mirror of
https://github.com/splunk/security_content
synced 2026-06-08 17:32:49 +00:00
Merge branch 'develop' into Risky
This commit is contained in:
+17
-8
@@ -496,14 +496,12 @@ workflows:
|
||||
filters:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
only: /.*/
|
||||
|
||||
- run-appinspect:
|
||||
# build always
|
||||
requires:
|
||||
- validate-content
|
||||
- build-sources
|
||||
- build-package
|
||||
|
||||
filters:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
only: /^v.*/
|
||||
@@ -514,7 +512,6 @@ workflows:
|
||||
- validate-content
|
||||
- build-sources
|
||||
- build-package
|
||||
|
||||
- run-appinspect
|
||||
filters:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
@@ -527,7 +524,6 @@ workflows:
|
||||
- validate-content
|
||||
- build-sources
|
||||
- build-package
|
||||
|
||||
- run-appinspect
|
||||
- create-report
|
||||
filters:
|
||||
@@ -541,7 +537,6 @@ workflows:
|
||||
- validate-content
|
||||
- build-sources
|
||||
- build-package
|
||||
|
||||
- run-appinspect
|
||||
- create-report
|
||||
- update-sources-github
|
||||
@@ -556,7 +551,6 @@ workflows:
|
||||
- validate-content
|
||||
- build-sources
|
||||
- build-package
|
||||
|
||||
- run-appinspect
|
||||
- create-report
|
||||
- update-sources-github
|
||||
@@ -571,7 +565,7 @@ workflows:
|
||||
requires:
|
||||
- validate-content
|
||||
- build-sources
|
||||
- build-package
|
||||
- build-package
|
||||
- run-appinspect
|
||||
- create-report
|
||||
- update-sources-github
|
||||
@@ -581,4 +575,19 @@ workflows:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
only: /^v.*/
|
||||
branches:
|
||||
ignore: /.*/
|
||||
ignore: /.*/
|
||||
|
||||
detection-testing:
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
- hold:
|
||||
type: approval
|
||||
filters:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
only: /^v.*/
|
||||
- detection-testing:
|
||||
# build always
|
||||
requires:
|
||||
- hold
|
||||
filters:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
only: /^v.*/
|
||||
@@ -51,7 +51,12 @@ def test_detections(ssh_key_name, private_key, splunk_ip, splunk_password, test_
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_detection(ssh_key_name, private_key, splunk_ip, splunk_password, test_file, test_index, uuid_test, uuid_var):
|
||||
test_file_obj = load_file("security_content/" + test_file[2:])
|
||||
try:
|
||||
test_file_obj = load_file("security_content/" + test_file[2:])
|
||||
except Exception as e:
|
||||
print('Error: ' + str(e))
|
||||
return
|
||||
|
||||
if not test_file_obj:
|
||||
return
|
||||
#print(test_file_obj)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Ransomware
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log
|
||||
kill_chain_phases:
|
||||
- Exploitation
|
||||
mitre_attack_id:
|
||||
@@ -47,6 +50,3 @@ tags:
|
||||
- Processes.parent_process_id
|
||||
- Processes.parent_process_name
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,11 +12,11 @@ description: This search is to detect a suspicious modification to the firewall
|
||||
more files.
|
||||
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
|
||||
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=netsh.exe
|
||||
Processes.process= "*firewall*" Processes.process= "*group=\"Network Discovery\"*" Processes.process="*enable*" Processes.process="*Yes*"
|
||||
by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name
|
||||
Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name
|
||||
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
|
||||
| `allow_network_discovery_in_firewall_filter`'
|
||||
Processes.process= "*firewall*" Processes.process= "*group=\"Network Discovery\"*" Processes.process="*enable*"
|
||||
Processes.process="*Yes*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process
|
||||
Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
|
||||
Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
|
||||
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `allow_network_discovery_in_firewall_filter`'
|
||||
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
|
||||
on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
|
||||
your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure
|
||||
@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Ransomware
|
||||
- Revil Ransomware
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log
|
||||
kill_chain_phases:
|
||||
- Exploitation
|
||||
mitre_attack_id:
|
||||
@@ -48,6 +51,3 @@ tags:
|
||||
- Processes.parent_process_id
|
||||
- Processes.parent_process_name
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -80,4 +80,4 @@ tags:
|
||||
- name: process_name
|
||||
type: Process
|
||||
role:
|
||||
- Child Process
|
||||
- Child Process
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -11,9 +11,9 @@ description: This following analytic detects PowerShell command to delete shadow
|
||||
to deploy DarkSide Ransomware where it executed a child process of PowerShell to
|
||||
execute a hex encoded command to delete shadow copy. This hex encoded command was
|
||||
able to be decrypted by PowerShell log.
|
||||
search: '`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message= "*ShadowCopy*" (Message = "*Delete*" OR Message = "*Remove*")
|
||||
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Message
|
||||
ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
|
||||
search: '`powershell` EventCode=4104 Message= "*ShadowCopy*" (Message = "*Delete*"
|
||||
OR Message = "*Remove*") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
|
||||
by EventCode Message ComputerName User | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
|
||||
| `delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell_filter`'
|
||||
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
|
||||
logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ description: 'The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscriptio
|
||||
1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID equals 20 \
|
||||
|
||||
1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID equals 21 \
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding.
|
||||
It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition,
|
||||
EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Ransomware
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log
|
||||
kill_chain_phases:
|
||||
- Exploitation
|
||||
mitre_attack_id:
|
||||
@@ -44,6 +47,3 @@ tags:
|
||||
- Registry.dest
|
||||
- Registry.registry_value_name
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Ransomware
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log
|
||||
kill_chain_phases:
|
||||
- Exploitation
|
||||
mitre_attack_id:
|
||||
@@ -42,6 +45,3 @@ tags:
|
||||
- Registry.dest
|
||||
- Registry.registry_value_name
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -10,15 +10,15 @@ description: This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable
|
||||
windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly
|
||||
seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections.
|
||||
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
|
||||
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where
|
||||
Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableBehaviorMonitoring" OR
|
||||
Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableOnAccessProtection" OR
|
||||
Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable" OR
|
||||
Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableRealtimeMonitoring" OR
|
||||
Registry.registry_path= "*\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem" OR
|
||||
Registry.registry_path= "*\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableIOAVProtection" OR
|
||||
Registry.registry_path= "*\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableScriptScanning"
|
||||
Registry.registry_value_name = "DWORD (0x00000001)"
|
||||
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows
|
||||
Defender\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableBehaviorMonitoring" OR Registry.registry_path=
|
||||
"*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableOnAccessProtection"
|
||||
OR Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Real-Time
|
||||
Protection\\DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable" OR Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows
|
||||
Defender\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableRealtimeMonitoring" OR Registry.registry_path=
|
||||
"*\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableIntrusionPreventionSystem" OR Registry.registry_path=
|
||||
"*\\Real-Time Protection\\DisableIOAVProtection" OR Registry.registry_path= "*\\Real-Time
|
||||
Protection\\DisableScriptScanning" Registry.registry_value_name = "DWORD (0x00000001)"
|
||||
by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name
|
||||
Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
|
||||
|`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `disable_windows_behavior_monitoring_filter`'
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -46,4 +46,3 @@ tags:
|
||||
- Registry.dest
|
||||
- Registry.registry_value_name
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Ransomware
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log
|
||||
kill_chain_phases:
|
||||
- Exploitation
|
||||
mitre_attack_id:
|
||||
@@ -41,6 +44,3 @@ tags:
|
||||
- process_name
|
||||
- process
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -25,6 +25,9 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Ransomware
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log
|
||||
kill_chain_phases:
|
||||
- Exploitation
|
||||
mitre_attack_id:
|
||||
@@ -43,6 +46,3 @@ tags:
|
||||
- Processes.dest
|
||||
- Processes.user
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Ransomware
|
||||
- Revil Ransomware
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets//malware/revil/msmpeng_side/windows-sysmon.log
|
||||
kill_chain_phases:
|
||||
- Exploitation
|
||||
mitre_attack_id:
|
||||
@@ -43,6 +46,3 @@ tags:
|
||||
- Filesystem.user
|
||||
- Filesystem.file_path
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets//malware/revil/msmpeng_side/windows-sysmon.log
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Ransomware
|
||||
- Revil Ransomware
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/pwh_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log
|
||||
kill_chain_phases:
|
||||
- Exploitation
|
||||
mitre_attack_id:
|
||||
@@ -45,6 +48,3 @@ tags:
|
||||
- Processes.process_id
|
||||
- Processes.parent_process_id
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1562.001/pwh_defender_disabling/windows-sysmon.log
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Malicious PowerShell
|
||||
- Ransomware
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-powershell.log
|
||||
kill_chain_phases:
|
||||
- Exploitation
|
||||
mitre_attack_id:
|
||||
@@ -39,6 +42,3 @@ tags:
|
||||
- ComputerName
|
||||
- User
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-powershell.log
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
analytic_story:
|
||||
- Ransomware
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log
|
||||
kill_chain_phases:
|
||||
- Exploitation
|
||||
mitre_attack_id:
|
||||
@@ -45,6 +48,3 @@ tags:
|
||||
- Processes.dest
|
||||
- Processes.user
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
automated_detection_testing: passed
|
||||
dataset:
|
||||
- https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/ransomware_ttp/data2/windows-sysmon.log
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -13,10 +13,11 @@ description: This analytic identifies suspicious modification in registry entry
|
||||
notes file name in the compromised host.
|
||||
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name)
|
||||
as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time)
|
||||
as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path="*\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Facebook_Assistant\\*" OR Registry.registry_path="*\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\BlackLivesMatter*")
|
||||
AND (Registry.registry_value_name = "\.*" OR Registry.registry_value_name = "Binary
|
||||
Data") by Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
|
||||
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `revil_registry_entry_filter`'
|
||||
as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path="*\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Facebook_Assistant\\*"
|
||||
OR Registry.registry_path="*\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\BlackLivesMatter*") AND (Registry.registry_value_name
|
||||
= "\.*" OR Registry.registry_value_name = "Binary Data") by Registry.registry_value_name
|
||||
Registry.dest Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
|
||||
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `revil_registry_entry_filter`'
|
||||
how_to_implement: to successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
|
||||
logs with the Image, TargetObject registry key, registry Details from your endpoints.
|
||||
If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -10,15 +10,17 @@ description: This analytic identifies suspicious series of attempt to kill multi
|
||||
services on a system using either `net.exe` or `sc.exe`. This technique is use by
|
||||
adversaries to terminate security services or other related services to continue
|
||||
there objective and evade detections.
|
||||
search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
|
||||
| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)),
|
||||
process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_path"), "string", null),
|
||||
parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), "string", null)
|
||||
| where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND like(cmd_line, "%delete%") AND process_name = "sc.exe"
|
||||
| eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null),
|
||||
ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
|
||||
body=create_map(["cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path])
|
||||
| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
|
||||
search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event,
|
||||
"_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"),
|
||||
"string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"),
|
||||
"string", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_path"), "string",
|
||||
null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), "string",
|
||||
null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND like(cmd_line, "%delete%") AND process_name
|
||||
= "sc.exe" | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event,
|
||||
"dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
|
||||
"string", null)), body=create_map(["cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name,
|
||||
"parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into
|
||||
write_ssa_detected_events();'
|
||||
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
|
||||
logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
|
||||
endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
|
||||
@@ -46,4 +48,4 @@ tags:
|
||||
- process_path
|
||||
- dest_user_id
|
||||
- process
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -10,15 +10,17 @@ description: This analytic will identify suspicious series of command-line to di
|
||||
several services. This technique is seen where the adversary attempts to disable
|
||||
security app services or other malware services to complete the objective on the
|
||||
compromised system.
|
||||
search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
|
||||
| eval _datamodels=ucast(map_get(input_event, "_datamodels"), "collection<string>", []), body={}
|
||||
| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)),
|
||||
process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_path"), "string", null),
|
||||
parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), "string", null)
|
||||
| where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND like(cmd_line, "%disabled%") AND like(cmd_line, "%config%") AND process_name="sc.exe"
|
||||
| eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null),
|
||||
ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
|
||||
body=create_map(["cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path])
|
||||
search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval _datamodels=ucast(map_get(input_event,
|
||||
"_datamodels"), "collection<string>", []), body={} | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event,
|
||||
"_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"),
|
||||
"string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"),
|
||||
"string", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_path"), "string",
|
||||
null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), "string",
|
||||
null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND like(cmd_line, "%disabled%") AND like(cmd_line,
|
||||
"%config%") AND process_name="sc.exe" | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp,
|
||||
entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event,
|
||||
"dest_device_id"), "string", null)), body=create_map(["cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name",
|
||||
process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path])
|
||||
| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
|
||||
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
|
||||
logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
|
||||
@@ -48,4 +50,4 @@ tags:
|
||||
- process_path
|
||||
- dest_user_id
|
||||
- process
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,17 +12,21 @@ description: This analytic will detect a suspicious net.exe/net1.exe command-lin
|
||||
user or deleting adversaries tracks created during its lateral movement additional
|
||||
systems. During triage, review parallel processes for additional behavior. Identify
|
||||
any other user accounts created before or after.
|
||||
search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
|
||||
| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null)),
|
||||
process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_path"), "string", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), "string", null)
|
||||
| where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND like(cmd_line, "%/delete%") AND (process_name="net1.exe" OR process_name="net.exe")
|
||||
| eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
|
||||
body=create_map(["cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path])
|
||||
| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
|
||||
how_to_implement: o successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
|
||||
logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
|
||||
endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
|
||||
Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed net.exe may be used.
|
||||
search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event,
|
||||
"_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"),
|
||||
"string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"),
|
||||
"string", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_path"), "string",
|
||||
null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), "string",
|
||||
null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND like(cmd_line, "%/delete%") AND (process_name="net1.exe"
|
||||
OR process_name="net.exe") | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event,
|
||||
"dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
|
||||
"string", null)), body=create_map(["cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name,
|
||||
"parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into
|
||||
write_ssa_detected_events();'
|
||||
how_to_implement: o successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs
|
||||
with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints.
|
||||
If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
|
||||
Tune and filter known instances where renamed net.exe may be used.
|
||||
known_false_positives: System administrators or scripts may delete user accounts via
|
||||
this technique. Filter as needed.
|
||||
references:
|
||||
@@ -47,4 +51,4 @@ tags:
|
||||
- process_path
|
||||
- dest_user_id
|
||||
- process
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -10,19 +10,24 @@ description: This analytic will identify a suspicious command-line that disables
|
||||
user account using the `net.exe` utility native to Windows. This technique may used
|
||||
by the adversaries to interrupt availability of such users to do their malicious
|
||||
act.
|
||||
search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
|
||||
| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null)),
|
||||
process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_path"), "string", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), "string", null)
|
||||
| where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND like(cmd_line, "%/active:no%") AND (process_name="net1.exe" OR process_name="net.exe")
|
||||
| eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
|
||||
body=create_map(["cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path])
|
||||
| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
|
||||
search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event,
|
||||
"_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"),
|
||||
"string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"),
|
||||
"string", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_path"), "string",
|
||||
null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), "string",
|
||||
null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND like(cmd_line, "%/active:no%") AND (process_name="net1.exe"
|
||||
OR process_name="net.exe") | eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event,
|
||||
"dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
|
||||
"string", null)), body=create_map(["cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name,
|
||||
"parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into
|
||||
write_ssa_detected_events();'
|
||||
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
|
||||
logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
|
||||
endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
|
||||
Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed net.exe/net1.exe may be
|
||||
used.
|
||||
known_false_positives: network operator may use this approach to quickly disable an account but not a common practice.
|
||||
known_false_positives: network operator may use this approach to quickly disable an
|
||||
account but not a common practice.
