bhash);
OPENSSL_free(zeroes);
OPENSSL_free(res);
return NULL; /* FAILED */
}
BIO_free_all(bhash);
sections = ctx->options->indata + ctx->pe_ctx->header_size + 24 + opthdr_size;
for (i=0; i<nsections; i++) {
/* Resource Table address and size */
bhash = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < (int)nsections; i++) {
/* SizeOfRawData and PointerToRawData from section header */
rs = GET_UINT32_LE(sections + 16);
ro = GET_UINT32_LE(sections + 20);
if (rs == 0 || rs >= UINT32_MAX) {
if (rs == 0) {
sections += 40;
continue;
}
for (l=0; l<rs; l+=pagesize, pi++) {
PUT_UINT32_LE(ro + l, res + pi*pphlen);
/* Validate section bounds against file size to prevent OOB read */
if (ro >= filebound || rs > filebound - ro) {
fprintf(stderr, "Section %d has invalid bounds: offset=0x%08X, size=0x%08X, fileend=0x%08X\n",
i, ro, rs, filebound);
OPENSSL_free(zeroes);
OPENSSL_free(res);
return NULL; /* FAILED */
}
for (l = 0; l < rs; l += pagesize, pi++) {
need = (size_t)(pi + 1) * (size_t)pphlen;
/* Prevent OOB write into res if pi grows beyond allocated factor */
if (need > (size_t)phlen) {
fprintf(stderr, "Page hash buffer overflow prevented: pi=%d need=%zu phlen=%d\n",
pi, need, phlen);
OPENSSL_free(zeroes);
OPENSSL_free(res);
return NULL; /* FAILED */
}
PUT_UINT32_LE(ro + l, res + (size_t)pi * (size_t)pphlen);
bhash = BIO_new(BIO_f_md());
if (bhash == NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(zeroes);
OPENSSL_free(res);
return NULL;
}
#if defined(__GNUC__)
#pragma GCC diagnostic push
#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wcast-qual"
@@ -1033,17 +1138,24 @@ static u_char *pe_page_hash_calc(int *rphlen, FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx, int phtype)
#if defined(__GNUC__)
#pragma GCC diagnostic pop
#endif
BIO_push(bhash, BIO_new(BIO_s_null()));
if (rs - l < pagesize) {
if (!BIO_write_ex(bhash, ctx->options->indata + ro + l, rs - l, &written)
|| written != rs - l) {
if (BIO_push(bhash, BIO_new(BIO_s_null())) == NULL) {
BIO_free_all(bhash);
OPENSSL_free(zeroes);
OPENSSL_free(res);
return NULL;
}
if (l < rs && rs - l < pagesize) {
size_t tail = (size_t)(rs - l);
if (!BIO_write_ex(bhash, ctx->options->indata + ro + l, tail, &written)
|| written != tail) {
BIO_free_all(bhash);
OPENSSL_free(zeroes);
OPENSSL_free(res);
return NULL; /* FAILED */
}
if (!BIO_write_ex(bhash, zeroes, pagesize - (rs - l), &written)
|| written != pagesize - (rs - l)) {
if (!BIO_write_ex(bhash, zeroes, pagesize - tail, &written)
|| written != pagesize - tail) {
BIO_free_all(bhash);
OPENSSL_free(zeroes);
OPENSSL_free(res);
@@ -1058,17 +1170,35 @@ static u_char *pe_page_hash_calc(int *rphlen, FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx, int phtype)
return NULL; /* FAILED */
}
}
BIO_gets(bhash, (char*)res + pi*pphlen + 4, EVP_MD_size(md));
if (BIO_gets(bhash, (char *)res + (size_t)pi * (size_t)pphlen + 4, mdlen) != mdlen) {
BIO_free_all(bhash);
OPENSSL_free(zeroes);
OPENSSL_free(res);
return NULL; /* FAILED */
}
BIO_free_all(bhash);
bhash = NULL;
}
lastpos = ro + rs;
sections += 40;
}
PUT_UINT32_LE(lastpos, res + pi*pphlen);
memset(res + pi*pphlen + 4, 0, (size_t)EVP_MD_size(md));
/* Final entry */
need = (size_t)(pi + 1) * (size_t)pphlen;
if (need > (size_t)phlen) {
fprintf(stderr, "Page hash buffer overflow prevented at final entry: pi=%d need=%zu phlen=%d\n",
pi, need, phlen);
OPENSSL_free(zeroes);
OPENSSL_free(res);
return NULL; /* FAILED */
}
PUT_UINT32_LE(lastpos, res + (size_t)pi * (size_t)pphlen);
memset(res + (size_t)pi * (size_t)pphlen + 4, 0, (size_t)mdlen);
