Compare commits

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Author SHA1 Message Date
semantic-release-bot f376abb60e chore(release): 8.6.13 [skip ci]
## [8.6.13](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/compare/8.6.12...8.6.13) (2026-03-07)

### Bug Fixes

* Denial of Service (DoS) and Cloud Function Dispatch Bypass via Prototype Chain Resolution ([GHSA-5j86-7r7m-p8h6](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-5j86-7r7m-p8h6)) ([#10124](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/issues/10124)) ([5c2d60a](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/5c2d60a2f3733ca3a4cb782d552ba38c526aee0b))
2026-03-07 17:39:30 +00:00
Manuel 5c2d60a2f3 fix: Denial of Service (DoS) and Cloud Function Dispatch Bypass via Prototype Chain Resolution ([GHSA-5j86-7r7m-p8h6](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-5j86-7r7m-p8h6)) (#10124) 2026-03-07 17:38:28 +00:00
semantic-release-bot 8c8eb46022 chore(release): 8.6.12 [skip ci]
## [8.6.12](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/compare/8.6.11...8.6.12) (2026-03-07)

### Bug Fixes

* Denylist `requestKeywordDenylist` keyword scan bypass through nested object placement ([GHSA-q342-9w2p-57fp](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-q342-9w2p-57fp)) ([#10122](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/issues/10122)) ([2b52feb](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/2b52feb06448e5c683017fa2e3d2038a5d8d6085))
2026-03-07 16:42:04 +00:00
Manuel 2b52feb064 fix: Denylist requestKeywordDenylist keyword scan bypass through nested object placement ([GHSA-q342-9w2p-57fp](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-q342-9w2p-57fp)) (#10122) 2026-03-07 16:40:49 +00:00
semantic-release-bot aa7c57e917 chore(release): 8.6.11 [skip ci]
## [8.6.11](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/compare/8.6.10...8.6.11) (2026-03-07)

### Bug Fixes

* Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via `$regex` query in LiveQuery ([GHSA-mf3j-86qx-cq5j](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-mf3j-86qx-cq5j)) ([#10120](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/issues/10120)) ([42bd2f0](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/42bd2f07bd3b425cac1e3c48161688cc4d54ef41))
2026-03-07 02:15:33 +00:00
Manuel 42bd2f07bd fix: Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via $regex query in LiveQuery ([GHSA-mf3j-86qx-cq5j](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-mf3j-86qx-cq5j)) (#10120) 2026-03-07 02:14:34 +00:00
semantic-release-bot 72af528d53 chore(release): 8.6.10 [skip ci]
## [8.6.10](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/compare/8.6.9...8.6.10) (2026-03-06)

### Bug Fixes

* JWT audience validation bypass in Google, Apple, and Facebook authentication adapters ([GHSA-x6fw-778m-wr9v](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-x6fw-778m-wr9v)) ([#10114](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/issues/10114)) ([1da3123](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/1da312311827a7790ad97852e8672119d40d529a))
2026-03-06 05:13:03 +00:00
Manuel 1da3123118 fix: JWT audience validation bypass in Google, Apple, and Facebook authentication adapters ([GHSA-x6fw-778m-wr9v](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-x6fw-778m-wr9v)) (#10114) 2026-03-06 05:12:09 +00:00
semantic-release-bot 79bd170d53 chore(release): 8.6.9 [skip ci]
## [8.6.9](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/compare/8.6.8...8.6.9) (2026-03-06)

### Bug Fixes

* File metadata endpoint bypasses `beforeFind` / `afterFind` trigger authorization ([GHSA-hwx8-q9cg-mqmc](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-hwx8-q9cg-mqmc)) ([#10107](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/issues/10107)) ([a7358b1](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/a7358b1e0c58ef4c6b5e0ade772bf673b5f78fd0))
2026-03-06 01:06:26 +00:00
Manuel a7358b1e0c fix: File metadata endpoint bypasses beforeFind / afterFind trigger authorization ([GHSA-hwx8-q9cg-mqmc](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-hwx8-q9cg-mqmc)) (#10107) 2026-03-06 01:05:25 +00:00
semantic-release-bot cf030af7f5 chore(release): 8.6.8 [skip ci]
## [8.6.8](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/compare/8.6.7...8.6.8) (2026-03-05)

### Bug Fixes

* `PagesRouter` path traversal allows reading files outside configured pages directory ([GHSA-hm3f-q6rw-m6wh](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-hm3f-q6rw-m6wh)) ([#10105](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/issues/10105)) ([d5a057d](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/d5a057d1a7cd5f6713d93afa3ad6f764f74b6ed2))
2026-03-05 23:50:37 +00:00
Manuel d5a057d1a7 fix: PagesRouter path traversal allows reading files outside configured pages directory ([GHSA-hm3f-q6rw-m6wh](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-hm3f-q6rw-m6wh)) (#10105) 2026-03-05 23:49:20 +00:00
semantic-release-bot 2c43ddb74e chore(release): 8.6.7 [skip ci]
## [8.6.7](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/compare/8.6.6...8.6.7) (2026-03-05)

### Bug Fixes

* Malformed `$regex` query leaks database error details in API response (GHSA-9cp7-3q5w-j92g) ([#10102](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/issues/10102)) ([07870f5](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/07870f59eec03f5c2a5fb1732cb28787ca3f8152))
2026-03-05 20:46:40 +00:00
Manuel 07870f59ee fix: Malformed $regex query leaks database error details in API response (GHSA-9cp7-3q5w-j92g) (#10102) 2026-03-05 20:45:39 +00:00
semantic-release-bot 0994d6e9b8 chore(release): 8.6.6 [skip ci]
## [8.6.6](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/compare/8.6.5...8.6.6) (2026-03-05)

### Bug Fixes

* Endpoint `/loginAs` allows `readOnlyMasterKey` to gain full read and write access as any user ([GHSA-79wj-8rqv-jvp5](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-79wj-8rqv-jvp5)) ([#10099](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/issues/10099)) ([0c940b7](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/0c940b70891c947fbf6c55536ed95ae300c23350))
2026-03-05 02:29:11 +00:00
Manuel 0c940b7089 fix: Endpoint /loginAs allows readOnlyMasterKey to gain full read and write access as any user ([GHSA-79wj-8rqv-jvp5](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-79wj-8rqv-jvp5)) (#10099) 2026-03-05 02:28:05 +00:00
semantic-release-bot bfe11c4917 chore(release): 8.6.5 [skip ci]
## [8.6.5](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/compare/8.6.4...8.6.5) (2026-03-05)

### Bug Fixes

* File creation and deletion bypasses `readOnlyMasterKey` write restriction (GHSA-xfh7-phr7-gr2x) ([#10096](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/issues/10096)) ([07bddc0](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/07bddc0850c0eebb51219fe1d5d342f4412461ba))
2026-03-05 01:45:59 +00:00
Manuel 07bddc0850 fix: File creation and deletion bypasses readOnlyMasterKey write restriction (GHSA-xfh7-phr7-gr2x) (#10096) 2026-03-05 01:44:56 +00:00
semantic-release-bot d39387f44d chore(release): 8.6.4 [skip ci]
## [8.6.4](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/compare/8.6.3...8.6.4) (2026-03-04)

### Bug Fixes

* Cloud Hooks and Cloud Jobs bypass `readOnlyMasterKey` write restriction (GHSA-vc89-5g3r-cmhh) ([#10089](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/issues/10089)) ([6c79da9](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/6c79da91fc5ec6f2a0bb69a0ca6a886c1585754f))
2026-03-04 00:16:10 +00:00
Manuel 6c79da91fc fix: Cloud Hooks and Cloud Jobs bypass readOnlyMasterKey write restriction (GHSA-vc89-5g3r-cmhh) (#10089) 2026-03-04 00:15:09 +00:00
semantic-release-bot 9f28ff5663 chore(release): 8.6.3 [skip ci]
## [8.6.3](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/compare/8.6.2...8.6.3) (2026-02-23)

### Bug Fixes

* JWT Algorithm Confusion in Google Auth Adapter ([GHSA-4q3h-vp4r-prv2](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-4q3h-vp4r-prv2)) ([#10073](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/issues/10073)) ([9b94083](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/9b94083accb7f3e72c6b8126c195c7a03dd2dfd7))
2026-02-23 22:06:23 +00:00
Manuel 9b94083acc fix: JWT Algorithm Confusion in Google Auth Adapter ([GHSA-4q3h-vp4r-prv2](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-4q3h-vp4r-prv2)) (#10073) 2026-02-23 22:04:35 +00:00
semantic-release-bot 035b9b549e chore(release): 8.6.2 [skip ci]
## [8.6.2](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/compare/8.6.1...8.6.2) (2025-12-16)

### Bug Fixes

* Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in Instagram auth adapter [GHSA-3f5f-xgrj-97pf](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-3f5f-xgrj-97pf) ([#9989](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/issues/9989)) ([155c6ad](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/155c6ad92d2375652c9720d7deed129a9e8f74ff))
2025-12-16 01:24:04 +00:00
Manuel 155c6ad92d fix: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in Instagram auth adapter [GHSA-3f5f-xgrj-97pf](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-3f5f-xgrj-97pf) (#9989) 2025-12-16 02:23:13 +01:00
semantic-release-bot 0b032a3f87 chore(release): 8.6.1 [skip ci]
## [8.6.1](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/compare/8.6.0...8.6.1) (2025-12-14)