|
||||
references:
|
||||
- https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
@@ -45,4 +50,4 @@ tags:
|
||||
- process_path
|
||||
- dest_user_id
|
||||
- process
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,13 +12,18 @@ description: The following analytics identifies the resizing of shadowstorage by
|
||||
team. one example of ransomware that use this technique is CLOP ransomware where
|
||||
it drops a .bat file that will resize the shadowstorage to minimum size as much
|
||||
as possible
|
||||
search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events()
|
||||
| eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event, "_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"), "string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"), "string", null)),
|
||||
process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_path"), "string", null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), "string", null)
|
||||
| where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND like(cmd_line, "%resize%") AND like(cmd_line, "%shadowstorage%") AND like(cmd_line, "%maxsize%") AND process_name="vssadmin.exe"
|
||||
| eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"), "string", null)),
|
||||
body=create_map(["cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name, "parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path])
|
||||
| into write_ssa_detected_events();'
|
||||
search: '| from read_ssa_enriched_events() | eval timestamp=parse_long(ucast(map_get(input_event,
|
||||
"_time"), "string", null)), cmd_line=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process"),
|
||||
"string", null)), process_name=lower(ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_name"),
|
||||
"string", null)), process_path=ucast(map_get(input_event, "process_path"), "string",
|
||||
null), parent_process_name=ucast(map_get(input_event, "parent_process_name"), "string",
|
||||
null) | where cmd_line IS NOT NULL AND like(cmd_line, "%resize%") AND like(cmd_line,
|
||||
"%shadowstorage%") AND like(cmd_line, "%maxsize%") AND process_name="vssadmin.exe"
|
||||
| eval start_time=timestamp, end_time=timestamp, entities=mvappend(ucast(map_get(input_event,
|
||||
"dest_user_id"), "string", null), ucast(map_get(input_event, "dest_device_id"),
|
||||
"string", null)), body=create_map(["cmd_line", cmd_line, "process_name", process_name,
|
||||
"parent_process_name", parent_process_name, "process_path", process_path]) | into
|
||||
write_ssa_detected_events();'
|
||||
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
|
||||
logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your
|
||||
endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the
|
||||
@@ -47,4 +52,4 @@ tags:
|
||||
- process_path
|
||||
- dest_user_id
|
||||
- process
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
security_domain: endpoint
|
||||
|
||||
Vendored
+1
-1
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
|
||||
"id": {
|
||||
"group": null,
|
||||
"name": "DA-ESS-ContentUpdate",
|
||||
"version": "3.25.0"
|
||||
"version": "3.25.1"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"author": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-4
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
#############
|
||||
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-07-13T07:57:29 UTC
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-07-13T23:06:08 UTC
|
||||
# Author: Splunk Security Research
|
||||
# Contact: research@splunk.com
|
||||
#############
|
||||
@@ -1487,9 +1487,7 @@ support_searches = []
|
||||
data_models = ["Endpoint"]
|
||||
providing_technologies = none
|
||||
description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred.
|
||||
narrative = WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance, detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data exfiltration. \
|
||||
The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems. The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems.\
|
||||
In the event that unauthorized WMI execution occurs, it will be important for analysts and investigators to determine the context of the event. These details may provide insights related to how WMI was used and to what end.
|
||||
narrative = WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance, detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data exfiltration. The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems. The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems. In the event that unauthorized WMI execution occurs, it will be important for analysts and investigators to determine the context of the event. These details may provide insights related to how WMI was used and to what end.
|
||||
product = ['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud']
|
||||
|
||||
[Suspicious Windows Registry Activities]
|
||||
|
||||
+110
-12
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
#############
|
||||
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-07-02T15:44:59 UTC
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-07-13T23:06:08 UTC
|
||||
# Author: Splunk Security Research
|
||||
# Contact: research@splunk.com
|
||||
#############
|
||||
@@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ version = 5
|
||||
references = ["https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malware-employs-powershell-to-infect-systems/", "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via System Reflection Assembly - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Creating Thread Mutex - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadFile - Rule", "ESCU - Any Powershell DownloadString - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Empire with PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Mimikatz With PowerShell Script Block Logging - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Multiple Suspicious Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process With Obfuscation Techniques - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Domain Enumeration - Rule", "ESCU - PowerShell Loading DotNET into Memory via System Reflection Assembly - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Creating Thread Mutex - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Processing Stream Of Data - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Using memory As Backing Store - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Recon Using WMI Class - Rule", "ESCU - Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To Unrestricted or Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Unloading AMSI via Reflection - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Recon Running Process Or Services - Rule", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities and tools that come standard on the endpoint--such as PowerShell--to achieve their goals without downloading binary files. These searches can help you detect and investigate PowerShell command-line options that may be indicative of malicious intent.
|
||||
narrative = The searches in this Analytic Story monitor for parameters often used for malicious purposes. It is helpful to understand how often the notable events generated by this story occur, as well as the commonalities between some of these events. These factors may provide clues about whether this is a common occurrence of minimal concern or a rare event that may require more extensive investigation. Likewise, it is important to determine whether the issue is restricted to a single user/system or is broader in scope. \
|
||||
The following factors may assist you in determining whether the event is malicious: \
|
||||
@@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/06/28/carbon-black-threat-research-technical-analysis-petya-notpetya-ransomware/", "https://www.splunk.com/blog/2017/06/27/closing-the-detection-to-mitigation-gap-or-to-petya-or-notpetya-whocares-.html"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "David Dorsey"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Conti Common Exec parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound File Modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule", "ESCU - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Start Up During Safe Mode Boot - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule", "ESCU - BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification - Rule", "ESCU - CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass - Rule", "ESCU - Clear Unallocated Sector Using Cipher App - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Extensions - Rule", "ESCU - Common Ransomware Notes - Rule", "ESCU - Conti Common Exec parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies - Rule", "ESCU - Detect RClone Command-Line Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Detect Renamed RClone - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Command-Line Arguments - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound File Modifications - Rule", "ESCU - Detect SharpHound Usage - Rule", "ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Service Stop Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Net App - Rule", "ESCU - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule", "ESCU - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule", "ESCU - ICACLS Grant Command - Rule", "ESCU - Known Services Killed by Ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Permission Modification using Takeown App - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule", "ESCU - Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit - Rule", "ESCU - Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed - Rule", "ESCU - Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule", "ESCU - Registry Keys Used For Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - SMB Traffic Spike - Rule", "ESCU - Scheduled tasks used in BadRabbit ransomware - Rule", "ESCU - Schtasks used for forcing a reboot - Rule", "ESCU - Spike in File Writes - Rule", "ESCU - Start Up During Safe Mode Boot - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory - Rule", "ESCU - Suspicious wevtutil Usage - Rule", "ESCU - System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations - Rule", "ESCU - TOR Traffic - Rule", "ESCU - USN Journal Deletion - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - MLTK - Rule", "ESCU - Unusually Long Command Line - Rule", "ESCU - WBAdmin Delete System Backups - Rule", "ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created Within Public Path - Rule", "ESCU - WinEvent Scheduled Task Created to Spawn Shell - Rule", "ESCU - Windows Event Log Cleared - Rule", "ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint - Response Task", "ESCU - Get History Of Email Sources - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Information For Port Activity - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to ransomware--spikes in SMB traffic, suspicious wevtutil usage, the presence of common ransomware extensions, and system processes run from unexpected locations, and many others.
|
||||
narrative = Ransomware is an ever-present risk to the enterprise, wherein an infected host encrypts business-critical data, holding it hostage until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of ransomware that can affect an enterprise. Attackers can deploy ransomware to enterprises through spearphishing campaigns and driveby downloads, as well as through traditional remote service-based exploitation. In the case of the WannaCry campaign, there was self-propagating wormable functionality that was used to maximize infection. Fortunately, organizations can apply several techniques--such as those in this Analytic Story--to detect and or mitigate the effects of ransomware.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -742,7 +742,7 @@ version = 1
|
||||
references = ["https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/05/a-closer-look-at-the-darkside-ransomware-gang/", "https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/"]
|
||||
maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Teoderick Contreras"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule"]
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule", "ESCU - Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell - Rule", "ESCU - Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Modification Of Wallpaper - Rule", "ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule", "ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Common Exec Parameter - Rule", "ESCU - Revil Registry Entry - Rule", "ESCU - Wbemprox COM Object Execution - Rule"]
|
||||
description = Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities that might relate to the Revil ransomware, including looking for file writes associated with Revil, encrypting network shares, deleting shadow volume storage, registry key modification, deleting of security logs, and more.
|
||||
narrative = Revil ransomware is a RaaS,that a single group may operates and manges the development of this ransomware. It involve the use of ransomware payloads along with exfiltration of data. Malicious actors demand payment for ransome of data and threaten deletion and exposure of exfiltrated data.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1026,9 +1026,7 @@ maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred.
|
||||
narrative = WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance, detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data exfiltration. \
|
||||
The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems. The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems.\
|
||||
In the event that unauthorized WMI execution occurs, it will be important for analysts and investigators to determine the context of the event. These details may provide insights related to how WMI was used and to what end.
|
||||
narrative = WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance, detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data exfiltration. The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems. The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems. In the event that unauthorized WMI execution occurs, it will be important for analysts and investigators to determine the context of the event. These details may provide insights related to how WMI was used and to what end.
|
||||
|
||||
[analytic_story://Suspicious Windows Registry Activities]
|
||||
category = Adversary Tactics
|
||||
@@ -1557,6 +1555,16 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1087.00
|
||||
known_false_positives = admin or power user may used this series of command.
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type =
|
||||
confidence = medium
|
||||
explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious modification of firewall to allow file and printer sharing. This technique was seen in ransomware to be able to discover more machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files
|
||||
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
|
||||
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"]}
|
||||
known_false_positives = network admin may modify this firewall feature that may cause this rule to be triggered.
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - Allow Inbound Traffic By Firewall Rule Registry - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type =
|
||||
@@ -1577,6 +1585,16 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1021.00
|
||||
known_false_positives = administrator may allow inbound traffic in certain network or machine.
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - Allow Network Discovery In Firewall - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type =
|
||||
confidence = medium
|
||||
explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious modification to the firewall to allow network discovery on a machine. This technique was seen in couple of ransomware (revil, reddot) to discover other machine connected to the compromised host to encrypt more files.
|
||||
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
|
||||
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.007"]}
|
||||
known_false_positives = network admin may modify this firewall feature that may cause this rule to be triggered.
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - Allow Operation with Consent Admin - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type =
|
||||
@@ -3008,11 +3026,11 @@ providing_technologies = []
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type =
|
||||
confidence = medium
|
||||
explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.
|
||||
explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.\
|
||||
All event subscriptions have three components \
|
||||
1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID = 19 \
|
||||
1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID = 20 \
|
||||
1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID = 21 \
|
||||
1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID equals 19 \
|
||||
1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID equals 20 \
|
||||
1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID equals 21 \
|
||||
Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription.
|
||||
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with that provide WMI Event Subscription from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA and have enabled EventID 19, 20 and 21. Tune and filter known good to limit the volume.
|
||||
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.003"]}
|
||||
@@ -3167,6 +3185,26 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 3"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Installation", "Action
|
||||
known_false_positives = While legitimate, these NirSoft tools are prone to abuse. You should verfiy that the tool was used for a legitimate purpose.
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - Disable AMSI Through Registry - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type =
|
||||
confidence = medium
|
||||
explanation = this search is to identify modification in registry to disable AMSI windows feature to evade detections. This technique was seen in several ransomware, RAT and even APT to impaire defenses of the compromise machine and to be able to execute payload with minimal alert as much as possible.
|
||||
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
|
||||
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
|
||||
known_false_positives = network operator may disable this feature of windows but not so common.
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - Disable ETW Through Registry - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type =
|
||||
confidence = medium
|
||||
explanation = this search is to identify modification in registry to disable ETW windows feature to evade detections. This technique was seen in several ransomware, RAT and even APT to impaire defenses of the compromise machine and to be able to execute payload with minimal alert as much as possible.
|
||||
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
|
||||
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
|
||||
known_false_positives = network operator may disable this feature of windows but not so common.
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - Disable Logs Using WevtUtil - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type =
|
||||
@@ -3541,6 +3579,16 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1531"]}
|
||||
known_false_positives = unknown. Filter as needed. Modify the time span as needed.
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type =
|
||||
confidence = medium
|
||||
explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious excessive usage of sc.exe in a host machine. This technique was seen in several ransomware , xmrig and other malware to create, modify, delete or disable a service may related to security application or to gain privilege escalation.
|
||||
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Tune and filter known instances where renamed taskkill.exe may be used.
|
||||
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1569.002"]}
|
||||
known_false_positives = excessive execution of sc.exe is quite suspicious since it can modify or execute app in high privilege permission.
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - Excessive Usage Of Taskkill - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type =
|
||||
@@ -3601,6 +3649,16 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1036"]}
|
||||
known_false_positives = Administrators may allow creation of script or exe in the paths specified. Filter as needed.
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type =
|
||||
confidence = medium
|
||||
explanation = This analytic will identify suspicious process of cscript.exe where it tries to execute javascript using jscript.encode CLSID (COM OBJ). This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot ransomware) where it execute javascript with this com object with combination of amsi disabling technique.
|
||||
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.
|
||||
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1059.005"]}
|
||||
known_false_positives = unknown
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - Execution of File With Spaces Before Extension - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type = Endpoint
|
||||
@@ -4215,6 +4273,16 @@ annotations = {"cis20": ["CIS 7"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Delivery"], "nist": ["
|
||||
known_false_positives = None at this time
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type =
|
||||
confidence = medium
|
||||
explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious creation of msmpeng.exe or mpsvc.dll in non default windows defender folder. This technique was seen couple days ago with revil ransomware in Kaseya Supply chain. The approach is to drop an old version of msmpeng.exe to load the actual payload name as mspvc.dll which will load the revil ransomware to the compromise machine
|
||||
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node.
|
||||
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1574.002"]}
|
||||
known_false_positives = quite minimal false positive expected.
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - Multiple Archive Files Http Post Traffic - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type =
|
||||
@@ -4715,6 +4783,26 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027.00
|
||||
known_false_positives = powershell developer may used this function in their script for instance checking too.
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Disable Security Monitoring - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type =
|
||||
confidence = medium
|
||||
explanation = This search is to identifies a modification in registry to disable the windows denfender real time behavior monitoring. This event or technique is commonly seen in RAT, bot, or Trojan to disable AV to evade detections.
|
||||
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.
|
||||
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1562.001"]}
|
||||
known_false_positives = Limited false positives. However, tune based on scripts that may perform this action.
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type =
|
||||
confidence = medium
|
||||
explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious enabling of smb1protocol through "powershell.exe". This technique was seen in some ransomware (like reddot) where it enable smb share to do the lateral movement and encrypt other files within the compromise network system.
|
||||
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the powershell logs from your endpoints. make sure you enable needed registry to monitor this event.
|
||||
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1027.005"]}
|
||||
known_false_positives = network operator may enable or disable this windows feature.
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type =
|
||||
@@ -4946,6 +5034,16 @@ annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Reconnaissance"], "mitre_attack": ["T1592"
|
||||
known_false_positives = network administrator may used this command for checking purposes
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type =
|
||||
confidence = medium
|
||||
explanation = This search is to detect a suspicious commandline designed to delete files or directory recursive using batch command. This technique was seen in ransomware (reddot) where it it tries to delete the files in recycle bin to impaire user from recovering deleted files.
|
||||
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
|
||||
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1070.004"]}
|
||||
known_false_positives = network operator may use this batch command to delete recursively a directory or files within directory
|
||||
providing_technologies = []
|
||||
|
||||
[savedsearch://ESCU - Reg exe Manipulating Windows Services Registry Keys - Rule]
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type = Endpoint
|
||||
@@ -5983,7 +6081,7 @@ providing_technologies = []
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type = Endpoint
|
||||
confidence = medium
|
||||
explanation = This analytic looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.
|
||||
explanation = This analytic looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.\
|
||||
All event subscriptions have three components \
|
||||
1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID = 19 \
|
||||
1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID = 20 \
|
||||
|
||||
Vendored
+2
-2
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
||||
is_configured = false
|
||||
state = enabled
|
||||
state_change_requires_restart = false
|
||||
build = 32560
|
||||
build = 34075
|
||||
|
||||
[triggers]
|
||||
reload.analytic_stories = simple
|
||||
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ reload.content-version = simple
|
||||
|
||||
[launcher]
|
||||
author = Splunk
|
||||
version = 3.25.0
|
||||
version = 3.25.1
|
||||
description = Explore the Analytic Stories included with ES Content Updates.
|
||||
|
||||
[ui]
|
||||
|
||||
Vendored
+1
-1
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
#############
|
||||
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-07-13T07:57:29 UTC
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-07-13T23:06:08 UTC
|
||||
# Author: Splunk Security Research
|
||||
# Contact: research@splunk.com
|
||||
#############
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
|
||||
[content-version]
|
||||
version = 3.25.0
|
||||
version = 3.25.1
|
||||
|
||||
Vendored
+1
-1
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
#############
|
||||
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-07-13T07:57:29 UTC
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-07-13T23:06:08 UTC
|
||||
# Author: Splunk Security Research
|
||||
# Contact: research@splunk.com
|
||||
#############
|
||||
|
||||
Vendored
+22
-7
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
#############
|
||||
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-07-13T07:57:29 UTC
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-07-13T23:06:08 UTC
|
||||
# Author: Splunk Security Research
|
||||
# Contact: research@splunk.com
|
||||
#############
|
||||
@@ -7323,10 +7323,20 @@ search = | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.proces
|
||||
[ESCU - Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence - Rule]
|
||||
action.escu = 0
|
||||
action.escu.enabled = 1
|
||||
description = The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions. All event subscriptions have three components 1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID = 19 1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID = 20 1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID = 21 Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription.
|
||||
description = The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.\
|
||||
All event subscriptions have three components \
|
||||
1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID equals 19 \
|
||||
1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID equals 20 \
|
||||
1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID equals 21 \
|
||||
Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription.