pi++;
OPENSSL_free(zeroes);
*rphlen = pi*pphlen;
*rphlen = pi * pphlen;
return res;
}
@@ -1088,6 +1218,10 @@ static int pe_verify_page_hash(FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx, u_char *ph, int phlen, int
if (!ph)
return 1; /* OK */
cph = pe_page_hash_calc(&cphlen, ctx, phtype);
if (!cph) {
fprintf(stderr, "Page hash verification failed: could not calculate page hash\n");
return 0; /* FAILED */
}
mdok = (phlen == cphlen) && !memcmp(ph, cph, (size_t)phlen);
printf("Page hash algorithm : %s\n", OBJ_nid2sn(phtype));
if (ctx->options->verbose) {
@@ -1190,7 +1324,8 @@ static int pe_check_file(FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx)
{
uint32_t real_pe_checksum, sum = 0;
if (!ctx) {
if (ctx == NULL || ctx->pe_ctx == NULL || ctx->options == NULL
|| ctx->options->indata == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Init error\n");
return 0; /* FAILED */
}
@@ -1202,25 +1337,52 @@ static int pe_check_file(FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx)
printf("Calculated PE checksum: %08X\n", real_pe_checksum);
printf("Warning: invalid PE checksum\n");
}
/* Signature directory bounds */
if (ctx->pe_ctx->sigpos == 0 || ctx->pe_ctx->siglen == 0
|| ctx->pe_ctx->sigpos > ctx->pe_ctx->fileend) {
|| ctx->pe_ctx->sigpos > ctx->pe_ctx->fileend
|| ctx->pe_ctx->siglen > ctx->pe_ctx->fileend - ctx->pe_ctx->sigpos) {
fprintf(stderr, "No signature found\n");
return 0; /* FAILED */
}
/*
* Validate WIN_CERTIFICATE chain.
* If the sum of the rounded dwLength values does not equal the Size value,
* then either the attribute certificate table or the Size field is corrupted.
*/
while (sum < ctx->pe_ctx->siglen) {
uint32_t len = GET_UINT32_LE(ctx->options->indata + ctx->pe_ctx->sigpos + sum);
if (ctx->pe_ctx->siglen - len > 8) {
uint32_t len, off;
/* Prevent overflow in sigpos + sum */
if (sum > UINT32_MAX - ctx->pe_ctx->sigpos) {
fprintf(stderr, "Corrupted attribute certificate table\n");
fprintf(stderr, "Attribute certificate table size : %08X\n", ctx->pe_ctx->siglen);
fprintf(stderr, "Attribute certificate entry length: %08X\n\n", len);
return 0; /* FAILED */
}
/* quadword align data */
len += len % 8 ? 8 - len % 8 : 0;
off = ctx->pe_ctx->sigpos + sum;
/* Need at least 4 bytes to read dwLength */
if (off > ctx->pe_ctx->fileend || ctx->pe_ctx->fileend - off < 4) {
fprintf(stderr, "Corrupted attribute certificate table\n");
return 0; /* FAILED */
}
len = GET_UINT32_LE(ctx->options->indata + off);
/* dwLength must include the 8-byte WIN_CERTIFICATE header */
if (len < 8 || len > ctx->pe_ctx->siglen - sum || len > ctx->pe_ctx->fileend - off) {
fprintf(stderr, "Corrupted attribute certificate table\n");
return 0; /* FAILED */
}
/* Quadword align data */
if (len % 8) {
uint32_t pad = 8 - (len % 8);
/* Ensure quadword alignment does not overflow or exceed remaining table size */
if (pad > ctx->pe_ctx->siglen - sum - len) {
fprintf(stderr, "Corrupted attribute certificate table\n");
return 0; /* FAILED */
}
len += pad;
}
sum += len;
}
if (sum != ctx->pe_ctx->siglen) {
+2 -1
View File
@@ -294,7 +294,8 @@ static int script_verify_digests(FILE_FORMAT_CTX *ctx, PKCS7 *p7)
const u_char *p = content_val->data;
SpcIndirectDataContent *idc = d2i_SpcIndirectDataContent(NULL, &p, content_val->length);
if (idc) {
if (spc_extract_digest_safe(idc, mdbuf, &mdtype) < 0) {
if (spc_indirect_data_content_get_digest(idc, mdbuf, &mdtype) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to extract message digest from signature\n\n");
SpcIndirectDataContent_free(idc);
return 0; /* FAILED */
}