### Bug Fixes

* Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via HTML pages for password reset and email verification [GHSA-jhgf-2h8h-ggxv](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-jhgf-2h8h-ggxv) ([#9986](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/issues/9986)) ([12d8b50](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/12d8b502a2f99098d177d095842b07d55f62313a))
2025-12-14 15:06:59 +00:00
Manuel 12d8b502a2 fix: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via HTML pages for password reset and email verification [GHSA-jhgf-2h8h-ggxv](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-jhgf-2h8h-ggxv) (#9986) 2025-12-14 16:06:02 +01:00
Manuel 9896817df6 ci: Update auto-release LTS branch (#9968) 2025-12-12 00:53:40 +01:00
39 changed files with 1397 additions and 334 deletions
+2 -3
View File
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ async function config() {
console.log(`Running on branch: ${branch}`);
// Set changelog file
const changelogFile = `./changelogs/CHANGELOG_${branch}.md`;
const changelogFile = `./changelogs/CHANGELOG_release.md`;
// eslint-disable-next-line no-console
console.log(`Changelog file output to: ${changelogFile}`);
@@ -46,9 +46,8 @@ async function config() {
'release',
{ name: 'alpha', prerelease: true },
// { name: 'beta', prerelease: true },
'next-major',
// Long-Term-Support branch
'release-8.x.x',
{ name: 'release-8.x.x', range: '8.x.x', channel: '8.x.x' },
],
dryRun: false,
debug: true,
+33
View File
@@ -525,6 +525,38 @@ async function benchmarkQueryWithIncludeNested(name) {
});
}
/**
* Benchmark: Object.save with nested data (denylist scanning)
*
* Measures create latency for objects with deeply nested structures containing
* multiple sibling objects at each level. This exercises the requestKeywordDenylist
* scanner (objectContainsKeyValue) which must traverse all keys and nested values.
*/
async function benchmarkObjectCreateNestedDenylist(name) {
let counter = 0;
return measureOperation({
name,
iterations: 1_000,
operation: async () => {
const TestObject = Parse.Object.extend('BenchmarkDenylist');
const obj = new TestObject();
const idx = counter++;
obj.set('nested', {
meta1: { info: { detail: `value-${idx}` } },
meta2: { info: { detail: `value-${idx}` } },
meta3: { info: { detail: `value-${idx}` } },
tags: ['a', 'b', 'c'],
config: {
setting1: { enabled: true, params: { x: 1 } },
setting2: { enabled: false, params: { y: 2 } },
},
});
await obj.save();
},
});
}
/**
* Run all benchmarks
*/
@@ -554,6 +586,7 @@ async function runBenchmarks() {
{ name: 'User.login', fn: benchmarkUserLogin },
{ name: 'Query.include (parallel pointers)', fn: benchmarkQueryWithIncludeParallel },
{ name: 'Query.include (nested pointers)', fn: benchmarkQueryWithIncludeNested },
{ name: 'Object.save (nested data, denylist scan)', fn: benchmarkObjectCreateNestedDenylist },
];
// Run each benchmark with database cleanup
+91
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,94 @@
## [8.6.13](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/compare/8.6.12...8.6.13) (2026-03-07)
### Bug Fixes
* Denial of Service (DoS) and Cloud Function Dispatch Bypass via Prototype Chain Resolution ([GHSA-5j86-7r7m-p8h6](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-5j86-7r7m-p8h6)) ([#10124](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/issues/10124)) ([5c2d60a](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/5c2d60a2f3733ca3a4cb782d552ba38c526aee0b))
## [8.6.12](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/compare/8.6.11...8.6.12) (2026-03-07)
### Bug Fixes
* Denylist `requestKeywordDenylist` keyword scan bypass through nested object placement ([GHSA-q342-9w2p-57fp](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-q342-9w2p-57fp)) ([#10122](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/issues/10122)) ([2b52feb](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/2b52feb06448e5c683017fa2e3d2038a5d8d6085))
## [8.6.11](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/compare/8.6.10...8.6.11) (2026-03-07)
### Bug Fixes
* Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via `$regex` query in LiveQuery ([GHSA-mf3j-86qx-cq5j](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-mf3j-86qx-cq5j)) ([#10120](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/issues/10120)) ([42bd2f0](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/42bd2f07bd3b425cac1e3c48161688cc4d54ef41))
## [8.6.10](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/compare/8.6.9...8.6.10) (2026-03-06)
### Bug Fixes
* JWT audience validation bypass in Google, Apple, and Facebook authentication adapters ([GHSA-x6fw-778m-wr9v](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-x6fw-778m-wr9v)) ([#10114](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/issues/10114)) ([1da3123](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/1da312311827a7790ad97852e8672119d40d529a))
## [8.6.9](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/compare/8.6.8...8.6.9) (2026-03-06)
### Bug Fixes
* File metadata endpoint bypasses `beforeFind` / `afterFind` trigger authorization ([GHSA-hwx8-q9cg-mqmc](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-hwx8-q9cg-mqmc)) ([#10107](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/issues/10107)) ([a7358b1](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/a7358b1e0c58ef4c6b5e0ade772bf673b5f78fd0))
## [8.6.8](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/compare/8.6.7...8.6.8) (2026-03-05)
### Bug Fixes
* `PagesRouter` path traversal allows reading files outside configured pages directory ([GHSA-hm3f-q6rw-m6wh](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-hm3f-q6rw-m6wh)) ([#10105](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/issues/10105)) ([d5a057d](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/d5a057d1a7cd5f6713d93afa3ad6f764f74b6ed2))
## [8.6.7](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/compare/8.6.6...8.6.7) (2026-03-05)
### Bug Fixes
* Malformed `$regex` query leaks database error details in API response (GHSA-9cp7-3q5w-j92g) ([#10102](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/issues/10102)) ([07870f5](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/07870f59eec03f5c2a5fb1732cb28787ca3f8152))
## [8.6.6](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/compare/8.6.5...8.6.6) (2026-03-05)
### Bug Fixes
* Endpoint `/loginAs` allows `readOnlyMasterKey` to gain full read and write access as any user ([GHSA-79wj-8rqv-jvp5](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-79wj-8rqv-jvp5)) ([#10099](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/issues/10099)) ([0c940b7](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/0c940b70891c947fbf6c55536ed95ae300c23350))
## [8.6.5](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/compare/8.6.4...8.6.5) (2026-03-05)
### Bug Fixes
* File creation and deletion bypasses `readOnlyMasterKey` write restriction (GHSA-xfh7-phr7-gr2x) ([#10096](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/issues/10096)) ([07bddc0](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/07bddc0850c0eebb51219fe1d5d342f4412461ba))
## [8.6.4](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/compare/8.6.3...8.6.4) (2026-03-04)
### Bug Fixes
* Cloud Hooks and Cloud Jobs bypass `readOnlyMasterKey` write restriction (GHSA-vc89-5g3r-cmhh) ([#10089](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/issues/10089)) ([6c79da9](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/6c79da91fc5ec6f2a0bb69a0ca6a886c1585754f))
## [8.6.3](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/compare/8.6.2...8.6.3) (2026-02-23)
### Bug Fixes
* JWT Algorithm Confusion in Google Auth Adapter ([GHSA-4q3h-vp4r-prv2](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-4q3h-vp4r-prv2)) ([#10073](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/issues/10073)) ([9b94083](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/9b94083accb7f3e72c6b8126c195c7a03dd2dfd7))
## [8.6.2](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/compare/8.6.1...8.6.2) (2025-12-16)
### Bug Fixes
* Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in Instagram auth adapter [GHSA-3f5f-xgrj-97pf](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-3f5f-xgrj-97pf) ([#9989](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/issues/9989)) ([155c6ad](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/155c6ad92d2375652c9720d7deed129a9e8f74ff))
## [8.6.1](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/compare/8.6.0...8.6.1) (2025-12-14)
### Bug Fixes
* Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via HTML pages for password reset and email verification [GHSA-jhgf-2h8h-ggxv](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-jhgf-2h8h-ggxv) ([#9986](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/issues/9986)) ([12d8b50](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/12d8b502a2f99098d177d095842b07d55f62313a))
# [8.6.0](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/compare/8.5.0...8.6.0) (2025-12-10)
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
{
"name": "parse-server",
"version": "8.6.0",
"version": "8.6.13",
"lockfileVersion": 2,
"requires": true,
"packages": {
"": {
"name": "parse-server",
"version": "8.6.0",
"version": "8.6.13",
"hasInstallScript": true,
"license": "Apache-2.0",
"dependencies": {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"name": "parse-server",
"version": "8.6.0",
"version": "8.6.13",
"description": "An express module providing a Parse-compatible API server",
"main": "lib/index.js",
"repository": {
@@ -14,9 +14,9 @@
<body>
<h1>{{appName}}</h1>
<h1>Expired verification link!</h1>
<form method="POST" action="{{{publicServerUrl}}}/apps/{{{appId}}}/resend_verification_email">
<input name="token" type="hidden" value="{{{token}}}">
<input name="locale" type="hidden" value="{{{locale}}}">
<form method="POST" action="{{publicServerUrl}}/apps/{{appId}}/resend_verification_email">
<input name="token" type="hidden" value="{{token}}">
<input name="locale" type="hidden" value="{{locale}}">
<button type="submit">Resend Link</button>
</form>
</body>
+4 -4
View File
@@ -23,11 +23,11 @@
<p>You can set a new Password for your account: {{username}}</p>
<br />
<p>{{error}}</p>
<form id='form' action='{{{publicServerUrl}}}/apps/{{{appId}}}/request_password_reset' method='POST'>
<form id='form' action='{{publicServerUrl}}/apps/{{appId}}/request_password_reset' method='POST'>
<input name='utf-8' type='hidden' value='✓' />
<input name="username" type="hidden" id="username" value="{{{username}}}" />
<input name="token" type="hidden" id="token" value="{{{token}}}" />
<input name="locale" type="hidden" id="locale" value="{{{locale}}}" />
<input name="username" type="hidden" id="username" value="{{username}}" />
<input name="token" type="hidden" id="token" value="{{token}}" />
<input name="locale" type="hidden" id="locale" value="{{locale}}" />
<p>New Password</p>
<input name="new_password" type="password" id="password" />
@@ -14,9 +14,9 @@
<body>
<h1>{{appName}}</h1>
<h1>Expired verification link!</h1>
<form method="POST" action="{{{publicServerUrl}}}/apps/{{{appId}}}/resend_verification_email">
<input name="token" type="hidden" value="{{{token}}}">
<input name="locale" type="hidden" value="{{{locale}}}">
<form method="POST" action="{{publicServerUrl}}/apps/{{appId}}/resend_verification_email">
<input name="token" type="hidden" value="{{token}}">
<input name="locale" type="hidden" value="{{locale}}">
<button type="submit">Resend Link</button>
</form>
</body>
+4 -4
View File
@@ -23,11 +23,11 @@
<p>You can set a new Password for your account: {{username}}</p>
<br />
<p>{{error}}</p>
<form id='form' action='{{{publicServerUrl}}}/apps/{{{appId}}}/request_password_reset' method='POST'>
<form id='form' action='{{publicServerUrl}}/apps/{{appId}}/request_password_reset' method='POST'>
<input name='utf-8' type='hidden' value='✓' />
<input name="username" type="hidden" id="username" value="{{{username}}}" />