|
||||
action.escu.mappings = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.003"]}
|
||||
action.escu.data_models = []
|
||||
action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions. All event subscriptions have three components 1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID = 19 1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID = 20 1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID = 21 Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription.
|
||||
action.escu.eli5 = The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.\
|
||||
All event subscriptions have three components \
|
||||
1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID equals 19 \
|
||||
1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID equals 20 \
|
||||
1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID equals 21 \
|
||||
Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription.
|
||||
action.escu.how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with that provide WMI Event Subscription from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA and have enabled EventID 19, 20 and 21. Tune and filter known good to limit the volume.
|
||||
action.escu.known_false_positives = It is possible some applications will create a consumer and may be required to be filtered. For tuning, add any additional LOLBin's for further depth of coverage.
|
||||
action.escu.creation_date = 2021-06-16
|
||||
@@ -7345,7 +7355,12 @@ action.correlationsearch.label = ESCU - Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistenc
|
||||
action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.003"]}
|
||||
schedule_window = auto
|
||||
action.notable = 1
|
||||
action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions. All event subscriptions have three components 1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID = 19 1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID = 20 1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID = 21 Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription.
|
||||
action.notable.param.rule_description = The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.\
|
||||
All event subscriptions have three components \
|
||||
1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID equals 19 \
|
||||
1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID equals 20 \
|
||||
1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID equals 21 \
|
||||
Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription.
|
||||
action.notable.param.rule_title = Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence
|
||||
action.notable.param.security_domain = endpoint
|
||||
action.notable.param.severity = high
|
||||
@@ -19707,7 +19722,7 @@ search = `wmi` EventCode=5861 Binding | rex field=Message "Consumer =\s+(?<consu
|
||||
[ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule]
|
||||
action.escu = 0
|
||||
action.escu.enabled = 1
|
||||
description = This analytic looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.
|
||||
description = This analytic looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.\
|
||||
All event subscriptions have three components \
|
||||
1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID = 19 \
|
||||
1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID = 20 \
|
||||
@@ -19715,7 +19730,7 @@ All event subscriptions have three components \
|
||||
Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription.
|
||||
action.escu.mappings = {"cis20": ["CIS 3", "CIS 5"], "kill_chain_phases": ["Actions on Objectives"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.003"], "nist": ["PR.PT", "PR.AT", "PR.AC", "PR.IP"]}
|
||||
action.escu.data_models = []
|
||||
action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.
|
||||
action.escu.eli5 = This analytic looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.\
|
||||
All event subscriptions have three components \
|
||||
1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID = 19 \
|
||||
1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID = 20 \
|
||||
@@ -19740,7 +19755,7 @@ action.correlationsearch.annotations = {"analytic_story": ["Suspicious WMI Use"]
|
||||
schedule_window = auto
|
||||
action.notable = 1
|
||||
action.notable.param.nes_fields = ['dest']
|
||||
action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.
|
||||
action.notable.param.rule_description = This analytic looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.\
|
||||
All event subscriptions have three components \
|
||||
1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID = 19 \
|
||||
1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID = 20 \
|
||||
|
||||
Vendored
+1
-1
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
#############
|
||||
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-07-13T07:57:29 UTC
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-07-13T23:06:08 UTC
|
||||
# Author: Splunk Security Research
|
||||
# Contact: research@splunk.com
|
||||
#############
|
||||
|
||||
+9
-6
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
#############
|
||||
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-07-13T07:57:29 UTC
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-07-13T23:06:08 UTC
|
||||
# Author: Splunk Security Research
|
||||
# Contact: research@splunk.com
|
||||
#############
|
||||
@@ -1026,9 +1026,7 @@ maintainers = [{"company": "Splunk", "email": "-", "name": "Rico Valdez"}]
|
||||
spec_version = 3
|
||||
searches = ["ESCU - Detect WMI Event Subscription Persistence - Rule", "ESCU - Process Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote Process Instantiation via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - Remote WMI Command Attempt - Rule", "ESCU - Script Execution via WMI - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Permanent Event Subscription - Sysmon - Rule", "ESCU - WMI Temporary Event Subscription - Rule", "ESCU - Get Notable History - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Parent Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Process Info - Response Task", "ESCU - Get Sysmon WMI Activity for Host - Response Task"]
|
||||
description = Attackers are increasingly abusing Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), a framework and associated utilities available on all modern Windows operating systems. Because WMI can be leveraged to manage both local and remote systems, it is important to identify the processes executed and the user context within which the activity occurred.
|
||||
narrative = WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance, detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data exfiltration. \
|
||||
The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems. The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems.\
|
||||
In the event that unauthorized WMI execution occurs, it will be important for analysts and investigators to determine the context of the event. These details may provide insights related to how WMI was used and to what end.
|
||||
narrative = WMI is a Microsoft infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows operating systems. It includes of a set of utilities that can be leveraged to manage both local and remote Windows systems. Attackers are increasingly turning to WMI abuse in their efforts to conduct nefarious tasks, such as reconnaissance, detection of antivirus and virtual machines, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data exfiltration. The detection searches included in this Analytic Story are used to look for suspicious use of WMI commands that attackers may leverage to interact with remote systems. The searches specifically look for the use of WMI to run processes on remote systems. In the event that unauthorized WMI execution occurs, it will be important for analysts and investigators to determine the context of the event. These details may provide insights related to how WMI was used and to what end.
|
||||
|
||||
[analytic_story://Suspicious Windows Registry Activities]
|
||||
category = Adversary Tactics
|
||||
@@ -3028,7 +3026,12 @@ providing_technologies = []
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type =
|
||||
confidence = medium
|
||||
explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions. All event subscriptions have three components 1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID = 19 1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID = 20 1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID = 21 Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription.
|
||||
explanation = The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.\
|
||||
All event subscriptions have three components \
|
||||
1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID equals 19 \
|
||||
1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID equals 20 \
|
||||
1. Binding - Registers a filter to a consumer. EventID equals 21 \
|
||||
Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding. It may be pertinent to review all 3 to identify the flow of execution. In addition, EventCode 4104 may assist with any other PowerShell script usage that registered the subscription.
|
||||
how_to_implement = To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with that provide WMI Event Subscription from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA and have enabled EventID 19, 20 and 21. Tune and filter known good to limit the volume.
|
||||
annotations = {"kill_chain_phases": ["Exploitation"], "mitre_attack": ["T1546.003"]}
|
||||
known_false_positives = It is possible some applications will create a consumer and may be required to be filtered. For tuning, add any additional LOLBin's for further depth of coverage.
|
||||
@@ -6078,7 +6081,7 @@ providing_technologies = []
|
||||
type = detection
|
||||
asset_type = Endpoint
|
||||
confidence = medium
|
||||
explanation = This analytic looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.
|
||||
explanation = This analytic looks for the creation of WMI permanent event subscriptions. The following analytic identifies the use of WMI Event Subscription to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. This analytic is restricted by commonly added process execution and a path. If the volume is low enough, remove the values and flag on any new subscriptions.\
|
||||
All event subscriptions have three components \
|
||||
1. Filter - WQL Query for the events we want. EventID = 19 \
|
||||
1. Consumer - An action to take upon triggering the filter. EventID = 20 \
|
||||
|
||||
+208
-332
@@ -1,182 +1,59 @@
|
||||
mitre_id,technique,tactics,groups
|
||||
T1553.006,Code Signing Policy Modification,Defense Evasion,Turla|APT39
|
||||
T1614,System Location Discovery,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1613,Container and Resource Discovery,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1552.007,Container API,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1612,Build Image on Host,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1611,Escape to Host,Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1204.003,Malicious Image,Execution,no
|
||||
T1053.007,Container Orchestration Job,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1610,Deploy Container,Defense Evasion|Execution,no
|
||||
T1609,Container Administration Command,Execution,no
|
||||
T1608.005,Link Target,Resource Development,Silent Librarian
|
||||
T1608.004,Drive-by Target,Resource Development,APT32|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1608.003,Install Digital Certificate,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1608.002,Upload Tool,Resource Development,Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1608.001,Upload Malware,Resource Development,APT32
|
||||
T1608,Stage Capabilities,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1016.001,Internet Connection Discovery,Discovery,APT29|UNC2452|Turla
|
||||
T1553.005,Mark-of-the-Web Bypass,Defense Evasion,TA505
|
||||
T1555.005,Password Managers,Credential Access,Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao
|
||||
T1484.002,Domain Trust Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT29|UNC2452
|
||||
T1484.001,Group Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Indrik Spider
|
||||
T1547.014,Active Setup,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1606.002,SAML Tokens,Credential Access,APT29|UNC2452
|
||||
T1606.001,Web Cookies,Credential Access,APT29|UNC2452
|
||||
T1606,Forge Web Credentials,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1555.004,Windows Credential Manager,Credential Access,Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Turla
|
||||
T1059.008,Network Device CLI,Execution,no
|
||||
T1602.002,Network Device Configuration Dump,Collection,no
|
||||
T1542.005,TFTP Boot,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1542.004,ROMMONkit,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1602.001,SNMP (MIB Dump),Collection,no
|
||||
T1602,Data from Configuration Repository,Collection,no
|
||||
T1601.002,Downgrade System Image,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1601.001,Patch System Image,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1601,Modify System Image,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1600.002,Disable Crypto Hardware,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1600.001,Reduce Key Space,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1600,Weaken Encryption,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1556.004,Network Device Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1599.001,Network Address Translation Traversal,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1599,Network Boundary Bridging,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1020.001,Traffic Duplication,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1557.002,ARP Cache Poisoning,Credential Access|Collection,Cleaver
|
||||
T1588.006,Vulnerabilities,Resource Development,Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1053.006,Systemd Timers,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1562.008,Disable Cloud Logs,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1547.012,Print Processors,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1598.003,Spearphishing Link,Reconnaissance,Silent Librarian|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|APT32|Kimsuky
|
||||
T1598.002,Spearphishing Attachment,Reconnaissance,Sidewinder
|
||||
T1598.001,Spearphishing Service,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1598,Phishing for Information,Reconnaissance,ZIRCONIUM|APT28
|
||||
T1597.002,Purchase Technical Data,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1597.001,Threat Intel Vendors,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1597,Search Closed Sources,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1596.005,Scan Databases,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1596.004,CDNs,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1596.003,Digital Certificates,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1596.001,DNS/Passive DNS,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1596.002,WHOIS,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1596,Search Open Technical Databases,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1595.002,Vulnerability Scanning,Reconnaissance,Volatile Cedar|APT28|Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1595.001,Scanning IP Blocks,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1595,Active Scanning,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1594,Search Victim-Owned Websites,Reconnaissance,Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1593.002,Search Engines,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1593.001,Social Media,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1593,Search Open Websites/Domains,Reconnaissance,Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1592.004,Client Configurations,Reconnaissance,HAFNIUM
|
||||
T1592.003,Firmware,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1592.002,Software,Reconnaissance,Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1592.001,Hardware,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1592,Gather Victim Host Information,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1591.004,Identify Roles,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1591.003,Identify Business Tempo,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1591.001,Determine Physical Locations,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1591.002,Business Relationships,Reconnaissance,Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1591,Gather Victim Org Information,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1590.006,Network Security Appliances,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1590.005,IP Addresses,Reconnaissance,HAFNIUM
|
||||
T1590.004,Network Topology,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1590.003,Network Trust Dependencies,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1590.002,DNS,Reconnaissance,no
|
||||
T1590.001,Domain Properties,Reconnaissance,Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1590,Gather Victim Network Information,Reconnaissance,HAFNIUM
|
||||
T1589.003,Employee Names,Reconnaissance,Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1589.002,Email Addresses,Reconnaissance,TA551|MuddyWater|HAFNIUM|APT32|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1589.001,Credentials,Reconnaissance,APT28|Magic Hound|Chimera
|
||||
T1589,Gather Victim Identity Information,Reconnaissance,APT32
|
||||
T1588.005,Exploits,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1588.004,Digital Certificates,Resource Development,Lazarus Group|Silent Librarian
|
||||
T1588.003,Code Signing Certificates,Resource Development,Wizard Spider
|
||||
T1588.002,Tool,Resource Development,MuddyWater|Silent Librarian|GALLIUM|Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1588.001,Malware,Resource Development,Turla|APT1
|
||||
T1588,Obtain Capabilities,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1587.004,Exploits,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1587.003,Digital Certificates,Resource Development,APT29|PROMETHIUM
|
||||
T1587.002,Code Signing Certificates,Resource Development,PROMETHIUM|Patchwork
|
||||
T1587.001,Malware,Resource Development,APT29|Lazarus Group|UNC2452|Sandworm Team|Turla|FIN7|Night Dragon|Cleaver
|
||||
T1587,Develop Capabilities,Resource Development,Kimsuky
|
||||
T1586.002,Email Accounts,Resource Development,Magic Hound|Kimsuky
|
||||
T1586.001,Social Media Accounts,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1586,Compromise Accounts,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1585.002,Email Accounts,Resource Development,Magic Hound|Silent Librarian|Sandworm Team|APT1
|
||||
T1585.001,Social Media Accounts,Resource Development,Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|APT32|Cleaver
|
||||
T1585,Establish Accounts,Resource Development,Fox Kitten|APT17
|
||||
T1584.006,Web Services,Resource Development,Turla
|
||||
T1584.005,Botnet,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1584.004,Server,Resource Development,Indrik Spider|Turla|APT16
|
||||
T1584.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,Turla
|
||||
T1584.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1584.001,Domains,Resource Development,APT29|UNC2452|APT1
|
||||
T1583.006,Web Services,Resource Development,ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|HAFNIUM|Lazarus Group|Turla|APT32|APT17|APT29
|
||||
T1583.005,Botnet,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1583.004,Server,Resource Development,GALLIUM|Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1583.003,Virtual Private Server,Resource Development,HAFNIUM|TEMP.Veles
|
||||
T1583.002,DNS Server,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1584,Compromise Infrastructure,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1583.001,Domains,Resource Development,APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|UNC2452|Lazarus Group|Silent Librarian|menuPass|Sandworm Team|APT32|Kimsuky|APT1|APT28
|
||||
T1583,Acquire Infrastructure,Resource Development,no
|
||||
T1564.007,VBA Stomping,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1558.004,AS-REP Roasting,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1580,Cloud Infrastructure Discovery,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1218.012,Verclsid,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1205.001,Port Knocking,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,PROMETHIUM
|
||||
T1205.001,Port Knocking,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no
|
||||
T1564.006,Run Virtual Instance,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1564.005,Hidden File System,Defense Evasion,Strider|Equation
|
||||
T1556.003,Pluggable Authentication Modules,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1556.003,Pluggable Authentication Modules,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1574.012,COR_PROFILER,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Blue Mockingbird
|
||||
T1562.007,Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1098.004,SSH Authorized Keys,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1480.001,Environmental Keying,Defense Evasion,APT41|Equation
|
||||
T1059.007,JavaScript,Execution,MuddyWater|Turla|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Kimsuky|FIN6|APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer
|
||||
T1059.007,JavaScript/JScript,Execution,APT32|FIN7|Cobalt Group|Molerats|TA505|Silence|Leafminer
|
||||
T1578.004,Revert Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1578.003,Delete Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1578.001,Create Snapshot,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1578.002,Create Cloud Instance,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1127.001,MSBuild,Defense Evasion,Frankenstein
|
||||
T1027.005,Indicator Removal from Tools,Defense Evasion,Operation Wocao|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|APT3|Turla|OilRig|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1027.005,Indicator Removal from Tools,Defense Evasion,Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|APT3|Turla|OilRig|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1562.006,Indicator Blocking,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1573.002,Asymmetric Cryptography,Command And Control,Operation Wocao|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|OilRig|FIN8|FIN6
|
||||
T1573.001,Symmetric Cryptography,Command And Control,Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|APT33|BRONZE BUTLER|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1573.002,Asymmetric Cryptography,Command And Control,Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|OilRig|FIN8|FIN6
|
||||
T1573.001,Symmetric Cryptography,Command And Control,Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|APT33|BRONZE BUTLER|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1573,Encrypted Channel,Command And Control,Tropic Trooper
|
||||
T1027.004,Compile After Delivery,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|MuddyWater
|
||||
T1574.004,Dylib Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1546.015,Component Object Model Hijacking,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT28
