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name: Windows MOVEit Transfer Writing ASPX
id: c0ed2aca-5666-45b3-813f-ddfac3f3eda0
version: 1
date: '2023-06-01'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: experimental
type: TTP
data_source:
- Sysmon Event ID 11
description: This analytic detects the creation of new ASPX files in the MOVEit Transfer application's "wwwroot" directory. This activity is indicative of the recent critical vulnerability found in MOVEit Transfer, where threat actors have been observed exploiting a zero-day vulnerability to install a malicious ASPX file (e.g., "human2.aspx") in the wwwroot directory. The injected file could then be used to exfiltrate sensitive data, including user credentials and file metadata. The vulnerability affects the MOVEit Transfer managed file transfer software developed by Progress, a subsidiary of US-based Progress Software Corporation. This analytic requires endpoint data reflecting process and filesystem activity. The identified process must be responsible for the creation of new ASPX or ASHX files in the specified directory.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
where Processes.process_name=System by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name
Processes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join process_guid, _time [|
tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path IN ("*\\MOVEitTransfer\\wwwroot\\*") Filesystem.file_name
IN("*.aspx", "*.ashx", "*.asp*") OR Filesystem.file_name IN ("human2.aspx","_human2.aspx") by _time span=1h Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_create_time
Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` |
fields _time dest file_create_time file_name file_path process_name process_path
process] | dedup file_create_time | table dest file_create_time, file_name, file_path,
process_name | `windows_moveit_transfer_writing_aspx_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node and `Filesystem`
node.
known_false_positives: The query is structured in a way that `action` (read, create)
is not defined. Review the results of this query, filter, and tune as necessary.
It may be necessary to generate this query specific to your endpoint product.
references:
- https://community.progress.com/s/article/MOVEit-Transfer-Critical-Vulnerability-31May2023
- https://www.reddit.com/r/sysadmin/comments/13wxuej/critical_vulnerability_moveit_file_transfer/
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-moveit-transfer-zero-day-mass-exploited-in-data-theft-attacks/
- https://www.reddit.com/r/sysadmin/comments/13wxuej/critical_vulnerability_moveit_file_transfer/
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/zero-day-moveit-data-theft
tags:
analytic_story:
- MOVEit Transfer Critical Vulnerability
asset_type: Endpoint
atomic_guid: []
confidence: 100
impact: 100
message: The MOVEit application on $dest$ has written a new ASPX file to disk.
mitre_attack_id:
- T1190
- T1133
observable:
- name: dest
type: Hostname
role:
- Victim
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
risk_score: 100
required_fields:
- _time
- Filesystem.file_path
- Filesystem.process_id
- Filesystem.file_name
- Filesystem.file_hash
- Filesystem.user
- Filesystem.file_create_time
- Processes.process_id
- Processes.process_name
- Processes.dest
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/moveit_windows-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
attackcti==0.3.9
docker==6.0.0
docker==6.1.3
GitPython==3.1.31
Jinja2==3.1.2
jsonschema==4.17.3
mock==4.0.3
psutil==5.9.5
pycvesearch==1.2
pydantic==1.10.7
pydantic==1.10.8
pysigma==0.9.8
pysigma-backend-splunk==1.0.2
pytest==7.3.1
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
name: MOVEit Transfer Critical Vulnerability
id: e8c05f9b-6ad4-45ac-8f5d-ff044da417c9
version: 1
date: '2023-06-01'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
description: A critical zero-day vulnerability has been discovered in the MOVEit Transfer file transfer software, widely used by businesses and developers worldwide. The vulnerability has been exploited by unknown threat actors to perform mass data theft from organizations. Progress Software Corporation, the developer of MOVEit, has issued a security advisory urging customers to take immediate action to protect their environments. They recommend blocking external traffic to ports 80 and 445 on the MOVEit server, and to check the c:\MOVEitTransfer\wwwroot\ folder for unusual files. A patch is currently being tested.
narrative: 'Hackers have been actively exploiting a zero-day vulnerability found in the MOVEit Transfer software. This software, developed by Progress Software Corporation, a US-based company and its subsidiary Ipswitch, is a managed file transfer solution. It is used by thousands of organizations worldwide, including Chase, Disney, GEICO, and MLB, and by 3.5 million developers. The software allows for secure file transfers between business partners and customers using SFTP, SCP, and HTTP-based uploads.\
The zero-day vulnerability has been exploited to steal data on a large scale from various organizations. The identity of the threat actors and the exact timeline of the exploitation remains unclear. However, it has been confirmed that multiple organizations have experienced breaches and data theft.\
In response to this critical situation, Progress released a security advisory warning customers of the vulnerability and providing mitigation strategies while a patch is being developed and tested. They urged customers to take immediate action to protect their MOVEit environments. They suggested blocking external traffic to ports 80 and 445 on the MOVEit server and checking the c:\MOVEitTransfer\wwwroot\ folder for unexpected files, including backups or large file downloads.\
Blocking these ports will prevent external access to the web UI, prevent some MOVEit Automation tasks from working, block APIs, and prevent the Outlook MOVEit plugin from working. However, SFTP and FTP/s protocols can continue to be used for file transfers.\
There is currently no detailed information about the zero-day vulnerability. But based on the ports blocked and the specific location to check for unusual files, the flaw is likely a web-facing vulnerability.\
While Progress has not officially confirmed that the vulnerability is being actively exploited, it is clear from several reports that multiple organizations have already had data stolen using this zero-day vulnerability. The exploitation appears very similar to the mass exploitation of a GoAnywhere MFT zero-day in January 2023 and the December 2020 zero-day exploitation of Accellion FTA servers. These were both managed file transfer platforms heavily exploited by the Clop ransomware gang to steal data and extort organizations.'
references:
- https://community.progress.com/s/article/MOVEit-Transfer-Critical-Vulnerability-31May2023
- https://www.reddit.com/r/sysadmin/comments/13wxuej/critical_vulnerability_moveit_file_transfer/
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-moveit-transfer-zero-day-mass-exploited-in-data-theft-attacks/
- https://www.reddit.com/r/sysadmin/comments/13wxuej/critical_vulnerability_moveit_file_transfer/
tags:
analytic_story: MOVEit Transfer Critical Vulnerability
category:
- Adversary Tactics
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
usecase: Advanced Threat Detection