<input name="token" type="hidden" id="token" value="{{{token}}}" />
<input name="locale" type="hidden" id="locale" value="{{{locale}}}" />
<input name="username" type="hidden" id="username" value="{{username}}" />
<input name="token" type="hidden" id="token" value="{{token}}" />
<input name="locale" type="hidden" id="locale" value="{{locale}}" />
<p>New Password</p>
<input name="new_password" type="password" id="password" />
+3 -3
View File
@@ -14,9 +14,9 @@
<body>
<h1>{{appName}}</h1>
<h1>Expired verification link!</h1>
<form method="POST" action="{{{publicServerUrl}}}/apps/{{{appId}}}/resend_verification_email">
<input name="token" type="hidden" value="{{{token}}}">
<input name="locale" type="hidden" value="{{{locale}}}">
<form method="POST" action="{{publicServerUrl}}/apps/{{appId}}/resend_verification_email">
<input name="token" type="hidden" value="{{token}}">
<input name="locale" type="hidden" value="{{locale}}">
<button type="submit">Resend Link</button>
</form>
</body>
+4 -4
View File
@@ -23,11 +23,11 @@
<p>You can set a new Password for your account: {{username}}</p>
<br />
<p>{{error}}</p>
<form id='form' action='{{{publicServerUrl}}}/apps/{{{appId}}}/request_password_reset' method='POST'>
<form id='form' action='{{publicServerUrl}}/apps/{{appId}}/request_password_reset' method='POST'>
<input name='utf-8' type='hidden' value='✓' />
<input name="username" type="hidden" id="username" value="{{{username}}}" />
<input name="token" type="hidden" id="token" value="{{{token}}}" />
<input name="locale" type="hidden" id="locale" value="{{{locale}}}" />
<input name="username" type="hidden" id="username" value="{{username}}" />
<input name="token" type="hidden" id="token" value="{{token}}" />
<input name="locale" type="hidden" id="locale" value="{{locale}}" />
<p>New Password</p>
<input name="new_password" type="password" id="password" />
+25
View File
@@ -101,6 +101,31 @@ describe('InstagramAdapter', function () {
'Instagram auth is invalid for this user.'
);
});
it('should ignore client-provided apiURL and use hardcoded endpoint', async () => {
const accessToken = 'mockAccessToken';
const authData = {
id: 'mockUserId',
apiURL: 'https://example.com/',
};
mockFetch([
{
url: 'https://graph.instagram.com/me?fields=id&access_token=mockAccessToken',
method: 'GET',
response: {
ok: true,
json: () =>
Promise.resolve({
id: 'mockUserId',
}),
},
},
]);
const user = await adapter.getUserFromAccessToken(accessToken, authData);
expect(user).toEqual({ id: 'mockUserId' });
});
});
describe('InstagramAdapter E2E Test', function () {
+153 -152
View File
@@ -484,7 +484,7 @@ describe('google auth adapter', () => {
it('should throw error with missing id_token', async () => {
try {
await google.validateAuthData({}, {});
await google.validateAuthData({}, { clientId: 'secret' });
fail();
} catch (e) {
expect(e.message).toBe('id token is invalid for this user.');
@@ -493,26 +493,67 @@ describe('google auth adapter', () => {
it('should not decode invalid id_token', async () => {
try {
await google.validateAuthData({ id: 'the_user_id', id_token: 'the_token' }, {});
await google.validateAuthData({ id: 'the_user_id', id_token: 'the_token' }, { clientId: 'secret' });
fail();
} catch (e) {
expect(e.message).toBe('provided token does not decode as JWT');
}
});
// it('should throw error if public key used to encode token is not available', async () => {
// const fakeDecodedToken = { header: { kid: '789', alg: 'RS256' } };
// try {
// spyOn(authUtils, 'getHeaderFromToken').and.callFake(() => fakeDecodedToken);
it('should reject forged alg:none JWT from advisory PoC (GHSA-4q3h-vp4r-prv2)', async () => {
const header = Buffer.from('{"alg":"none","kid":"nonexistent-key","typ":"JWT"}').toString('base64url');
const payload = Buffer.from('{"sub":"the_user_id","iss":"accounts.google.com","aud":"secret","exp":9999999999}').toString('base64url');
const forgedToken = `${header}.${payload}.`;
// await google.validateAuthData({ id: 'the_user_id', id_token: 'the_token' }, {});
// fail();
// } catch (e) {
// expect(e.message).toBe(
// `Unable to find matching key for Key ID: ${fakeDecodedToken.header.kid}`
// );
// }
// });
const fakeSigningKey = { kid: '123', rsaPublicKey: 'the_rsa_public_key' };
spyOn(authUtils, 'getSigningKey').and.resolveTo(fakeSigningKey);
try {
await google.validateAuthData(
{ id: 'the_user_id', id_token: forgedToken },
{ clientId: 'secret' }
);
fail('should have rejected forged token');
} catch (e) {
expect(e.code).toBe(Parse.Error.OBJECT_NOT_FOUND);
}
});
it('should pass hardcoded RS256 algorithm to jwt.verify, not the JWT header alg', async () => {
const fakeClaim = {
iss: 'https://accounts.google.com',
aud: 'secret',
exp: Date.now(),
sub: 'the_user_id',
};
const fakeDecodedToken = { kid: '123', alg: 'ES256' };
const fakeSigningKey = { kid: '123', rsaPublicKey: 'the_rsa_public_key' };
spyOn(authUtils, 'getHeaderFromToken').and.callFake(() => fakeDecodedToken);
spyOn(authUtils, 'getSigningKey').and.resolveTo(fakeSigningKey);
spyOn(jwt, 'verify').and.callFake(() => fakeClaim);
await google.validateAuthData(
{ id: 'the_user_id', id_token: 'the_token' },
{ clientId: 'secret' }
);
expect(jwt.verify.calls.first().args[2].algorithms).toEqual(['RS256']);
});
it('should throw error if Google signing key is not found', async () => {
const fakeDecodedToken = { kid: '789', alg: 'RS256' };
spyOn(authUtils, 'getHeaderFromToken').and.callFake(() => fakeDecodedToken);
spyOn(authUtils, 'getSigningKey').and.rejectWith(new Error('key not found'));
try {
await google.validateAuthData(
{ id: 'the_user_id', id_token: 'the_token' },
{ clientId: 'secret' }
);
fail('should have thrown');
} catch (e) {
expect(e.message).toBe('Unable to find matching key for Key ID: 789');
}
});
it('(using client id as string) should verify id_token (google.com)', async () => {
const fakeClaim = {
@@ -521,8 +562,10 @@ describe('google auth adapter', () => {
exp: Date.now(),
sub: 'the_user_id',
};
const fakeDecodedToken = { header: { kid: '123', alg: 'RS256' } };
const fakeDecodedToken = { kid: '123', alg: 'RS256' };
const fakeSigningKey = { kid: '123', rsaPublicKey: 'the_rsa_public_key' };
spyOn(authUtils, 'getHeaderFromToken').and.callFake(() => fakeDecodedToken);
spyOn(authUtils, 'getSigningKey').and.resolveTo(fakeSigningKey);
spyOn(jwt, 'verify').and.callFake(() => fakeClaim);
const result = await google.validateAuthData(
@@ -537,8 +580,10 @@ describe('google auth adapter', () => {
iss: 'https://not.google.com',
sub: 'the_user_id',
};
const fakeDecodedToken = { header: { kid: '123', alg: 'RS256' } };
const fakeDecodedToken = { kid: '123', alg: 'RS256' };
const fakeSigningKey = { kid: '123', rsaPublicKey: 'the_rsa_public_key' };
spyOn(authUtils, 'getHeaderFromToken').and.callFake(() => fakeDecodedToken);
spyOn(authUtils, 'getSigningKey').and.resolveTo(fakeSigningKey);
spyOn(jwt, 'verify').and.callFake(() => fakeClaim);
try {
@@ -561,8 +606,10 @@ describe('google auth adapter', () => {
exp: Date.now(),
sub: 'the_user_id',
};
const fakeDecodedToken = { header: { kid: '123', alg: 'RS256' } };
const fakeDecodedToken = { kid: '123', alg: 'RS256' };
const fakeSigningKey = { kid: '123', rsaPublicKey: 'the_rsa_public_key' };
spyOn(authUtils, 'getHeaderFromToken').and.callFake(() => fakeDecodedToken);
spyOn(authUtils, 'getSigningKey').and.resolveTo(fakeSigningKey);
spyOn(jwt, 'verify').and.callFake(() => fakeClaim);
try {
@@ -583,8 +630,10 @@ describe('google auth adapter', () => {
exp: Date.now(),
sub: 'the_user_id',
};
const fakeDecodedToken = { header: { kid: '123', alg: 'RS256' } };
const fakeDecodedToken = { kid: '123', alg: 'RS256' };
const fakeSigningKey = { kid: '123', rsaPublicKey: 'the_rsa_public_key' };
spyOn(authUtils, 'getHeaderFromToken').and.callFake(() => fakeDecodedToken);
spyOn(authUtils, 'getSigningKey').and.resolveTo(fakeSigningKey);
spyOn(jwt, 'verify').and.callFake(() => fakeClaim);
try {
@@ -597,6 +646,15 @@ describe('google auth adapter', () => {
expect(e.message).toBe('auth data is invalid for this user.');
}
});
it('should throw error when clientId is not configured', async () => {
try {
await google.validateAuthData({ id: 'the_user_id', id_token: 'the_token' }, {});
fail('should have thrown');
} catch (e) {
expect(e.message).toBe('Google auth is not configured.');
}
});
});
describe('keycloak auth adapter', () => {
@@ -897,7 +955,27 @@ describe('apple signin auth adapter', () => {
{ clientId: 'secret' }
);
expect(result).toEqual(fakeClaim);
expect(jwt.verify.calls.first().args[2].algorithms).toEqual(fakeDecodedToken.header.alg);
expect(jwt.verify.calls.first().args[2].algorithms).toEqual(['RS256']);
});
it('should pass hardcoded RS256 algorithm to jwt.verify, not the JWT header alg (GHSA-4q3h-vp4r-prv2)', async () => {
const fakeClaim = {
iss: 'https://appleid.apple.com',
aud: 'secret',
exp: Date.now(),
sub: 'the_user_id',
};
const fakeDecodedToken = { kid: '123', alg: 'none' };
const fakeSigningKey = { kid: '123', rsaPublicKey: 'the_rsa_public_key' };
spyOn(authUtils, 'getHeaderFromToken').and.callFake(() => fakeDecodedToken);
spyOn(authUtils, 'getSigningKey').and.resolveTo(fakeSigningKey);
spyOn(jwt, 'verify').and.callFake(() => fakeClaim);
await apple.validateAuthData(
{ id: 'the_user_id', token: 'the_token' },
{ clientId: 'secret' }
);
expect(jwt.verify.calls.first().args[2].algorithms).toEqual(['RS256']);
});
it('should not verify invalid id_token', async () => {
@@ -1133,6 +1211,15 @@ describe('apple signin auth adapter', () => {
expect(e.message).toBe('auth data is invalid for this user.');
}
});
it('should throw error when clientId is not configured', async () => {
try {
await apple.validateAuthData({ id: 'the_user_id', token: 'the_token' }, {});
fail('should have thrown');
} catch (e) {
expect(e.message).toBe('Apple auth is not configured.');
}
});
});
describe('phant auth adapter', () => {
@@ -1168,19 +1255,9 @@ describe('facebook limited auth adapter', () => {
const authUtils = require('../lib/Adapters/Auth/utils');
// TODO: figure out a way to run this test alongside facebook classic tests
xit('(using client id as string) should throw error with missing id_token', async () => {
xit('should throw error with missing id_token', async () => {
try {
await facebook.validateAuthData({}, { clientId: 'secret' });
fail();
} catch (e) {
expect(e.message).toBe('Facebook auth is not configured.');
}
});
// TODO: figure out a way to run this test alongside facebook classic tests
xit('(using client id as array) should throw error with missing id_token', async () => {
try {
await facebook.validateAuthData({}, { clientId: ['secret'] });
await facebook.validateAuthData({}, { appIds: ['secret'] });
fail();
} catch (e) {
expect(e.message).toBe('Facebook auth is not configured.');
@@ -1191,7 +1268,7 @@ describe('facebook limited auth adapter', () => {
try {
await facebook.validateAuthData(
{ id: 'the_user_id', token: 'the_token' },
{ clientId: 'secret' }
{ appIds: ['secret'] }
);
fail();
} catch (e) {
@@ -1208,7 +1285,7 @@ describe('facebook limited auth adapter', () => {
await facebook.validateAuthData(
{ id: 'the_user_id', token: 'the_token' },
{ clientId: 'secret' }
{ appIds: ['secret'] }
);
fail();
} catch (e) {
@@ -1233,10 +1310,30 @@ describe('facebook limited auth adapter', () => {
const result = await facebook.validateAuthData(
{ id: 'the_user_id', token: 'the_token' },
{ clientId: 'secret' }
{ appIds: ['secret'] }
);
expect(result).toEqual(fakeClaim);
expect(jwt.verify.calls.first().args[2].algorithms).toEqual(fakeDecodedToken.header.alg);
expect(jwt.verify.calls.first().args[2].algorithms).toEqual(['RS256']);
});
it('should pass hardcoded RS256 algorithm to jwt.verify, not the JWT header alg (GHSA-4q3h-vp4r-prv2)', async () => {
const fakeClaim = {
iss: 'https://www.facebook.com',
aud: 'secret',
exp: Date.now(),
sub: 'the_user_id',
};
const fakeDecodedToken = { kid: '123', alg: 'none' };
const fakeSigningKey = { kid: '123', rsaPublicKey: 'the_rsa_public_key' };
spyOn(authUtils, 'getHeaderFromToken').and.callFake(() => fakeDecodedToken);
spyOn(authUtils, 'getSigningKey').and.resolveTo(fakeSigningKey);