|
||||
T1071.004,DNS,Command And Control,Chimera|APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7
|
||||
T1071.003,Mail Protocols,Command And Control,Turla|Kimsuky|APT32|SilverTerrier|APT28
|
||||
T1071.002,File Transfer Protocols,Command And Control,Kimsuky|APT41|SilverTerrier|Honeybee
|
||||
T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|UNC2452|Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|APT19|Cobalt Group|Rancor|Orangeworm|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Turla|APT37|Dark Caracal|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Magic Hound|OilRig|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
|
||||
T1572,Protocol Tunneling,Command And Control,Chimera|Fox Kitten|OilRig|Cobalt Group|FIN6
|
||||
T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,Wizard Spider|FIN6|APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1048.002,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,APT29|UNC2452
|
||||
T1071.004,DNS,Command And Control,APT39|Tropic Trooper|OilRig|Ke3chang|Cobalt Group|APT18|APT41|FIN7
|
||||
T1071.003,Mail Protocols,Command And Control,APT32|SilverTerrier|APT28
|
||||
T1071.002,File Transfer Protocols,Command And Control,APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|Honeybee
|
||||
T1071.001,Web Protocols,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|TA505|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Inception|APT41|SilverTerrier|Machete|APT28|WIRTE|APT33|FIN4|Night Dragon|APT18|APT38|Cobalt Group|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Rancor|Orangeworm|APT37|Ke3chang|Dark Caracal|Turla|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|OilRig|Magic Hound|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon
|
||||
T1572,Protocol Tunneling,Command And Control,OilRig|Cobalt Group|FIN6
|
||||
T1048.003,Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,APT32|APT33|Thrip|FIN8|OilRig|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1048.002,Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1048.001,Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1001.003,Protocol Impersonation,Command And Control,Higaisa|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1001.002,Steganography,Command And Control,APT29|Axiom
|
||||
T1001.003,Protocol Impersonation,Command And Control,Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1001.002,Steganography,Command And Control,Axiom
|
||||
T1001.001,Junk Data,Command And Control,APT28
|
||||
T1132.002,Non-Standard Encoding,Command And Control,no
|
||||
T1132.001,Standard Encoding,Command And Control,HAFNIUM|TA551|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT33|APT19|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork
|
||||
T1132.001,Standard Encoding,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT33|APT19|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork
|
||||
T1090.004,Domain Fronting,Command And Control,APT29
|
||||
T1090.003,Multi-hop Proxy,Command And Control,APT28|Operation Wocao|Inception|FIN4|APT29
|
||||
T1090.002,External Proxy,Command And Control,APT39|Silence|GALLIUM|MuddyWater|APT3|FIN5|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT28
|
||||
T1090.001,Internal Proxy,Command And Control,APT29|Higaisa|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|APT39|Strider
|
||||
T1090.003,Multi-hop Proxy,Command And Control,Inception|FIN4|APT29
|
||||
T1090.002,External Proxy,Command And Control,APT39|Silence|Soft Cell|MuddyWater|APT3|FIN5|Lazarus Group|menuPass|APT28
|
||||
T1090.001,Internal Proxy,Command And Control,APT39|Strider
|
||||
T1102.003,One-Way Communication,Command And Control,Leviathan
|
||||
T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|APT28|APT29|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|FIN7|Turla|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
|
||||
T1102.002,Bidirectional Communication,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|APT39|APT12|Turla|FIN7|APT37|Magic Hound|Carbanak
|
||||
T1102.001,Dead Drop Resolver,Command And Control,Rocke|APT41|BRONZE BUTLER|RTM|Patchwork
|
||||
T1571,Non-Standard Port,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Rocke|DarkVishnya|Silence|APT-C-36|Magic Hound|APT33|APT32|TEMP.Veles|Lazarus Group|FIN7
|
||||
T1074.002,Remote Data Staging,Collection,APT29|Chimera|UNC2452|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8
|
||||
T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|Kimsuky|APT39|Operation Wocao|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Honeybee|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
|
||||
T1074.002,Remote Data Staging,Collection,Threat Group-3390|menuPass|FIN6|Night Dragon|FIN8
|
||||
T1074.001,Local Data Staging,Collection,Machete|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Patchwork|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|Leviathan|APT3|FIN5|menuPass|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
|
||||
T1078.004,Cloud Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,APT33
|
||||
T1564.004,NTFS File Attributes,Defense Evasion,APT32
|
||||
T1564.003,Hidden Window,Defense Evasion,Higaisa|Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound
|
||||
T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,HAFNIUM|Turla|Operation Wocao|PROMETHIUM|Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32
|
||||
T1078.002,Domain Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Indrik Spider|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT29|TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314
|
||||
T1564.003,Hidden Window,Defense Evasion,Gorgon Group|Deep Panda|DarkHydrus|CopyKittens|APT19|APT32|APT28|APT3|Magic Hound
|
||||
T1078.003,Local Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Tropic Trooper|FIN10|Stolen Pencil|APT32
|
||||
T1078.002,Domain Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,TA505|APT3|Threat Group-1314
|
||||
T1078.001,Default Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,no
|
||||
T1564.002,Hidden Users,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1574.006,Dynamic Linker Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,APT41|Rocke
|
||||
T1574.002,DLL Side-Loading,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|Higaisa|BlackTech|Sidewinder|Chimera|BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|APT19|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1574.001,DLL Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Evilnum|APT41|Whitefly|RTM|Threat Group-3390|menuPass
|
||||
T1574.006,LD_PRELOAD,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Rocke
|
||||
T1574.002,DLL Side-Loading,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|Naikon|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|APT19|APT32|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1574.001,DLL Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Whitefly|RTM|Threat Group-3390|menuPass
|
||||
T1574.008,Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1574.007,Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1574.009,Path Interception by Unquoted Path,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
@@ -184,174 +61,174 @@ T1574.011,Services Registry Permissions Weakness,Persistence|Privilege Escalatio
|
||||
T1574.005,Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1574.010,Services File Permissions Weakness,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1574,Hijack Execution Flow,Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1069.001,Local Groups,Discovery,Chimera|Operation Wocao|Turla|OilRig|admin@338
|
||||
T1570,Lateral Tool Transfer,Lateral Movement,Chimera|GALLIUM|Operation Wocao|APT32|Wizard Spider|Turla|FIN10
|
||||
T1069.001,Local Groups,Discovery,Turla|OilRig|admin@338
|
||||
T1570,Lateral Tool Transfer,Lateral Movement,APT32|Wizard Spider|Turla|FIN10
|
||||
T1568.003,DNS Calculation,Command And Control,APT12
|
||||
T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Kimsuky|FIN6|PROMETHIUM|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Patchwork|MuddyWater|DarkHydrus|OilRig|APT32|Rancor|Lazarus Group|APT29|APT28|APT37|FIN8|Elderwood|menuPass|PLATINUM|TA459|Leviathan
|
||||
T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,APT28|APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|APT33|Turla
|
||||
T1204.002,Malicious File,Execution,Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|RTM|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|Machete|admin@338|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Gorgon Group|Patchwork|OilRig|Dark Caracal|MuddyWater|Lazarus Group|FIN7|APT32|Rancor|APT37|FIN8|APT28|Elderwood|TA459|APT29|Leviathan|menuPass|PLATINUM
|
||||
T1204.001,Malicious Link,Execution,Patchwork|Windshift|APT32|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|TA505|OilRig|Machete|Leviathan|FIN8|FIN4|Elderwood|Dragonfly 2.0|Cobalt Group|APT39|Night Dragon|APT33|Turla
|
||||
T1195.003,Compromise Hardware Supply Chain,Initial Access,no
|
||||
T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,APT29|UNC2452|Cobalt Group|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly|Sandworm Team|APT41
|
||||
T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,Initial Access,Sandworm Team|APT41
|
||||
T1195.001,Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools,Initial Access,no
|
||||
T1568.001,Fast Flux DNS,Command And Control,menuPass|TA505
|
||||
T1052.001,Exfiltration over USB,Exfiltration,Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper
|
||||
T1569.002,Service Execution,Execution,Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT41|Silence|FIN6|APT32|Honeybee|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1568.001,Fast Flux DNS,Command And Control,TA505
|
||||
T1052.001,Exfiltration over USB,Exfiltration,Tropic Trooper
|
||||
T1569.002,Service Execution,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT41|Silence|FIN6|APT32|Honeybee|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1569.001,Launchctl,Execution,no
|
||||
T1569,System Services,Execution,no
|
||||
T1568.002,Domain Generation Algorithms,Command And Control,TA551|APT41
|
||||
T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,APT29|UNC2452
|
||||
T1568.002,Domain Generation Algorithms,Command And Control,APT41
|
||||
T1568,Dynamic Resolution,Command And Control,no
|
||||
T1011.001,Exfiltration Over Bluetooth,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1567.002,Exfiltration to Cloud Storage,Exfiltration,ZIRCONIUM|HAFNIUM|Chimera|Leviathan|Turla
|
||||
T1567.002,Exfiltration to Cloud Storage,Exfiltration,Leviathan|Turla
|
||||
T1567.001,Exfiltration to Code Repository,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1059.006,Python,Execution,ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Turla|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|APT29|Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete
|
||||
T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT39|Machete|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound
|
||||
T1059.006,Python,Execution,Rocke|BRONZE BUTLER|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Machete
|
||||
T1059.005,Visual Basic,Execution,APT33|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|Rancor|Patchwork|MuddyWater|Honeybee|FIN7|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|Turla|TA505|Silence|WIRTE|FIN4|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|Magic Hound
|
||||
T1059.004,Unix Shell,Execution,Rocke|APT41
|
||||
T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Higaisa|Indrik Spider|Chimera|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Machete|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|FIN6|TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Silence|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Gorgon Group|Dark Caracal|Rancor|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|APT37|FIN8|APT28|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN10|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Suckfly|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
|
||||
T1059.003,Windows Command Shell,Execution,TA505|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|OilRig|Lazarus Group|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Silence|APT32|APT39|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Dark Caracal|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Rancor|Ke3chang|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|APT28|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gamaredon Group|Suckfly|Patchwork|Threat Group-1314|APT3|admin@338|APT1
|
||||
T1059.002,AppleScript,Execution,no
|
||||
T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Mustang Panda|Indrik Spider|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Lazarus Group|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|APT28|Thrip|Cobalt Group|DarkHydrus|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|TA459|MuddyWater|FIN8|Magic Hound|CopyKittens|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|APT32|FIN7|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1567,Exfiltration Over Web Service,Exfiltration,APT28
|
||||
T1059.001,PowerShell,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|DarkVishnya|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Inception|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|TEMP.Veles|APT33|Gallmaker|Turla|APT19|DarkHydrus|APT28|Thrip|Gorgon Group|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|TA459|FIN8|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT32|FIN7|FIN10|Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Poseidon Group|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1567,Exfiltration Over Web Service,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1497.003,Time Based Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no
|
||||
T1497.002,User Activity Based Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Darkhotel|FIN7
|
||||
T1497.001,System Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Darkhotel|Evilnum|Frankenstein
|
||||
T1497.002,User Activity Based Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,FIN7
|
||||
T1497.001,System Checks,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Frankenstein
|
||||
T1498.002,Reflection Amplification,Impact,no
|
||||
T1498.001,Direct Network Flood,Impact,no
|
||||
T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,Ajax Security Team|Lazarus Group|Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal
|
||||
T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|MuddyWater|Sidewinder|Evilnum|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|APT1|Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|Cobalt Group|Turla|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|APT33|APT29|Leviathan|Elderwood|FIN8|Patchwork|Magic Hound
|
||||
T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT1|FIN6|APT30|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|Gorgon Group|Rancor|DarkHydrus|Cobalt Group|FIN7|APT19|Lazarus Group|OilRig|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|Dragonfly 2.0|MuddyWater|APT28|FIN8|TA459|Elderwood|APT29|Leviathan|Patchwork|APT37|menuPass|PLATINUM
|
||||
T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Dragonfly
|
||||
T1566.003,Spearphishing via Service,Initial Access,Magic Hound|Windshift|FIN6|OilRig|Dark Caracal
|
||||
T1566.002,Spearphishing Link,Initial Access,Windshift|Molerats|Mofang|BlackTech|Machete|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|APT39|FIN4|APT32|Night Dragon|Turla|APT28|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|APT33|Elderwood|Leviathan|Magic Hound|Patchwork|APT29|FIN8
|
||||
T1566.001,Spearphishing Attachment,Initial Access,Magic Hound|Windshift|APT33|Sandworm Team|Naikon|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Mofang|Wizard Spider|RTM|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|admin@338|Kimsuky|APT12|TA505|Silence|The White Company|APT39|FIN4|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|Tropic Trooper|Turla|Gorgon Group|Rancor|DarkHydrus|Cobalt Group|FIN7|OilRig|Lazarus Group|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|APT32|FIN8|MuddyWater|APT28|TA459|Leviathan|Patchwork|PLATINUM|Elderwood|APT29|APT37|menuPass
|
||||
T1566,Phishing,Initial Access,no
|
||||
T1565.003,Runtime Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
|
||||
T1565.002,Transmitted Data Manipulation,Impact,APT38
|
||||
T1565.001,Stored Data Manipulation,Impact,FIN4|APT38
|
||||
T1565,Data Manipulation,Impact,no
|
||||
T1564.001,Hidden Files and Directories,Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|Rocke|APT32|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|APT28
|
||||
T1564.001,Hidden Files and Directories,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT32|Tropic Trooper|APT28|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1564,Hide Artifacts,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1563.002,RDP Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1563.001,SSH Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1563,Remote Service Session Hijacking,Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1518.001,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,Windshift|Sidewinder|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon
|
||||
T1518.001,Security Software Discovery,Discovery,Turla|Rocke|Frankenstein|The White Company|Cobalt Group|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|Tropic Trooper|FIN8|Patchwork|Naikon
|
||||
T1069.003,Cloud Groups,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1069.002,Domain Groups,Discovery,Turla|Inception|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1069.002,Domain Groups,Discovery,Turla|Wizard Spider|Inception|OilRig|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1087.004,Cloud Account,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1087.003,Email Account,Discovery,Sandworm Team|TA505
|
||||
T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,MuddyWater|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1087.001,Local Account,Discovery,Chimera|Fox Kitten|Turla|Poseidon Group|OilRig|Ke3chang|APT32|APT1|Threat Group-3390|APT3|admin@338
|
||||
T1087.002,Domain Account,Discovery,Turla|Sandworm Team|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Poseidon Group|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1087.001,Local Account,Discovery,Turla|Poseidon Group|OilRig|Ke3chang|APT32|APT1|Threat Group-3390|APT3|admin@338
|
||||
T1553.004,Install Root Certificate,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak
|
||||
T1562.003,Impair Command History Logging,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1562.002,Disable Windows Event Logging,Defense Evasion,APT29|UNC2452|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,APT29|MuddyWater|UNC2452|Wizard Spider|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
|
||||
T1562.004,Disable or Modify System Firewall,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|Dragonfly 2.0|Carbanak
|
||||
T1562.003,HISTCONTROL,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1562.002,Disable Windows Event Logging,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Rocke|Kimsuky|Turla|Night Dragon|Gorgon Group|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
|
||||
T1562,Impair Defenses,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1003.004,LSA Secrets,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|menuPass|Leafminer|Ke3chang|Dragonfly 2.0|APT33|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1003.005,Cached Domain Credentials,Credential Access,OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33
|
||||
T1561.002,Disk Structure Wipe,Impact,Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38|APT37
|
||||
T1561.001,Disk Content Wipe,Impact,Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1561,Disk Wipe,Impact,no
|
||||
T1560.003,Archive via Custom Method,Collection,Mustang Panda|Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|CopyKittens|FIN6
|
||||
T1560.003,Archive via Custom Method,Collection,Lazarus Group|Kimsuky|CopyKittens|FIN6
|
||||
T1560.002,Archive via Library,Collection,Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,APT29|Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|Sowbug|APT3|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1560.001,Archive via Utility,Collection,APT41|Soft Cell|Turla|Gallmaker|APT33|APT39|MuddyWater|Magic Hound|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|CopyKittens|APT3|Sowbug|menuPass|APT1|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1560,Archive Collected Data,Collection,menuPass|APT32|Honeybee|Patchwork|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1499.004,Application or System Exploitation,Impact,no
|
||||
T1499.003,Application Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
|
||||
T1499.002,Service Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
|
||||
T1499.001,OS Exhaustion Flood,Impact,no
|
||||
T1491.002,External Defacement,Impact,Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1491.002,External Defacement,Impact,no
|
||||
T1491.001,Internal Defacement,Impact,Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1114.003,Email Forwarding Rule,Collection,Silent Librarian|Kimsuky
|
||||
T1114.002,Remote Email Collection,Collection,APT29|HAFNIUM|Chimera|UNC2452|APT1|FIN4|Dragonfly 2.0|APT28|Leafminer|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1114.001,Local Email Collection,Collection,Chimera|Magic Hound|APT1
|
||||
T1114.003,Email Forwarding Rule,Collection,no
|
||||
T1114.002,Remote Email Collection,Collection,APT1|FIN4|APT28|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|Leafminer
|
||||
T1114.001,Local Email Collection,Collection,Magic Hound|APT1
|
||||
T1134.005,SID-History Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1134.004,Parent PID Spoofing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1134.003,Make and Impersonate Token,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1134.002,Create Process with Token,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Turla|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1134.001,Token Impersonation/Theft,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT28
|
||||
T1213.002,Sharepoint,Collection,Chimera|Ke3chang|APT28
|
||||
T1213.002,Sharepoint,Collection,Ke3chang|APT28
|
||||
T1213.001,Confluence,Collection,no
|
||||
T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,Ajax Security Team|ZIRCONIUM|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats
|
||||
T1555.003,Credentials from Web Browsers,Credential Access,Magic Hound|Sandworm Team|Inception|Stealth Falcon|OilRig|Leafminer|APT33|APT3|Kimsuky|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT37|Patchwork|Molerats
|
||||
T1555.002,Securityd Memory,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1555.001,Keychain,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Sidewinder|Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|APT28|FIN7
|
||||
T1559.002,Dynamic Data Exchange,Execution,Sharpshooter|TA505|MuddyWater|Gallmaker|Patchwork|Cobalt Group|APT37|APT28|FIN7
|
||||
T1559.001,Component Object Model,Execution,Gamaredon Group|MuddyWater
|
||||
T1559,Inter-Process Communication,Execution,no
|
||||
T1558.002,Silver Ticket,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1558.001,Golden Ticket,Credential Access,Ke3chang
|
||||