spyOn(jwt, 'verify').and.callFake(() => fakeClaim);
await facebook.validateAuthData(
{ id: 'the_user_id', token: 'the_token' },
{ appIds: ['secret'] }
);
expect(jwt.verify.calls.first().args[2].algorithms).toEqual(['RS256']);
});
it('should not verify invalid id_token', async () => {
@@ -1248,7 +1345,7 @@ describe('facebook limited auth adapter', () => {
try {
await facebook.validateAuthData(
{ id: 'the_user_id', token: 'the_token' },
{ clientId: 'secret' }
{ appIds: ['secret'] }
);
fail();
} catch (e) {
@@ -1256,19 +1353,7 @@ describe('facebook limited auth adapter', () => {
}
});
it('(using client id as array) should not verify invalid id_token', async () => {
try {
await facebook.validateAuthData(
{ id: 'the_user_id', token: 'the_token' },
{ clientId: ['secret'] }
);
fail();
} catch (e) {
expect(e.message).toBe('provided token does not decode as JWT');
}
});
it_id('4bcb1a1a-11f8-4e12-a3f6-73f7e25e355a')(it)('using client id as string) should verify id_token (facebook.com)', async () => {
it_id('4bcb1a1a-11f8-4e12-a3f6-73f7e25e355a')(it)('should verify id_token (facebook.com)', async () => {
const fakeClaim = {
iss: 'https://www.facebook.com',
aud: 'secret',
@@ -1283,12 +1368,12 @@ describe('facebook limited auth adapter', () => {
const result = await facebook.validateAuthData(
{ id: 'the_user_id', token: 'the_token' },
{ clientId: 'secret' }
{ appIds: ['secret'] }
);
expect(result).toEqual(fakeClaim);
});
it_id('c521a272-2ac2-4d8b-b5ed-ea250336d8b1')(it)('(using client id as array) should verify id_token (facebook.com)', async () => {
it_id('e3f16404-18e9-4a87-a555-4710cfbdac67')(it)('(using multiple appIds) should verify id_token (facebook.com)', async () => {
const fakeClaim = {
iss: 'https://www.facebook.com',
aud: 'secret',
@@ -1303,32 +1388,12 @@ describe('facebook limited auth adapter', () => {
const result = await facebook.validateAuthData(
{ id: 'the_user_id', token: 'the_token' },
{ clientId: ['secret'] }
{ appIds: ['secret', 'secret 123'] }
);
expect(result).toEqual(fakeClaim);
});
it_id('e3f16404-18e9-4a87-a555-4710cfbdac67')(it)('(using client id as array with multiple items) should verify id_token (facebook.com)', async () => {
const fakeClaim = {
iss: 'https://www.facebook.com',
aud: 'secret',
exp: Date.now(),
sub: 'the_user_id',
};
const fakeDecodedToken = { header: { kid: '123', alg: 'RS256' } };
const fakeSigningKey = { kid: '123', rsaPublicKey: 'the_rsa_public_key' };
spyOn(authUtils, 'getHeaderFromToken').and.callFake(() => fakeDecodedToken);
spyOn(authUtils, 'getSigningKey').and.resolveTo(fakeSigningKey);
spyOn(jwt, 'verify').and.callFake(() => fakeClaim);
const result = await facebook.validateAuthData(
{ id: 'the_user_id', token: 'the_token' },
{ clientId: ['secret', 'secret 123'] }
);
expect(result).toEqual(fakeClaim);
});
it_id('549c33a1-3a6b-4732-8cf6-8f010ad4569c')(it)('(using client id as string) should throw error with with invalid jwt issuer (facebook.com)', async () => {
it_id('549c33a1-3a6b-4732-8cf6-8f010ad4569c')(it)('should throw error with with invalid jwt issuer (facebook.com)', async () => {
const fakeClaim = {
iss: 'https://not.facebook.com',
sub: 'the_user_id',
@@ -1342,7 +1407,7 @@ describe('facebook limited auth adapter', () => {
try {
await facebook.validateAuthData(
{ id: 'the_user_id', token: 'the_token' },
{ clientId: 'secret' }
{ appIds: ['secret'] }
);
fail();
} catch (e) {
@@ -1354,87 +1419,14 @@ describe('facebook limited auth adapter', () => {
// TODO: figure out a way to generate our own facebook signed tokens, perhaps with a parse facebook account
// and a private key
xit('(using client id as array) should throw error with with invalid jwt issuer', async () => {
const fakeClaim = {
iss: 'https://not.facebook.com',
sub: 'the_user_id',
};
const fakeDecodedToken = { header: { kid: '123', alg: 'RS256' } };
const fakeSigningKey = { kid: '123', rsaPublicKey: 'the_rsa_public_key' };
spyOn(authUtils, 'getHeaderFromToken').and.callFake(() => fakeDecodedToken);
spyOn(authUtils, 'getSigningKey').and.resolveTo(fakeSigningKey);
spyOn(jwt, 'verify').and.callFake(() => fakeClaim);
try {
await facebook.validateAuthData(
{
id: 'INSERT ID HERE',
token: 'INSERT FACEBOOK TOKEN HERE WITH INVALID JWT ISSUER',
},
{ clientId: ['INSERT CLIENT ID HERE'] }
);
fail();
} catch (e) {
expect(e.message).toBe(
'id token not issued by correct OpenID provider - expected: https://www.facebook.com | from: https://not.facebook.com'
);
}
});
it('(using client id as string) with token', async () => {
const fakeClaim = {
iss: 'https://not.facebook.com',
sub: 'the_user_id',
};
const fakeDecodedToken = { header: { kid: '123', alg: 'RS256' } };
const fakeSigningKey = { kid: '123', rsaPublicKey: 'the_rsa_public_key' };
spyOn(authUtils, 'getHeaderFromToken').and.callFake(() => fakeDecodedToken);
spyOn(authUtils, 'getSigningKey').and.resolveTo(fakeSigningKey);
spyOn(jwt, 'verify').and.callFake(() => fakeClaim);
try {
await facebook.validateAuthData(
{
id: 'INSERT ID HERE',
token: 'INSERT FACEBOOK TOKEN HERE WITH INVALID JWT ISSUER',
},
{ clientId: 'INSERT CLIENT ID HERE' }
);
fail();
} catch (e) {
expect(e.message).toBe(
'id token not issued by correct OpenID provider - expected: https://www.facebook.com | from: https://not.facebook.com'
);
}
});
// TODO: figure out a way to generate our own facebook signed tokens, perhaps with a parse facebook account
// and a private key
xit('(using client id as string) should throw error with invalid jwt clientId', async () => {
xit('should throw error with invalid jwt audience', async () => {
try {
await facebook.validateAuthData(
{
id: 'INSERT ID HERE',
token: 'INSERT FACEBOOK TOKEN HERE',
},
{ clientId: 'secret' }
);
fail();
} catch (e) {
expect(e.message).toBe('jwt audience invalid. expected: secret');
}
});
// TODO: figure out a way to generate our own facebook signed tokens, perhaps with a parse facebook account
// and a private key
xit('(using client id as array) should throw error with invalid jwt clientId', async () => {
try {
await facebook.validateAuthData(
{
id: 'INSERT ID HERE',
token: 'INSERT FACEBOOK TOKEN HERE',
},
{ clientId: ['secret'] }
{ appIds: ['secret'] }
);
fail();
} catch (e) {
@@ -1451,7 +1443,7 @@ describe('facebook limited auth adapter', () => {
id: 'invalid user',
token: 'INSERT FACEBOOK TOKEN HERE',
},
{ clientId: 'INSERT CLIENT ID HERE' }
{ appIds: ['INSERT APP ID HERE'] }
);
fail();
} catch (e) {
@@ -1462,7 +1454,7 @@ describe('facebook limited auth adapter', () => {
it_id('c194d902-e697-46c9-a303-82c2d914473c')(it)('should throw error with with invalid user id (facebook.com)', async () => {
const fakeClaim = {
iss: 'https://www.facebook.com',
aud: 'invalid_client_id',
aud: 'invalid_app_id',
sub: 'a_different_user_id',
};
const fakeDecodedToken = { header: { kid: '123', alg: 'RS256' } };
@@ -1474,13 +1466,22 @@ describe('facebook limited auth adapter', () => {
try {
await facebook.validateAuthData(
{ id: 'the_user_id', token: 'the_token' },
{ clientId: 'secret' }
{ appIds: ['secret'] }
);
fail();
} catch (e) {
expect(e.message).toBe('auth data is invalid for this user.');
}
});
it('should throw error when appIds is not configured for Limited Login', async () => {
try {
await facebook.validateAuthData({ id: 'the_user_id', token: 'the_token' }, {});
fail('should have thrown');
} catch (e) {
expect(e.message).toBe('Facebook auth is not configured.');
}
});
});
describe('OTP TOTP auth adatper', () => {
+15
View File
@@ -4473,6 +4473,21 @@ describe('Parse.File hooks', () => {
});
expect(response.headers['content-disposition']).toBe(`attachment;filename=${file._name}`);
});
it('beforeFind blocks metadata endpoint', async () => {
const file = new Parse.File('popeye.txt', [1, 2, 3], 'text/plain');
await file.save({ useMasterKey: true });
Parse.Cloud.beforeFind(Parse.File, () => {
throw 'unauthorized';
});
await expectAsync(
request({
url: `http://localhost:8378/1/files/test/metadata/${file._name}`,
}).catch(e => {
throw new Parse.Error(e.data.code, e.data.error);
})
).toBeRejectedWith(new Parse.Error(Parse.Error.SCRIPT_FAILED, 'unauthorized'));
});
});
describe('Cloud Config hooks', () => {
+113
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
'use strict';
const request = require('../lib/request');
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs').promises;
const mustache = require('mustache');
const Utils = require('../lib/Utils');
@@ -957,6 +958,50 @@ describe('Pages Router', () => {
expect(response.status).toBe(404);
expect(response.text).toBe('Not found.');
});
it('rejects requesting file from sibling directory with prefix-colliding name via encoded path traversal', async () => {
// Create a temporary pages directory and a sibling directory whose name
// starts with the same prefix (e.g. "pages" vs "pages-secret"), which
// would bypass a naive `startsWith` check without a path separator.
const baseDir = path.join(__dirname, 'tmp-pages-exploit-test');
const pagesDir = path.join(baseDir, 'pages');
const siblingDir = path.join(baseDir, 'pages-secret');
const marker = `SECRET_CONTENT_${Date.now()}`;
try {
await fs.mkdir(pagesDir, { recursive: true });
await fs.mkdir(siblingDir, { recursive: true });
// Copy a required HTML file so the pages router initializes correctly
const publicDir = path.resolve(__dirname, '../public');
const htmlFile = await fs.readFile(
path.join(publicDir, 'email_verification_link_invalid.html'),
'utf-8'
);
await fs.writeFile(
path.join(pagesDir, 'email_verification_link_invalid.html'),
htmlFile
);
// Write a secret file in the sibling directory
await fs.writeFile(path.join(siblingDir, 'secret.txt'), marker);
config.pages.pagesPath = pagesDir;
await reconfigureServer(config);
// Use URL-encoded path traversal: %2e%2e%2f = ../
// This reaches the sibling "pages-secret" directory which shares
// the "pages" prefix with the configured pagesPath directory name.
const url = `${config.publicServerURL}/apps/%2e%2e%2fpages-secret%2fsecret.txt`;
const response = await request({
url: url,
followRedirects: false,
}).catch(e => e);
expect(response.status).toBe(404);
expect(response.text).not.toContain(marker);
} finally {
await fs.rm(baseDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
});
describe('custom route', () => {
@@ -1180,4 +1225,72 @@ describe('Pages Router', () => {
});
});
});
describe('XSS Protection', () => {
beforeEach(async () => {
await reconfigureServer({
appId: 'test',
appName: 'exampleAppname',
publicServerURL: 'http://localhost:8378/1',
pages: { enableRouter: true },
});
});
it('should escape XSS payloads in token parameter', async () => {
const xssPayload = '"><script>alert("XSS")</script>';
const response = await request({
url: `http://localhost:8378/1/apps/choose_password?token=${encodeURIComponent(xssPayload)}&username=test&appId=test`,
});
expect(response.status).toBe(200);
expect(response.text).not.toContain('<script>alert("XSS")</script>');
expect(response.text).toContain('&quot;&gt;&lt;script&gt;');
});
it('should escape XSS in username parameter', async () => {
const xssUsername = '<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>';
const response = await request({
url: `http://localhost:8378/1/apps/choose_password?username=${encodeURIComponent(xssUsername)}&appId=test`,
});
expect(response.status).toBe(200);
expect(response.text).not.toContain('<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>');
expect(response.text).toContain('&lt;img');
});
it('should escape XSS in locale parameter', async () => {
const xssLocale = '"><svg/onload=alert(1)>';
const response = await request({
url: `http://localhost:8378/1/apps/choose_password?locale=${encodeURIComponent(xssLocale)}&appId=test`,
});
expect(response.status).toBe(200);
expect(response.text).not.toContain('<svg/onload=alert(1)>');
expect(response.text).toContain('&quot;&gt;&lt;svg');
});
it('should handle legitimate usernames with quotes correctly', async () => {
const username = "O'Brien";
const response = await request({
url: `http://localhost:8378/1/apps/choose_password?username=${encodeURIComponent(username)}&appId=test`,
});
expect(response.status).toBe(200);