T1558,Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1557.001,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,Credential Access|Collection,Wizard Spider
|
||||
T1557,Man-in-the-Middle,Credential Access|Collection,Kimsuky
|
||||
T1556.002,Password Filter DLL,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence,Strider
|
||||
T1556.001,Domain Controller Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence,Chimera
|
||||
T1556,Modify Authentication Process,Credential Access|Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1557.001,LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay,Credential Access|Collection,no
|
||||
T1557,Man-in-the-Middle,Credential Access|Collection,no
|
||||
T1556.002,Password Filter DLL,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,Strider
|
||||
T1556.001,Domain Controller Authentication,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1556,Modify Authentication Process,Credential Access|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1056.004,Credential API Hooking,Collection|Credential Access,PLATINUM
|
||||
T1056.003,Web Portal Capture,Collection|Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1056.002,GUI Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,FIN4
|
||||
T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,Ajax Security Team|Operation Wocao|APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|OilRig|Ke3chang|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28
|
||||
T1555,Credentials from Password Stores,Credential Access,APT29|Evilnum|UNC2452|FIN6|APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Stealth Falcon
|
||||
T1056.001,Keylogging,Collection|Credential Access,APT32|Sandworm Team|APT39|APT41|Kimsuky|menuPass|Stolen Pencil|FIN4|APT38|Ke3chang|OilRig|PLATINUM|Sowbug|Magic Hound|Group5|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Darkhotel|APT28
|
||||
T1555,Credentials from Password Stores,Credential Access,APT39|OilRig|MuddyWater|Leafminer|APT33|Turla|Stealth Falcon
|
||||
T1552.005,Cloud Instance Metadata API,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1003.008,/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1003.007,Proc Filesystem,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1003.006,DCSync,Credential Access,APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao
|
||||
T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider
|
||||
T1003.006,DCSync,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1558.003,Kerberoasting,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1552.006,Group Policy Preferences,Credential Access,APT33
|
||||
T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,Mustang Panda|HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Chimera|FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0
|
||||
T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass
|
||||
T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,HAFNIUM|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Leafminer|Magic Hound|Lazarus Group|MuddyWater|PLATINUM|FIN8|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
|
||||
T1110.004,Credential Stuffing,Credential Access,Chimera
|
||||
T1110.003,Password Spraying,Credential Access,Silent Librarian|Chimera|APT28|APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,FIN6|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
|
||||
T1110.001,Password Guessing,Credential Access,APT28
|
||||
T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,APT29|UNC2452|Chimera|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1021.005,VNC,Lateral Movement,Fox Kitten|GCMAN
|
||||
T1021.004,SSH,Lateral Movement,Fox Kitten|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN
|
||||
T1003.003,NTDS,Credential Access,FIN6|Dragonfly 2.0
|
||||
T1003.002,Security Account Manager,Credential Access,Threat Group-3390|Ke3chang|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass
|
||||
T1003.001,LSASS Memory,Credential Access,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Blue Mockingbird|Silence|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Stolen Pencil|APT32|Lazarus Group|Leafminer|Magic Hound|MuddyWater|PLATINUM|FIN8|BRONZE BUTLER|OilRig|FIN6|APT3|APT28|APT1|Ke3chang|Cleaver
|
||||
T1110.004,Credential Stuffing,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1110.003,Password Spraying,Credential Access,APT33|Leafminer|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1110.002,Password Cracking,Credential Access,APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|APT3
|
||||
T1110.001,Password Guessing,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1021.006,Windows Remote Management,Lateral Movement,Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1021.005,VNC,Lateral Movement,GCMAN
|
||||
T1021.004,SSH,Lateral Movement,Rocke|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|OilRig|menuPass|GCMAN
|
||||
T1021.003,Distributed Component Object Model,Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,Fox Kitten|APT41|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,Fox Kitten|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|FIN10|menuPass|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
|
||||
T1021.002,SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Lateral Movement,Blue Mockingbird|APT39|APT32|Orangeworm|FIN8|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-1314|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1021.001,Remote Desktop Protocol,Lateral Movement,Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Stolen Pencil|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT3|OilRig|menuPass|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|APT1|Axiom
|
||||
T1554,Compromise Client Software Binary,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1036.006,Space after Filename,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,APT29|Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Darkhotel|Lazarus Group|Indrik Spider|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Machete|Chimera|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1
|
||||
T1036.004,Masquerade Task or Service,Defense Evasion,ZIRCONIUM|APT29|Higaisa|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|PROMETHIUM|Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7
|
||||
T1036.003,Rename System Utilities,Defense Evasion,menuPass|APT32|GALLIUM
|
||||
T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Sandworm Team|APT39|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Tropic Trooper|Silence|APT41|menuPass|TEMP.Veles|MuddyWater|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT32|Patchwork|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Carbanak|APT1
|
||||
T1036.004,Masquerade Task or Service,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider|APT-C-36|Carbanak|APT32|FIN6|FIN7
|
||||
T1036.003,Rename System Utilities,Defense Evasion,menuPass|APT32|Soft Cell|PLATINUM
|
||||
T1036.002,Right-to-Left Override,Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|BlackTech|Ke3chang|Scarlet Mimic
|
||||
T1036.001,Invalid Code Signature,Defense Evasion,Windshift|APT37
|
||||
T1036.001,Invalid Code Signature,Defense Evasion,Windshift
|
||||
T1553.003,SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,APT29|GALLIUM|UNC2452|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|PROMETHIUM|Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
|
||||
T1553.002,Code Signing,Defense Evasion,Patchwork|Silence|APT41|FIN6|TA505|FIN7|Honeybee|Leviathan|APT37|CopyKittens|Winnti Group|Suckfly|Molerats|Darkhotel
|
||||
T1553.001,Gatekeeper Bypass,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1553,Subvert Trust Controls,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1027.003,Steganography,Defense Evasion,TA551|BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT37
|
||||
T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,ZIRCONIUM|Lazarus Group|TA505|Rocke|GALLIUM|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon
|
||||
T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|APT32|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee
|
||||
T1027.003,Steganography,Defense Evasion,BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|MuddyWater|APT37
|
||||
T1027.002,Software Packing,Defense Evasion,TA505|Rocke|Soft Cell|The White Company|APT39|APT38|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT3|Patchwork|APT29|Night Dragon
|
||||
T1027.001,Binary Padding,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|APT32|Leviathan|BRONZE BUTLER|Moafee
|
||||
T1222.002,Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT32
|
||||
T1222.001,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,Wizard Spider
|
||||
T1552.004,Private Keys,Credential Access,APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Rocke
|
||||
T1222.001,Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1552.004,Private Keys,Credential Access,Rocke
|
||||
T1552.003,Bash History,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1552.002,Credentials in Registry,Credential Access,APT32
|
||||
T1552.001,Credentials In Files,Credential Access,Fox Kitten|Leafminer|APT33|OilRig|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT3
|
||||
T1552.001,Credentials In Files,Credential Access,Leafminer|APT33|OilRig|TA505|Stolen Pencil|MuddyWater|APT3
|
||||
T1552,Unsecured Credentials,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1216.001,PubPrn,Defense Evasion,APT32
|
||||
T1070.006,Timestomp,Defense Evasion,APT29|UNC2452|Chimera|Kimsuky|Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28
|
||||
T1070.006,Timestomp,Defense Evasion,Rocke|TEMP.Veles|APT32|Lazarus Group|APT28
|
||||
T1070.005,Network Share Connection Removal,Defense Evasion,Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,APT39|Mustang Panda|Chimera|Evilnum|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|Threat Group-3390|FIN10|APT28|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
|
||||
T1070.004,File Deletion,Defense Evasion,Sandworm Team|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Wizard Spider|APT41|Kimsuky|Silence|The White Company|TEMP.Veles|APT32|APT38|Patchwork|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Dragonfly 2.0|menuPass|FIN8|OilRig|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|APT28|Threat Group-3390|Group5|Lazarus Group|APT18|APT29
|
||||
T1070.003,Clear Command History,Defense Evasion,APT41
|
||||
T1550.004,Web Session Cookie,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT29|UNC2452
|
||||
T1550.004,Web Session Cookie,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1550.001,Application Access Token,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT28
|
||||
T1550.003,Pass the Ticket,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|APT29
|
||||
T1550.002,Pass the Hash,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,Chimera|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|APT1
|
||||
T1550,Use Alternate Authentication Material,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,APT29|UNC2452
|
||||
T1550.002,Pass the Hash,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,Soft Cell|APT32|Night Dragon|APT28|APT1
|
||||
T1550,Use Alternate Authentication Material,Defense Evasion|Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1548.004,Elevated Execution with Prompt,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1548.003,Sudo and Sudo Caching,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1548.002,Bypass User Account Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,Evilnum|APT37|MuddyWater|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
|
||||
T1548.002,Bypass User Access Control,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,APT37|MuddyWater|Honeybee|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|APT29
|
||||
T1548.001,Setuid and Setgid,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1548,Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism,Privilege Escalation|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1136.003,Cloud Account,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1070.002,Clear Linux or Mac System Logs,Defense Evasion,Rocke
|
||||
T1070.001,Clear Windows Event Logs,Defense Evasion,Chimera|Operation Wocao|APT41|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28
|
||||
T1136.002,Domain Account,Persistence,HAFNIUM|GALLIUM
|
||||
T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,Fox Kitten|APT39|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|APT3
|
||||
T1070.001,Clear Windows Event Logs,Defense Evasion,APT41|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|FIN8|FIN5|APT28
|
||||
T1136.002,Domain Account,Persistence,Soft Cell
|
||||
T1136.001,Local Account,Persistence,APT39|APT41|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|APT3
|
||||
T1547.011,Plist Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1547.010,Port Monitors,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1547.009,Shortcut Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group|Leviathan
|
||||
T1547.009,Shortcut Modification,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,APT39|Darkhotel|APT29|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|Leviathan|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1547.008,LSASS Driver,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1547.007,Re-opened Applications,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1547.006,Kernel Modules and Extensions,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1547.005,Security Support Provider,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1547.004,Winlogon Helper DLL,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Wizard Spider|Tropic Trooper|Turla
|
||||
T1547.005,Security Support Provider,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1547.004,Winlogon Helper DLL,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Tropic Trooper|Turla
|
||||
T1547.003,Time Providers,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1546.014,Emond,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1546.013,PowerShell Profile,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Turla
|
||||
@@ -359,38 +236,38 @@ T1546.012,Image File Execution Options Injection,Privilege Escalation|Persistenc
|
||||
T1218.008,Odbcconf,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group
|
||||
T1546.011,Application Shimming,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,FIN7
|
||||
T1547.002,Authentication Package,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1546.010,AppInit DLLs,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT39
|
||||
T1546.010,AppInit DLLs,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1546.009,AppCert DLLs,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Honeybee
|
||||
T1218.007,Msiexec,Defense Evasion,ZIRCONIUM|Molerats|Machete|TA505|Rancor
|
||||
T1546.008,Accessibility Features,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Fox Kitten|APT41|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda|Axiom
|
||||
T1218.007,Msiexec,Defense Evasion,TA505|Rancor
|
||||
T1546.008,Accessibility Features,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT41|APT3|APT29|Deep Panda|Axiom
|
||||
T1546.007,Netsh Helper DLL,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1546.006,LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1546.005,Trap,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1546.004,Unix Shell Configuration Modification,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1546.003,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Mustang Panda|UNC2452|APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29
|
||||
T1546.004,.bash_profile and .bashrc,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1546.003,Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,APT33|Blue Mockingbird|Turla|Leviathan|APT29
|
||||
T1546.002,Screensaver,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1546.001,Change Default File Association,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,Kimsuky
|
||||
T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Windshift|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|APT28|Wizard Spider|PROMETHIUM|Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Turla|APT19|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Threat Group-3390|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Gorgon Group|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|MuddyWater|Leviathan|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|FIN7|FIN10|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
|
||||
T1547.001,Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke|Tropic Trooper|Gamaredon Group|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Silence|RTM|Inception|APT41|Machete|Kimsuky|APT33|APT39|APT32|APT18|Turla|Dark Caracal|Cobalt Group|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Gorgon Group|Ke3chang|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT37|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|APT3|FIN10|FIN7|Patchwork|FIN6|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT29|Darkhotel
|
||||
T1218.002,Control Panel,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1218.010,Regsvr32,Defense Evasion,TA551|Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|APT19|Cobalt Group|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1218.010,Regsvr32,Defense Evasion,Blue Mockingbird|Inception|WIRTE|Cobalt Group|APT19|Leviathan|APT32|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1218.009,Regsvcs/Regasm,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|TA551|Sidewinder|Lazarus Group|Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7
|
||||
T1218.004,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion,Mustang Panda|menuPass
|
||||
T1218.005,Mshta,Defense Evasion,Inception|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|FIN7
|
||||
T1218.004,InstallUtil,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1218.001,Compiled HTML File,Defense Evasion,APT41|Silence|Lazarus Group|Dark Caracal|OilRig
|
||||
T1218.003,CMSTP,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group|MuddyWater
|
||||
T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,HAFNIUM|TA551|UNC2452|APT41|Gamaredon Group|APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28
|
||||
T1218.011,Rundll32,Defense Evasion,APT32|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|TA505|MuddyWater|APT29|APT19|CopyKittens|APT3|Carbanak|APT28
|
||||
T1547,Boot or Logon Autostart Execution,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1546,Event Triggered Execution,Privilege Escalation|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1098.003,Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1098.002,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,Persistence,APT29|UNC2452|Magic Hound
|
||||
T1098.001,Additional Cloud Credentials,Persistence,APT29|UNC2452
|
||||
T1098.002,Exchange Email Delegate Permissions,Persistence,Magic Hound
|
||||
T1098.001,Additional Azure Service Principal Credentials,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1543.004,Launch Daemon,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,PROMETHIUM|Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|FIN7|APT19|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak
|
||||
T1543.003,Windows Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Blue Mockingbird|DarkVishnya|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT41|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Ke3chang|Honeybee|FIN7|Threat Group-3390|APT19|APT3|Lazarus Group|Carbanak
|
||||
T1543.002,Systemd Service,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
|
||||
T1543.001,Launch Agent,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1037.005,Startup Items,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1037.004,RC Scripts,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1055.012,Process Hollowing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Threat Group-3390|Gorgon Group|menuPass|Patchwork
|
||||
T1037.004,Rc.common,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1055.012,Process Hollowing,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Threat Group-3390|menuPass|Gorgon Group|Patchwork
|
||||
T1055.013,Process Doppelgänging,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Leafminer
|
||||
T1055.011,Extra Window Memory Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1055.014,VDSO Hijacking,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
@@ -400,7 +277,7 @@ T1055.005,Thread Local Storage,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1055.004,Asynchronous Procedure Call,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1055.003,Thread Execution Hijacking,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1055.002,Portable Executable Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Rocke|Gorgon Group
|
||||
T1055.001,Dynamic-link Library Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Wizard Spider|TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
|
||||
T1055.001,Dynamic-link Library Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,TA505|Turla|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda
|
||||
T1037.003,Network Logon Script,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1543,Create or Modify System Process,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1037.002,Logon Script (Mac),Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
@@ -408,13 +285,13 @@ T1037.001,Logon Script (Windows),Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Cobalt Group|A
|
||||
T1542.003,Bootkit,Persistence|Defense Evasion,APT41|Lazarus Group|APT28
|
||||
T1542.002,Component Firmware,Persistence|Defense Evasion,Equation
|
||||
T1542.001,System Firmware,Persistence|Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1505.003,Web Shell,Persistence,Sandworm Team|HAFNIUM|Volatile Cedar|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Tropic Trooper|GALLIUM|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|OilRig|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1505.003,Web Shell,Persistence,Tropic Trooper|Soft Cell|Threat Group-3390|TEMP.Veles|Leviathan|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT32|OilRig|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1505.002,Transport Agent,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1505.001,SQL Stored Procedures,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1053.003,Cron,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
|
||||
T1053.004,Launchd,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1053.001,At (Linux),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Mustang Panda|Higaisa|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Molerats|Machete|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|GALLIUM|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Cobalt Group|Rancor|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Patchwork|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|FIN7|APT32|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
|
||||
T1053.005,Scheduled Task,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT-C-36|BRONZE BUTLER|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Silence|TEMP.Veles|APT33|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|Patchwork|OilRig|Rancor|Cobalt Group|FIN8|menuPass|FIN10|APT32|FIN7|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|APT3|APT29
|
||||
T1053.002,At (Windows),Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,BRONZE BUTLER|Threat Group-3390|APT18
|
||||
T1542,Pre-OS Boot,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1137.001,Office Template Macros,Persistence,MuddyWater
|
||||
@@ -424,141 +301,140 @@ T1137.005,Outlook Rules,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1137.006,Add-ins,Persistence,Naikon
|
||||
T1137.002,Office Test,Persistence,APT28
|
||||
T1531,Account Access Removal,Impact,no
|
||||
T1539,Steal Web Session Cookie,Credential Access,Evilnum
|
||||
T1539,Steal Web Session Cookie,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1529,System Shutdown/Reboot,Impact,Lazarus Group|APT38|APT37
|
||||
T1518,Software Discovery,Discovery,Mustang Panda|Windshift|MuddyWater|Windigo|Sidewinder|Operation Wocao|BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|Inception
|
||||
T1547.013,XDG Autostart Entries,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1518,Software Discovery,Discovery,BRONZE BUTLER|Tropic Trooper|Inception
|
||||
T1534,Internal Spearphishing,Lateral Movement,Gamaredon Group
|
||||
T1528,Steal Application Access Token,Credential Access,APT28
|
||||
T1535,Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1525,Implant Internal Image,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1525,Implant Container Image,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1538,Cloud Service Dashboard,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1530,Data from Cloud Storage Object,Collection,Fox Kitten
|
||||
T1530,Data from Cloud Storage Object,Collection,no
|
||||
T1578,Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1537,Transfer Data to Cloud Account,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1526,Cloud Service Discovery,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1505,Server Software Component,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1499,Endpoint Denial of Service,Impact,Sandworm Team
|
||||
T1497,Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,Darkhotel
|
||||
T1498,Network Denial of Service,Impact,APT28
|
||||
T1499,Endpoint Denial of Service,Impact,no
|
||||
T1497,Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion,Defense Evasion|Discovery,no
|
||||
T1498,Network Denial of Service,Impact,no
|
||||
T1496,Resource Hijacking,Impact,Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT41|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1495,Firmware Corruption,Impact,no
|
||||
T1491,Defacement,Impact,no
|
||||
T1490,Inhibit System Recovery,Impact,no
|
||||
T1489,Service Stop,Impact,Wizard Spider|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1486,Data Encrypted for Impact,Impact,Indrik Spider|APT41|TA505|APT38
|
||||
T1489,Service Stop,Impact,Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1486,Data Encrypted for Impact,Impact,APT41|TA505|APT38
|
||||
T1485,Data Destruction,Impact,Sandworm Team|Lazarus Group|APT38
|
||||
T1484,Domain Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1482,Domain Trust Discovery,Discovery,APT29|Chimera|UNC2452
|
||||
T1484,Group Policy Modification,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1482,Domain Trust Discovery,Discovery,Wizard Spider
|
||||
T1480,Execution Guardrails,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1222,File and Directory Permissions Modification,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1220,XSL Script Processing,Defense Evasion,Higaisa|Cobalt Group
|
||||
T1221,Template Injection,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Frankenstein|Inception|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Dragonfly 2.0|DarkHydrus
|
||||
T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Machete|Windigo|Dragonfly|PROMETHIUM|Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|APT19|APT32|Threat Group-3390|Dark Caracal|Elderwood|APT37|Patchwork|PLATINUM
|
||||
T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,Volatile Cedar|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|APT28|APT29|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|GALLIUM|Night Dragon|Axiom
|
||||
T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Fox Kitten|menuPass|Wizard Spider|Threat Group-3390|APT28
|
||||
T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,Chimera|Fox Kitten
|
||||
T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,Fox Kitten|FIN6|Turla
|
||||
T1197,BITS Jobs,Defense Evasion|Persistence,APT39|Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan
|
||||
T1219,Remote Access Software,Command And Control,Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Evilnum|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Carbanak
|
||||
T1195,Supply Chain Compromise,Initial Access,no
|
||||
T1204,User Execution,Execution,no
|
||||
T1220,XSL Script Processing,Defense Evasion,Cobalt Group
|
||||
T1197,BITS Jobs,Defense Evasion|Persistence,Patchwork|APT41|Leviathan
|
||||
T1217,Browser Bookmark Discovery,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1213,Data from Information Repositories,Collection,Turla
|
||||
T1189,Drive-by Compromise,Initial Access,Turla|Windshift|RTM|Darkhotel|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|BRONZE BUTLER|Leafminer|Dark Caracal|APT19|APT32|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|Elderwood|APT37|Patchwork|PLATINUM
|
||||
T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Cobalt Group|APT37|Patchwork|Leviathan|Elderwood|TA459|APT29
|
||||
T1212,Exploitation for Credential Access,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1211,Exploitation for Defense Evasion,Defense Evasion,APT28
|
||||
T1200,Hardware Additions,Initial Access,DarkVishnya
|
||||
T1190,Exploit Public-Facing Application,Initial Access,Blue Mockingbird|Rocke|APT39|BlackTech|APT41|Soft Cell|Night Dragon|Axiom
|
||||
T1210,Exploitation of Remote Services,Lateral Movement,Threat Group-3390|APT28
|
||||
T1202,Indirect Command Execution,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1201,Password Policy Discovery,Discovery,Chimera|Turla|OilRig
|
||||
T1200,Hardware Additions,Initial Access,DarkVishnya
|
||||
T1201,Password Policy Discovery,Discovery,Turla|OilRig
|
||||
T1219,Remote Access Software,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|RTM|Kimsuky|Night Dragon|Thrip|Cobalt Group|Carbanak
|
||||
T1207,Rogue Domain Controller,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1203,Exploitation for Client Execution,Execution,Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Higaisa|HAFNIUM|Sidewinder|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Frankenstein|Inception|BlackTech|APT41|admin@338|Threat Group-3390|APT12|The White Company|APT33|APT32|APT28|Tropic Trooper|BRONZE BUTLER|Lazarus Group|Cobalt Group|APT37|Patchwork|APT29|TA459|Leviathan|Elderwood
|
||||
T1216,Signed Script Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,Sandworm Team|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|APT28|menuPass
|
||||
T1199,Trusted Relationship,Initial Access,APT28|menuPass
|
||||
T1218,Signed Binary Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1204,User Execution,Execution,no
|
||||
T1216,Signed Script Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1195,Supply Chain Compromise,Initial Access,Elderwood
|
||||
T1205,Traffic Signaling,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Command And Control,no
|
||||
T1176,Browser Extensions,Persistence,Kimsuky|Stolen Pencil
|
||||
T1175,Component Object Model and Distributed COM,Lateral Movement|Execution,no
|
||||
T1187,Forced Authentication,Credential Access,DarkHydrus|Dragonfly 2.0
|
||||
T1185,Man in the Browser,Collection,no
|
||||
T1149,LC_MAIN Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,FIN6|Blue Mockingbird
|
||||
T1134,Access Token Manipulation,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Blue Mockingbird
|
||||
T1136,Create Account,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|menuPass|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|APT19|Gorgon Group|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
|
||||
T1149,LC_MAIN Hijacking,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
|
||||
T1137,Office Application Startup,Persistence,Gamaredon Group|APT32
|
||||
T1140,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Defense Evasion,APT39|APT29|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|UNC2452|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Gamaredon Group|Molerats|Frankenstein|Turla|WIRTE|Darkhotel|Tropic Trooper|Gorgon Group|menuPass|Honeybee|Threat Group-3390|APT19|Leviathan|MuddyWater|APT28|OilRig|BRONZE BUTLER
|
||||
T1135,Network Share Discovery,Discovery,Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|APT32|APT39|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT1|Dragonfly 2.0|Sowbug
|
||||
T1153,Source,Execution,no
|
||||
T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,APT29|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Kimsuky|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Chimera|Sandworm Team|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
|
||||
T1133,External Remote Services,Persistence|Initial Access,Sandworm Team|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Ke3chang|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|APT18
|
||||
T1132,Data Encoding,Command And Control,no
|
||||
T1129,Shared Modules,Execution,no
|
||||
T1127,Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1125,Video Capture,Collection,Silence|FIN7
|
||||
T1124,System Time Discovery,Discovery,Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|The White Company|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Turla
|
||||
T1124,System Time Discovery,Discovery,The White Company|Lazarus Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Turla
|
||||
T1123,Audio Capture,Collection,APT37
|
||||
T1120,Peripheral Device Discovery,Discovery,Operation Wocao|Turla|APT37|Gamaredon Group|Equation|APT28
|
||||
T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Mustang Panda|Sidewinder|Chimera|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
|
||||
T1115,Clipboard Data,Collection,Operation Wocao|APT39|APT38
|
||||
T1114,Email Collection,Collection,Silent Librarian
|
||||
T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28
|
||||
T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|Lazarus Group|Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|Honeybee|FIN8
|
||||
T1111,Two-Factor Authentication Interception,Credential Access,Chimera|Operation Wocao
|
||||
T1110,Brute Force,Credential Access,APT28|Fox Kitten|DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla
|
||||
T1120,Peripheral Device Discovery,Discovery,Turla|APT37|Gamaredon Group|Equation|APT28
|
||||
T1119,Automated Collection,Collection,Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT1|APT28|Patchwork|OilRig|FIN5|Threat Group-3390|FIN6
|
||||
T1115,Clipboard Data,Collection,APT39|APT38
|
||||
T1114,Email Collection,Collection,no
|
||||
T1113,Screen Capture,Collection,Gamaredon Group|APT39|Silence|MuddyWater|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Dark Caracal|FIN7|BRONZE BUTLER|Magic Hound|Group5|APT28
|
||||
T1112,Modify Registry,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Turla|APT32|APT38|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Patchwork|Gorgon Group|FIN8
|
||||
T1111,Two-Factor Authentication Interception,Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1110,Brute Force,Credential Access,DarkVishnya|APT39|OilRig|FIN5|Turla
|
||||
T1108,Redundant Access,Defense Evasion|Persistence,no
|
||||
T1106,Native API,Execution,Higaisa|menuPass|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|APT37|Gorgon Group
|
||||
T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,HAFNIUM|APT29|Ajax Security Team|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Darkhotel|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|Volatile Cedar|Indrik Spider|Evilnum|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Kimsuky|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Gorgon Group|Turla|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|Leviathan|FIN8|PLATINUM|Elderwood|APT3|Magic Hound|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|FIN7|menuPass|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
|
||||
T1106,Native API,Execution,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Turla|Silence|Gorgon Group|APT37
|
||||
T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Whitefly|Rocke|APT39|Tropic Trooper|Sharpshooter|Molerats|Frankenstein|Silence|APT-C-36|APT41|Soft Cell|TA505|WIRTE|APT33|MuddyWater|APT18|APT38|Rancor|Cobalt Group|Turla|Gorgon Group|OilRig|Dragonfly 2.0|APT37|FIN8|PLATINUM|Leviathan|Elderwood|Magic Hound|APT3|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN7|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390|APT28
|
||||
T1104,Multi-Stage Channels,Command And Control,APT41|MuddyWater|APT3
|
||||
T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,Fox Kitten|Turla|APT32|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6
|
||||
T1102,Web Service,Command And Control,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Inception|FIN6
|
||||
T1098,Account Manipulation,Persistence,APT3|Dragonfly 2.0|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,HAFNIUM|Operation Wocao|FIN6|APT29|PLATINUM|APT3
|
||||
T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,APT29|PLATINUM|APT3
|
||||
T1092,Communication Through Removable Media,Command And Control,APT28
|
||||
T1091,Replication Through Removable Media,Lateral Movement|Initial Access,Mustang Panda|Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28
|
||||
T1090,Proxy,Command And Control,Windigo|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|APT41|Turla
|
||||
T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,APT29|UNC2452
|
||||
T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,APT29|Mustang Panda|Darkhotel|Windigo|Sidewinder|Chimera|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|menuPass|APT39|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Magic Hound|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Sowbug|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Windigo|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|APT37|APT19|Honeybee|APT32|Magic Hound|Sowbug|OilRig|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,Gamaredon Group|BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel
|
||||
T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,APT29|Silent Librarian|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|GALLIUM|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT33|Leviathan|OilRig|FIN5|menuPass|FIN10|APT28|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
|
||||
T1091,Replication Through Removable Media,Lateral Movement|Initial Access,Tropic Trooper|Darkhotel|APT28
|
||||
T1090,Proxy,Command And Control,Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|APT41|Turla
|
||||
T1087,Account Discovery,Discovery,no
|
||||
T1083,File and Directory Discovery,Discovery,Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Inception|APT41|Kimsuky|APT32|MuddyWater|APT18|Leafminer|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|APT3|APT28|Patchwork|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1082,System Information Discovery,Discovery,Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT18|Honeybee|APT19|APT37|APT32|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|Sowbug|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1080,Taint Shared Content,Lateral Movement,BRONZE BUTLER|Darkhotel
|
||||
T1078,Valid Accounts,Defense Evasion|Persistence|Privilege Escalation|Initial Access,Sandworm Team|Wizard Spider|Silence|APT41|Soft Cell|TEMP.Veles|APT39|FIN4|Night Dragon|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|Leviathan|APT33|OilRig|FIN5|menuPass|APT28|FIN10|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390|APT18|PittyTiger|Carbanak
|
||||
T1074,Data Staged,Collection,Wizard Spider
|
||||
T1072,Software Deployment Tools,Execution|Lateral Movement,Silence|APT32|Threat Group-1314
|
||||
T1071,Application Layer Protocol,Command And Control,Rocke|Magic Hound|Dragonfly 2.0
|
||||
T1070,Indicator Removal on Host,Defense Evasion,APT29|UNC2452
|
||||
T1069,Permission Groups Discovery,Discovery,APT29|UNC2452|TA505|APT3
|
||||
T1068,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,Privilege Escalation,ZIRCONIUM|Turla|Whitefly|APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Threat Group-3390|FIN6|APT28
|
||||
T1070,Indicator Removal on Host,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1069,Permission Groups Discovery,Discovery,TA505|APT3
|
||||
T1068,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,Privilege Escalation,Whitefly|APT33|Cobalt Group|PLATINUM|FIN8|APT32|Threat Group-3390|FIN6|APT28
|
||||
T1064,Scripting,Defense Evasion|Execution,no
|
||||
T1062,Hypervisor,Persistence,no
|
||||
T1061,Graphical User Interface,Execution,no
|
||||
T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,Windigo|Fox Kitten|APT32|Whitefly|APT39|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|FIN7|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,APT29|Mustang Panda|Windshift|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1056,Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,APT39
|
||||
T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,Operation Wocao|APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Turla|Cobalt Group|APT37|Honeybee|PLATINUM
|
||||
T1059,Command and Scripting Interpreter,Execution,APT32|Molerats|Whitefly|Dragonfly 2.0|APT19|FIN7|OilRig|FIN5|Stealth Falcon|FIN6|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1057,Process Discovery,Discovery,Rocke|Frankenstein|Inception|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT38|Tropic Trooper|APT37|Honeybee|OilRig|APT3|Magic Hound|APT28|Winnti Group|Stealth Falcon|Poseidon Group|Lazarus Group|Molerats|Turla|Deep Panda|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1056,Input Capture,Collection|Credential Access,no
|
||||
T1055,Process Injection,Defense Evasion|Privilege Escalation,APT32|Sharpshooter|Silence|APT41|Kimsuky|Turla|Cobalt Group|APT37|Honeybee|PLATINUM
|
||||
T1053,Scheduled Task/Job,Execution|Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1052,Exfiltration Over Physical Medium,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1051,Shared Webroot,Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,Mustang Panda|MuddyWater|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|GALLIUM|APT32|APT1|APT3|OilRig|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1049,System Network Connections Discovery,Discovery,Tropic Trooper|APT41|APT38|Soft Cell|APT32|APT1|OilRig|APT3|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1048,Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Mustang Panda|Windshift|UNC2452|Operation Wocao|Chimera|Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|GALLIUM|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|Leviathan|FIN8|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|OilRig|Leafminer|Cobalt Group|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1043,Commonly Used Port,Command And Control,OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|APT19|FIN7|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN8|APT37|Magic Hound|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1041,Exfiltration Over C2 Channel,Exfiltration,ZIRCONIUM|Higaisa|Chimera|APT39|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1040,Network Sniffing,Credential Access|Discovery,Kimsuky|Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|Stolen Pencil|APT28
|
||||
T1039,Data from Network Shared Drive,Collection,Chimera|Fox Kitten|Gamaredon Group|Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass
|
||||
T1047,Windows Management Instrumentation,Execution,Blue Mockingbird|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|FIN6|Soft Cell|APT32|MuddyWater|OilRig|Threat Group-3390|FIN8|Leviathan|menuPass|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT29|Deep Panda
|
||||
T1046,Network Service Scanning,Discovery,Rocke|DarkVishnya|APT41|Tropic Trooper|APT39|APT32|Leafminer|OilRig|Cobalt Group|menuPass|Suckfly|FIN6|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1043,Commonly Used Port,Command And Control,Machete|OilRig|APT28|TEMP.Veles|Night Dragon|APT29|APT18|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|FIN7|FIN8|APT37|Magic Hound|APT3|Lazarus Group|Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1041,Exfiltration Over C2 Channel,Exfiltration,Sandworm Team|MuddyWater|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|APT32|APT3|Gamaredon Group|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1040,Network Sniffing,Credential Access|Discovery,Sandworm Team|DarkVishnya|APT33|Stolen Pencil|APT28
|
||||
T1039,Data from Network Shared Drive,Collection,Sowbug|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass
|
||||
T1037,Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,Rocke
|
||||
T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,APT29|Mustang Panda|ZIRCONIUM|TA551|UNC2452|Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|PLATINUM|Dragonfly 2.0
|
||||
T1036,Masquerading,Defense Evasion,Windshift|APT32|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|Dragonfly 2.0
|
||||
T1034,Path Interception,Persistence|Privilege Escalation,no
|
||||
T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,Windshift|ZIRCONIUM|Sidewinder|Chimera|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
|
||||
T1033,System Owner/User Discovery,Discovery,Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|Tropic Trooper|APT39|MuddyWater|APT32|APT37|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|FIN10|Gamaredon Group|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3
|
||||
T1030,Data Transfer Size Limits,Exfiltration,Threat Group-3390
|
||||
T1029,Scheduled Transfer,Exfiltration,Higaisa
|
||||
T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,APT39|Mustang Panda|Windshift|TA551|Higaisa|Sidewinder|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|GOLD SOUTHFIELD|Operation Wocao|Kimsuky|FIN6|Chimera|Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|GALLIUM|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Patchwork|APT37|Honeybee|menuPass|Leafminer|Cobalt Group|Threat Group-3390|Dark Caracal|APT19|FIN8|BlackOasis|MuddyWater|Elderwood|Leviathan|FIN7|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28
|
||||
T1029,Scheduled Transfer,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,Defense Evasion,Gamaredon Group|Rocke|Sandworm Team|Blue Mockingbird|Whitefly|Molerats|Wizard Spider|Mofang|Frankenstein|Inception|APT-C-36|APT41|Machete|Soft Cell|Turla|TA505|Silence|APT33|Night Dragon|Darkhotel|Gallmaker|APT29|APT18|Tropic Trooper|Cobalt Group|Patchwork|Leafminer|APT37|Threat Group-3390|Honeybee|Dark Caracal|menuPass|APT19|BlackOasis|FIN8|Leviathan|Elderwood|MuddyWater|FIN7|Magic Hound|OilRig|APT3|APT32|Group5|Dust Storm|Lazarus Group|Putter Panda|APT28
|
||||
T1026,Multiband Communication,Command And Control,Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1025,Data from Removable Media,Collection,Turla|Gamaredon Group|APT28
|
||||
T1025,Data from Removable Media,Collection,Machete|Turla|Gamaredon Group|APT28
|
||||
T1021,Remote Services,Lateral Movement,no
|
||||