// Should be properly escaped as HTML entity
expect(response.text).toContain('O&#39;Brien');
// Should NOT contain unescaped quote that breaks HTML
expect(response.text).not.toContain('value="O\'Brien"');
});
it('should handle legitimate usernames with ampersands correctly', async () => {
const username = 'Smith & Co';
const response = await request({
url: `http://localhost:8378/1/apps/choose_password?username=${encodeURIComponent(username)}&appId=test`,
});
expect(response.status).toBe(200);
// Should be properly escaped
expect(response.text).toContain('Smith &amp; Co');
});
});
});
+98
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ const Id = require('../lib/LiveQuery/Id');
const QueryTools = require('../lib/LiveQuery/QueryTools');
const queryHash = QueryTools.queryHash;
const matchesQuery = QueryTools.matchesQuery;
const setRegexTimeout = QueryTools.setRegexTimeout;
const Item = Parse.Object.extend('Item');
@@ -445,6 +446,103 @@ describe('matchesQuery', function () {
expect(matchesQuery(player, q)).toBe(false);
});
it('rejects $regex with catastrophic backtracking pattern (string)', function () {
setRegexTimeout(100);
try {
const player = {
id: new Id('Player', 'P1'),
name: 'a'.repeat(30),
score: 12,
};
// (a+)+b - classic catastrophic backtracking
expect(matchesQuery(player, { name: { $regex: '(a+)+b' } })).toBe(false);
// (a|a)+b - alternation variant
expect(matchesQuery(player, { name: { $regex: '(a|a)+b' } })).toBe(false);
// (a+){2,}b - quantifier variant
expect(matchesQuery(player, { name: { $regex: '(a+){2,}b' } })).toBe(false);
} finally {
setRegexTimeout(0);
}
});
it('rejects $regex with catastrophic backtracking pattern (RegExp object)', function () {
setRegexTimeout(100);
try {
const player = {
id: new Id('Player', 'P1'),
name: 'a'.repeat(30),
score: 12,
};
const q = new Parse.Query('Player');
q.matches('name', /(a+)+b/);
expect(matchesQuery(player, q)).toBe(false);
} finally {
setRegexTimeout(0);
}
});
it('still matches safe $regex patterns with regexTimeout enabled', function () {
setRegexTimeout(100);
try {
const player = {
id: new Id('Player', 'P1'),
name: 'Player 1',
score: 12,
};
// startsWith
let q = new Parse.Query('Player');
q.startsWith('name', 'Play');
expect(matchesQuery(player, q)).toBe(true);
// endsWith
q = new Parse.Query('Player');
q.endsWith('name', ' 1');
expect(matchesQuery(player, q)).toBe(true);
// contains
player.name = 'Android-7';
q = new Parse.Query('Player');
q.contains('name', 'd-7');
expect(matchesQuery(player, q)).toBe(true);
// matches
q = new Parse.Query('Player');
q.matches('name', /A.d/);
expect(matchesQuery(player, q)).toBe(true);
// case insensitive
q = new Parse.Query('Player');
q.matches('name', /android/i);
expect(matchesQuery(player, q)).toBe(true);
} finally {
setRegexTimeout(0);
}
});
it('matches $regex with backreferences when regexTimeout is enabled', function () {
setRegexTimeout(100);
try {
const player = {
id: new Id('Player', 'P1'),
name: 'aa',
score: 12,
};
expect(matchesQuery(player, { name: { $regex: '(a)\\1' } })).toBe(true);
player.name = 'ab';
expect(matchesQuery(player, { name: { $regex: '(a)\\1' } })).toBe(false);
} finally {
setRegexTimeout(0);
}
});
it('uses native RegExp when regexTimeout is 0 (disabled)', function () {
setRegexTimeout(0);
const player = {
id: new Id('Player', 'P1'),
name: 'Player 1',
score: 12,
};
const q = new Parse.Query('Player');
q.startsWith('name', 'Play');
expect(matchesQuery(player, q)).toBe(true);
});
it('matches $nearSphere queries', function () {
let q = new Parse.Query('Checkin');
q.near('location', new Parse.GeoPoint(20, 20));
+39
View File
@@ -338,6 +338,45 @@ describe('Security Check', () => {
}
});
it('warns when LiveQuery regex timeout is disabled', async () => {
await reconfigureServer({
security: { enableCheck: true, enableCheckLog: true },
liveQuery: { classNames: ['TestObject'], regexTimeout: 0 },
});
const runner = new CheckRunner({ enableCheck: true });
const report = await runner.run();
const check = report.report.groups
.flatMap(g => g.checks)
.find(c => c.title === 'LiveQuery regex timeout enabled');
expect(check).toBeDefined();
expect(check.state).toBe(CheckState.fail);
});
it('passes when LiveQuery regex timeout is enabled', async () => {
await reconfigureServer({
security: { enableCheck: true, enableCheckLog: true },
liveQuery: { classNames: ['TestObject'], regexTimeout: 100 },
});
const runner = new CheckRunner({ enableCheck: true });
const report = await runner.run();
const check = report.report.groups
.flatMap(g => g.checks)
.find(c => c.title === 'LiveQuery regex timeout enabled');
expect(check.state).toBe(CheckState.success);
});
it('passes when LiveQuery is not configured', async () => {
await reconfigureServer({
security: { enableCheck: true, enableCheckLog: true },
});
const runner = new CheckRunner({ enableCheck: true });
const report = await runner.run();
const check = report.report.groups
.flatMap(g => g.checks)
.find(c => c.title === 'LiveQuery regex timeout enabled');
expect(check.state).toBe(CheckState.success);
});
it('does update featuresRouter', async () => {
let response = await request({
url: 'http://localhost:8378/1/serverInfo',
+5 -3
View File
@@ -659,12 +659,12 @@ describe('server', () => {
});
it('should not fail when Google signin is introduced without the optional clientId', done => {
it('should not fail when Google signin is introduced with clientId', done => {
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const authUtils = require('../lib/Adapters/Auth/utils');
reconfigureServer({
auth: { google: {} },
auth: { google: { clientId: 'secret' } },
})
.then(() => {
const fakeClaim = {
@@ -673,8 +673,10 @@ describe('server', () => {
exp: Date.now(),
sub: 'the_user_id',
};
const fakeDecodedToken = { header: { kid: '123', alg: 'RS256' } };
const fakeDecodedToken = { kid: '123', alg: 'RS256' };
const fakeSigningKey = { kid: '123', rsaPublicKey: 'the_rsa_public_key' };
spyOn(authUtils, 'getHeaderFromToken').and.callFake(() => fakeDecodedToken);
spyOn(authUtils, 'getSigningKey').and.resolveTo(fakeSigningKey);
spyOn(jwt, 'verify').and.callFake(() => fakeClaim);
const user = new Parse.User();
user
+218
View File
@@ -1172,6 +1172,224 @@ describe('read-only masterKey', () => {
done();
});
});
it('should throw when trying to create a hook function', async () => {
loggerErrorSpy.calls.reset();
try {
await request({
url: `${Parse.serverURL}/hooks/functions`,
method: 'POST',
headers: {
'X-Parse-Application-Id': Parse.applicationId,
'X-Parse-Master-Key': 'read-only-test',
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
},
body: { functionName: 'readOnlyTest', url: 'https://example.com/hook' },
});
fail('should have thrown');
} catch (res) {
expect(res.data.code).toBe(Parse.Error.OPERATION_FORBIDDEN);
expect(res.data.error).toBe('Permission denied');
}
});
it('should throw when trying to create a hook trigger', async () => {
loggerErrorSpy.calls.reset();
try {
await request({
url: `${Parse.serverURL}/hooks/triggers`,
method: 'POST',
headers: {
'X-Parse-Application-Id': Parse.applicationId,
'X-Parse-Master-Key': 'read-only-test',
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
},
body: { className: 'MyClass', triggerName: 'beforeSave', url: 'https://example.com/hook' },
});
fail('should have thrown');
} catch (res) {
expect(res.data.code).toBe(Parse.Error.OPERATION_FORBIDDEN);
expect(res.data.error).toBe('Permission denied');
}
});
it('should throw when trying to update a hook function', async () => {
// First create the hook with the real master key
await request({
url: `${Parse.serverURL}/hooks/functions`,
method: 'POST',
headers: {
'X-Parse-Application-Id': Parse.applicationId,
'X-Parse-Master-Key': Parse.masterKey,
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
},
body: { functionName: 'readOnlyUpdateTest', url: 'https://example.com/hook' },
});
loggerErrorSpy.calls.reset();
try {
await request({
url: `${Parse.serverURL}/hooks/functions/readOnlyUpdateTest`,
method: 'PUT',
headers: {
'X-Parse-Application-Id': Parse.applicationId,
'X-Parse-Master-Key': 'read-only-test',
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
},
body: { url: 'https://example.com/hacked' },
});
fail('should have thrown');
} catch (res) {
expect(res.data.code).toBe(Parse.Error.OPERATION_FORBIDDEN);
expect(res.data.error).toBe('Permission denied');
}
});
it('should throw when trying to delete a hook function', async () => {
// First create the hook with the real master key
await request({
url: `${Parse.serverURL}/hooks/functions`,
method: 'POST',
headers: {
'X-Parse-Application-Id': Parse.applicationId,
'X-Parse-Master-Key': Parse.masterKey,
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
},
body: { functionName: 'readOnlyDeleteTest', url: 'https://example.com/hook' },
});
loggerErrorSpy.calls.reset();
try {
await request({
url: `${Parse.serverURL}/hooks/functions/readOnlyDeleteTest`,
method: 'PUT',
headers: {
'X-Parse-Application-Id': Parse.applicationId,
'X-Parse-Master-Key': 'read-only-test',
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
},
body: { __op: 'Delete' },
});
fail('should have thrown');
} catch (res) {
expect(res.data.code).toBe(Parse.Error.OPERATION_FORBIDDEN);
expect(res.data.error).toBe('Permission denied');
}
});
it('should throw when trying to run a job with readOnlyMasterKey', async () => {
Parse.Cloud.job('readOnlyTestJob', () => {});
loggerErrorSpy.calls.reset();
try {
await request({
url: `${Parse.serverURL}/jobs/readOnlyTestJob`,
method: 'POST',
headers: {
'X-Parse-Application-Id': Parse.applicationId,
'X-Parse-Master-Key': 'read-only-test',
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
},
body: {},
});
fail('should have thrown');
} catch (res) {
expect(res.data.code).toBe(Parse.Error.OPERATION_FORBIDDEN);
expect(res.data.error).toBe('Permission denied');
}
});
it('should allow reading hooks with readOnlyMasterKey', async () => {
const res = await request({
url: `${Parse.serverURL}/hooks/functions`,
method: 'GET',
headers: {
'X-Parse-Application-Id': Parse.applicationId,
'X-Parse-Master-Key': 'read-only-test',
},
});
expect(Array.isArray(res.data)).toBe(true);
});
it('should throw when trying to delete a file with readOnlyMasterKey', async () => {
// Create a file with the real master key
const uploadRes = await request({
method: 'POST',
url: `${Parse.serverURL}/files/readonly-delete-test.txt`,
headers: {
'X-Parse-Application-Id': Parse.applicationId,
'X-Parse-Master-Key': Parse.masterKey,
'Content-Type': 'text/plain',
},
body: 'file content',
});
const filename = uploadRes.data.name;
expect(filename).toBeDefined();
// Attempt delete with readOnlyMasterKey — should be rejected
loggerErrorSpy.calls.reset();
try {
await request({
method: 'DELETE',
url: `${Parse.serverURL}/files/${filename}`,
headers: {
'X-Parse-Application-Id': Parse.applicationId,
'X-Parse-Master-Key': 'read-only-test',
},
});
fail('should have thrown');
} catch (res) {
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
expect(res.data.error).toBe('Permission denied');
}
// Verify file still exists
const getRes = await request({ url: uploadRes.data.url });
expect(getRes.status).toBe(200);
});
it('should throw when trying to create a file with readOnlyMasterKey', async () => {
loggerErrorSpy.calls.reset();
try {
await request({
method: 'POST',
url: `${Parse.serverURL}/files/readonly-create-test.txt`,
headers: {
'X-Parse-Application-Id': Parse.applicationId,
'X-Parse-Master-Key': 'read-only-test',
'Content-Type': 'text/plain',
},
body: 'file content',
});
fail('should have thrown');
} catch (res) {
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
expect(res.data.error).toBe('Permission denied');
}
});
it('should throw when trying to loginAs with readOnlyMasterKey', async () => {
// Create a target user
await Parse.User.signUp('readonly-loginas-test', 'password123');
const userId = Parse.User.current().id;
await Parse.User.logOut();
// Attempt loginAs with readOnlyMasterKey — should be rejected
loggerErrorSpy.calls.reset();
try {
await request({
method: 'POST',
url: `${Parse.serverURL}/loginAs`,
headers: {