T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Sidewinder|Gamaredon Group|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee
|
||||
T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,APT29|UNC2452|Chimera|Fox Kitten|Operation Wocao|Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|GALLIUM|APT39|APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Deep Panda|Threat Group-3390|Leafminer|Ke3chang|FIN8|FIN5|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
|
||||
T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,ZIRCONIUM|Mustang Panda|Higaisa|Sidewinder|Chimera|Operation Wocao|Wizard Spider|Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|GALLIUM|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|OilRig|Magic Hound|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1020,Automated Exfiltration,Exfiltration,Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|Honeybee
|
||||
T1018,Remote System Discovery,Discovery,Sandworm Team|Rocke|Wizard Spider|Silence|Soft Cell|APT39|APT32|Deep Panda|Threat Group-3390|Dragonfly 2.0|Leafminer|Ke3chang|FIN8|APT3|FIN5|BRONZE BUTLER|menuPass|FIN6|Turla
|
||||
T1016,System Network Configuration Discovery,Discovery,Sandworm Team|Tropic Trooper|Frankenstein|APT41|Soft Cell|APT32|Darkhotel|MuddyWater|APT1|APT19|Dragonfly 2.0|Magic Hound|OilRig|menuPass|Threat Group-3390|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|APT3|Naikon|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1014,Rootkit,Defense Evasion,Rocke|APT41|APT28|Winnti Group
|
||||
T1012,Query Registry,Discovery,ZIRCONIUM|Chimera|Fox Kitten|APT39|Operation Wocao|APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla
|
||||
T1012,Query Registry,Discovery,APT32|Dragonfly 2.0|Threat Group-3390|OilRig|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Turla
|
||||
T1011,Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium,Exfiltration,no
|
||||
T1010,Application Window Discovery,Discovery,Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1008,Fallback Channels,Command And Control,Carbanak|APT41|OilRig|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1007,System Service Discovery,Discovery,Chimera|Operation Wocao|BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1008,Fallback Channels,Command And Control,APT41|OilRig|Lazarus Group
|
||||
T1007,System Service Discovery,Discovery,BRONZE BUTLER|APT1|OilRig|Poseidon Group|admin@338|Turla|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1006,Direct Volume Access,Defense Evasion,no
|
||||
T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,APT29|Windigo|UNC2452|Fox Kitten|Sandworm Team|Operation Wocao|FIN6|Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|GALLIUM|Turla|menuPass|Dragonfly 2.0|Dark Caracal|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1005,Data from Local System,Collection,Gamaredon Group|APT39|Frankenstein|Inception|Kimsuky|Soft Cell|Turla|menuPass|Dark Caracal|Dragonfly 2.0|Honeybee|APT37|APT28|APT3|BRONZE BUTLER|Patchwork|Stealth Falcon|Lazarus Group|Dust Storm|Threat Group-3390|APT1|Ke3chang
|
||||
T1003,OS Credential Dumping,Credential Access,APT39|Frankenstein|APT32|APT28|Leviathan|Sowbug|Suckfly|Poseidon Group|Axiom
|
||||
T1001,Data Obfuscation,Command And Control,Operation Wocao|Axiom
|
||||
T1001,Data Obfuscation,Command And Control,Axiom
|
||||
|
||||
|
+2
-1
@@ -295,4 +295,5 @@ Extensions,Name
|
||||
.TELEGRAM,Telegram
|
||||
.FUSION,Fusion
|
||||
.MILIHPEN,Milihpen
|
||||
.GANGBANG,Gangbang
|
||||
.GANGBANG,Gangbang
|
||||
.reddot,RedDot
|
||||
|
Vendored
+1
-1
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
|
||||
"id": {
|
||||
"group": null,
|
||||
"name": "DA-ESS_AmazonWebServices_Content",
|
||||
"version": "3.25.0"
|
||||
"version": "3.25.1"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"author": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
#############
|
||||
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-07-02T15:45:19 UTC
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-07-13T23:06:32 UTC
|
||||
# Author: Splunk Security Research
|
||||
# Contact: research@splunk.com
|
||||
#############
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
#############
|
||||
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-07-02T15:45:19 UTC
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-07-13T23:06:32 UTC
|
||||
# Author: Splunk Security Research
|
||||
# Contact: research@splunk.com
|
||||
#############
|
||||
|
||||
Vendored
+2
-2
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
||||
is_configured = false
|
||||
state = enabled
|
||||
state_change_requires_restart = false
|
||||
build = 32560
|
||||
build = 34075
|
||||
|
||||
[triggers]
|
||||
reload.analytic_stories = simple
|
||||
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ reload.content-version = simple
|
||||
|
||||
[launcher]
|
||||
author = Splunk
|
||||
version = 3.25.0
|
||||
version = 3.25.1
|
||||
description = Explore the Analytic Stories included with Splunk Security Analytics for AWS Content
|
||||
|
||||
[ui]
|
||||
|
||||
Vendored
+1
-1
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
#############
|
||||
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-07-02T15:45:19 UTC
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-07-13T23:06:32 UTC
|
||||
# Author: Splunk Security Research
|
||||
# Contact: research@splunk.com
|
||||
#############
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
|
||||
[content-version]
|
||||
version = 3.25.0
|
||||
version = 3.25.1
|
||||
|
||||
Vendored
+1
-1
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
#############
|
||||
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-07-02T15:45:19 UTC
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-07-13T23:06:32 UTC
|
||||
# Author: Splunk Security Research
|
||||
# Contact: research@splunk.com
|
||||
#############
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
#############
|
||||
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-07-02T15:45:19 UTC
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-07-13T23:06:32 UTC
|
||||
# Author: Splunk Security Research
|
||||
# Contact: research@splunk.com
|
||||
#############
|
||||
|
||||
Vendored
+1
-1
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
#############
|
||||
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-07-02T15:45:19 UTC
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-07-13T23:06:32 UTC
|
||||
# Author: Splunk Security Research
|
||||
# Contact: research@splunk.com
|
||||
#############
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
#############
|
||||
# Automatically generated by generator.py in splunk/security_content
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-07-02T15:45:19 UTC
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-07-13T23:06:32 UTC
|
||||
# Author: Splunk Security Research
|
||||
# Contact: research@splunk.com
|
||||
#############
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-1
@@ -295,4 +295,5 @@ Extensions,Name
|
||||
.TELEGRAM,Telegram
|
||||
.FUSION,Fusion
|
||||
.MILIHPEN,Milihpen
|
||||
.GANGBANG,Gangbang
|
||||
.GANGBANG,Gangbang
|
||||
.reddot,RedDot
|
||||
|
+1402
-18
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
+1298
-19
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
+23121
-18350
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
+10643
-7707
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
+15047
-11010
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
+6900
-6166
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
+75
-5
@@ -1295,6 +1295,8 @@ Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities an
|
||||
|
||||
* [Powershell Creating Thread Mutex](detections.md#powershell-creating-thread-mutex)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature](detections.md#powershell-enable-smb1protocol-feature)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress](detections.md#powershell-fileless-process-injection-via-getprocaddress)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content](detections.md#powershell-fileless-script-contains-base64-encoded-content)
|
||||
@@ -4162,7 +4164,7 @@ Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities th
|
||||
|
||||
- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
|
||||
- **Datamodel**: Endpoint
|
||||
- **ATT&CK**: [T1003.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003.002/), [T1070.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070.001/), [T1204](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/), [T1485](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485/), [T1486](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486/), [T1490](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/), [T1543](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/), [T1569.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569.001/), [T1569.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569.002/)
|
||||
- **ATT&CK**: [T1003.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003.002/), [T1070.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070.001/), [T1204](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/), [T1485](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485/), [T1486](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486/), [T1489](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489/), [T1490](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/), [T1543](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/), [T1569.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569.001/), [T1569.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569.002/)
|
||||
- **Last Updated**: 2021-03-17
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
@@ -4192,6 +4194,8 @@ Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities th
|
||||
|
||||
* [Resize ShadowStorage volume](detections.md#resize-shadowstorage-volume)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Resize Shadowstorage Volume](detections.md#resize-shadowstorage-volume)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior](detections.md#suspicious-event-log-service-behavior)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Suspicious wevtutil Usage](detections.md#suspicious-wevtutil-usage)
|
||||
@@ -4213,6 +4217,7 @@ Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities th
|
||||
| T1490 | Inhibit System Recovery | Impact |
|
||||
| T1486 | Data Encrypted for Impact | Impact |
|
||||
| T1003.002 | Security Account Manager | Credential Access |
|
||||
| T1489 | Service Stop | Impact |
|
||||
| T1070.001 | Clear Windows Event Logs | Defense Evasion |
|
||||
|
||||
#### Kill Chain Phase
|
||||
@@ -4693,7 +4698,7 @@ Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities th
|
||||
|
||||
- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
|
||||
- **Datamodel**: Endpoint, Network_Traffic
|
||||
- **ATT&CK**: [T1020](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/), [T1021.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021.002/), [T1036.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036.003/), [T1047](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/), [T1048](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/), [T1053.005](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053.005/), [T1069.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069.001/), [T1069.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069.002/), [T1070](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/), [T1070.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070.001/), [T1070.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070.004/), [T1071.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071.001/), [T1087.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087.001/), [T1087.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087.002/), [T1112](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/), [T1204](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/), [T1218.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218.003/), [T1222](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/), [T1482](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/), [T1485](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485/), [T1490](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/), [T1491](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/), [T1547.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547.001/), [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/), [T1592](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/)
|
||||
- **ATT&CK**: [T1020](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/), [T1021.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021.002/), [T1027.005](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027.005/), [T1036.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036.003/), [T1047](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/), [T1048](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/), [T1053.005](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053.005/), [T1059.005](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059.005/), [T1069.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069.001/), [T1069.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069.002/), [T1070](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/), [T1070.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070.001/), [T1070.004](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070.004/), [T1071.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071.001/), [T1087.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087.001/), [T1087.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087.002/), [T1112](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/), [T1204](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/), [T1218.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218.003/), [T1222](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/), [T1482](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/), [T1485](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485/), [T1489](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489/), [T1490](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/), [T1491](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/), [T1531](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531/), [T1547.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547.001/), [T1548](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/), [T1562.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562.001/), [T1562.007](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562.007/), [T1569.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569.002/), [T1574.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574.002/), [T1592](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/)
|
||||
- **Last Updated**: 2020-02-04
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
@@ -4701,8 +4706,16 @@ Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities th
|
||||
|
||||
#### Detection Profile
|
||||
|
||||
* [Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall](detections.md#allow-file-and-printing-sharing-in-firewall)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Allow Network Discovery In Firewall](detections.md#allow-network-discovery-in-firewall)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Allow Operation with Consent Admin](detections.md#allow-operation-with-consent-admin)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Attempt To Disable Services](detections.md#attempt-to-disable-services)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Attempt To delete Services](detections.md#attempt-to-delete-services)
|
||||
|
||||
* [BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification](detections.md#bcdedit-failure-recovery-modification)
|
||||
|
||||
* [CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass](detections.md#cmlua-or-cmstplua-uac-bypass)
|
||||
@@ -4715,6 +4728,8 @@ Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities th
|
||||
|
||||
* [Conti Common Exec parameter](detections.md#conti-common-exec-parameter)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Delete A Net User](detections.md#delete-a-net-user)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell](detections.md#delete-shadowcopy-with-powershell)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Deleting Shadow Copies](detections.md#deleting-shadow-copies)
|
||||
@@ -4729,24 +4744,52 @@ Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities th
|
||||
|
||||
* [Detect SharpHound Usage](detections.md#detect-sharphound-usage)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Disable AMSI Through Registry](detections.md#disable-amsi-through-registry)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Disable ETW Through Registry](detections.md#disable-etw-through-registry)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Disable Logs Using WevtUtil](detections.md#disable-logs-using-wevtutil)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Disable Net User Account](detections.md#disable-net-user-account)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring](detections.md#disable-windows-behavior-monitoring)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Excessive Service Stop Attempt](detections.md#excessive-service-stop-attempt)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Excessive Usage Of Net App](detections.md#excessive-usage-of-net-app)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility](detections.md#excessive-usage-of-sc-service-utility)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID](detections.md#execute-javascript-with-jscript-com-clsid)
|
||||
|
||||
* [ICACLS Grant Command](detections.md#icacls-grant-command)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Known Services Killed by Ransomware](detections.md#known-services-killed-by-ransomware)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Modification Of Wallpaper](detections.md#modification-of-wallpaper)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading](detections.md#msmpeng-application-dll-side-loading)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Permission Modification using Takeown App](detections.md#permission-modification-using-takeown-app)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Powershell Disable Security Monitoring](detections.md#powershell-disable-security-monitoring)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature](detections.md#powershell-enable-smb1protocol-feature)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit](detections.md#prevent-automatic-repair-mode-using-bcdedit)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed](detections.md#prohibited-network-traffic-allowed)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI](detections.md#recon-avproduct-through-pwh-or-wmi)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD](detections.md#recursive-delete-of-directory-in-batch-cmd)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Registry Keys Used For Persistence](detections.md#registry-keys-used-for-persistence)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Remote Process Instantiation via WMI](detections.md#remote-process-instantiation-via-wmi)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Resize Shadowstorage Volume](detections.md#resize-shadowstorage-volume)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Revil Common Exec Parameter](detections.md#revil-common-exec-parameter)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Revil Registry Entry](detections.md#revil-registry-entry)
|
||||
@@ -4796,7 +4839,9 @@ Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities th
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Technique | Tactic |
|
||||
| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|
|
||||
| T1562.007 | Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall | Defense Evasion |
|
||||
| T1548 | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion |
|
||||
| T1489 | Service Stop | Impact |
|
||||
| T1490 | Inhibit System Recovery | Impact |
|
||||
| T1218.003 | CMSTP | Defense Evasion |
|
||||
| T1070.004 | File Deletion | Defense Evasion |
|
||||
@@ -4808,9 +4853,15 @@ Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities th
|
||||
| T1482 | Domain Trust Discovery | Discovery |
|
||||
| T1069.002 | Domain Groups | Discovery |
|
||||
| T1069.001 | Local Groups | Discovery |
|
||||
| T1562.001 | Disable or Modify Tools | Defense Evasion |
|
||||
| T1070.001 | Clear Windows Event Logs | Defense Evasion |
|
||||
| T1491 | Defacement | Impact |
|
||||
| T1531 | Account Access Removal | Impact |
|
||||
| T1569.002 | Service Execution | Execution |
|
||||
| T1059.005 | Visual Basic | Execution |
|
||||
| T1222 | File and Directory Permissions Modification | Defense Evasion |
|
||||
| T1491 | Defacement | Impact |
|
||||
| T1574.002 | DLL Side-Loading | Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion |
|
||||
| T1027.005 | Indicator Removal from Tools | Defense Evasion |
|
||||
| T1048 | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol | Exfiltration |
|
||||
| T1592 | Gather Victim Host Information | Reconnaissance |
|
||||
| T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | Persistence, Privilege Escalation |
|
||||
@@ -4897,7 +4948,7 @@ Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities th
|
||||
|
||||
- **Product**: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
|
||||
- **Datamodel**: Endpoint
|
||||
- **ATT&CK**: [T1112](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/), [T1204](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/), [T1218.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218.003/), [T1490](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/), [T1491](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/)
|
||||
- **ATT&CK**: [T1112](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/), [T1204](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/), [T1218.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218.003/), [T1490](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/), [T1491](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/), [T1562.001](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562.001/), [T1562.007](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562.007/), [T1574.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574.002/)
|
||||
- **Last Updated**: 2021-06-04
|
||||
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
@@ -4905,10 +4956,18 @@ Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities th
|
||||
|
||||
#### Detection Profile
|
||||
|
||||
* [Allow Network Discovery In Firewall](detections.md#allow-network-discovery-in-firewall)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell](detections.md#delete-shadowcopy-with-powershell)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring](detections.md#disable-windows-behavior-monitoring)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Modification Of Wallpaper](detections.md#modification-of-wallpaper)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading](detections.md#msmpeng-application-dll-side-loading)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Powershell Disable Security Monitoring](detections.md#powershell-disable-security-monitoring)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Revil Common Exec Parameter](detections.md#revil-common-exec-parameter)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Revil Registry Entry](detections.md#revil-registry-entry)
|
||||
@@ -4920,8 +4979,11 @@ Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities th
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Technique | Tactic |
|
||||
| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|
|
||||
| T1562.007 | Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall | Defense Evasion |
|
||||
| T1490 | Inhibit System Recovery | Impact |
|
||||
| T1562.001 | Disable or Modify Tools | Defense Evasion |
|
||||
| T1491 | Defacement | Impact |
|
||||
| T1574.002 | DLL Side-Loading | Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion |
|
||||
| T1204 | User Execution | Execution |
|
||||
| T1112 | Modify Registry | Defense Evasion |
|
||||
| T1218.003 | CMSTP | Defense Evasion |
|
||||
@@ -5391,10 +5453,18 @@ Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities th
|
||||
|
||||
#### Detection Profile
|
||||
|
||||
* [Attempt To Disable Services](detections.md#attempt-to-disable-services)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Attempt To delete Services](detections.md#attempt-to-delete-services)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Delete A Net User](detections.md#delete-a-net-user)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Deleting Of Net Users](detections.md#deleting-of-net-users)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Deny Permission using Cacls Utility](detections.md#deny-permission-using-cacls-utility)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Disable Net User Account](detections.md#disable-net-user-account)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Disable Windows App Hotkeys](detections.md#disable-windows-app-hotkeys)
|
||||
|
||||
* [Disabling Net User Account](detections.md#disabling-net-user-account)
|
||||
@@ -5442,12 +5512,12 @@ Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities th
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Technique | Tactic |
|
||||
| ----------- | ----------- |--------------|
|
||||
| T1489 | Service Stop | Impact |
|
||||
| T1531 | Account Access Removal | Impact |
|
||||
| T1222 | File and Directory Permissions Modification | Defense Evasion |
|
||||
| T1562.001 | Disable or Modify Tools | Defense Evasion |
|
||||
| T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | Command And Control |
|
||||
| T1087 | Account Discovery | Discovery |
|
||||
| T1489 | Service Stop | Impact |
|
||||
| T1036 | Masquerading | Defense Evasion |
|
||||
| T1053 | Scheduled Task/Job | Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation |
|
||||
| T1543.003 | Windows Service | Persistence, Privilege Escalation |
|
||||
|
||||
+117
-11
@@ -1744,6 +1744,8 @@ Attackers are finding stealthy ways "live off the land," leveraging utilities an
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Powershell_creating_thread_mutex|Powershell Creating Thread Mutex]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature|Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Powershell_fileless_process_injection_via_getprocaddress|Powershell Fileless Process Injection via GetProcAddress]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Powershell_fileless_script_contains_base64_encoded_content|Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content]]
|
||||
@@ -5468,7 +5470,7 @@ Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities th
|
||||
|
||||
* '''Product''': Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
|
||||
* '''Datamodel''': Endpoint
|
||||
* '''ATT&CK''': [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/ T1204], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/ T1543], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485/ T1485], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569.001/ T1569.001], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569.002/ T1569.002], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/ T1490], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486/ T1486], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003.002/ T1003.002], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070.001/ T1070.001]
|
||||
* '''ATT&CK''': [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/ T1204], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/ T1543], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485/ T1485], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569.001/ T1569.001], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569.002/ T1569.002], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/ T1490], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486/ T1486], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003.002/ T1003.002], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489/ T1489], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070.001/ T1070.001]
|
||||
* '''Last Updated''': 2021-03-17
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="toccolours mw-collapsible mw-collapsed">
|
||||
@@ -5498,6 +5500,8 @@ Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities th
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Resize_shadowstorage_volume|Resize ShadowStorage volume]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Resize_shadowstorage_volume|Resize Shadowstorage Volume]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Suspicious_event_log_service_behavior|Suspicious Event Log Service Behavior]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Suspicious_wevtutil_usage|Suspicious wevtutil Usage]]
|
||||
@@ -5546,6 +5550,10 @@ Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities th
|
||||
| Security Account Manager
|
||||
| Credential Access
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1489
|
||||
| Service Stop
|
||||
| Impact
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1070.001
|
||||
| Clear Windows Event Logs
|
||||
| Defense Evasion
|
||||
@@ -6209,7 +6217,7 @@ Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities th
|
||||
|
||||
* '''Product''': Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
|
||||
* '''Datamodel''': Endpoint, Network_Traffic
|
||||
* '''ATT&CK''': [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/ T1548], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/ T1490], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218.003/ T1218.003], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070.004/ T1070.004], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485/ T1485], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/ T1204], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/ T1020], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087.002/ T1087.002], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087.001/ T1087.001], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/ T1482], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069.002/ T1069.002], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069.001/ T1069.001], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070.001/ T1070.001], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/ T1491], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/ T1222], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/ T1048], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/ T1592], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547.001/ T1547.001], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/ T1047], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/ T1112], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021.002/ T1021.002], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053.005/ T1053.005], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036.003/ T1036.003], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071.001/ T1071.001], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/ T1070]
|
||||
* '''ATT&CK''': [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562.007/ T1562.007], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/ T1548], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489/ T1489], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/ T1490], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218.003/ T1218.003], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070.004/ T1070.004], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485/ T1485], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/ T1204], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/ T1020], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087.002/ T1087.002], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087.001/ T1087.001], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/ T1482], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069.002/ T1069.002], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069.001/ T1069.001], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562.001/ T1562.001], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070.001/ T1070.001], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531/ T1531], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569.002/ T1569.002], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059.005/ T1059.005], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/ T1222], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/ T1491], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574.002/ T1574.002], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027.005/ T1027.005], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/ T1048], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592/ T1592], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547.001/ T1547.001], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/ T1047], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/ T1112], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021.002/ T1021.002], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053.005/ T1053.005], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036.003/ T1036.003], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071.001/ T1071.001], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/ T1070]
|
||||
* '''Last Updated''': 2020-02-04
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="toccolours mw-collapsible mw-collapsed">
|
||||
@@ -6217,8 +6225,16 @@ Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities th
|
||||
|
||||
====Detection Profile====
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Allow_file_and_printing_sharing_in_firewall|Allow File And Printing Sharing In Firewall]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Allow_network_discovery_in_firewall|Allow Network Discovery In Firewall]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Allow_operation_with_consent_admin|Allow Operation with Consent Admin]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Attempt_to_disable_services|Attempt To Disable Services]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Attempt_to_delete_services|Attempt To delete Services]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Bcdedit_failure_recovery_modification|BCDEdit Failure Recovery Modification]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Cmlua_or_cmstplua_uac_bypass|CMLUA Or CMSTPLUA UAC Bypass]]
|
||||
@@ -6231,6 +6247,8 @@ Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities th
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Conti_common_exec_parameter|Conti Common Exec parameter]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Delete_a_net_user|Delete A Net User]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell|Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Deleting_shadow_copies|Deleting Shadow Copies]]
|
||||
@@ -6245,24 +6263,52 @@ Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities th
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Detect_sharphound_usage|Detect SharpHound Usage]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Disable_amsi_through_registry|Disable AMSI Through Registry]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Disable_etw_through_registry|Disable ETW Through Registry]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Disable_logs_using_wevtutil|Disable Logs Using WevtUtil]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Disable_net_user_account|Disable Net User Account]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Disable_windows_behavior_monitoring|Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Excessive_service_stop_attempt|Excessive Service Stop Attempt]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Excessive_usage_of_net_app|Excessive Usage Of Net App]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Excessive_usage_of_sc_service_utility|Excessive Usage Of SC Service Utility]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Execute_javascript_with_jscript_com_clsid|Execute Javascript With Jscript COM CLSID]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Icacls_grant_command|ICACLS Grant Command]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Known_services_killed_by_ransomware|Known Services Killed by Ransomware]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Modification_of_wallpaper|Modification Of Wallpaper]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading|Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Permission_modification_using_takeown_app|Permission Modification using Takeown App]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Powershell_disable_security_monitoring|Powershell Disable Security Monitoring]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Powershell_enable_smb1protocol_feature|Powershell Enable SMB1Protocol Feature]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Prevent_automatic_repair_mode_using_bcdedit|Prevent Automatic Repair Mode using Bcdedit]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Prohibited_network_traffic_allowed|Prohibited Network Traffic Allowed]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Recon_avproduct_through_pwh_or_wmi|Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Recursive_delete_of_directory_in_batch_cmd|Recursive Delete of Directory In Batch CMD]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Registry_keys_used_for_persistence|Registry Keys Used For Persistence]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Remote_process_instantiation_via_wmi|Remote Process Instantiation via WMI]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Resize_shadowstorage_volume|Resize Shadowstorage Volume]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Revil_common_exec_parameter|Revil Common Exec Parameter]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Revil_registry_entry|Revil Registry Entry]]
|
||||
@@ -6315,10 +6361,18 @@ Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities th
|
||||
! Technique
|
||||
! Tactic
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1562.007
|
||||
| Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall
|
||||
| Defense Evasion
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1548
|
||||
| Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
|
||||
| Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1489
|
||||
| Service Stop
|
||||
| Impact
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1490
|
||||
| Inhibit System Recovery
|
||||
| Impact
|
||||
@@ -6363,16 +6417,40 @@ Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities th
|
||||
| Local Groups
|
||||
| Discovery
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1562.001
|
||||
| Disable or Modify Tools
|
||||
| Defense Evasion
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1070.001
|
||||
| Clear Windows Event Logs
|
||||
| Defense Evasion
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1531
|
||||
| Account Access Removal
|
||||
| Impact
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1569.002
|
||||
| Service Execution
|
||||
| Execution
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1059.005
|
||||
| Visual Basic
|
||||
| Execution
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1222
|
||||
| File and Directory Permissions Modification
|
||||
| Defense Evasion
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1491
|
||||
| Defacement
|
||||
| Impact
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1222
|
||||
| File and Directory Permissions Modification
|
||||
| T1574.002
|
||||
| DLL Side-Loading
|
||||
| Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1027.005
|
||||
| Indicator Removal from Tools
|
||||
| Defense Evasion
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1048
|
||||
@@ -6501,7 +6579,7 @@ Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities th
|
||||
|
||||
* '''Product''': Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
|
||||
* '''Datamodel''': Endpoint
|
||||
* '''ATT&CK''': [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/ T1490], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/ T1491], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/ T1204], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/ T1112], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218.003/ T1218.003]
|
||||
* '''ATT&CK''': [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562.007/ T1562.007], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/ T1490], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562.001/ T1562.001], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/ T1491], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574.002/ T1574.002], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/ T1204], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/ T1112], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218.003/ T1218.003]
|
||||
* '''Last Updated''': 2021-06-04
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="toccolours mw-collapsible mw-collapsed">
|
||||
@@ -6509,10 +6587,18 @@ Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities th
|
||||
|
||||
====Detection Profile====
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Allow_network_discovery_in_firewall|Allow Network Discovery In Firewall]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Delete_shadowcopy_with_powershell|Delete ShadowCopy With PowerShell]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Disable_windows_behavior_monitoring|Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Modification_of_wallpaper|Modification Of Wallpaper]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Msmpeng_application_dll_side_loading|Msmpeng Application DLL Side Loading]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Powershell_disable_security_monitoring|Powershell Disable Security Monitoring]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Revil_common_exec_parameter|Revil Common Exec Parameter]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Revil_registry_entry|Revil Registry Entry]]
|
||||
@@ -6527,14 +6613,26 @@ Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities th
|
||||
! Technique
|
||||
! Tactic
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1562.007
|
||||
| Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall
|
||||
| Defense Evasion
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1490
|
||||
| Inhibit System Recovery
|
||||
| Impact
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1562.001
|
||||
| Disable or Modify Tools
|
||||
| Defense Evasion
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1491
|
||||
| Defacement
|
||||
| Impact
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1574.002
|
||||
| DLL Side-Loading
|
||||
| Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1204
|
||||
| User Execution
|
||||
| Execution
|
||||
@@ -7184,7 +7282,7 @@ Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities th
|
||||
|
||||
* '''Product''': Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
|
||||
* '''Datamodel''': Endpoint
|
||||
* '''ATT&CK''': [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531/ T1531], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/ T1222], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562.001/ T1562.001], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/ T1105], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/ T1087], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489/ T1489], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/ T1036], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/ T1053], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543.003/ T1543.003], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/ T1543]
|
||||
* '''ATT&CK''': [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489/ T1489], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531/ T1531], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/ T1222], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562.001/ T1562.001], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/ T1105], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/ T1087], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/ T1036], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/ T1053], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543.003/ T1543.003], [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/ T1543]
|
||||
* '''Last Updated''': 2021-05-07
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="toccolours mw-collapsible mw-collapsed">
|
||||
@@ -7192,10 +7290,18 @@ Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities th
|
||||
|
||||
====Detection Profile====
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Attempt_to_disable_services|Attempt To Disable Services]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Attempt_to_delete_services|Attempt To delete Services]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Delete_a_net_user|Delete A Net User]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Deleting_of_net_users|Deleting Of Net Users]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Deny_permission_using_cacls_utility|Deny Permission using Cacls Utility]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Disable_net_user_account|Disable Net User Account]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Disable_windows_app_hotkeys|Disable Windows App Hotkeys]]
|
||||
|
||||
* [[Documentation:ESSOC:detections:Detections#Disabling_net_user_account|Disabling Net User Account]]
|
||||
@@ -7246,6 +7352,10 @@ Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities th
|
||||
! Technique
|
||||
! Tactic
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1489
|
||||
| Service Stop
|
||||
| Impact
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1531
|
||||
| Account Access Removal
|
||||
| Impact
|
||||
@@ -7266,10 +7376,6 @@ Leverage searches that allow you to detect and investigate unusual activities th
|
||||
| Account Discovery
|
||||
| Discovery
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1489
|
||||
| Service Stop
|
||||
| Impact
|
||||
|-
|
||||
| T1036
|
||||
| Masquerading
|
||||
| Defense Evasion
|
||||
@@ -7423,7 +7529,7 @@ In March of 2016, adversaries were seen using JexBoss--an open-source utility us
|
||||
<pre>
|
||||
#############
|
||||
# Automatically generated by doc_gen.py in https://github.com/splunk/security_content
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-07-02 15:57:11.500371 UTC
|
||||
# On Date: 2021-07-13 23:18:20.194549 UTC
|
||||
# Author: Splunk Security Research
|
||||
# Contact: research@splunk.com
|
||||
#############
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user