'X-Parse-Application-Id': Parse.applicationId,
'X-Parse-Master-Key': 'read-only-test',
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
},
body: { userId },
});
fail('should have thrown');
} catch (res) {
expect(res.data.code).toBe(Parse.Error.OPERATION_FORBIDDEN);
expect(res.data.error).toBe('Permission denied');
}
});
});
describe('rest context', () => {
+315
View File
@@ -131,7 +131,228 @@ describe('Vulnerabilities', () => {
});
});
describe('(GHSA-5j86-7r7m-p8h6) Cloud function name prototype chain bypass', () => {
const headers = {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'X-Parse-Application-Id': 'test',
'X-Parse-REST-API-Key': 'rest',
};
it('rejects "constructor" as cloud function name', async () => {
const response = await request({
headers,
method: 'POST',
url: 'http://localhost:8378/1/functions/constructor',
body: JSON.stringify({}),
}).catch(e => e);
expect(response.status).toBe(400);
const text = JSON.parse(response.text);
expect(text.code).toBe(Parse.Error.SCRIPT_FAILED);
expect(text.error).toContain('Invalid function');
});
it('rejects "toString" as cloud function name', async () => {
const response = await request({
headers,
method: 'POST',
url: 'http://localhost:8378/1/functions/toString',
body: JSON.stringify({}),
}).catch(e => e);
expect(response.status).toBe(400);
const text = JSON.parse(response.text);
expect(text.code).toBe(Parse.Error.SCRIPT_FAILED);
expect(text.error).toContain('Invalid function');
});
it('rejects "valueOf" as cloud function name', async () => {
const response = await request({
headers,
method: 'POST',
url: 'http://localhost:8378/1/functions/valueOf',
body: JSON.stringify({}),
}).catch(e => e);
expect(response.status).toBe(400);
const text = JSON.parse(response.text);
expect(text.code).toBe(Parse.Error.SCRIPT_FAILED);
expect(text.error).toContain('Invalid function');
});
it('rejects "hasOwnProperty" as cloud function name', async () => {
const response = await request({
headers,
method: 'POST',
url: 'http://localhost:8378/1/functions/hasOwnProperty',
body: JSON.stringify({}),
}).catch(e => e);
expect(response.status).toBe(400);
const text = JSON.parse(response.text);
expect(text.code).toBe(Parse.Error.SCRIPT_FAILED);
expect(text.error).toContain('Invalid function');
});
it('rejects "__proto__.toString" as cloud function name', async () => {
const response = await request({
headers,
method: 'POST',
url: 'http://localhost:8378/1/functions/__proto__.toString',
body: JSON.stringify({}),
}).catch(e => e);
expect(response.status).toBe(400);
const text = JSON.parse(response.text);
expect(text.code).toBe(Parse.Error.SCRIPT_FAILED);
expect(text.error).toContain('Invalid function');
});
it('still executes a legitimately defined cloud function', async () => {
Parse.Cloud.define('legitimateFunction', () => 'hello');
const response = await request({
headers,
method: 'POST',
url: 'http://localhost:8378/1/functions/legitimateFunction',
body: JSON.stringify({}),
});
expect(response.status).toBe(200);
expect(JSON.parse(response.text).result).toBe('hello');
});
});
describe('Request denylist', () => {
describe('(GHSA-q342-9w2p-57fp) Denylist bypass via sibling nested objects', () => {
it('denies _bsontype:Code after a sibling nested object', async () => {
const headers = {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'X-Parse-Application-Id': 'test',
'X-Parse-REST-API-Key': 'rest',
};
const response = await request({
headers,
method: 'POST',
url: 'http://localhost:8378/1/classes/Bypass',
body: JSON.stringify({
obj: {
metadata: {},
_bsontype: 'Code',
code: 'malicious',
},
}),
}).catch(e => e);
expect(response.status).toBe(400);
const text = JSON.parse(response.text);
expect(text.code).toBe(Parse.Error.INVALID_KEY_NAME);
expect(text.error).toBe(
'Prohibited keyword in request data: {"key":"_bsontype","value":"Code"}.'
);
});
it('denies _bsontype:Code after a sibling nested array', async () => {
const headers = {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'X-Parse-Application-Id': 'test',
'X-Parse-REST-API-Key': 'rest',
};
const response = await request({
headers,
method: 'POST',
url: 'http://localhost:8378/1/classes/Bypass',
body: JSON.stringify({
obj: {
tags: ['safe'],
_bsontype: 'Code',
code: 'malicious',
},
}),
}).catch(e => e);
expect(response.status).toBe(400);
const text = JSON.parse(response.text);
expect(text.code).toBe(Parse.Error.INVALID_KEY_NAME);
expect(text.error).toBe(
'Prohibited keyword in request data: {"key":"_bsontype","value":"Code"}.'
);
});
it('denies __proto__ after a sibling nested object', async () => {
// Cannot test via HTTP because deepcopy() strips __proto__ before the denylist
// check runs. Test objectContainsKeyValue directly with a JSON.parse'd object
// that preserves __proto__ as an own property.
const Utils = require('../lib/Utils');
const data = JSON.parse('{"profile": {"name": "alice"}, "__proto__": {"isAdmin": true}}');
expect(Utils.objectContainsKeyValue(data, '__proto__', undefined)).toBe(true);
});
it('denies constructor after a sibling nested object', async () => {
const headers = {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'X-Parse-Application-Id': 'test',
'X-Parse-REST-API-Key': 'rest',
};
const response = await request({
headers,
method: 'POST',
url: 'http://localhost:8378/1/classes/Bypass',
body: JSON.stringify({
obj: {
data: {},
constructor: { prototype: { polluted: true } },
},
}),
}).catch(e => e);
expect(response.status).toBe(400);
const text = JSON.parse(response.text);
expect(text.code).toBe(Parse.Error.INVALID_KEY_NAME);
expect(text.error).toBe(
'Prohibited keyword in request data: {"key":"constructor"}.'
);
});
it('denies _bsontype:Code nested inside a second sibling object', async () => {
const headers = {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'X-Parse-Application-Id': 'test',
'X-Parse-REST-API-Key': 'rest',
};
const response = await request({
headers,
method: 'POST',
url: 'http://localhost:8378/1/classes/Bypass',
body: JSON.stringify({
field1: { safe: true },
field2: { _bsontype: 'Code', code: 'malicious' },
}),
}).catch(e => e);
expect(response.status).toBe(400);
const text = JSON.parse(response.text);
expect(text.code).toBe(Parse.Error.INVALID_KEY_NAME);
expect(text.error).toBe(
'Prohibited keyword in request data: {"key":"_bsontype","value":"Code"}.'
);
});
it('handles circular references without infinite loop', () => {
const Utils = require('../lib/Utils');
const obj = { name: 'test', nested: { value: 1 } };
obj.nested.self = obj;
expect(Utils.objectContainsKeyValue(obj, 'nonexistent', undefined)).toBe(false);
});
it('denies _bsontype:Code in file metadata after a sibling nested object', async () => {
const str = 'Hello World!';
const data = [];
for (let i = 0; i < str.length; i++) {
data.push(str.charCodeAt(i));
}
const file = new Parse.File('hello.txt', data, 'text/plain');
file.addMetadata('nested', { safe: true });
file.addMetadata('_bsontype', 'Code');
file.addMetadata('code', 'malicious');
await expectAsync(file.save()).toBeRejectedWith(
new Parse.Error(
Parse.Error.INVALID_KEY_NAME,
'Prohibited keyword in request data: {"key":"_bsontype","value":"Code"}.'
)
);
});
});
it('denies BSON type code data in write request by default', async () => {
const headers = {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
@@ -478,6 +699,100 @@ describe('Vulnerabilities', () => {
});
});
describe('(GHSA-mf3j-86qx-cq5j) ReDoS via $regex in LiveQuery subscription', () => {
it('should prevent ReDoS via catastrophic backtracking in LiveQuery $regex', async () => {
await reconfigureServer({
liveQuery: {
classNames: ['TestObject'],
regexTimeout: 100,
},
startLiveQueryServer: true,
});
const query = new Parse.Query('TestObject');
query.matches('field', /(a+)+b/);
const subscription = await query.subscribe();
const createPromise = new Promise(resolve => {
subscription.on('create', () => resolve('should_not_match'));
setTimeout(() => resolve('timeout'), 3000);
});
const obj = new Parse.Object('TestObject');
obj.set('field', 'a'.repeat(30));
await obj.save();
const result = await createPromise;
expect(result).toBe('timeout');
subscription.unsubscribe();
});
});
describe('Malformed $regex information disclosure', () => {
it('should not leak database error internals for invalid regex pattern in class query', async () => {
const logger = require('../lib/logger').default;
const loggerErrorSpy = spyOn(logger, 'error').and.callThrough();
const obj = new Parse.Object('TestObject');
await obj.save({ field: 'value' });
try {
await request({
method: 'GET',
url: `http://localhost:8378/1/classes/TestObject`,
headers: {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'X-Parse-Application-Id': 'test',
'X-Parse-REST-API-Key': 'rest',
},
qs: {
where: JSON.stringify({ field: { $regex: '[abc' } }),
},
});
fail('Request should have failed');
} catch (e) {
expect(e.data.code).toBe(Parse.Error.INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR);
expect(e.data.error).toBe('An internal server error occurred');
expect(typeof e.data.error).toBe('string');
expect(JSON.stringify(e.data)).not.toContain('errmsg');
expect(JSON.stringify(e.data)).not.toContain('codeName');
expect(JSON.stringify(e.data)).not.toContain('errorResponse');
expect(loggerErrorSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'Sanitized error:',
jasmine.stringMatching(/[Rr]egular expression/i)
);
}
});
it('should not leak database error internals for invalid regex pattern in role query', async () => {
const logger = require('../lib/logger').default;
const loggerErrorSpy = spyOn(logger, 'error').and.callThrough();
const role = new Parse.Role('testrole', new Parse.ACL());
await role.save(null, { useMasterKey: true });
try {
await request({
method: 'GET',
url: `http://localhost:8378/1/roles`,
headers: {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'X-Parse-Application-Id': 'test',
'X-Parse-REST-API-Key': 'rest',
},
qs: {
where: JSON.stringify({ name: { $regex: '[abc' } }),
},
});
fail('Request should have failed');
} catch (e) {
expect(e.data.code).toBe(Parse.Error.INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR);
expect(e.data.error).toBe('An internal server error occurred');
expect(typeof e.data.error).toBe('string');
expect(JSON.stringify(e.data)).not.toContain('errmsg');
expect(JSON.stringify(e.data)).not.toContain('codeName');
expect(JSON.stringify(e.data)).not.toContain('errorResponse');
expect(loggerErrorSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'Sanitized error:',
jasmine.stringMatching(/[Rr]egular expression/i)
);
}
});
});
describe('Postgres regex sanitizater', () => {
it('sanitizes the regex correctly to prevent Injection', async () => {
const user = new Parse.User();
+9 -2
View File
@@ -73,11 +73,18 @@ const getAppleKeyByKeyId = async (keyId, cacheMaxEntries, cacheMaxAge) => {
};
const verifyIdToken = async ({ token, id }, { clientId, cacheMaxEntries, cacheMaxAge }) => {
if (!clientId) {
throw new Parse.Error(
Parse.Error.OBJECT_NOT_FOUND,
'Apple auth is not configured.'
);
}
if (!token) {
throw new Parse.Error(Parse.Error.OBJECT_NOT_FOUND, `id token is invalid for this user.`);
}
const { kid: keyId, alg: algorithm } = authUtils.getHeaderFromToken(token);
const { kid: keyId } = authUtils.getHeaderFromToken(token);
const ONE_HOUR_IN_MS = 3600000;
let jwtClaims;
@@ -89,7 +96,7 @@ const verifyIdToken = async ({ token, id }, { clientId, cacheMaxEntries, cacheMa
try {
jwtClaims = jwt.verify(token, signingKey, {
algorithms: algorithm,
algorithms: ['RS256'],
// the audience can be checked against a string, a regular expression or a list of strings and/or regular expressions.
audience: clientId,
});
+11 -6
View File
@@ -52,8 +52,6 @@
* - `>= 6.5.6 < 7`
* - `>= 7.0.1`
*
* Secure authentication is recommended to ensure proper data protection and compliance with Facebook's guidelines.
*
* @see {@link https://developers.facebook.com/docs/facebook-login/limited-login/ Facebook Limited Login}
* @see {@link https://developers.facebook.com/docs/facebook-login/facebook-login-for-business/ Facebook Login for Business}
*/
@@ -131,12 +129,19 @@ const getFacebookKeyByKeyId = async (keyId, cacheMaxEntries, cacheMaxAge) => {
return key;
};
const verifyIdToken = async ({ token, id }, { clientId, cacheMaxEntries, cacheMaxAge }) => {
const verifyIdToken = async ({ token, id }, { appIds, cacheMaxEntries, cacheMaxAge }) => {
if (!Array.isArray(appIds) || !appIds.length) {
throw new Parse.Error(
Parse.Error.OBJECT_NOT_FOUND,
'Facebook auth is not configured.'
);
}
if (!token) {
throw new Parse.Error(Parse.Error.OBJECT_NOT_FOUND, 'id token is invalid for this user.');
}
const { kid: keyId, alg: algorithm } = authUtils.getHeaderFromToken(token);
const { kid: keyId } = authUtils.getHeaderFromToken(token);
const ONE_HOUR_IN_MS = 3600000;
let jwtClaims;
@@ -148,9 +153,9 @@ const verifyIdToken = async ({ token, id }, { clientId, cacheMaxEntries, cacheMa
try {
jwtClaims = jwt.verify(token, signingKey, {
algorithms: algorithm,
algorithms: ['RS256'],
// the audience can be checked against a string, a regular expression or a list of strings and/or regular expressions.
audience: clientId,
audience: appIds,
});
} catch (exception) {
const message = exception.message;
+41 -112
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,9 @@
*
* @class GoogleAdapter
* @param {Object} options - The adapter configuration options.
* @param {string} options.clientId - Your Google application Client ID. Required for authentication.
* @param {string} options.clientId - Your Google application Client ID.
* @param {number} [options.cacheMaxEntries] - Maximum number of JWKS cache entries. Default: 5.
* @param {number} [options.cacheMaxAge] - Maximum age of JWKS cache entries in ms. Default: 3600000 (1 hour).
*
* @description
* ## Parse Server Configuration
@@ -21,7 +23,6 @@
* The adapter requires the following `authData` fields:
* - **id**: The Google user ID.
* - **id_token**: The Google ID token.
* - **access_token**: The Google access token.
*
* ## Auth Payload
* ### Example Auth Data Payload
@@ -29,85 +30,74 @@
* {
* "google": {
* "id": "1234567",
* "id_token": "xxxxx.yyyyy.zzzzz",
* "access_token": "abc123def456ghi789"
* "id_token": "xxxxx.yyyyy.zzzzz"
* }
* }
* ```
*
* ## Notes
* - Ensure your Google Client ID is configured properly in the Parse Server configuration.
* - The `id_token` and `access_token` are validated against Google's authentication services.
* - The `id_token` is validated against Google's authentication services.
*
* @see {@link https://developers.google.com/identity/sign-in/web/backend-auth Google Authentication Documentation}
*/
'use strict';
// Helper functions for accessing the google API.
var Parse = require('parse/node').Parse;
const https = require('https');
const jwksClient = require('jwks-rsa');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const authUtils = require('./utils');
const TOKEN_ISSUER = 'accounts.google.com';
const HTTPS_TOKEN_ISSUER = 'https://accounts.google.com';
let cache = {};
const getGoogleKeyByKeyId = async (keyId, cacheMaxEntries, cacheMaxAge) => {
const client = jwksClient({
jwksUri: 'https://www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v3/certs',
cache: true,
cacheMaxEntries,
cacheMaxAge,
});
// Retrieve Google Signin Keys (with cache control)
function getGoogleKeyByKeyId(keyId) {
if (cache[keyId] && cache.expiresAt > new Date()) {
return cache[keyId];
let key;
try {
key = await authUtils.getSigningKey(client, keyId);
} catch {
throw new Parse.Error(
Parse.Error.OBJECT_NOT_FOUND,
`Unable to find matching key for Key ID: ${keyId}`
);
}
return key;
};
async function verifyIdToken({ id_token: token, id }, { clientId, cacheMaxEntries, cacheMaxAge }) {
if (!clientId) {
throw new Parse.Error(
Parse.Error.OBJECT_NOT_FOUND,
'Google auth is not configured.'
);
}
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
https
.get(`https://www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v3/certs`, res => {
let data = '';
res.on('data', chunk => {
data += chunk.toString('utf8');
});
res.on('end', () => {
const { keys } = JSON.parse(data);
const pems = keys.reduce(
(pems, { n: modulus, e: exposant, kid }) =>
Object.assign(pems, {
[kid]: rsaPublicKeyToPEM(modulus, exposant),
}),
{}
);
if (res.headers['cache-control']) {
var expire = res.headers['cache-control'].match(/max-age=([0-9]+)/);
if (expire) {
cache = Object.assign({}, pems, {
expiresAt: new Date(new Date().getTime() + Number(expire[1]) * 1000),
});
}
}
resolve(pems[keyId]);
});
})
.on('error', reject);
});
}
async function verifyIdToken({ id_token: token, id }, { clientId }) {
if (!token) {
throw new Parse.Error(Parse.Error.OBJECT_NOT_FOUND, `id token is invalid for this user.`);
}
const { kid: keyId, alg: algorithm } = authUtils.getHeaderFromToken(token);
const { kid: keyId } = authUtils.getHeaderFromToken(token);
const ONE_HOUR_IN_MS = 3600000;
let jwtClaims;
const googleKey = await getGoogleKeyByKeyId(keyId);
cacheMaxAge = cacheMaxAge || ONE_HOUR_IN_MS;
cacheMaxEntries = cacheMaxEntries || 5;
const googleKey = await getGoogleKeyByKeyId(keyId, cacheMaxEntries, cacheMaxAge);
const signingKey = googleKey.publicKey || googleKey.rsaPublicKey;
try {
jwtClaims = jwt.verify(token, googleKey, {
algorithms: algorithm,
jwtClaims = jwt.verify(token, signingKey, {
algorithms: ['RS256'],
audience: clientId,
});
} catch (exception) {
@@ -126,13 +116,6 @@ async function verifyIdToken({ id_token: token, id }, { clientId }) {
throw new Parse.Error(Parse.Error.OBJECT_NOT_FOUND, `auth data is invalid for this user.`);
}
if (clientId && jwtClaims.aud !== clientId) {
throw new Parse.Error(
Parse.Error.OBJECT_NOT_FOUND,
`id token not authorized for this clientId.`
);
}
return jwtClaims;
}
@@ -150,57 +133,3 @@ module.exports = {
validateAppId: validateAppId,
validateAuthData: validateAuthData,
};
// Helpers functions to convert the RSA certs to PEM (from jwks-rsa)
function rsaPublicKeyToPEM(modulusB64, exponentB64) {
const modulus = new Buffer(modulusB64, 'base64');
const exponent = new Buffer(exponentB64, 'base64');
const modulusHex = prepadSigned(modulus.toString('hex'));
const exponentHex = prepadSigned(exponent.toString('hex'));
const modlen = modulusHex.length / 2;
const explen = exponentHex.length / 2;
const encodedModlen = encodeLengthHex(modlen);
const encodedExplen = encodeLengthHex(explen);
const encodedPubkey =
'30' +
encodeLengthHex(modlen + explen + encodedModlen.length / 2 + encodedExplen.length / 2 + 2) +
'02' +
encodedModlen +
modulusHex +
'02' +
encodedExplen +
exponentHex;
const der = new Buffer(encodedPubkey, 'hex').toString('base64');
let pem = '-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n';
pem += `${der.match(/.{1,64}/g).join('\n')}`;
pem += '\n-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\n';
return pem;
}
function prepadSigned(hexStr) {
const msb = hexStr[0];
if (msb < '0' || msb > '7') {
return `00${hexStr}`;
}
return hexStr;
}
function toHex(number) {
const nstr = number.toString(16);
if (nstr.length % 2) {
return `0${nstr}`;
}
return nstr;
}
function encodeLengthHex(n) {
if (n <= 127) {
return toHex(n);
}
const nHex = toHex(n);
const lengthOfLengthByte = 128 + nHex.length / 2;
return toHex(lengthOfLengthByte) + nHex;
}
+1 -2
View File
@@ -96,8 +96,7 @@ class InstagramAdapter extends BaseAuthCodeAdapter {
}
async getUserFromAccessToken(accessToken, authData) {
const defaultURL = 'https://graph.instagram.com/';
const apiURL = authData.apiURL || defaultURL;
const apiURL = 'https://graph.instagram.com/';
const path = `${apiURL}me?fields=id&access_token=${accessToken}`;
const response = await fetch(path);
+14 -1
View File
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ import SchemaCache from '../Adapters/Cache/SchemaCache';
import type { LoadSchemaOptions } from './types';
import type { ParseServerOptions } from '../Options';
import type { QueryOptions, FullQueryOptions } from '../Adapters/Storage/StorageAdapter';
import { createSanitizedError } from '../Error';
function addWriteACL(query, acl) {
const newQuery = _.cloneDeep(query);
@@ -1354,7 +1355,19 @@ class DatabaseController {
})
)
.catch(error => {
throw new Parse.Error(Parse.Error.INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, error);
if (error instanceof Parse.Error) {
throw error;
}
const detailedMessage =
typeof error === 'string'
? error
: error?.message || 'An internal server error occurred';
throw createSanitizedError(
Parse.Error.INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
detailedMessage,
this.options,
'An internal server error occurred'
);
});
}
});
+4 -2
View File
@@ -6,9 +6,11 @@ import defaultLogger from './logger';
*
* @param {number} errorCode - The Parse.Error code (e.g., Parse.Error.OPERATION_FORBIDDEN)
* @param {string} detailedMessage - The detailed error message to log server-side
* @param {object} config - Parse Server config with enableSanitizedErrorResponse
* @param {string} [sanitizedMessage='Permission denied'] - The sanitized message to return to clients
* @returns {Parse.Error} A Parse.Error with sanitized message
*/
function createSanitizedError(errorCode, detailedMessage, config) {
function createSanitizedError(errorCode, detailedMessage, config, sanitizedMessage = 'Permission denied') {
// On testing we need to add a prefix to the message to allow to find the correct call in the TestUtils.js file
if (process.env.TESTING) {
defaultLogger.error('Sanitized error:', detailedMessage);
@@ -16,7 +18,7 @@ function createSanitizedError(errorCode, detailedMessage, config) {
defaultLogger.error(detailedMessage);
}
return new Parse.Error(errorCode, config?.enableSanitizedErrorResponse !== false ? 'Permission denied' : detailedMessage);
return new Parse.Error(errorCode, config?.enableSanitizedErrorResponse !== false ? sanitizedMessage : detailedMessage);
}
/**
+45 -4
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,43 @@
var equalObjects = require('./equalObjects');
var Id = require('./Id');
var Parse = require('parse/node');
var vm = require('vm');
var logger = require('../logger').default;
var regexTimeout = 0;
var vmContext = vm.createContext(Object.create(null));
var scriptCache = new Map();
var SCRIPT_CACHE_MAX = 1000;
function setRegexTimeout(ms) {
regexTimeout = ms;
}
function safeRegexTest(pattern, flags, input) {
if (!regexTimeout) {
var re = new RegExp(pattern, flags);
return re.test(input);
}
var cacheKey = flags + ':' + pattern;
var script = scriptCache.get(cacheKey);
if (!script) {
if (scriptCache.size >= SCRIPT_CACHE_MAX) { scriptCache.clear(); }
script = new vm.Script('new RegExp(pattern, flags).test(input)');
scriptCache.set(cacheKey, script);
}
vmContext.pattern = pattern;
vmContext.flags = flags;
vmContext.input = input;
try {
return script.runInContext(vmContext, { timeout: regexTimeout });
} catch (e) {
if (e.code === 'ERR_SCRIPT_EXECUTION_TIMEOUT') {
logger.warn(`Regex timeout: pattern "${pattern}" with flags "${flags}" exceeded ${regexTimeout}ms limit`);
return false;
}
throw e;
}
}
/**
* Query Hashes are deterministic hashes for Parse Queries.
@@ -290,9 +327,12 @@ function matchesKeyConstraints(object, key, constraints) {
}
break;
}
case '$regex':
case '$regex': {
if (typeof compareTo === 'object') {
return compareTo.test(object[key]);
if (!safeRegexTest(compareTo.source, compareTo.flags, object[key])) {
return false;
}
break;
}
// JS doesn't support perl-style escaping
var expString = '';
@@ -312,11 +352,11 @@ function matchesKeyConstraints(object, key, constraints) {
escapeStart = compareTo.indexOf('\\Q', escapeEnd);
}
expString += compareTo.substring(Math.max(escapeStart, escapeEnd + 2));
var exp = new RegExp(expString, constraints.$options || '');
if (!exp.test(object[key])) {
if (!safeRegexTest(expString, constraints.$options || '', object[key])) {
return false;
}
break;
}
case '$nearSphere':
if (!compareTo || !object[key]) {
return false;
@@ -396,6 +436,7 @@ function matchesKeyConstraints(object, key, constraints) {
var QueryTools = {
queryHash: queryHash,
matchesQuery: matchesQuery,
setRegexTimeout: setRegexTimeout,
};
module.exports = QueryTools;
+7
View File
@@ -901,6 +901,13 @@ module.exports.LiveQueryOptions = {
env: 'PARSE_SERVER_LIVEQUERY_REDIS_URL',
help: "parse-server's LiveQuery redisURL",
},
regexTimeout: {
env: 'PARSE_SERVER_LIVEQUERY_REGEX_TIMEOUT',
help:
'Sets the maximum execution time in milliseconds for regular expression pattern matching in LiveQuery. This protects against Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attacks where a malicious regex pattern could block the event loop. A regex that exceeds the timeout will be treated as non-matching.<br><br>The protection runs each regex evaluation in an isolated VM context with a timeout. This adds approximately 50 microseconds of overhead per regex evaluation. For most applications this is negligible, but it can add up if you have a very large number of LiveQuery subscriptions that use `$regex` on the same class. For example, 10,000 concurrent regex subscriptions would add approximately 500ms of processing time per object save event on that class.<br><br>Set to `0` to disable the timeout and use native regex evaluation without protection. Defaults to `100`.',
action: parsers.numberParser('regexTimeout'),
default: 100,
},
wssAdapter: {
env: 'PARSE_SERVER_LIVEQUERY_WSS_ADAPTER',
help: 'Adapter module for the WebSocketServer',
+1
View File
@@ -186,6 +186,7 @@
* @property {Adapter<PubSubAdapter>} pubSubAdapter LiveQuery pubsub adapter
* @property {Any} redisOptions parse-server's LiveQuery redisOptions
* @property {String} redisURL parse-server's LiveQuery redisURL
* @property {Number} regexTimeout Sets the maximum execution time in milliseconds for regular expression pattern matching in LiveQuery. This protects against Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attacks where a malicious regex pattern could block the event loop. A regex that exceeds the timeout will be treated as non-matching.<br><br>The protection runs each regex evaluation in an isolated VM context with a timeout. This adds approximately 50 microseconds of overhead per regex evaluation. For most applications this is negligible, but it can add up if you have a very large number of LiveQuery subscriptions that use `$regex` on the same class. For example, 10,000 concurrent regex subscriptions would add approximately 500ms of processing time per object save event on that class.<br><br>Set to `0` to disable the timeout and use native regex evaluation without protection. Defaults to `100`.
* @property {Adapter<WSSAdapter>} wssAdapter Adapter module for the WebSocketServer
*/
+3
View File
@@ -489,6 +489,9 @@ export interface LiveQueryOptions {
redisURL: ?string;
/* LiveQuery pubsub adapter */
pubSubAdapter: ?Adapter<PubSubAdapter>;
/* Sets the maximum execution time in milliseconds for regular expression pattern matching in LiveQuery. This protects against Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attacks where a malicious regex pattern could block the event loop. A regex that exceeds the timeout will be treated as non-matching.<br><br>The protection runs each regex evaluation in an isolated VM context with a timeout. This adds approximately 50 microseconds of overhead per regex evaluation. For most applications this is negligible, but it can add up if you have a very large number of LiveQuery subscriptions that use `$regex` on the same class. For example, 10,000 concurrent regex subscriptions would add approximately 500ms of processing time per object save event on that class.<br><br>Set to `0` to disable the timeout and use native regex evaluation without protection. Defaults to `100`.
:DEFAULT: 100 */
regexTimeout: ?number;
/* Adapter module for the WebSocketServer */
wssAdapter: ?Adapter<WSSAdapter>;
}
+2
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ var batch = require('./batch'),
fs = require('fs');
import { ParseServerOptions, LiveQueryServerOptions } from './Options';
import { setRegexTimeout } from './LiveQuery/QueryTools';
import defaults from './defaults';
import * as logging from './logger';
import Config from './Config';
@@ -139,6 +140,7 @@ class ParseServer {
this.config.masterKeyIpsStore = new Map();
this.config.maintenanceKeyIpsStore = new Map();
logging.setLogger(allControllers.loggerController);
setRegexTimeout(options.liveQuery?.regexTimeout);
}
/**
+49 -5
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import Config from '../Config';
import logger from '../logger';
const triggers = require('../triggers');
const Utils = require('../Utils');
import { createSanitizedHttpError } from '../Error';
export class FilesRouter {
expressRouter({ maxUploadSize = '20Mb' } = {}) {
@@ -112,6 +113,12 @@ export class FilesRouter {
}
async createHandler(req, res, next) {
if (req.auth.isReadOnly) {
const error = createSanitizedHttpError(403, "read-only masterKey isn't allowed to create a file.", req.config);
res.status(error.status);
res.end(`{"error":"${error.message}"}`);
return;
}
const config = req.config;
const user = req.auth.user;
const isMaster = req.auth.isMaster;
@@ -266,6 +273,12 @@ export class FilesRouter {
}
async deleteHandler(req, res, next) {
if (req.auth.isReadOnly) {
const error = createSanitizedHttpError(403, "read-only masterKey isn't allowed to delete a file.", req.config);
res.status(error.status);
res.end(`{"error":"${error.message}"}`);
return;
}
try {
const { filesController } = req.config;
const { filename } = req.params;
@@ -304,14 +317,45 @@ export class FilesRouter {
async metadataHandler(req, res) {
try {
const config = Config.get(req.params.appId);
if (!config) {
res.status(200);
res.json({});
return;
}
const { filesController } = config;
const { filename } = req.params;
const data = await filesController.getMetadata(filename);
let { filename } = req.params;
const file = new Parse.File(filename, { base64: '' });
const triggerResult = await triggers.maybeRunFileTrigger(
triggers.Types.beforeFind,
{ file },
config,
req.auth
);
if (triggerResult?.file?._name) {
filename = triggerResult.file._name;
}
const data = await filesController.getMetadata(filename).catch(() => {
res.status(200);
res.json({});
});
if (!data) {
return;
}
await triggers.maybeRunFileTrigger(
triggers.Types.afterFind,
{ file },
config,
req.auth
);
res.status(200);
res.json(data);
} catch {
res.status(200);
res.json({});
} catch (e) {
const err = triggers.resolveError(e, {
code: Parse.Error.SCRIPT_FAILED,
message: 'Could not get file metadata.',
});
res.status(403);
res.json({ code: err.code, error: err.message });
}
}
}
+8
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import { promiseEnforceMasterKeyAccess, promiseEnsureIdempotency } from '../midd
import { jobStatusHandler } from '../StatusHandler';
import _ from 'lodash';
import { logger } from '../logger';
import { createSanitizedError } from '../Error';
function parseObject(obj, config) {
if (Array.isArray(obj)) {
@@ -58,6 +59,13 @@ export class FunctionsRouter extends PromiseRouter {
}
static handleCloudJob(req) {
if (req.auth.isReadOnly) {
throw createSanitizedError(
Parse.Error.OPERATION_FORBIDDEN,
"read-only masterKey isn't allowed to run a job.",
req.config
);
}
const jobName = req.params.jobName || req.body?.jobName;
const applicationId = req.config.applicationId;
const jobHandler = jobStatusHandler(req.config);
+15
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
import { Parse } from 'parse/node';
import PromiseRouter from '../PromiseRouter';
import * as middleware from '../middlewares';
import { createSanitizedError } from '../Error';
export class HooksRouter extends PromiseRouter {
createHook(aHook, config) {
@@ -12,6 +13,13 @@ export class HooksRouter extends PromiseRouter {
}
handlePost(req) {
if (req.auth.isReadOnly) {
throw createSanitizedError(
Parse.Error.OPERATION_FORBIDDEN,
"read-only masterKey isn't allowed to create a hook.",
req.config
);
}
return this.createHook(req.body || {}, req.config);
}
@@ -82,6 +90,13 @@ export class HooksRouter extends PromiseRouter {
}
handlePut(req) {
if (req.auth.isReadOnly) {
throw createSanitizedError(
Parse.Error.OPERATION_FORBIDDEN,
"read-only masterKey isn't allowed to modify a hook.",
req.config
);
}
var body = req.body || {};
if (body.__op == 'Delete') {
return this.handleDelete(req);
+1 -1
View File
@@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ export class PagesRouter extends PromiseRouter {
const normalizedPath = path.normalize(filePath);
// Abort if the path is outside of the path directory scope
if (!normalizedPath.startsWith(this.pagesPath)) {
if (!normalizedPath.startsWith(this.pagesPath + path.sep)) {
throw errors.fileOutsideAllowedScope;
}
+7
View File
@@ -341,6 +341,13 @@ export class UsersRouter extends ClassesRouter {
req.config
);
}
if (req.auth.isReadOnly) {
throw createSanitizedError(
Parse.Error.OPERATION_FORBIDDEN,
"read-only masterKey isn't allowed to login as another user.",
req.config
);
}
const userId = req.body?.userId || req.query.userId;
if (!userId) {
@@ -105,6 +105,18 @@ class CheckGroupServerConfig extends CheckGroup {
}
},
}),
new Check({
title: 'LiveQuery regex timeout enabled',
warning:
'LiveQuery regex timeout is disabled. A malicious client can subscribe with a crafted $regex pattern that causes catastrophic backtracking, blocking the Node.js event loop and making the server unresponsive.',
solution:
"Change Parse Server configuration to 'liveQuery.regexTimeout: 100' to set a 100ms timeout for regex evaluation in LiveQuery.",
check: () => {
if (config.liveQuery?.classNames?.length > 0 && config.liveQuery?.regexTimeout === 0) {
throw 1;
}
},
}),
];
}
}
+18 -9
View File
@@ -344,16 +344,25 @@ class Utils {
const isMatch = (a, b) => (typeof a === 'string' && new RegExp(b).test(a)) || a === b;
const isKeyMatch = k => isMatch(k, key);
const isValueMatch = v => isMatch(v, value);
for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(obj)) {
if (key !== undefined && value === undefined && isKeyMatch(k)) {
return true;
} else if (key === undefined && value !== undefined && isValueMatch(v)) {
return true;
} else if (key !== undefined && value !== undefined && isKeyMatch(k) && isValueMatch(v)) {
return true;
const stack = [obj];
const seen = new WeakSet();
while (stack.length > 0) {
const current = stack.pop();
if (seen.has(current)) {
continue;
}
if (['[object Object]', '[object Array]'].includes(Object.prototype.toString.call(v))) {
return Utils.objectContainsKeyValue(v, key, value);
seen.add(current);
for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(current)) {
if (key !== undefined && value === undefined && isKeyMatch(k)) {
return true;
} else if (key === undefined && value !== undefined && isValueMatch(v)) {
return true;
} else if (key !== undefined && value !== undefined && isKeyMatch(k) && isValueMatch(v)) {
return true;
}
if (['[object Object]', '[object Array]'].includes(Object.prototype.toString.call(v))) {
stack.push(v);
}
}
}
return false;
+18 -8
View File
@@ -20,18 +20,28 @@ export const Types = {
const ConnectClassName = '@Connect';
/**
* Creates a prototype-free object for use as a lookup store.
* This prevents prototype chain properties (e.g. `constructor`, `toString`)
* from being resolved as registered handlers when using bracket notation
* for lookups. Always use this instead of `{}` for handler stores.
*/
function createStore() {
return Object.create(null);
}
const baseStore = function () {
const Validators = Object.keys(Types).reduce(function (base, key) {
base[key] = {};
base[key] = createStore();
return base;
}, {});
const Functions = {};
const Jobs = {};
}, createStore());
const Functions = createStore();
const Jobs = createStore();
const LiveQuery = [];
const Triggers = Object.keys(Types).reduce(function (base, key) {
base[key] = {};
base[key] = createStore();
return base;
}, {});
}, createStore());
return Object.freeze({
Functions,
@@ -90,7 +100,7 @@ function getStore(category, name, applicationId) {
const invalidNameRegex = /['"`]/;
if (invalidNameRegex.test(name)) {
// Prevent a malicious user from injecting properties into the store
return {};
return createStore();
}
const path = name.split('.');
@@ -101,7 +111,7 @@ function getStore(category, name, applicationId) {
for (const component of path) {
store = store[component];
if (!store) {
return {};
return createStore();
}
}
return store;